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ABSTRACT 
The dominant liberal peacebuilding critiques tends to focus on ‘states’ and 
the failure of interventions in rebuilding them. Consequently, a standardised 
critique has emerged largely because the critics apply a broad brush across 
a diverse range of contexts, programmes, issues and activities as illustrated 
by the lack of scrutiny on mine action and emerging contexts such as 
Somaliland. The liberal peacebuilding critics critique the standardised ‘one 
size fits all approach’ employed by interveners, yet they take the same 
approach.  I therefore argue for the need to broaden the critique to include 
other elements and contexts of peacebuilding.   
I demonstrate that as an intervention mine action has intrinsic peacebuilding 
potential. However, the way mine action is implemented both globally and in 
Somaliland reflects the same dominant characteristics of the liberal 
peacebuilding critique i.e.; it is externally led; uses technical and 
standardised formulaic approaches; disregards local context thus failing to 
secure local ownership.  Attributes that the critics argue have led to the 
failure and/or limited success of peacebuilding interventions.  I therefore 
contend with the critics and demonstrate how these attributes have 
contributed to the challenges of implementing mine action activities thereby 
limiting mine actions ‘peace-ability’ potential in Somaliland.  However, 
beyond the implementation modalities there are other factors that further 
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contribute to limiting this potential; these include the Sector Actors; the 
Somaliland context i.e. the historical and political context, and the perception 
of Somaliland people. Thus in conclusion I argue for a nuanced critique that 
acknowledges the challenging realities of implementing programmes in 
challenging post conflict environments. 
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CHAPTER 1: MINE ACTION AND SOMALILAND; 
‘DANGER’ AND ‘INSECURITY’ IN RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
‘Humanitarian aid workers are no longer seen as ’respected and protected 
neutral healers’; instead they are increasingly becoming targets, hostages and 
victims ‘of an anarchy they cannot control’ (Cahill, 1999 p. 2) 
INTRODUCTION 
Felbaba-Brown (2014) advises that getting into and out of difficult (dangerous) 
areas of research  can be greatly facilitated by working with or through local 
organizations such as NGOs, which can provide security advice and access to 
local assets. She therefore advises that ‘before a researcher decides to work 
with or seek the support of any such organization, he or she needs to check out 
the institution for the same security, legal, and due-diligence issues’ (p. 5).  
However, a Researcher who seeks to become embedded within the 
humanitarian aid complex must be cognisant of the above claims by Cahill 
(1999), especially if their research context is located in a place like Somaliland 
and involves researching an inherently dangerous issue such as 
landmines/mines.  Therefore these thoughts remained at the back of my mind 
as I carried out this research and they came to shape the whole research 
process including the choice of research methods.  
On my first day at the office with my host organization the Danish Demining 
Group (DDG), the following incident took place as recorded in my research 
diary: 
Whilst in the office, I hear some ‘gun shots’, once, twice, three times… 
no one reacts – so I guess then it can’t be what I think it is.  A few 
minutes later I hear some screaming – I look out through the window and 
there’s someone on the ground, wailing! It cannot be what am thinking it 
is – but still no movement from anyone in the office, the wailing goes on 
for a while and in my mind am thinking – ‘could they have forgotten I am 
in the office and have gone into some secret hiding place?  I decide to 
walk out of the office to see whether there is anyone else concerned in 
what was going on outside.  Yes, there is one of the girls at the door who 
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quickly informs me that this is just a simulation exercise for the field 
security training and there is indeed nothing to worry about.  Ahh, I had 
forgotten a mention by Jessica that she would be in a security training all 
day.  For a moment I was scared.   (Research Diary dated 8th of 
November 2010) 
When the programme manager heard about this, she apologised profusely for 
not forewarning me that there was field-security training going on. Such 
exercises are designed to leave little room for ambiguity regarding the world 
they are conveying; the message is always clear, simple and repetitive about 
the insecurity that the participants face in the field.  Jessica Buchanan was one 
of the participants at this particular training and was the Mine Risk Education 
Coordinator for DDG, during the course of my field work Jess was to become a 
good friend.  We discussed her anxieties and hesitance in undertaking a field 
trip to Galkayo in Gal Mudug (See figure 1:  Map showing the location of 
Galkaayo).  At the end of the security training, she invited me to dinner to meet 
with those who were carrying out the training. 
As I prepared for the second phase of data collection, I received news that 
nearly changed the course of this study; this was the kidnap on the 25th of 
October 2011 of Jessica Buchanan and Poul Hagen Thisted.  They were 
returning from a field trip in Galkaayo, Mudug region of Puntland State of 
Somalia after conducting Mine Risk Education training. This event painted an 
image of a very insecure research context1; and although Somaliland was not 
the safest place in the world, it was actually fairly secure.  I felt much safer 
walking the streets of Hargeisa, than I did in Nairobi.  The kidnapping however 
contributes to contextualizing the global humanitarian and research context in 
which peace research is sometimes undertaken. 
  
                                            
1 Jessica and Poul were not taken from Somaliland, however, the fact that they both worked for 
the same organisation that was hosting me, and that they had been out carrying out training for 
Mine Risk Educators was what weighed a lot in my mind.  If that could happen to those offering 
such a vital service, what would happen to a mere Researcher like me? 
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Figure 1: Map showing the location of Galkaayo in relation to Somaliland 
 Source: 
Map available from https://sites.google.com/site/somaliahamradio/somalia-map accessed 
on 24th November 2014 
 
GENESIS OF RESEARCH 
My interest in researching on mine action comes from years of involvement in 
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) both as an activist and as 
a researcher for the civil society initiative “The Landmine Monitor Initiative”; 
which monitors and reports on implementation of and compliance with the 1997 
Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).  As part of my mandate as a policy and information 
officer working for the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Eastern Africa Region, I 
was tasked to ensure the regional office participated in campaigns and 
initiatives that were supported by JRS Internationally. JRS, having had first-
hand experience of the impact of landmines amongst refugee populations 
across the world, were among the first organisations to support the call for a 
ban.  Because of our strategic advantage in the region and our access to 
refugees across the region, I was requested by the ICBL’s, Landmine Monitor 
Initiative to facilitate and collect data from refugees who had crossed borders 
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from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda (all situated in 
various refugee camps in Tanzania).  Information and data were used to 
corroborate the data collected from in-country.  Most of the time, these data 
were not available and therefore the narratives from refugees provided crucial 
information.   
Thus, my interaction with the Mine Action Sector had primarily been through my 
involvement as an activist and a Landmine Monitor Researcher from 1999 to 
2004.   In 2003, I enrolled for an MA course in Peace Studies. Whilst on the 
programme, I was involved with various organisations providing assistance in 
research projects  such as the Global Survey on  Explosive Remnants of War 
by UNIDIR And (Landmine Action, 2003); and the project whose output was  
Mine action after Diana : progress in the struggle against landmines by  (Maslen, 
2004). These were undertaken whilst writing my MA dissertation on the impact 
of landmines on post conflict reconstruction with a focus on Afghanistan.  
In 2004, whilst still working on my MA dissertation, I returned to Kenya to work 
with the Kenyan chapter of the ICBL, the Kenyan Coalition of NGOs against 
Landmines (KCAL).  The KCAL worked closely with the Kenyan government 
where I coordinated and managed all the campaign events in in the preparation 
for the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty: Nairobi Summit on a 
Mine-Free World2.   The conference coincided with my final year as Landmine 
Monitor researcher and the completion of my MA course in peace studies.   
Having the academic experience and having worked on these research projects 
my interest and senses were heightened; hence during the Nairobi Summit I 
became increasingly aware of the  divergent views that were emerging within 
the Sector; these were from those who were directly involved in mine clearance 
and those whose organizations were primarily focused on advocacy. Similarly, 
based on my experience carrying out research for the Landmine Monitor and 
assistance in research projects, I had increasingly observed and was aware of 
the contrast between what the Mine Action Sector was saying and the reality on 
the ground.  
                                            
2 The conference was held at the United Nations offices in Nairobi and hosted by the Kenyan government. 
It was held on 29 November - 3 December 2004. 
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Thanks largely to the growing academic literature that was highly critical of the 
peacebuilding interventions that were taking place, I came to acknowledge how, 
as a practitioner, I had uncritically maintained a narrative on both the impact of 
landmines and, without hesitation, a foregone conclusion on how mine action 
contributed to post conflict peacebuilding.  My encounter with the academic 
literature that was increasingly challenging approaches by humanitarian aid 
projects and interventions that were not conflict sensitive (Anderson, 1999); and 
I critiqued peacebuilding processes that rarely succeed in creating the 
necessary conditions for the emergence of a sustainable peace not guided by a 
genuine (rather than virtual) social contract, as would be expected in a liberal 
democratic society (Richmond, 2011).  
Similarly, peacebuilding projects or intervention projects in general were seen 
as poorly conceived  and  executed, technocratic,  or inappropriate, 
based  on  a  weak  understanding  of  local  specificities.  They were therefore 
seen as part  of  a  neo-colonial agenda  of  western  actors  in the guise 
of  peace  and  development.  Hence, having observed the Sector on the 
ground, I became interested in the extent to which this critique was relevant to 
mine action and the implementation processes.  Similarly, the divergent views 
that I encountered at the Review conference greatly contributed to my interest 
in further research hence the formulation of the following research questions:  
1. To what extent is the critique of Liberal Peacebuilding reflected in mine 
action especially in its implementation and operationalization?   
a. Which of these critiques are supported by the implementation 
and operationalization of mine action in Somaliland? 
b. To what extent does the Somaliland context define the way in 
which mine action is implemented?  
2. How is mine action in Somaliland conceptualised and what factors 
dictate the way in which it is conceptualised?  
As a practitioner, I also believed that evaluative research can be an important 
and powerful tool in guiding the implementation and outcome of programs.  I 
observed that the Sector was highly self-referential and therefore a critical 
examination of mine action implementations was largely unavailable.   
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My choice of questions was informed by my work as a landmine monitor 
researcher, my uncritical role as landmine campaigner and activist was 
challenged by my academic exposure.  What was surprising was that the 
evidence of the role of mine action in peacebuilding was largely anecdotal and 
rhetorical at best. It soon also became evident that the role of the MA sector 
had not been critically examined. This however changed during the course of 
this research project with a number of PhD research outputs such as Chapman 
(2008), Bolton (2010), and  Durham (2012). 
Inevitably, I was guided by my subjective judgments and therefore interpretation 
of the findings at times might reflect my previous work, values and strengths. 
Personal, professional and academic interest influenced the formulation of the 
research project. It makes the research pertinent, not only to the peacebuilding 
academic world, but also hopefully to the Mine Action Sector. 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Research Location; Somaliland 
Somaliland is situated in the North-Eastern tip of the Horn of Africa, and 
constitutes the North-Western regions of the former Republic of Somalia.  It is 
bordered on the west by Djibouti, on the south by Ethiopia, by Somalia 
(Puntland) to the east and to the north is the Gulf of Aden, neighbouring Yemen 
and the Indian Ocean (see Figure 2: Map of Somalia, including the boundary of 
Somaliland and Puntland.).   
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Figure 2: Map of Somalia, including the boundary of Somaliland and 
Puntland. 
Source: Taken from (HOEHNE, 2015) Markus Virgil Hoehne (2015) 
Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and 
conflicting political visions Rift Valley Institute (RVI) Contested 
Borderlands Report. (p. 3) Available online on 
http://www.riftvalley.net/publication/between-somaliland-and-puntland 
accessed on 8th May 2015 
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Somaliland3 was known as British Somaliland until it achieved independence on 
June 26, 1960, becoming the first free Somali nation to join the United Nations.  
Its territory corresponds with that demarcated by the British during its time as a 
Protectorate.  Both Somaliland and Somalia are mainly semi-desert and harsh 
semi-arid regions, with ecologies best suited for nomadic pastoralism along with 
varying levels of transhumant existence. Together they have one of the longest 
coastlines in Africa, 3,025 km (Pham, 2010).  Somaliland’s Ministry of Planning 
and Coordination estimated population at three million in 1997. Of this the 
nomadic people are 55% and urban and rural dwellers 45% (Ministry of 
Planning & Coordination, 2004). It is endowed with mainly grazing land and 
livestock, and a strategically placed port of Berbera (Azam, 2010) 
Somaliland is not an internationally recognised State, and it endures blanket 
references of ‘State failure’, as applied to Somalia, whilst being acknowledged 
as a region of Somalia that is an ‘Oasis of peace’ (Fisher, 1999; Riemann and 
Gregg-Wallace, 2009), ‘an oasis of security, reconciliation, and cooperation’ 
(Ahmad, 2011)  a ‘pocket of stability’ (Forti, 2011),  or a  ‘pocket of peace’ in the 
midst of chaos.  This classification of Somaliland has a lot of bearing not only 
for research but also for the way the international community engages with it 
(see chapter 3).  This framing of Somaliland within Somalia dictates the 
perceived security complexities associated with Somalia, and unfortunately also 
the perceived security challenges, the implications of which are not just relevant 
for program implementation but also for research and therefore the methods 
chosen for research and most importantly, it also has a bearing on how access 
is negotiated, as will be explained in detail below (see also chapter 7 under 
security challenges).  
Somaliland has made great achievements in building a safe and secure 
environment; has a system of rule of law, and a political system which is seen to 
be democratic and is the result of  innovative integration of traditional and 
modern sources of law and authority with a political structure that is based on a 
                                            
3 The term "Somaliland" will be used interchangeably with "North West Somalia"; the rest of Somalia will 
be referred to as Somalia without further elaboration. Information about clan genealogies and boundaries 
are only indicative.   
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unique home-grown hybrid between a Western-type democracy (Adan Yusuf 
Abokor et al., 2006; Bradbury, 2008).  However, Somaliland is also located 
within the reality of a growing threat from armed groups in Somalia, including 
killings of humanitarian aid workers. The Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen 
(The Youth Movement) a militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts 
formed in 2004 and took over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 
2006; it is a decentralized and violent Somali jihadist movement that aspires to 
create a fundamentalist Islamist emirate across the Horn of Africa.  Its leaders, 
hailed from its forerunner Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI, or “Unity of Islam”), a militant 
Salafi group that peaked in the 1990s after the fall of the Siad Barre military 
regime (1969–1991) and the outbreak of civil war.  The AIAI reportedly emerged 
from a band of Middle Eastern-educated Somali extremists that was partly 
funded and armed by al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden.  It sought to establish 
an Islamist emirate in Somalia, and many of its fighters, including current Al-
Shabab commanders, fled the country and fought in Afghanistan in the late 
1990s after being pushed out by the Ethiopian army and its Somali supporters 
(Masters and Sergie, 2015) .  
Hence, threat from such insurgent groups is relevant to Somaliland’s stability.  
Such concerns also extend to jihadist infiltrators who might, according to  
reports by (ICG, 2005; McGregor, 2008)  as a result of statelessness in the 
south, extend regional terror networks into Somaliland, threatening the foreign 
expatriate presence that has made Somaliland its base of operations 
(Jhazbhay, 2008 ). More specifically, Al Shabab has previously threatened Mine 
Action organisations in south central Somalia to cease operations in areas 
under their control.  The accusation is labelled against United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) that it is paying the salaries of government police 
officers. Al Shabab accused the UN of attempting to disrupt peace and justice 
by bribing various community elders and inciting them to rebel against the 
Islamic administration. Furthermore, “they have been surveying and sign-
posting some of the most vital and sensitive areas under the control of the 
Mujahideen," (Omar, 2009).   
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Mine Action 
Mine action as a concept aims at alleviating the impact of landmines and similar 
explosive remnants of war.  According to the UN’s International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS), it is defined as “activities which aim to reduce the social, 
economic and environmental impact of landmines and ERW, including cluster 
munitions.”  It encompasses several dimensions, all of which must be taken into 
account in order to address the full range of problems posed by ERW 
contamination. There are five major “pillars” that support mine action; (a) 
advocacy, (b) mine risk education (MRE); (c) humanitarian demining, often 
referred to as “clearance”, which includes all technical activities required during 
the clearance process (i.e. survey, mapping, marking, clearance); (d) victim 
assistance, which includes physical and psychological rehabilitation and 
reintegration; and (e) stockpile destruction. 
Due to the nature and intensity of other activities this research pays less 
attention to mine awareness, victim assistance and advocacy work, although 
these are integral components of Mine Action. In Somaliland, there is less 
concentration by the Sector on other activities; except demining and a certain 
level of mine risk education. 
RESEARCH TERMS  
The United Nations and the ICBL use the terminology Humanitarian Mine Action 
(HMA) at a strategic level; both organisations also use the terminology “HMA” 
and “Mine Action” (together with the terminology “humanitarian demining”) 
seemingly interchangeably, including in their key publication the Landmine 
Monitor. Similarly at the field levels the terms "mine action" and "mine 
clearance" are also used interchangeably (Filippino and GICHD., 2002). 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs); Landmines, UXOs, AXOs 
Explosive Remnants of War has been described by Landmine Action (UK) as a 
broad term that includes all types of explosive weapons, including antipersonnel 
and anti-tank landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and abandoned 
explosive ordnance (AXO) (Benini et al., 2002). The Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) further defines UXO and ERWs as 
the unplanned consequence of the use of weapons systems with the exception 
of munitions dropped or planted with an anti-disturbance element deliberately 
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incorporated with the express intention of hampering clearance operation 
(Bryden et al., 2002). 
There is no distinction for those people on the ground working in response to 
the contamination of mines and ERWs.  Since the late 1980s, the words “mine” 
or “landmine” have been used to refer primarily to anti-personnel landmines —
the weapon system banned from use by the Mine Ban Treaty—yet such 
systems are but one type of the increasingly varied range of weapons on which 
mine action focuses. There is a growing lexicon of terms, such as unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), ERW, abandoned explosive ordnance, explosive ordnance, 
cluster munition (and submunition), and improvised explosive device (IED).  The 
distinction between landmines and other types of explosive devices usually 
does not apply to the daily work on the ground. Although they represent 
different types of threat, the problems posed and the impact on socio-economic 
activities of affected communities are analogous to those of landmines (DPKO, 
2006 p. iv).  Similarly within donor policies the inclusion of ERWs, Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs) and cluster munitions, together with anti-personnel 
mines and anti-tank mines, reflects a broadening focus, which is an indication 
that attention is no longer directed to single item pursuits like landmines, but to 
a grouping of explosive devices that pose a threat to human security (Devlin, 
2010 p. 8). 
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Figure 3: Examples of the Different types of Mines 
 
Anti-tank mines 
 
Source: GICHD, 2004 ‘A Guide to Mine Action’, Geneva International 
Center for Humanitarian Demining 
 
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)   
Unexploded ordnance are explosive munitions that have been fired, thrown, 
dropped or launched but have failed to detonate as intended. UXO include 
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artillery and mortar shells, fuses, grenades, large and small bombs and 
bombies4, sub-munitions, rockets and missiles, among others (Moyes, 2004). 
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)  
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been 
used during armed conflict and has been left behind and is no longer under 
control of the party that left it behind. It may or may not have been primed, 
fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use (Landmine Monitor – online)5. 
Minefields 
The International Mine Action Standards give a relatively short definition of a 
minefield: an area of ground containing mines deployed with or without a 
pattern. Minefields with unpredictable patterns - referred to as nuisance mine 
laying - are often more dangerous and much harder to clear than systematically 
laid minefields, especially in the absence of minefield maps. Such minefields 
were the most common type found in Somaliland (HALO Trust website). 
Suspected Hazardous Areas 
This study will use the concept of hazardous areas or suspected hazardous 
areas (SHA), rather than the term or concept of a minefield. As a more generic 
term it considers different kinds of contamination, including inaccessible areas 
not in productive use due to the perceived or actual presence of mines, UXO or 
other explosive devices. 
A mine affected area or community 
A community is referred to as mine affected if it contains one or several areas 
which are believed or verified to contain mines. Similarly, an area which is 
believed or verified to contain mines will be termed “a mine affected area”. 
The Mine Action Sector 
The term Mine Action Sector (the Sector), will refer collectively to the various 
organizations active in all aspects of mine action. The Sector is not a 
                                            
4 Bombies are bomblets, about the size of a tennis ball, ( mainly a term associated with Laos PDR); they 
are mainly a result of anti-personnel cluster bombs that were intended to explode on or shortly after impact 
but remaining ‘live’ in the ground after the end of the war.  See http://lao-foundation.org/learn-about-
laos/unexploded-ordnance-landmines/ accessed on 2nd March 2015 
5 See the Monitor webpage http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/The-Issues/Explosive-Remnants-of-
War accessed on the 24th of November 2014 
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homogenous entity; rather, each organisation maintains and performs their 
specialties or preferences. Some of the agencies are involved in clearance 
operations on the ground and may or may not be involved in mine awareness or 
campaigning activities, and may even disagree with the campaign objectives. 
Similarly, other agencies may undertake campaigning as a specialty e.g., Mine 
Action Canada, Human Rights Watch.  Others undertake mine awareness 
education and may have no involvement with, or expertise in, clearance 
operations. The Sector includes international organisations such as the various 
UN entities (UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF etc.), these organisations are active in 
one or more components of mine action and may not necessarily work 
operationally on the ground. 
SOMALILAND AND MINE ACTION: ‘INSECURITY’ ‘DANGER’ 
AND SAFETY- IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH  
As a post conflict environment, Somaliland evokes a perceived or real higher 
level of ambient and situational danger (Fast, 2007 p. 140).  In explaining the 
dangers that researchers face during fieldwork Lee (1995), differentiates 
ambient from situational danger. He defines ambient danger as arising when 
the researcher is exposed to otherwise avoidable dangers by having to be in a 
dangerous setting to undertake research. Situational danger arises when the 
researcher’s presence or actions evoke aggression, hostility, or violence from 
those within the setting (1995 pp. 3-4).  
Many of the perceived ‘dangers’ and challenges in Somaliland are premised on 
the assumption that ‘Somalia’ is a chaotic, highly insecure and dangerous 
context that lacks any order. While that view has long had some validity in 
South Central Somalia, it is manifestly incorrect for Somaliland as will be 
demonstrated. However I do acknowledge that there is a significant level of 
danger associated with field research in Somaliland. However, this level of 
perception of insecurity and/or danger is heightened by the fact that the 
international community operates under de jure constraints of having to treat it 
as part of Somalia (see Chapter 3).  The reality on the ground is quite different.  
Acknowledgement of danger by researchers has been neglected and is mostly 
limited to shared anecdotes between researchers which are often left out of the 
writing process (Sluka, 1990). Goldstein (2014) has noted the infrequency with 
 
 
15 
 
which qualitative researchers have explicitly discussed safety which is sur-
prising given how often they work in potentially dangerous settings. Bloor et al. 
(2008), authors of a commissioned inquiry into the risks to well-being of 
researchers in Qualitative Research, noted that while researchers frequently 
study subjects who are exposed to danger from violence, “it is difficult to 
understand why there is such an absence of reflection upon [the researchers] 
themselves as vulnerable beings in volatile situations” (p. 22).  Previously,   
researchers such as Lee (1995), Nordstrom and Robben, (1995), Lee-Treweek 
and Linkogle (2000),  Kovats-Bernat, (2002), and (Hobbs, 2006) have brought 
to the fore discussion of safety, danger and fear.  Incidents such as that of 
American researcher Paula Lloyd who was doused with gasoline by a disputant 
and set afire during her field work in Afghanistan, emphasise the need for 
qualitative researchers to address the issue of safety and security as recently 
observed by the Social Security Research Council (SSRC) under the Drugs 
Security and Democracy programme and through an edited volume Arias (2014) 
of working papers on Research Security which have sought to address this 
deficit.  
Similarly,  feminist researchers such as Hume (2007),  Lee (1997),  Nilan 
(2002), Arendell  (1997),  and Sharp and Kremer ( 2006)  highlight the  growing  
awareness of possible dangers that are faced by female researchers. Gill and 
Maclean (2002) argue that female researchers are more highly scrutinized than 
male scholars making their gender status cognisant in the field.  
The notion of insecurity, in post conflict environments in general is further 
perpetuated by a prevailing perception that violence in the field, especially 
against aid workers (with whom researchers are often embedded) is increasing 
globally. Research determines that this perception is based on findings based 
on a broader set of factors which worsen the climate in which aid workers 
operate; this includes the widespread availability of small arms and the growing 
number and scale of integrated missions, increasing the relative risk to 
humanitarian aid workers as a direct result of the ‘Global War on Terror’. In 
Somaliland in 2003, a number of incidents underscored this further when three 
humanitarian workers – two British teachers and an Italian, Dr Annalena 
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Tonelli6, were killed by groups engaged in operations targeting warlords and 
militia commanders who are purportedly supporting Western counterterrorism 
efforts in Somalia. They also engaged in a spate of murders of international aid 
workers (Le Sage, 2009).   These groups were later linked to the 2008 bomb 
attacks that targeted the presidential palace, the Ethiopian consulate and the 
United Nations offices in Hargeisa. Twenty people died at Ethiopia's consulate 
in Hargeisa, while five were killed at the president's residence. Those killed by 
the car-bombs were the President’s personal secretary and senior anti-terrorism 
official Ibrahim Hutu (McGregor, 2008). Two were killed and six injured at the 
UNDP compound, a UN staff member, a driver and a security adviser. Another 
two vehicles exploded in neighbouring Puntland on the same day.  
Before these incidences Somaliland was considered relatively safe in 
comparison to other similar contexts such as Afghanistan and Somalia, and aid 
agencies travelled freely around the country. These killings came as a shock, 
and prompted changes in security policies, including tightening security 
procedures stipulated in the Minimum Operating Security Standards for Somalia 
(MOSS), not only for Somaliland. Other measures included a government 
advisory to foreigners not to travel outside Hargeisa after 8pm, whilst the United 
Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) imposed a curfew on 
travel to certain areas of Somaliland.  These killings and attacks therefore 
further embedded the ‘security’ and ‘danger’ perceptions for research and 
humanitarian operations in general.   
The notion of ‘insecurity’ and or perception of ‘danger’ for this research project 
was further reinforced by the fact that mine action research implies research 
sites that are ‘contaminated’ with mines and other unexploded devices. After the 
cessation of all hostilities, a serious residual threat to the local population was 
left and accidents were reported. Vast amounts of ammunition were also 
abandoned as various armies and rebels retreated, contributing significantly to 
the abandoned explosive ordnance AXO/UXO contamination. In 2001, one in 
every 652 returnees to Somaliland was a mine victim whilst 5,000 mine 
                                            
6 Dr Anna Tonelli was the winner of the 2003 Nansen Award for her work for destitute Somalis. She was 
killed on 2 October 2003, on the grounds of the tuberculosis (TB) hospital she founded in Borama in 
northwestern Somaliland. See article on her work on http://www.unicef.org/people/people_14935.html 
accessed on 23rd November 2014 
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causalities (3,500 fatalities and 1,500 amputations) had been recorded for the 
period between 1991 and 2001  (UNDP, 2001 p. 64).  Landmine injury to 
humanitarian aid workers emerged in a study by (King, 2002) who, having 
analysed the deaths of aid workers between 1997 to 2001, established that 
landmines were one of the causes. Similarly, according to Refugees 
International, the death of 13 aid workers through landmine accidents on roads 
in Angola was indicative that even with all the information and education on 
safety given to aid workers, landmines continued to take their toll (Refugees 
International, 2003).  Hence, Somaliland as a ‘post conflict mine contaminated 
research site’, and mine action as a research agenda, are imbued with the 
perception of ‘danger’ with far-reaching security implications. This is 
demonstrated by the reluctance of academic institutions to encourage field 
research in such contexts.  Thus the opportunity to undertake research in 
Somaliland under the auspices of a mine action NGO was a great opportunity 
that presented itself to me.  
The literature assumes and addresses issues of dangerous (post conflict/war) 
contexts as being challenging. However there is a dearth of literature on how 
‘security concerns’ and narratives of ‘danger’ are perpetuated by agencies to 
limit access by researchers. For example Kovats-Bernat (2002) advises on 
“shifting social complexities unique to unstable field sites which should depend 
on a level of investigative flexibility on the part of the ethnographer, who cannot 
always be expected to work in safety and security” (p. 3).   The adoption of 
strategies for research that are responsive to the spectrum of risks existent in 
dangerous fields facilitates the engagement of data that simply cannot be 
accessed without an immeasurable degree of risk. However there is little written 
on how the perceived ‘security’ and ‘danger’ is used to limit a researcher 
accessing data or the field or controlling the same. I argue that ‘security’, 
‘safety’ and ‘danger’, offered by organisations and/or individuals (gate-keepers) 
in conflict and post conflict zones create opportunities for blocking research in 
areas that they would rather not be investigated by outsiders, however I find no 
evidence in the literature to support this7.  
                                            
7  This observation has also been made by my colleague who underwent a similar experience while 
carrying out her fieldwork in South Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  We have had numerous 
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NEGOTIATING ACCESS TO THE RESEARCH SITE 
Given the above context, access into Somaliland as a research site involved 
multiple negotiations on various levels and with various authorities.  
Accessibility is almost impossible without negotiating logistical support with a 
specialised humanitarian organisation, if not specifically a demining 
organisation. It also meant that beyond physical access into Somaliland further 
access to sites and participants had to be negotiated. The physical access 
sought by any researcher is merely an initial geographical step for qualitative 
research. 
Having obtained physical access into Somaliland through UNDP Somalia, I 
negotiated support and further access through DDG who were to provide 
logistical support. I also learnt that DDG had scaled down their mine action 
activities and that the only organisation that was left actively undertaking mine 
action was HALO Trust. I then spent some time working with the Peace 
Caravan, a project that was being funded by UNDP, as I finished the internship 
period.  This provided me with ample time to adjust to the context and to 
negotiate and make contacts informally; mainly through social gatherings and 
contact with expatriate staff in Hargeisa. 
DDG was happy, through the Program Manager, to make calls to introduce me 
to the Sector.  All those contacted responded very positively and meetings were 
organised without any problems, except for the key organisation vital for my 
research.  As soon as the phone calls were made I was invited to their office 
where I met the Programmes Manager.  The purpose of the meeting was not as 
I had expected, instead it was for the Manager to establish what my research 
was about; discuss my research question and who the targeted audience for my 
research would be.  I responded as fully and honestly as I could. The meeting 
ended with a request by the Manager to email all this to him so that he could 
forward it and get clearance from his headquarters.  I was also made to 
understand that ‘he could not see any reason that my request could be denied’ 
(Email communication with program manager).  
                                                                                                                                
discussions and have been searching for any academic reflections precisely on that but have yet to come 
across any.   
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Until then, physical access into Somaliland had been the easiest part. The 
response from HALO Trust however, was a flat refusal of any involvement in the 
research.  They were the only demining organisation still undertaking mine 
action programs; reasons cited included unavailability of time for staff to engage 
with the research, especially to accompany and incorporate my field visits to 
sites or even to the premises as a research site.  Any suggestions that I made 
in an effort to fit into their own schedules were refused. One explanation was 
that the staff were otherwise busy and would be heading to Scotland for a 
meeting – to which I suggested that I reschedule my meetings to take place 
there.  This was also deemed unacceptable. At this point, I was about to give up 
on Somaliland as a research site. After discussing it with various people, 
including the UNDP Programme manager, they suggested that this reluctance 
by the organisation actually provided a good reason to persist in trying to 
undertake the research. I hypothesise that the unease towards allowing deeper 
access than mere entrance to a research site may have resulted from the risk of 
unpacking and/or examining unfavourable truths and/or bringing criticism of the 
organisation. 
This denial of access served as a both a challenge to investigate more and a 
means to refine my methodology further; it meant that whatever data were 
received went through a more critical analysis – raising the need for more 
validation and triangulation.  It also meant that when out in the field I observed 
more and I challenged myself to look and understand beyond what was being 
said/ presented to me.   
I left Somaliland and prepared to return after refining the research questions. At 
the time, I made contact with HALO Trust headquarters through the desk 
officer; through email correspondence he introduced me to the programme 
manager – fortunately the one I had previously dealt with had left.  It was a new 
start.  
The kidnap and demand for ransom for Jess and Poul happened just as I was 
preparing to return for the second part of my data collection.  They were later 
rescued when President Obama ordered their release by the Seal 6 team. This 
event delayed my decision to return to Somaliland. When I eventually went, 
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Somaliland was a much calmer and more relaxed place than it had been when I 
had first visited8. 
METHODOLOGY 
Methodology “refers to the choices we make about cases to study, methods of 
data gathering, forms of data analysis, etc. in planning and executing research 
study” (Silverman, 2013  p. 119).  
A study that involves research in areas under the rubric of peace building lends 
itself to a research methodology that is mainly qualitative as it is seeking to 
understand people’s perspectives etc. Similarly, for a good understanding of the 
role of the Mine Action Sector, observation and interviews, methods within 
qualitative methodology presented the best option. The methods of data 
generation within a qualitative methodology provide for flexibility and sensitivity 
to the social context within which research is carried, rather than a rigidly 
standardised or structured approach that is removed from ‘real life’ or social 
context as in experimental methods in a quantitative study (Patton, 1990).  One 
of the fundamental critiques of quantitative methodology is that it does not 
capture the real meaning of social behaviour, and although quantitative 
research gives a solid statistical account of particular issues involved in mine 
action, and is the methodology generally preferred by the Sector, a qualitative 
approach offers a greater depth to the issues involved. Gilbert (1993) argues 
that both qualitative and quantitative approaches have a key role to play in 
policy relevant research.  Similarly, time and financial constraints during 
fieldwork meant that it was not feasible to carry out large-scale surveys as well 
as in depth interviews and observation. Similarly, the research did not intend to 
turn participants into ‘objects’ or ‘units’ as required by a quantitative approach.  
The research stresses the importance of the context, and thus is cognizant of 
what Marshall and Rossman (1999) define as qualitative research; as 
exploratory or descriptive and one that stresses the importance of context 
setting and participants’ frames of reference.  
                                            
8 With hindsight this is probably a result of the fact that I was more confident as a Researcher 
and was more at ease with the surrounding.  Similarly the security requirements for example 
being accompanied by an SPU all the time had been relaxed and this could have contributed to 
my feeling much at ease than previously.  
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Research Strategy/Design 
Within a qualitative study, I used a case study approach as the chosen design.  
Yin (1993) defines the case study research design as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used.  
A case study approach focuses on understanding dynamics within single 
settings.  It is arguably the most popular method of social science research 
Burton (2000) offering the opportunity to cover a wide range of data collection 
methods, both qualitative and quantitative. A case study approach is an 
‘umbrella’ for a number of research methods and does not exclude any data 
collection method allowing adaptation to circumstance (Bell, 1993).  This 
approach has also been likened to an experiment, a history, or a simulation, 
though not linked to any particular type of evidence or method of data collection 
(Yin 2003). Case studies emphasise detailed contextual analysis of a limited 
number of events or conditions and their relationships.   
Research Philosophy 
Case study research design lends itself to a constructivist paradigm through 
which participants tell their stories and are able to describe their view of reality.  
Thus this research is guided by a social constructivist research philosophy that 
views parts of society as existing but constructed and reconstructed through 
social interaction.  The term social construction of reality is rooted in the work of 
Berger and Luckman (1965).  They sought to redefine the ambiguity of 
sociology of knowledge and brought forth the debate on subjective and 
objective reality. Marx influenced Berger and Luckmans’ anthropological views 
amongst others, whilst they drew on Durkheimian philosophy for their view of 
the nature. The work of Herbert Mead (1967) also greatly influenced their 
analysis of internalisation of social reality.  They argue that what is ‘known’ is 
expressed socially, not just in social contexts but also in language.   A 
constructivist paradigm today is often mistakenly associated with an approach 
to teaching and learning rather than a philosophy of knowledge creation. It 
refers to the philosophical belief that people construct their own understanding 
of reality. Constructivism contrasts realism, which holds that there is a truth out 
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there and that this reality can be known through a variety of means.  Realists 
believe in an external world that is independent of subjectivity (Warrick, 2001).  
Similarly according to Bryman (2004) objectivism differs from constructivism 
since it implies that we confront an external social phenomenon that is 
independent and separate from us  (p.16). 
Social constructivists assume that there are many possible interpretations of the 
same data, all of which are potentially meaningful. I will therefore make no claim 
that my interpretation of events and activities is the only explanation available 
as constructions are not separate from those who make them; they "are not part 
of some 'objective' world that exists apart from their constructors," (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989 p. 143).  Similarly, I will ‘examine the truth claims within the 
borders of social context in terms of the claims themselves, the claims makers 
and the claims making process’ (Temple and Edwards, 2002 cf Gergen 1994).  
Data Collection methods within a Case Study approach 
Different types of data were used in conjunction to allow for complementarity 
and, whenever possible, to increase the overall validity of the study. A case 
study design allows for a mixture of methods to be used; this allows for 
methodological triangulation to ensure reliability and validity.  I enlisted the 
following methods:- 
a) Interviews 
Kvale (1983) defines qualitative interviewing as "an interview, whose purpose is 
to gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to 
interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena" (1983 p. 174).  It is 
a method employed by social scientists who seek to investigate varieties of 
human experience. They attempt to understand the world from the participants’ 
points of view and to unfold the meaning of their lived world. Interviews give 
voice to these people, allowing them to present their life situations in their own 
words, and allow for a close personal interaction between the researchers and 
their participants (Kvale, 2006). 
The use of interviews can, in some cases, translate into the use of information 
which is anecdotal. However, interviews are regarded as central to the work 
because they serve to provide an ‘inside’ and more detailed look into how the 
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interviewees felt about the presence of mines, what the community needed and 
what the capacities are.  Interviews composed the largest portion of field data. 
Thus, interviewing is a strategy for exploring others' perspectives, obtaining 
"here and now constructions" and "reconstructions" of "persons, events, 
activities, organisations, feelings, motivations, claims, concerns, and other 
entities" (Lincoln and Guba, 1985 p. 268) .   
This research called for reconstruction of events by asking interviewees to think 
back over how a certain series of events unfolded in relation to a mine action, a 
very important aspect of the project especially considering the length of time 
that mine action has been going on in Somaliland. Similarly, issues around 
peacebuilding are not always amenable to observation, hence interviewing 
represented the only viable means of finding out.  As a tool, therefore, 
interviewing was used within each context to allow for a gainful insight into 
history.   
Interviewing is a method of using conversation with a specific purpose. In any 
social structures, conversations are seen as a meaningful way of human 
interaction.  Berger and Luckmann (1967) stated that conversation is “the most 
important vehicle of reality-maintenance” (p. 152).  New conversations suggest 
new realities; the way in which we carry out these conversations becomes 
important in the continued construction and reconstruction of reality. Such a 
process has a way of changing a society’s collectively created reality that 
enables communication of social meanings.  
Ascribing meaning to the emerging conversations therefore relies upon context, 
the social and linguistic construction of a perspectival reality where knowledge 
is validated through practice (Kvale, 1996 p. 42). Using a social constructionist 
view of the world, acknowledging that interpretation is a result of a collective 
and not an individual process, meaning is defined through my assumptions as 
the researcher, the socially constructed meanings in interviews and socially 
constructed meanings that may emerge.   
Gilbert (1993) identifies two types of interviews; structured and unstructured.  
Patton (1990) classifies interviews into; informal conversation interview, the 
general interview and the standardised open ended interview.  There are 
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different methods based on the demarcation of the way interviews are carried 
as Carment (1993) identifies.  These are structured interview, semi-structured 
interview, group interview and unstructured or focused interview. I mainly used 
unstructured (open ended) interviews which involved asking informants open-
ended questions, and probing wherever necessary to obtain data deemed 
useful to the research project. The interviews entailed extensive and lengthy 
conversations; that did not follow a pre-established or standardised set of 
questions; instead, the list of issues addressed was continuously revised to 
follow up on new insights – or questions – that emerged throughout the data-
collection process. Such a technique is described by Patton (1987) as a type of 
interview that researchers use to elicit information in order to achieve holistic 
understanding of the interviewee’s point of view or situation.  This technique led 
to the identification of key issues of concern or relevance. This method allowed 
‘control’ over the line of questioning, seeking elaboration and clarification of 
points unlike a questionnaire or a very structured interview where the answers 
would have been set without allowing for any thoughts outside the choices 
provided. 
Interviews were conducted in a range of surroundings: extremely hot and 
uncomfortable surroundings, comfortable offices, in restaurants and other public 
places. Sometimes voices were drowned out by background noise, making 
recording difficult. All interviewees except one were happy to have the 
interviews recorded, and each of the interviews was transcribed using high 
quality audio equipment at the end of each day. This was an onerous task as 
some participants spoke English with very heavy accents which meant that 
accurate transcription was a lengthy and arduous process. Basic transcription 
was done whilst in the field and refined upon return. The challenges in 
transcribing are acknowledged by Poland who notes that some of the issues 
that can interfere with the accuracy of transcribed data include capturing the 
words, use of quotations, omissions and mistaking words and phrases for 
others (Poland, 2002).  
In total I undertook 45 interviews with people who represented a cross section 
of backgrounds: former deminers; government officials; UN staff, local mine 
clearance employees, members of local NGOs involved in peacebuilding work 
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and members of research institutions in Hargeisa.  Due to problems with access 
with HALO Trust, I interviewed people who had previously worked with HALO 
Trust and gathered any information about the organisation and how it operated. 
I was therefore constantly aware of some shortcomings of the interviews 
especially with those who had points to score with the organisation and 
therefore raise reliability concerns.  This called for a lot of reflexivity and 
reflection on who was speaking and who were they speaking to, as well as the 
purpose of the interview and under what circumstances they were speaking me. 
Facts were double checked to ensure reliability. 
Interviews with local NGOs provided me with an understanding of the 
perceptions of local people towards mine action and the Sector Actors.  They 
also helped in clarifying what their understanding of peacebuilding was and 
what shaped the way peacebuilding was conceptualised in Somaliland; I 
acknowledge that this is not representative of the Somaliland population but, 
given the limitations, it was the only viable option. I had initially considered 
carrying out focus group interviews, but this idea was abandoned for various 
reasons. At the time of research, especially 2010, I was hosted by DDG and 
relied heavily on the goodwill of the office for logistics support as I had to 
adhere to strict security arrangements regarding expatriate workers including 
the requirements for armed guards.  With no other means of transport, and 
being linked with DDG, I felt that the focus groups thus convened would mean 
the research would be compromised by the interviewees’ desire for mimicking 
what they thought I would want to hear (the Landmine Impact Survey process 
suffered this bias as I was to discover later).  This would have been influenced 
by my arrival in a branded DDG vehicle, and my reliance on the DDG staff to 
organise the focus groups for me.  There were issues regarding language as 
well. I did not have the financial capability to hire someone to do simultaneous 
translations which would have been necessary as the local population generally 
does not speak English. It was also a very busy period for the staff at DDG and 
I did not want to inconvenience them more than necessary.  
Carrying out the interviews was both a challenging venture and an enriching 
experience. The Somali language has a rich oral tradition with storytelling very 
much part of the culture.  Anyone who has undertaken interviews about the 
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peacebuilding process will certainly appreciate the pride with which the process 
is spoken about.  Thus, most of the Somali interviewees found great pleasure in 
describing the clan led peacebuilding process, perhaps unaware that all the 
previous interviewees started with the same narrative.  It therefore took longer 
to get to the point and sometimes some important historical facts may have 
been missed as I would sometimes not be listening, as I patiently waited to get 
over the historical narrative into what I needed to get to9.   
Before embarking on any interviews, information about me as the researcher 
and the research itself was provided together with a written ‘consent form’; 
PART C: CONSENT FORM) provided for each respondent.  In tandem with the 
ethical requirements, I also asked whether it was okay to use the recording 
device and in all except one instance participants were happy to be recorded 
and also to be cited. 
I relied a lot on informal interviews which served a supplementary purpose and 
help to make sense of what one has been told. For example, I gathered quite a 
lot of detail on the frustration of working in Somaliland from mine action 
organisations during a field trip and also at an informal get together.   As I 
waited in offices to meet the people, I was able to talk informally to the people 
working in the organisations who shared a lot of information that helped in 
understanding not only the context of Somaliland, but also some views of 
people who I might not otherwise have considered as interviewees.   
b) Documentary Evidence  
Citing the work of Scot (1990) May (1993) points out that documents may be 
regarded as ‘physically embodied texts, where the containment of the text is the 
primary purpose of the physical medium’ (p.12).   May (op cit) argues that this 
reflects a very broad spectrum of both perspectives and research sources.  
They are viewed as part of the practical contingencies of organisational life, as 
part of the wider social context, or by centrality of their authorship (May, 1993). 
Apart from carrying out interviews, I collected documentary sources in 
Somaliland. While archival resources were especially useful for case study 
                                            
9 This was not because I wasn’t interested in the details (as these contributed to understanding 
the context).  It was mainly because the same narrative was being retold over and over again. 
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construction as they are stable, broad and exact (Yin, 2003 p. 86) such an 
ideal-type situation of archival resources did not exist for either Somalia or 
Somaliland. Written material and (consistent) statistical data are hard to come 
by – partly because the respective authorities have insufficient resources for 
data collection and partly because the region was poorly administered for many 
years and devastated by repeated conflict (Balthasar, 2012). The data I 
gathered was from specific organisations and this enabled some additional and 
deeper insight mine action policies and programmes over time. 
During some of the interviews, I was referred to documents that had been 
generated by practitioners out in the field.  The documents included Institutional 
reports; this includes a wide variety of documents relating to specific activities 
conducted by individual institutions or organisations working in the mine action 
arena.   Inevitably, and given its social context and identity, one may give a 
selective and biased understanding of a document, and may even deliberately 
chose and select particular documents. Even though this is a common criticism 
against researchers using any technique of data collection, I did not entirely rule 
it out.  During my engagement in this field, as a Landmine Monitor researcher, I 
particularly interacted with Landmine and ERW survivors and was very 
sympathetic to their plight. With this in mind one can easily have biases towards 
a certain way of representing facts. 
For the historical narrative, especially during the setting up of mine clearance by 
RIMFIRE, I benefitted enormously when I established contact with the person 
who was the UN Monitor for the clearance work at the time.  From his archives I 
received a lot of reports and records on events that took place.  Inevitably, 
authors of documents decide to record and leave out information informed by 
their social, political and economic environment. Historical documents, thus, are 
amenable to manipulation and selective influence. In undertaking documentary 
research, I was aware of these influences and did not assume that documents 
were simply neutral artifacts from the past.  
While new technologies (e.g., the internet) offered possibilities for acquiring 
documents, critical reflexivity was required.  Also some of the documents, 
especially by organisations that are currently working on the issues were biased 
and overemphasised certain areas in order to elicit funding from donors etc. 
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Similarly, using documents comes with the risk of being charged as being un-
reflexive and uncritical, however this arises if one uses the documents without 
due consideration to the process and social context of their construction.  Thus, 
where documents were used, there was a high degree of sophistication and 
scepticism in reading and interpretation. 
c) Overt Observations 
Observation is defined as “a purposeful, systematic and selective way of 
watching and listening to an interaction or phenomenon as it takes place” 
(Kumar, 2005) and it could be used as a method of data collection. Observation 
involves watching, listening and recording (May, 1993). 
Somaliland has a large presence of expatriates in the country and many aid 
agencies have offices in Hargeisa waiting around the Mansoor or the 
Ambassador hotels for meetings with the interviewees or to pass time between 
interviews provided good opportunities to talk to various people. Inevitably the 
local people thought that I was part of the aid community. 
Important factors in conducting interviews and participant observation were 
proximity and chance. The sites of contact included social gatherings (there 
were a lot in Hargeisa); organisations residences in main centres; and, where 
pre-planning had been carried out, in offices and residences. In addition to 
interviews observations included instances such as attending social evenings at 
NGO residences; travelling with de-miners to field sites; accompanying NGO 
staff on lengthy road journeys to remote field sites.  
Apart from the interviews, extra attention was paid to the surroundings 
especially during the visits to demining sites.  These observations reinforced the 
statements made by the interviewees and offered a useful opening gambit to 
interviews.  
In conclusion, when undertaking such a diverse area of research one needs to 
have a good knowledge base and most importantly endeavour to be free from 
preconceived ideas that may be derived from theory.  One should also be 
adaptive and flexible as undertaking research in a real world means that things 
don’t always go as planned; one takes newly encountered situations as 
opportunities rather than threats.   Therefore different innovative methods were 
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utilised such as accessing key informants via Skype and Facebook.  This meant 
that any clarification of the interviews was dealt with as they arose through 
Instant Messaging. 
Similarly interview data was supported by further information from aid agency 
websites, unpublished agency documents, academic sources and archives in 
order to build understanding of agencies’ histories, funding sources, political 
associations, and the broader context. For both the earlier and the later dataset, 
information was collated, compared, and compiled during the research process, 
enabling interviews to follow up emerging issues and themes. 
Data Analysis and process  
For analysis I use a simplified model  that has previously been used for health 
policy analysis by Walt and Gilson (1994). (see Figure 4: The Gilt and Wilson 
(1994) policy framework triangle; model for Health Policy Analysis.)  This model 
incorporates the concepts of context, content, process and actors to illustrate 
how these interplay to influence the definition of the policy and challenges of 
implementation.  The Gilt and Wilson policy analysis model is ideal for analysing 
the Sector as it allows for more than the limited focus on how the Sector, or if it 
were the case, the Mine Ban Treaty operates without neglecting other important 
dimensions that explain how the formation process and the actors all impact the 
Sector’s governance and implementation structures and how they have 
emerged. The model also allows for this process to be analysed based on the 
context in which the policies are being formed.  This is relevant within the mine 
action Sector where decisions taken at an international level seek to achieve an 
impact on the level of communities and individuals.  
This analytical model incorporates the concepts of context, content, process 
and actors.  This model has been used primarily to help policy analysts think 
more systematically about the multitude of factors (content, process, context 
and actors) affecting policy and the interrelations between these factors (Walt 
and Gilson 1994).  They noted that health policy research focused largely on 
the content of policy, neglecting actors, context and processes. Their policy 
triangle framework is grounded in a political economy perspective, and 
considers how all four of these elements interact to shape policy-making. Walt & 
Gilson’s framework was originally designed to analyse national policymaking 
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processes, however, I use it as a tool to analyse a Sector’s formation and the 
emerging policy – as it is hypothesised that the same factors that shape the 
formation of the sector also influence policy formation and implementation at all 
levels.  Utilising the framework further helps in conceptualising and organising 
these themes and guided the analysis.  
A study that looks just at the implementation of an intervention may focus on 
specific actors, such as humanitarian aid workers in isolation, ignoring how the 
whole intervention interacts with other factors such as the political context, the 
donor requirements and local context where the activity is being implemented.  
Such an approach tends to be reductionist and often causes the analysis to 
attribute all of the improvements or deteriorations in the conflict situation to one 
kind of organisation or actor though these developments usually result from the 
combined work of different local and external factors including the policy 
decisions that guide them. 
Thus applying context analysis ensures a proper examination of the 
circumstances and the environment within which an organisation operates, with 
a particular focus on how context and organisational values, mission, and 
programming might interact.  
The Mine Action Sector; mine action policy; mine action sector actors are a 
reflection of the same global political dynamics which dictated the process of 
formation of the Sector.  Similarly the formation process defines the normative 
framework that governs the Sector. 
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Figure 4: The Gilt and Wilson (1994) policy framework triangle; model for 
Health Policy Analysis.  
 
Source: Walt and Gilson, (1994) 
This research will also use the ‘peace-ability’ methodology, whereby Mine 
Action achievements are conceptualised in terms of their role in increasing or 
decreasing probabilities for peace, rather than as precise cause and effect 
relationships. This is because “impact” is a concept that is inappropriate for the 
examination of peace-building for a number of reasons. The problems of 
attribution, time frames and the lack of the counterfactual mean that it is difficult 
to talk with precision about the contribution of Mine Action programmes on 
peace building or conflict fuelling processes.  At best, I can only talk about the 
general direction of change and the probabilities that Mine Action interventions 
have had an impact on peace and conflict dynamics (Goodhand, 2002).  The 
evaluative stance of those examining the role of an activity on peace-building 
best focuses on ‘improving’ performance rather than ‘proving’ impact (Hulme, 
2000).  In addition to the technical problems of assessing impact, there is the 
conceptual challenge of understanding and interpreting ‘peace’. Like gender, 
peacebuilding will be a lens through which I assess the outcomes of policies, 
activities and programmes of mine action organisations (Goodhand, 2002). 
CONSTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES  
People were interviewed on the record, with the majority agreeing to be quoted. 
The limitations of this methodology are that it relies on human memory to 
Content Context 
Process 
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retrace policy decisions when (accessible) documentation is not available; time 
constraints and the difficulty of travelling in Somaliland only allowed for one day 
of field trip.  
‘Security’ Limitations 
Association with humanitarian aid agencies in Somaliland does not necessarily 
provide immunity, as groups such as Al Shabab are known to kidnap and target 
humanitarian aid workers. In research carried out by Fast (2007) on NGO 
insecurity in conflict zones, some respondents reported that aid workers were 
seen as ‘soft targets’ and therefore more vulnerable. 
Hence due to security concerns and in adherence to the standard operating 
procedures that were in place for DDG expatriate workers, (during the first 
phase of the data collection) I could not leave the office without being 
accompanied by an armed guard commonly referred to as an SPU i.e. Special 
Protection Unit (SPU) 10 .   Similarly I could not travel to other regions of 
Somaliland because at the time travel outside Hargeisa for expatriate staff 
required one not only to be accompanied by an SPU but also to hire a minimum 
of two 4x4 vehicles one for myself and one for the SPUs.  Thus an urban bias of 
the fieldwork was mainly due to ‘security’ and safety constraints as well as 
limited finances. Despite the difficulties, good primary data was gathered in the 
field.  
Research observation, especially mine clearance, therefore involved ‘safety’ 
issues and for ‘security’ reasons the need to be accompanied to the field meant 
that such visits were only possible through advance planning and negotiation 
that took people away from their busy routines. 
Whilst in the field access to the demining team was limited and guarded.  Even 
within the allowed parameters there were restrictions on where I could go and 
who I could interact with, an obvious cautious move by the HALO Trust.  I read 
this as an effort  to ‘manage’ and limit any exposure of  unflattering or sensitive 
aspects in the ‘field’, or disrupt routine (Lee, 1995 p. 22).    
                                            
10 Following the spate of killings and kidnap of expatriate staff, the Governments of Somaliland, with the 
encouragement and financial support from donors and the United Nations Country Team for Somalia, have 
established a Special Protection Unit (SPU) tasked with providing compound security and the escort 
security for the international community including humanitarian and development actors. 
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There is need to acknowledge that there were ‘genuine’ reasons for concerns 
for safety and therefore the organisations had a duty of care towards me; 
however the extent to which these concerns were used to limit access to sites 
and individuals for example deminers working in the field, should not be under-
estimated.  
Access to official Documents 
Access to official documents from the Sector was difficult, beyond those 
available online.  I found that the Sector was rather reluctant to share 
documents such as reports etc., beyond those that were available online.  
Unlike other organisations in the field, HALO Trust does not publicise their 
evaluation reports or end of year reports. This means that I relied heavily on 
reports that were held by previous programme managers in their personal 
computers.  As an organisation HALO Trust is shrouded by secrecy and 
therefore coming across any of their publications was quite difficult. Various 
emails to the headquarters for reports were not responded to, neither were 
emails for clarifications even after an interview had been given by the 
programme manager.  As for DDG, for example, a number of their evaluation 
reports and research outputs were accessible via the internet.  Specific annual 
reports to donors were made available only by past programme managers.   
Access to official documents from Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC) was 
impossible as the director continually failed to show up for appointments.  
Similarly requests for documents from other officials were not sanctioned and 
therefore this research has relied on publicly available information. 
Institutional memory loss 
Due to the high turnover of international staff, a significant part of the research 
relied on observation and contacts with those who had already left.  With every 
departure of a Programme Manager part of the institutional memory went too.  
This is not limited to mine action organisations but also within the UNDP, 
UNMAS and other local organisations.  I ended up tracking the individuals who 
worked within these organisations for reports and narratives of their time within 
the organisation.   
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Whenever I emailed former programme managers for clarification on specific 
key events in the life of the mine action programme the response received was 
always indicative of a lack of awareness of the same.  It thus may appear that 
programme managers did not get an introduction to the programmes to learn 
the history so as to understand the context of the programmes they were taking 
on.  Similarly upon their departure, any reports written during their time left with 
them.  Most of the organisations had no physical archives for programme 
reports and these were only available where the respective people had stored 
them in their personal computers and some were willing to share them with me. 
As a demonstration of staff turnover, between 2010 and 2012, HALO Trust had 
3 programme managers; DDG had 2; the UN had one expat staff who I 
interviewed a second time but was in the process of winding up when I returned 
and none of those I met and interviewed in 2010 were still with the 
organisations in 2012. This meant that there was a lack of institutional memory 
within UN and international NGO agencies. Somaliland suffers from the loss of 
vital institutional memory due to constant changes of personnel.  This was not 
always a negative for my research as it meant that new relationships were 
formed with others where previously access had been denied.  The staff 
turnover though means that information on a lot of the programmes is not 
shared.  In the era of technology where most of the documentation is 
electronically stored in individual computers, this resulted in a dearth of 
information.  
Challenges of Language and transcribing 
Temple and Edwards (2002) argue that language is an important part of 
formulating and expressing beliefs and values and it should not be seen just a 
tool for presenting ideas or concepts. The experience of research participants is 
carried and accumulated within the language they speak. Cultural, social and 
political meanings cannot be conveyed through a process of translation as 
language is seen as a way of preparing and organising the experience of its 
speakers . The same words can mean different things in different languages 
and cultures.  The way in which words are used also matter.  Due to Somalia’s 
different colonisation histories and powers, the Somali language has different 
and varied spellings as demonstrated by the spelling of Somalia’s capital, which 
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is spelled Mogadiscio by the Italians, Mogadishu by the English, and Muqdisho 
by the Somalis; the name Ali, is spelled Cali; and Hashi, Xashi (reflected in 
chapter 7 under Role and knowledge of the survey teams). The Somali 
language borrows many elements from Arabic, and was transcribed into the 
Roman alphabet in 1972.  A number of documents would use different names 
attributed to the diversity of the Somali language with alternations depending on 
whether the name is given in Somali, Arabic, English, or Italian (Saeed, 1999).   
All my research participants spoke English; however, language was still a 
challenge due to the very deep Somali accents which took time to get used to.  
Somali accents and dialect are challenges that have been acknowledged and 
have been a subject of research such as  (Conway, 2008; Hassan, 2011). 
Though all Somalis speak the same language, Saeed (1999) has identified 
three distinct dialects:  Northern, Benadir and May.  The standard is the 
Northern which is somewhat misleading in its name as it is spoken in northern 
(Somaliland), western and southern parts of Somalia. Saeed (ibid) attributes 
this dominance to widespread clan migrations. The Northern dialect which is 
common amongst Somaliland speakers tends to have glottal or pharyngeal 
sounds.  Most of the Somali speakers have several phonemes which are 
consistently mispronounced. This was particularly challenging for the 
transcription work that followed. Some of these include for example the 
phonemes /p/ and /b/; for example, ‘bin’ and ‘pin’; save and safe. 
REFLECTING ON PROCESS 
Hammond (2011) and Donà (2011) have offered critical reflections to illustrate 
how method encompasses access to the field illustrating how researchers 
analytically order and shape them into ethnographic representations. The edited 
volume by Cramer et al. (2011) provides useful examples of in situ decisions of 
ethical and methodological challenges whilst research in being undertaken in 
violent contexts in Africa.    
Thus, as noted earlier, the challenges of access and the perceived security 
challenges in Somaliland meant that at any time that I met with an interviewee, I 
carried out lengthy interviews (mainly because I was never sure of returning to 
the field) this means that the interviewees took up the role of ‘key informant’ and 
therefore the interviews became ‘key informant interviews’.  The advantage of 
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this, according to Marshall (1996), is the quality of data that can be obtained in 
a relatively short period of time. To obtain the same amount of information and 
insight from in-depth interviews with other members of a community can be 
prohibitively time-consuming and expensive as I had indicated (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985). The process provided a level of flexibility that allowed me to 
explore new ideas and issues that I had not anticipated whilst planning my 
study. The disadvantage is that the interviewees can be biased. However, I 
used other methods for triangulation. As a technique, key Informant interview is 
described as in-depth interviews with people selected for their first-hand 
knowledge about a topic of interest. The interviews are loosely structured, 
relying on a list of issues to be discussed. Key informant interviews resemble a 
conversation among acquaintances, allowing a free flow of ideas and 
information (Marshall, 1996).  
THESIS STRUCTURE  
I have divided this thesis into nine chapters; the first chapter is an introduction 
and gives a background to terms and methodology that I used for this research; 
I reflect on the tools that I used both for data collection and for analysis.  The 
chapter also gives some definition of key terms that I use throughout the thesis; 
research methodology and research instruments of data collection; which are 
mainly, interviews; overt observation and secondary data such as documents. I 
then look at the constraints and challenges that I encountered and reflect on 
how these oriented the research process including the outcome of the chosen 
methods of data collection.    
In Chapter 2, I examine the conceptualization of peacebuilding and mine action 
analysing the processes that both have undergone; tracing these processes 
highlights the similarities and between mine action and peacebuilding.  I 
highlight the dominant critiques of liberal peacebuilding that have emerged 
mainly those around the context of liberal peacebuilding, the approach; the 
ownership and/or legitimacy; the actors and the nature of peace.  I then outline 
the limitations of the critiques.  The last section of this chapter looks into mine 
action and how integrated it is within mine action also identifying the critiques 
and literature gaps within this literature. 
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In Chapter 3, I provide the contextualisation of the thesis by addressing the 
context and challenges that confronted Somaliland post her self-proclaimed 
independence; I demonstrate that outside the process of state building in 
Somalia and specifically Somaliland, there are other peacebuilding processes 
that are ongoing; and which have a liberal agenda.  Through this chapter I 
outline the characteristics of Somaliland as demonstrating typical characteristics 
of a liberal peacebuilding context hence is relevant in providing a nuanced 
critique for liberal peacebuilding.  Similarly, in Chapter 4 I outline how the global 
Mine Action Sector can provide a sectoral critique on the implementation of 
peacebuilding; I start by outlining the process of the Sector formation and the 
global context within which this process took place; therefore demonstrating the 
emerging governance structure, the actors and the policies that guide the 
Sector and implementation of mine action activities.  This chapter provides the 
explanation as to how the Sector arrived at standardised approaches and 
template based implementation of programmes.  
Chapter 5 and 6 provides the historical and political context within which mine 
action in Somaliland takes place within.  By providing a historical context of 
mine clearance Chapter 5 specifically highlights the challenges that the Sector 
met in implementing a standardised approach. Mine clearance gave the 
international community a significant early entry point to contribute to post 
conflict peacebuilding in Somaliland however the chapter highlights the extent 
to which the approach of the Sector as external actors is characterised by the 
problematic assumption that a vacuum exists prior to the arrival of international 
staff” (Chesterman, 2004); thus local capacity is assumed to be missing and 
therefore is needed to be rebuilt. The chapter highlights the consequences of 
such an approach to the Sector. In Chapter 6, I examine the implications of 
political non recognition, highlighting how Somaliland’s unique political non 
recognition status presents the Sector with a challenge when implementing 
programmes. These challenges highlight the need for knowledge and 
awareness — specifically in terms of how intervention activities, actors, and 
methods impact on, and are perceived in, the immediate local and national 
environment thus, calling for the need for interventions to be tailor-made to 
reflect such unique contextual aspects.    
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In Chapter 7, I specifically present the implementation of the Landmine Impact 
Survey and demonstrate further the importance of contextual knowledge. In this 
chapter I illustrate how the Sector’s failure to take into account the different 
contextual factors inevitably challenges standardised approaches thereby 
sacrificing context specific approaches to universal templates with far reaching 
consequences to the Sector. 
In Chapter 8 I apply the peace-ability approach to analyse the extent to which 
the endowments  “peace capital” of mine action are accrued or undermined by 
Sector activities; the types of activities, at which time, and in which particular 
context, have had a positive or negative impact. I demonstrate in this chapter 
that the extent to which the Somaliland community conceptualises mine action 
as peacebuilding is informed by the Sector Actors; including their relationship 
with the communities; the Sector’s identity and values and most importantly the 
Sector programmes. 
Chapter 9 gives a summary of the major conclusions of the thesis and revisits 
the main research question in order to establish the extent to which the question 
has been answered. 
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CHAPTER 2:  PEACEBUILDING AND MINE 
ACTION; THE DEBATES AND CRITIQUES 
The formation and implementation of mine action is a microcosm of 
peacebuilding. (A personal observation) 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the conceptual background in which the thesis is placed. 
In the chapter I provide a contextualisation of both peacebuilding and mine 
action. In the first section I contextualise the peacebuilding debates and identify 
the dominant liberal peacebuilding critiques; I trace the history of post conflict 
peacebuilding from the agenda for peace to the present form of understanding 
liberal peace as the dominant form of international peace interventions (Mac 
Ginty 2011).  This form of peacebuilding has come under scrutiny from some 
critical scholars who   question the values and policy assumptions underpinning 
the liberal peace, its methodology, hegemonic nature, and inherent limits and 
contradictions. I highlight the key dominant critiques that have emerged 
avoiding hypercritical narratives.  In the second section I interrogate mine action 
within this academic literature and also within practice. I trace the evolution of 
the mine ban process and make the observation made by Harpviken and 
Isaksen (2004)  and Kjellman et al (2003) who have highlighted that mine action 
is only marginally acknowledged as part of peacebuilding. In this chapter I set 
out to identify the reason behind this limitation and argue for the need to place 
the mine action sector and mine action as activities within the broader 
peacebuilding discourse. I interrogate mine action within peacebuilding and 
argue for the need to re-conceptualise mine action as part of peacebuilding 
within the integrated peacebuilding framework. I then look into the factors that 
limit the conceptualisation of mine action and, in so doing, identify both the 
emerging critiques and the gaps within the literature.   
CONTEXTUALISING POST CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING  
Instead of the orderly ‘new world order’ that was anticipated with the collapse of 
the bipolar power blocs, there has been an eruption of conflict, which may have 
had little or no chance of escalating during the preceding period.   Conflicts in 
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places like Africa, having been to a large extent influenced by the great power 
rivalries, acquired their own specific regional and national dynamics.   
The flow of aid (especially military aid) from both blocs during the Cold War had 
been high and was mainly motivated by the desire to ensure continued support 
of client states.  Strong centralised governments enforced their authority 
through large standing armies supported through the provision of primarily 
heavy, high maintenance military equipment provided for by their respective 
power blocs. The end of the Cold War led to a cessation of external help to 
these large armies but very little demobilisation.  These armies remained, 
contributing to new areas of conflict and sustained factional irregular armed 
groups (Luckham et al., 2001). Whereas previously arms deals had involved 
state-to-state transfers, as conflicts or clashes were expected between regular 
armed forces of established states, this was replaced by a growth of 
commercial arms dealing and illegal arms transfer of small arms and light 
weapons as conflict consisted largely of ethnic and sectarian warfare within 
states (Klare, 1999). There was a dramatic implosion of states and the eruption 
of violent conflicts in places such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Rwanda which, other than being 
considered complex emergencies, came to define the phenomenon of state 
collapse and failure. The wars had local and global influences through war 
economies and financing, use of modern information and arms technology with 
high levels of civilian suffering. This made the conflicts protracted or intractable, 
as international efforts to reduce the intensity and duration of internal warfare 
were undermined by the flow of firearms into these areas.  These conflicts also 
became globalised in terms of their cause and effects (through their 
dependence on external resources) and eroded the capacity of governments to 
function, including maintaining the Weberian monopoly of violence.  
Similarly the nature of international politics had evolved and changed; there was 
the realisation that the traditional notion of security, rooted in the protection of 
the state and relying on a balance of power for peace and stability, was 
insufficient in addressing the majority of challenges that people faced. These 
called for deepening concepts such as security, and  thus the prominent state-
centric and militaristic definitions were challenged (see Betts and Eagleton-
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Pierce, 2005; Walker, 1997). This debate was attributed to Buzan (1983) who 
proposed the expansion of the notion of security horizontally to include aspects 
other than simply the political and military security of states. Krause and 
Williams (1997) attempted to extend this conceptualisation vertically to embrace 
society as well as the individual. Thus human security took the most dramatic 
step of making the individual the referent subject rather than the state in order 
to address conditions and actions affecting people’s lives (Owen, 2004 p. 17). 
At the heart of these debates were non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
who played an important role in highlighting humanitarian agendas and the 
connection between rights-based rule and stability. NGOs were at the forefront 
of helping establish international agendas by defining what issues were 
important through the formation of coalitions of interest around specific issues 
or goals.  They helped to develop new norms by directly pressing governments 
and business leaders to change policies, and indirectly by altering public 
perceptions of what governments and firms should be doing (Nye, 2003).  Of 
specific interest to this thesis is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
which led to new international treaty (the Mine Ban Treaty).  Other campaigns 
that  emerged from the international commitment to human security included the 
call to regulate small arms and light weapons, and the campaign to establish an 
international criminal court (Tschirgi, 2004). 
In tandem with the debate on security, the UN Secretary General was also 
redefining peacebuilding through the report ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peacekeeping’  (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) which 
proposed a strategy for resolving conflicts.  This involved four components: 
preventive diplomacy – actions to prevent disputes from arising or escalating 
into conflicts; peace-making – actions aimed at bringing hostile parties to 
agreement through peaceful means – usually invoking Chapter VI of the UN 
charter; peacekeeping –the deployment of a UN presence, and post conflict 
peacebuilding – actions that identify and support structures that tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.  However, 
the peacebuilding record since the Agenda for Peace, has been mixed and 
there was recognition that the international response introduced then did not 
necessarily follow a neat, linear, chronological progression; and that in practise 
the various elements overlapped, interlinked and some mutually supported 
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others and even took place simultaneously (De Coning, 2012). Similarly such 
labels only related to programming, and thus did not have any relevance to the 
situation on the ground; they were an expression mainly of the need of donor 
administrations to give meaning to their programming efforts and to be able to 
activate different funding modalities. People within the society concerned 
obviously do not perceive the reality they experience in those terms.   Even 
though this has been acknowledged, and it is commonly understood that such 
labels were only a guide to the administration of donor activities, they continue 
to impact on the actions and reality on the ground which will be demonstrated 
by the example of Somaliland. 
Of relevance to this thesis is the fact that the Agenda for Peace coincided with 
the UN’s mandate in Somalia, described by Makinda (1993) as ambitious, that 
saw the UN intervene in an intra-state conflict even when the state at that point 
did not present a military threat to its neighbours (Lemay-Hébert and Toupin, 
2011; Makinda, 1993 p. 61).    The act was driven by the basis for the UN’s 
newfound moral imperative to save human lives (large scale deaths from direct 
conflict worsened by acute malnutrition) and restore human dignity; thus the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’, encapsulated the ideals of human security 
intervention during the 1990s.  Somalia therefore became the “laboratory for a 
new form of engagement when the international community responded with a 
humanitarian and military intervention on an unprecedented scale” (Bradbury 
and Healy, 2010a p. 11).   
Other examples included UN operations in Cambodia, Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Chad, Sudan, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia and 
Croatia.  Similarly, just as the deepening of the security debate had given 
impetus to the landmine issue, the Agenda for Peace explicitly called for 
support for a ban as will be observed in the section under Mine action. 
Thus, the post-Cold War period saw a post-Westphalian approach to conflict 
management and international security which had been legitimised by claims for 
human security.  The approaches became interventionist in nature, raising the 
onus of the interveners to adopt multi-faceted and multidimensional approaches 
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which were reflected in approaches that required a wide range of social, 
economic and institutional needs. There was also the acknowledgment that due 
to the protracted nature of the conflicts, the time that was needed to achieve 
peace settlements was longer.  Thus, in order for the peace to be maintained, 
these activities had to be undertaken concurrently.  After the provision of 
humanitarian aid to a war’s victims, mediation of peace accords and 
enforcement of ceasefires, international agencies gradually took on many more 
tasks in post-conflict arenas. Thus their roles were not restricted to just 
humanitarian aid,  such as relief, but also encompassed addressing wider 
security issues such as disarmament, demobilisation, and security sector reform,  
political, human rights, civil and governance functions,  collectively referred to 
as ‘track two diplomacy’ (Lund, 2003 p. 6; Miall et al., 1999).   
The Brahimi Report made this interdependency explicit and official, in order to 
ensure that post-conflict security achieved broader peacebuilding (Lund, 2003).  
All these multi-dimensional concepts led to the consolidation of a template for 
post conflict peacebuilding. This model was firstly elaborated in 2004 in the 
Utstein Report and was referred to as the ‘Peacebuilding Palette’.   Körppen 
(2011) refers to it as a technical toolkit and ‘Ikea-peacebuilding’ that is based on 
the theory that if the right strategy is developed and appropriate tools applied, 
then significant change within a system can be achieved ( p. 77).    
Thus the concept of peacebuilding and its resultant set of practices collectively 
founded the academic literature commonly known as the ‘liberal peace 
interventions’ or the liberal ‘peacebuilding consensus’ (Crocker et al., 2001; 
Miall et al., 1999).  These practises include:  the conviction that conflict 
management can be achieved through peacebuilding; the reform of institutions 
and governance; specifically identifying sovereignty as responsibility; 
highlighting of the interconnections between security and development and 
addressing issues of reconciliation to address societal divisions.  They are 
closely linked to the agenda of liberal internationalism which, when viewed in 
conjunction with liberal parliamentary democracy and liberal market capitalism, 
equates to the ideals of the ‘Liberal Peacebuilding model’; a model that has 
become a description of what was intended as the outcome of applying the 
standard operating procedures (Hirst, 2011). This set of practices includes both 
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short and long term interventions organised by both local and external actors.  It 
was also fronted by western nations, who were  criticised as promoting Liberal 
Peace (Heathershaw, 2008).  Thus, other than implicitly claiming a formulaic 
universal template, the peace that the ‘Agenda for Peace’  had proposed was 
state-centric at heart and considered sovereign states to be the main actors 
(Richmond, 2010a). Thus more frequently now, peacebuilding and analysis of 
conflict are characterised by a state-bias, and as a consequence peacebuilding 
is associated with state-building (Körppen, 2011).  
Similarly, the mainstream academic discourses on practices of conflict 
management had overtly moved away from peace and reconciliation towards 
governance and state-building. The shift was attributed to the post September 
11th era which brought in a new dimension of state security, conceptualisation 
of peace and its implementation. The focus on ‘failed states’ or ‘states in 
situations of fragility’ was brought to the fore, thus creating a strong interest in 
the debates on ‘state building’, which had become an over-arching concept. The 
analysis also associated peacebuilding with state building and conflated the two 
(Newman, 2009).  This assumption is mainly propagated by the view that those 
states that are defined as ‘failed’ have become a source of international 
insecurity by becoming a haven for terrorism, drugs, arms and people traffickers 
etc. (Rotberg, 2002b).  Places such as Somalia, a typical case of the most 
prolonged case of state failure, changed from being a “strategic threat” to global 
stability, to a threat to the international system of states (Helman and Ratner, 
1992).  This vision acquired a particularly acute dimension during the 
interventions of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are both described as 
extreme cases of state collapse and failure.  This has led to the term been 
described by Chesterman (2005) as a dismissive reference to the application of 
US military resources beyond traditional mandates. 
In conclusion the conceptual basis for the conception of ‘liberal peace’ is 
‘human security’ which emphasises the humanitarian responsibility to intervene 
in conflicts, particularly in situations of grave human rights abuse and threats to 
global security; post-conflict reconstruction through state building; and 
promotion of development (Duffield, 2005; Duffield, 2007; Pugh, 1998; 
Richmond, 2004a). The core ideas underlying the Liberal Peace approach 
 
 
45 
 
adopted by western governments, according to Richmond, remained 
democratisation, economic liberalisation, neoliberal development, human rights 
and the rule of law (Richmond, 2006a).  Thus, following on from the Agenda for 
Peace, and the moral imperative to intervene in Somalia, ‘Liberal Peace’ 
became the dominant form of peace-making and peace-building favoured by 
leading states, international organisations and international financial institutions 
(Mac Ginty, 2010).  This LP approach is based on the assumption that a 
liberally constructed state will be more peaceful and developed, and will have 
the capacity to reduce violence and prevent any relapse into chaos.  As the 
number of interventions undertaken increased, in some instances they seemed 
to have been counterproductive, and by the end of the decade the ‘liberal peace’ 
model was increasingly called into question.  
THE DOMINANT CRITIQUES OF LIBERAL PEACE  
At the centre of the Liberal Peace debate lies a complex dichotomy between 
“critical scholars” (Chandler, 2010; Chesterman, 2005; Duffield, 2007; Mac 
Ginty, 2010; Pugh, 2005; Richmond, 2005) and “problem solvers,” (Newman, 
2009; Paris and Sisk, 2009).  Within this dichotomy, the “problem solvers” 
generally seem comfortable with the notion of Liberal peace but are critical that 
it could not be fully implemented in post conflict or war torn societies; instead 
they focus on performance issues. The  “critical  scholars”  meanwhile are  
more  inclined  to  question  the values  and  policy assumptions underpinning  
the  liberal  peace, its methodology, hegemonic nature, and inherent limits and 
contradictions (Hameiri, 2011).  These critics within the dichotomised approach 
are not a homogenous group; each of them comes from a different school of 
thought, and therefore the debates vary in focus both theoretically and 
empirically (Stamnes, 2010).  
However, these critical debates are based on several broad standpoints; the 
main opposition to Liberal Peace by the critics is the way in which post conflict 
peacebuilding has now become associated with Anglo-Saxon market capitalism 
and elections, and the neo-liberal ideology of governance (Chandler 2006; Mac 
Ginty 2006; Richmond 2005). 
This thesis recognises the substantial body of scholarly critiques of Liberal 
Peace, however I concur with those (e.g. Chandler, 2010; Sabaratnam, 2011a) 
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who have argued that the emerging debates have  become increasingly distant 
from the concerns of the policy discourse and implementation and have become 
‘meta-critiques’ of contemporary projects of conflict management. Such  
critiques have been accused by Paris11 of being ‘hyper-critical’, pointing out that 
such criticism has gone past the point of justified questioning, and verges on 
unfounded scepticism and even cynicism (Paris, 2010 p. 338) also see (Begby 
and Burgess, 2009; Newman, 2009).   
The Context 
The context within which peacebuilding is based is normally a post conflict 
environment, which peace-builders are accused of defining as traumatised, 
dysfunctional, irrational, and immature, therefore legitimising models and 
solutions defined by outsiders rather than local actors (see (Hughes and 
Pupavac, 2005) citing (Cahill, 2013); (Duffield, 2001; Paris, 2002) .  Such an 
approach has been referred to as the “pathologisation” of fragile states and post 
conflict societies (Hughes and Pupavac, 2005). Rather than focusing 
exclusively on technical conflict management, peacebuilding is accused of 
having become a vehicle for exporting a particular vision of the State into non-
Western environments (Paris, 2004; Paris and Sisk, 2009). Peacebuilding is 
therefore viewed as a form of neo-colonial or neo-imperial control of the global 
South by the North/West whereby outsiders seek to shape the structures of 
these weaker societies into their own prevailing notions of ‘good’ or ‘civilised 
governance’ in what Paris (2002)  refers to as mission civilisatrice. According to 
Duffield, peacebuilding is thus an instrument of ‘global liberal governance’ for 
the self-preservation of an exclusive transnational network of governmental and 
non-governmental actors, hypocritically preserving their self-interests in the 
name of global peace, security and development (Duffield, 2002).  Thus, 
peacebuilding is challenged as being a state building project in the post conflict 
context whose assumptions are that liberalisation creates stable and peaceful 
societies through the introduction of multiparty democracy that inevitably sees 
conflicts being channelled through party politics rather than violence; and 
eradication of poverty through trade and marketisation.  The peacebuilders are 
                                            
11 Paris Roland was one of the critics but in what appears to have been a drastic turn, challenged the other 
critics in an article aptly titled “Saving Liberal Peace” in which he challenged them to admit that there was 
nothing in the recent critical literature that provided ‘a convincing rationale for abandoning liberal 
peacebuilding or replacing it with a non-liberal or ‘post-liberal’ alternative’. (Paris 2010 PAGE NO?) 
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accused of having limited knowledge of distinctive local conditions and 
variations across the societies hosting them (Autesserre, 2014; Donais, 2009; 
Paris, 2010; Sending, 2009b). 
Standardised ‘One Size Fits All’ approach 
A common critique of liberal peacebuilding  is that policy-makers consider 
conflict and post-conflict management to be a technical process and favour a 
standardised approach which uses a ‘one size fits all approach’ standardised 
template (Call and Cousens, 2007; Mac Ginty, 2008; Tschirgi, 2004).   Mac 
Ginty (2008) observes the existence of “set templates” and a “formulaic path” in 
internationally sponsored peacebuilding (p. 144) whilst Newman (2009), notes 
that “a core problem of contemporary peacebuilding is its tendency to be 
formulaic (p. 42).  Peacebuilding interveners are said to favour a checklist 
approach,  with each  situation requiring the use of a pre-existing toolkit12 that 
includes: the deployment of peacekeepers; the  disarmament, demobilisation, 
and reintegration of combatants; the repatriation of refugees; the  liberalisation 
of the economy; and the organisation of elections (ICG, 2004; Newman, 2009).  
Such an approach limits the ability of peacebuilding to adequately address the 
concerns and conditions of the host societies.  This approach also diminishes 
diversity and reduces every context into a standard box even though every 
country differs.  The approach is operated as if the challenges of peacebuilding 
are more or less the same in very different countries  (Barnett, 2006). Call and 
Cousens (2007) argue that  such programmes assume that international 
standards  will always be applicable thus  the preference of technical solutions 
over culturally specific approaches ( p. 14).  These ‘institutional remedies’ 
according to Fanthorpe (2006) are preferred due to the relatively fast rotation of 
personnel and limited bureaucratic and financial resources. However, he argues 
that such approaches blind practitioners to the political imperatives that bind the 
rural poor to non-liberal modes of governance and therefore “leave hastily 
erected ‘democratic’ institutions vulnerable to political capture by the very forces 
the project seeks to thwart” (Fanthorpe, 2006 p. 45).  Richmond (2006b) 
attributes the preference for standardised templates to the desire for 
measurable outputs, outcomes and impact which he argues leaves no room for 
                                            
12 See Ottaway, M. (2003) Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices. International Studies 
Perspectives, 4 (3), 314-322. on the creation and transformation of this toolkit. 
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context specific approaches.  Körppen (2011) notes that within such 
standardised approaches, specific outcomes are defined in advance in ‘log 
frames’ and permit participation only within predefined liberal frameworks.  
Ownership and or legitimacy 
The key failure by peacebuilders, according to the critics, is the way in which 
external actors formulate peacebuilding strategies and how they implement 
them in practice.  Peacebuilding fails to secure and respect the elements of 
local ownership, thus they fail in their effort of building reforms that command 
legitimacy from the grassroots. This amounts to insufficient ‘local ownership’ 
over the strategic direction and daily activities of such operations.  Such failure 
thus contributes to the lack of the sustainability important for an effective Liberal 
Peacebuilding agenda (Chandler, 2013; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Richmond, 2007; 
Sending, 2009b; Suhrke, 2002).   Sending (2009a) asserts that peacebuilders 
are ‘blind’ when they fail to be sensitive to local context; they are ‘arrogant’ 
when they fail to secure local ownership for peacebuilding efforts. He further 
asserts that research suggests that this lack of attention to context and 
ownership goes a long way in accounting for the relative lack of success of 
peacebuilding efforts (p.  1).  
Peacebuilders are expected to establish the principle of local ownership as the 
starting point of their approach to peacebuilding. Reich (2006) argues that local 
actors only serve as implementers whilst ‘local ownership’ only serves to “cover 
up a ‘business as usual’ approach”  that legitimates  rather than mitigates 
foreign control  ( p. 4).   As one of the key principles of peacebuilding, the 
strategies, approaches and interventions should be drawn from the local needs 
of the people, using resources and capacities that empower them to implement 
these strategies.  With this notion, international donors and other players 
explicitly search for a greater degree of legitimacy and sustainability in their 
interventions. However, Chesterman (2005) argues that local ownership is often 
used “disingenuously - either to mask the assertion of potentially dictatorial 
powers by international actors or to carry a psychological rather than political 
meaning in the area of reconstruction”.  Ownership in this context, he further 
argues, ‘is usually not intended to mean control and often does not even imply a 
direct input into political questions’ ( p. 160).  
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The Actors  
Peacebuilding has been institutionalised in the work of the UN and international 
agencies, international ﬁnancial institutions, NGOs, and the many actors 
engaged in conﬂict environments.  Such activities, by virtue of their depth and 
breadth, require coordination. This is normally undertaken by either the 
dominant states or by the UN thus providing opportunities for political influence 
and resources (Stewart, 2008); they also suffer poor strategic coordination 
(Richmond, 2004b).  With such a diverse group of actors, who have varying and 
sometimes competing agendas, problems are bound to contribute to the 
weakening of the peacebuilding processes. Post-conflict interventions may 
sometimes rest upon a problematic relationship between external and local 
actors, and in some cases reflect what Barnett & Finnemore (1999) have called 
institutional ‘pathologies’ of international organisations (Krause and Jütersonke, 
2005).  
The organisations and interveners such as the UN and World Bank are accused 
of harbouring political agendas rather than being neutral (Mac Ginty, 2011).  
Whilst they engage in apparently neutral strategic debates about managing the 
projects they still hold the purse strings and have control of the programs and 
disbursement processes (Körppen, 2011). Thus the roles and responsibilities of 
these external actors often determine or have significant influence on the final 
outcome of the peacebuilding process. Mac Ginty (2011), highlighting this, gives 
the example of the UNDP which operates on behalf of all UN members, yet as 
an organisation its agenda reflects western goals (p. 34). 
Similarly, increasingly interventions have included military responses (Schnabel 
and Ehrhart, 2005). According to Pugh (2004), the ‘received wisdom’ thus  is 
not value neutral but serves to protect an existing international order. 
Peacebuilding seeks to portray soldiers as ‘humanitarian’ actors, impartially 
pursuing peace.  Thus according to Duffield (2007) humanitarian assistance 
and peacebuilding are increasingly becoming utilised as part of a grand strategy 
for securing Western interests especially in areas that  Collinson et al (2010) 
refer to as “‘islands of instability’ because of their  association with international 
terrorism, transnational crime and other real and existential threats” (Collinson 
et al. 2010, p.278). This image, according to the critics, has resulted in 
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unresolved tensions in relations between the military and non-military 
participants in these operations. This also means that those working alongside 
the military in such interventions appear to have abandoned their traditional and, 
in the eyes of critics such as Pugh (2004), vital political neutrality, thereby 
diluting their own long-term impact.  The theory and practice of peace 
operations are not neutral, but instead reﬂect particular political values (Pugh, 
2004). Thus according to critics such as (Duffield, Pugh) such a strategy 
represents the south as a source of plague (insecurity) that needs to be 
contained.  
The nature of peace  
Liberal Peace is seen as ontologically incoherent and does not seem to hold a 
common understanding of the kind of peace it aims to achieve (Richmond, 
2009).  The critiques highlight the fact that the many activities of peacebuilding 
have not actually achieved the results that they seek in the countries in which 
they are carried out. Lund argues that despite efforts to seek legitimacy, the 
ambitions of peacebuilding have come about gradually in response to practical 
problems and events and that peacebuilding still constitutes a huge, hopeful 
experiment whose results are not clear. In cases depicted as having been 
successful, such as Cambodia and Tajikistan, the peace is described as no 
more than ‘virtual peace’ (Heathershaw, 2009; Richmond, 2011).  Indeed, critics 
argue that the reverse has been achieved, failed peace agreements have led to 
more deaths than during the wars and intergroup antagonism remains high 
(Lund, 2003; Mac Ginty, 2007; Paris, 2004).  According to Pugh (2005), market 
liberalisation increases the vulnerability of the population to poverty, as they are 
deprived a voice in economic reconstruction and the policies do not address 
their reliance on shadow economies.  International presence is seen to have 
failed to address the more serious question of what would constitute a positive 
peace, and focuses on the creation of the hard shell of the state, instead of 
working on establishing a working society  complete with a viable economy 
(Richmond, 2006b). 
What has emerged from within these critical scholars is that they never outline 
an alternative set of principles and ideals for post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconstruction and therefore they do not advocate a strict non-involvement of 
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interveners. However the debate can be best described as less about the 
validity of the liberal peace and more of how to conceive of it and implement it. 
The critics argue that Liberal Peacebuilding is based on the fact that human 
security guides the Liberal Peace thesis in conceptualising a framework for 
peacebuilding and maintenance of the global order. The conceptualisation and 
practice of human security has been criticised as lacking in political strategy   
(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). This means that while concepts such as 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the European Union doctrine for Human 
Security (2004) place ethical responsibility on the international community to 
protect individuals where states have failed or are unwilling to protect them, 
they ignore the importance of political deconstruction of the politics of 
securitisation and militarised peacebuilding.  Thus, peacebuilders are accused 
of embracing the hoary “Liberal Peace approach” uncritically and as a 
consequence they have often designed peacebuilding strategies that actually 
destabilised fragile transitional polities such as  in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Burundi and Iraq (Doyle and Sambanis, 1999; Newman et al., 2009; Paris, 
1997). Sending (2011) acknowledges that these critical debates have brought to 
the fore the importance of issues on context sensitivity, local ownership, bottom-
up and hybrid forms of peacebuilding; however, there are limitations to these 
critiques as outlined in the next section.  
Mac Ginty (2010; 2008) explores an alternative conception of peace-building 
through indigenous approaches to conﬂict resolution and localised responses to 
conﬂict (2008; 2010). He proposes a hybrid peacebuilding that acknowledges 
that the ‘local’ has agency and hence “ability to hybridise the Liberal Peace by 
enforcing some change on it” (Mac Ginty, 2011 p. 84).  This hybrid approach 
has also been proposed by other authors (Boege et al., 2009; Pugh et al., 2008; 
Richmond, 2010b).   Others such as, Boege et al (2009)propose “hybrid political 
orders” that combine governance strategies of governments and of indigenous 
communities (2009, p. 24). Richmond has explored the more elusive concept of 
‘an everyday “post-Liberal Peace” and critical policies for peacebuilding’ and, 
together with Franks, they propose an emancipatory model that seeks local 
consent with full ownership of the peacebuilding process, while critical of 
external international impositions, conditionalities and dependencies expressed 
in the conservative and orthodox models, however, this model takes a bottom-
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up approach. Even then they fault this by highlighting that the underlying fact is 
that Liberal Peace is externally driven with the intention of ‘stabilising’ states 
towards democracy and local participation (Richmond and Franks, 2007 p. 30)  
Liberal peacebuilding’s most trenchant critics offer little in the way of 
alternatives.  However, some of them have begun to discuss alternative 
approaches to liberal peacebuilding. Having been one of the major critics of 
Liberal Peace building, Paris acknowledges that there is no realistic alternative 
to some form of Liberal Peace strategy, and that efforts should be geared 
towards improving its applied approaches rather than dismissing it entirely 
(Paris, 2012).  This view is challenged by Cooper et al (2011) who observe that 
such a view fails to take cognizance of the common prescriptions of Liberal 
Peacebuilding, particularly in political economy. Instead they propose a welfare 
based approach, arguing that this will incorporate the wellbeing of the individual 
and community within the political economy of peacebuilding (p. 11). 
In conclusion, the  critics see international interventions as neo-colonialist and 
neo-imperialist (Bellamy and Williams, 2004; Chandler, 2013; Duffield, 2002),  
based on Western liberal norms that orient international interventions toward 
the implementation of a liberal agenda (Paris, 2002; Paris, 2004; Pugh, 2002; 
Pugh, 2005), an extension of the western hegemonic powers over developing 
nations;  and unsuited to the realities of post-conflict environments, arguing for 
external actors to be more context-sensitive and supportive of local ownership 
(Pouligny, 2009); they call for ‘bottom-up’ and ‘hybrid’ forms of peacebuilding 
(Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2009; Schia and Karlsrud, 2013).   
LIMITATION OF THE LIBERAL PEACE CRITIQUES  
Critics consider peacebuilding as a discourse of a singular Liberal Peace, 
disregarding the fact that peacebuilding is not a homogenous entity  and that to 
understand  one must explore the multiple discourses of the Liberal Peace by 
shifting the analytical focus to multiple peacebuildings (Heathershaw, 2008 p. 
603). Similarly, their discourse is often dominated by a perspective which 
somewhat simplistically lumps all international actors together under the term 
‘peacebuilders’, without acknowledging the substantial pluralism of mandates 
and modes of interaction with local authorities and populations. Hoffman ( 2009) 
calls for a rethink of the nature of peace itself, and argues that rather than 
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assuming that peace is a coherent project which can be readily transplanted 
from one society to another, there needs to be a recognition that the nature and 
meaning of peace should be heavily debated and constantly evolving.  Similarly, 
the same must then be appreciated as to the nature of peacebuilding.  
Critics engage in alternative conceptions of legitimacy that stress the need for 
political development to be grounded on the ‘local’, however they do not engage 
in how the ‘local’ conceptualises their idea of peacebuilding and often assume 
that ‘local’ is not liberal.  Their critiques are not contextually specific.  As de 
Coning (2013) has observed “no one seems to challenge the essential logic that 
for any peace process to be sustainable it has to make sense for, and serve the 
interests of the people directly involved” (p.2).  However, there are different 
views about the real meaning of “local ownership”, as it is a flexible and 
subjective concept. Donais (2009) defines the concept of “local ownership”, as 
the extent to which domestic actors control both the design and implementation 
of political processes (p. 3).  Accepting that the critique is that “ownership” 
never actually refers to full control over all project aspects locally however, 
(Reich, 2006) argues local ownership is not always a practical objective 
especially within international funding and working structures and she presents 
it as a vision to strive towards.  This is because the working structures are the 
conditions that determine whether local ownership is realisable or not (p. 7). 
Thus, local ownership is a quality foreign donors have to ‘nurture’ and ‘allow’ 
(Krogstad, 2013 p. 10). 
As this chapter has demonstrated, peacebuilding practise has generated a lot of 
critical discourse; however, even within this discourse the recipients of the 
practise remain passive and voiceless.  This could perhaps be an indication as 
to why peacebuilding is seen to have failed, partly because the actors and 
recipients may have contrasting views of what the end result is; and the 
conceptualisation of the recipients is not taken into consideration.  There is also 
a generalisation, and an underlying assumption, that because the peacebuilding 
arena is normally a post conflict environment, then ‘local’ leaders have no local 
legitimacy.  Though in a number of cases this may ring true, the same cannot 
be said for every context, as will be demonstrated in the case of Somaliland, 
where the clan elders commanded high levels of legitimacy as agents of 
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peacebuilding and are therefore continually seen by the Somaliland people as 
the only ones with the authority to engage in nurturing their version of peace.   
Another underlying and oft highlighted critique of ownership fails to 
acknowledge that there are several factors that may limit local ownership.  
Mateos (2011), for example, identifies three main “practical problems” 
(influenced by perceptions of reality) that explain why local ownership is more a 
rhetorical concept than a real one: a problem of lack of “local capacity” 
(especially where most of those educated have previously fled), a problem of 
the locals’ dependence on externals for resources, and a problem of mutual 
mistrust. Although locals are supposed to lead the different reforms, they 
strongly depend on external funding (Mateos, 2011).  Though this may not be 
explicitly outlined in policy documents; in practise some donor funding practises 
make funding available through personal connections with programme heads 
where mutual trust is inferred so long as the organisation is headed by specific 
individuals.   
Likewise the critics miss out on the fact that different societies, especially those 
which are highly segmented, may not necessarily have any one institution 
holding a monopoly over the legitimate use of power to rule, or for physical 
violence. Nevertheless, they exhibit tendencies that are very far from a 
Hobbesian situation of a bellum omnium contra omnes (i.e. a war of everybody 
against everybody else). These societies are not all chaotic, but include 
examples which are ‘orderly’ in a completely different way from the state order 
that is commonly perceived by the powerful countries of the world as the only 
valid order. Such societies, as has been evidenced for example within the 
Somalia communities, have their own institutions of violence control, conflict 
transformation and peacebuilding.  Thus, those like Paris (2004) who locate the 
main weakness of contemporary peacebuilding in its neglect for strong 
institutions such the judiciary, executive and rule of law, base their evidence on 
their own perception as to what these institutions ought to be, rather than what 
the reality on the ground dictates.  They advocate that state building must 
precede peacebuilding and even democratisation. Peacebuilding must first 
address human needs, produce physical safety and foster socio-economic 
stability before elections and democratic government can be instituted (ibid). 
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The peacebuilding critics fail to show what a practical alternative would look like. 
The empirical evidence is that these external transnational networks of 
governmental and non-governmental actors do make a crucial contribution at 
very delicate times of the post conflict environment.  In situations where most of 
the populations have fled, there may be a lack of available capacity in the 
provision of vital services e.g. health care provision; mine clearance specialists; 
provision of basic education, amongst others.  In such contexts these external 
actors and transnational networks are vital.  On the same note, sometimes local 
capacity may have the resilience needed to address their immediate needs but 
may lack the proper resources and tools to undertake such tasks, as this thesis 
will illustrate with the case of Somaliland’s efforts on mine clearance.  The 
critics and the critiques only provide a partial view of international interventions, 
neglecting what Autesserre (2011) has noted as ‘the concrete, daily practices of 
international action, the social and epistemological tensions among international 
actors, and the impact of public opinion and domestic considerations’ which 
means that they overlook how interventions operate on the ground where most 
peacebuilding operations occur (2011 p. 5).   Peacebuilding interventions have 
to contend with the reality and the practical challenges on the ground and these 
challenges are unique for every context.  Similarly Opongo (2011) has argued 
that these liberal peace critiques tend to rely on anecdotal evidence without 
talking to the people on the ground to find out their own perceptions of the 
critiques being made (p. 369). He has argued that the critique has often been 
undertaken at a macro level while ignoring the interactive peacebuilding 
processes at the micro level and how these shape the discourse and practice of 
peacebuilding at the middle and top level structures of the society.  My analysis 
will draw attention to the importance of context, both historical and political, in 
challenging the implementation of programmes.  The critics also overlook how 
the context both at the global level (be it in funding etc. and therefore policy 
formulation) and local level for implementation may contribute to the failures or 
successes of interventions.  Thus by focusing on actors alone in their critiques, 
the critics perpetuate the very problem of failure of acknowledging local context 
and other factors that exert control over peacebuilding processes.  This will be 
illustrated by the role of mine action that has intrinsic value for peacebuilding 
but of which the context presents a particular challenge for implementation.  
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Therefore just as peacebuilding is conceptualised by both the external actors 
and the recipients themselves; the responses, the sequencing, and the activities 
ought to be uniquely shaped in order to make the right impact. Similarly the 
wide arrays of actors have divergent and sometimes conflicting interests, values, 
purposes, organisational forms and modalities of action that they bring into the 
context that they are working in.  It is important to acknowledge that 
peacebuilding does not take place in a vacuum, and even when in reference to 
the local, it is important to engage in understanding how the ‘local’ 
conceptualises their idea of peacebuilding without necessarily assuming that 
‘local’ is not liberal.  Thus any critiques should be context specific; and they 
should consider peacebuilding as a discourse of a multiple peace, appreciating 
the fact that peacebuilding is not a homogenous entity  and that to understand,  
one must explore the multiple discourses by shifting the analytical focus to 
multiple ‘peacebuildings’ (Heathershaw, 2008 p. 603).   
INTERROGATING MINE ACTION WITHIN PEACEBUILDING 
The extent to which mine action supports peacebuilding has not been critically 
examined and the evidence remains anecdotal and rhetorical at best.  This 
section will demonstrate how the peacebuilding literature, and the mine action 
Sector itself, pigeonholes mine action only within security thereby limiting the 
extent to which mine action can offer itself for scrutiny as an activity within 
peacebuilding, or even be conceptualised as such.   
This section will aim to provide a coherent narrative that looks beyond the 
security gains for mine action.  Similarly, the section will demonstrate the extent 
to which the contemporary debates on post conflict peacebuilding mirror mine 
action.  
I locate the conceptualisation of mine action within peacebuilding through the 
Mine Ban Movement analyzing the way in which the campaign to ban 
landmines emerged and through the intrinsic values of mine action as an 
activity.  I do not go into detail in looking at the benefits of mine action as these 
benefits are assumed through clearance; I analyse the other potential benefits 
for mine clearance that might not be obvious.  
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The following section on mapping the landmines campaign is important both in 
illustrating the normative framing of the Sector (as a humanitarian issue) and 
secondly it helps in unpacking and understanding the Sector that was a result of 
this process.  Understanding the campaign and the process, helps in identifying 
the actors and the context the mine ban movement emerged from; I argue that 
these actors and context are instructive when looking at the process of mine 
action implementation as these factors continually define the Sector beyond the 
campaigning period. This section therefore forms the context for the next 
chapter. 
Mine Action as Humanitarian agenda  
a) The Evolution of the Mine Ban process  
The intention of this section is provide the movement/campaign that achieved 
the mine ban treaty (MBT) as a process that culminated in establishing the 
Sector.  I therefore refer to the ‘mine ban process’, throughout to describe the 
broad coalition of states, international organisations and non-governmental 
organisations that actively supported a total ban on anti-personnel mines as 
well as increased resources for mine clearance and victim assistance. It is also 
used to distinguish this broader and less formalised movement from the civil 
society based International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). 
Just as the Post-Cold War era brought about a multiplicity of intrastate conflicts, 
it also brought forth the extensive use of weapons such as landmines that were 
used against civilian populations in places such as Somalia, Cambodia, Angola, 
and Mozambique. With the end of the Cold War, conflict in the developing world 
was no longer viewed simply through the lens of global competition. Attention to 
these conflicts in their own right resulted in increased recognition of the human 
toll exacted by light weapons, including landmines. Similarly this change of the 
international systems provided the development and entrenchment of norms of 
multilateralism that encouraged the coordinated international call to ban 
landmines.  The nature of mine/UXO contamination meant that demining 
became pivotal in conflict and post conflict environments, if humanitarian 
assistance and post conflict reconstruction was to get underway in these 
countries.   
 
 
58 
 
The use of antipersonnel landmines grew more extensively during and after 
World War II, but the existing international legal institutions of states did not 
provide an institutional direct line for concerns about these weapons. 
Significantly, this task was left to NGOs, and concern with antipersonnel 
landmines initially grew out of work on humanitarian laws of conflict as carried 
out chiefly by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)  (Price, 
1998).  
Previously, in the early 1970s, bodies such as the ICRC, United Nations (UN) 
and some governments had been prompted by the Indochina Wars to call for a 
ban, but the absence of a strong international law frustrated this process.  In the 
intervening period, the anti-personnel mine problem grew, with mines being laid 
at much faster rates than they could be cleared. Even with the existent 
humanitarian law, within which the use of mines and other forms of weapons 
such as cluster bombs were controlled, the  Cold War exposed the 
inadequacies of the same,  and the uncontrolled use of anti-personnel mines in 
internal conflicts was evident in the 80s and 90s (Cave, 2006). Its end enabled 
state policymakers to focus on less strategic weapons, such as landmines, and 
allowed many states to pursue unilateral military policies, sometimes in 
opposition to the major powers (Rutherford, 2000a). 
The efforts of mine clearance started immediately after the end World War II to 
aid post-war reconstruction in Europe13 and due to the work involving a large 
amount of manpower the victorious Allies enlisted the use of Prisoners of War14 
(Bolton, 2010; Lardner, 2005).  However, the impact and problems caused by 
mines/UXOs to populations living in and near mined areas remained largely 
invisible to the international community. Over time those working in areas that 
had been arenas of armed conflicts could no longer ignore the ever growing 
numbers of injured civilians that emerged at hospitals and emergency clinics.   
NGOs such as Handicap International (HI) and ICRC field surgeons working in 
medical assistance programs noted the steady growth of amputees needing 
                                            
13In 1945 the French used 49,000 German POWs (prisoners of war), as well as French civilians and 
military personnel. 
14 The practise of using PoWs for clearance drew a lot of concern which prompted Article 52 of the Third 
Geneva Convention of 1949 specifically prohibits the use of POWs for mine clearance activities unless 
they are “volunteers”. 
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prostheses in places such as Cambodia15. ICRC also witnessed how huge 
areas of land and major roads were out-of-bounds, restricting livelihoods and 
preventing rehabilitation and refugee return; health facilities, schools, markets 
and water sources being too dangerous to access. This revulsion over the 
human suffering often affecting the poorest in the world’s most impoverished 
and isolated states compelled these NGOs to engage their identities/interests 
as providers of humanitarian medical assistance, mine clearance services, and 
as organisations dedicated to documenting and advocating against human 
rights violations (Rutherford, 2011).  Without further action, their response of 
providing surgical and medical emergency support proved inefficient, and the 
organisations soon realised that more was needed.   Previously HI had begun a 
proactive approach to the crisis, and had been joined by the Mine Advisory 
Group (MAG), a British demining organisation founded by Rae McGrath (an ex-
British Army Engineer, with 18 years of experience in the Army)16 who had been 
working for several years in Afghanistan; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Medico 
International, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Physicians for Human Rights 
(PHR), and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) progressed to the 
formal initiation of an International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), an 
organisation founded by these groups of NGOs that had already started working 
together. The NGOs mobilised politically around the call for a global ban.    
They also continued providing evidence that they had gathered in their work to 
demonstrate both the scale of landmine contamination in different parts of the 
world, and the way these were affecting civilians.  Earlier the organisation 
Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation, led by a Jesuit Priest, had published 
reports on landmines in the council’s widely circulated newsletter. The activities 
of these three organisations saw the beginnings of a concerted effort towards a 
campaign calling for a ban on landmines. These reports were improved and 
further presented in a series of influential reports.   “Landmines in Cambodia: 
The Coward’s War” (Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1991) was 
                                            
15 In its first decade of operations, HI fitted more than 15,000 amputees with prostheses; however, by the 
early 1990s the number of amputees had grown to over 30,000 and was getting worse in their other 
countries of operation. 
16 Rae Mcgrath founded the Mines Advisory Group in 1989, after seeing the impact of landmines and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) on civilians in Afghanistan, became an internationally acknowledged expert 
on the impact of landmines and cluster munitions on relief and humanitarian efforts; one of the co-founders 
of ICBL and presented the acceptance speech on behalf of the ICBL in Oslo. 
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the first of the reports.  Rae McGrath collaborated with Human Rights Watch to 
produce the report “Hidden Death; The Landmine Situation in Iraqi Kurdistan” 
(Middle East Watch, 1992); this was followed by two reports written by Alex 
Vines at Human Rights Watch, on Angola in 1993 “Landmines in Angola: An 
African Report” (Human Rights Watch, 1993b), and one on Mozambique in 
1994 (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994).  (Physicians for Human Rights (U.S.), 
1992) “Hidden Enemies: Landmines in Northern Somalia”; (Human Rights 
Watch, 1993b) “Landmines in Angola”.  In October of 1993, HRW and PHR then 
published the ground breaking “Landmines: A Deadly Legacy”, (Human Rights 
Watch, 1993a) a complete book on the landmines issue that integrated the 
results of the earlier reports into a comprehensive picture of landmine 
production and use, and their terrible impact. Other relevant titles included a 
joint MAG UK and African Rights report entitled, “Violent Deeds Live On; 
landmines in Somalia and Somaliland” (Omaar et al., 1993) and (Roberts and 
Williams, 1995) Vietnam Veterans of America,  After the Guns Fall Silent (1995).    
The response by the NGOs was described as somewhat ‘hesitant’ at first, as 
these organisations were entering into an area they conventionally saw as the 
preserve of the military (IRIN, 2004a). These reports had several positive 
outcomes: they helped in the portrayal of landmines as “weapons of mass 
destruction in slow motion” including, significantly, getting the US State 
Department to describe landmines as “the most toxic and widespread pollution 
facing mankind”17 (Petrova, 2010).  The narratives that emerged from these 
accounts were of a “humanitarian crisis,” and a “global epidemic of landmines,” 
(Larrinaga and Sjolander, 1998). Similarly their impact had been described as a 
“humanitarian holocaust” of landmines (Gray, 1997). 
The campaign that ensued capitalised on these narratives and hence captured 
the imagination, and harnessed the global moral outrage against landmines.  
The success of the NGOs in strategically framing the debates regarding their 
humanitarian impact and military ineffectiveness, brought about a shift in the 
perceptions of their military utility, argues (Petrova, 2010).  Thus the vilification 
                                            
17 Quoted by Senator Leahy in a speech to the Senate (Congressional Record, February 28, 1994) Bill, 
103d CONGRESS 2d Session - S.2216 To state the sense of Congress on the production, possession, 
transfer, and use of antipersonnel landmines, to place a moratorium on United States production of 
antipersonnel landmines. 
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of landmines through the NGO narratives strategically managed to de-securitise 
the landmines issue. The reports, and the fact that those involved in the work 
were mainly NGOs, contributed immensely to efforts towards reframing the 
debate on landmines from security into humanitarian terms (Hubert, 2000; 
Matthew and Rutherford, 2003; Price, 1998; Rutherford, 2000a).  This process 
contributed to the deepening of the security debate as has been noted by 
(Behringer, 2005; Paris, 2001) amongst others.  The  way in which landmines 
impact on civilians may have been previously seen as a security issue, but the 
manner in which this crisis was responded to lay beyond a traditional state-
centric concept of security, and instead was directly embedded within the core 
of the new ‘human security’ paradigm (Harpviken and Skaešra, 2003 p. 815).  
Through key publications, landmines were portrayed as causing horrific 
suffering of innocent victims (most often women and children), and impediments 
to reconstruction efforts in war-torn societies.   
The momentum of the ban movement grew, because a ban seemed a logical 
solution to what the campaign had managed to illustrate as an obvious 
humanitarian disaster.  Price notes that “the most basic effect of civil society, 
then, had been the transnational dissemination of information about the scope 
of landmine use and its effects, thereby helping to define the use of 
antipersonnel landmines as not only a problem, but as a global crisis” (Price, 
1998 p. 622).   
Other factors that helped in facilitating the emergence of the global network of 
concerned supporters around the issue were the unprecedented role played by 
telecommunication through the internet and electronic media, including 
telecommunications, fax machines.  A virtual community was created across 
disparate identities that utilised web sites and e-mail traffic proliferated to 
provide a wealth of instantaneously available information and spotlighting 
recalcitrants, whether they be governments or private industries that produced 
mines (DeChaine, 2005; Price, 1998). 
Certain governments were sympathetic to the ambitions of NGOs for a strong 
treaty, and their receptiveness to a real partnership with NGOs facilitated the 
attainment of the goals (Short, 1999). These states were Canada, Norway, 
Belgium, Austria and South Africa among other small- to medium-sized 
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countries.  Thus a broad-based campaign emerged comprising of a dynamic 
interaction of actors such as the NGOs, the ICRC, UN agencies, and 
‘sympathetic’ states. It was these state officials who represented the core group 
of states supporting the comprehensive ban who ensured that the NGOs did not 
remain marginalised at the edges of the international conferences from which 
they were initially routinely excluded. The Canadian government in many 
respects served as a “patron” to NGOs. It made information about the political 
process open to NGOs and championed the participation of the ICBL leadership 
in diplomatic meetings.  Short (1999) argues that the Canadian government’s 
patronage of the Ottawa Process ‘may have been constructed to express a 
liberal ideal’ (p. 493). 
The efficacy of a humanitarian framing of the anti-personnel mine problem and 
its potential solution was confirmed by empirical data on the effects of these 
mines and by dynamic contact between mine action practitioners with 
multilateral negotiators.  NGOs provided statistics about the nature and extent 
of the landmine problem, especially its social and economic consequences; 
these were used to get states to recognise the severity of the landmine problem. 
The statistics were grim and were widely cited by the campaigners; some of the 
frequently cited estimates included that in 1994 ‘there were up to 110 million 
mines deployed in some sixty-four countries’; this was compared with how 
inexpensive it was to manufacture landmines they supposedly ‘cost as little as 
three dollars apiece; whilst exponentially more costly in terms of time, money, 
and human life’.  The rate of demining was also highlighted.  By the mid-1990s 
the NGOs reckoned that only 100,000 landmines were being removed annually 
and they argued that, at that rate, it would take 1,100 years to clear those 
already on the ground (Bottigliero, 2000; DeChaine, 2005; Price, 1998).  These 
statistics resonated with the media, the public, and policymakers and they were 
seen as so outrageous that the problem could no longer be ignored. In the 
event it has become apparent that many of the statistics generated by NGOs 
were inflated and, more significantly, regurgitated by the media and 
policymakers without proper fact-checking and research.  I will argue that this 
was later to haunt the Sector that emerged. 
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The NGOs campaigned and set the agenda, adopting and rallying around the 
slogan that anti-personnel mines caused unnecessary suffering and maiming of 
soldiers and civilians and that they should be banned on humanitarian grounds 
(Stott et al., 2003).  Chapman (2008 p. 113) argues that through the NGO’s 
stigmatisation landmines were given agency, and became an asset in 
peacetime. The publicity generated was a rallying call for more intensive mine 
clearance resources through donor funding as the international community’s 
contribution to addressing the landmine crisis. 
Thus, the development and emergent of the Mine Action Sector mirrors the 
development of international peacebuilding in a number of ways. As with 
peacebuilding, and as noted earlier, the broadening of the security debate and 
impetus that NGOs had found in this new environment provided for a rallying 
call in support of a ban on landmines; the NGOs did this by providing evidence 
that they had gathered in their work to demonstrate both the scale of landmine 
contamination in different parts of the world, and the impact on civilians.   
b) The Actors 
Short (1999)  argues that advocacy for a ban came from four different sets of 
actors: NGOs, the ICRC, the United Nations (UN), and individual governments; 
however, I observe that these actors were aided in the process by the expertise 
provided by the military, and I therefore consider military forces  as a fifth set of 
actors. The ICBL and the ICRC were typical lead actors; each of them with a 
different legitimacy base and character. The media also played a key role in 
documenting the impact of the weapons around the world and providing vivid 
images of victims. Each of the actors made a significant contribution to the 
process. Government actors provided the platforms from which to discuss the 
issue, the ability to change and create law, and financial resources; NGOs and 
international organisations brought to the table knowledge, field experience and 
the ability to maintain a spotlight on the issue. Each of these sectors was not 
monolithic and tended to ‘self-select’.  This self-selection process became one 
of the calling-cards of the Ottawa Process, though it could also be considered a 
natural process of coalition building (Anderson, 2000; Rutherford, 2011).  
Due to the challenges brought by mine/UXO contamination the Sector 
underwent a very rapid expansion that incorporated a variety of usually very 
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disparate organisations and actors; these included practitioners from fields as 
diverse as the military, medical, development, humanitarian bodies, security, 
and the UN, all converged under the Mine Action Sector.  The refrain that 
landmines were “a humanitarian, not an arms control, issue” has been 
described as a perspective that reflects the composition and motivation of many 
of the organisations involved in the campaign (Murray et al., 2012  p. 483).  The 
campaign was thus founded, led and dominated by a small coterie of well-
connected Northern 18  humanitarian/development and human rights NGOs, 
staffed by Northern professionals who depended financially and politically on 
sections of Western19 states. The six ICBL founders, which also comprised its 
Steering Committee until 1995-6 when several new NGOs were added (ICBL 
1996a, p.5, 1996b), included three US (Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation, Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights) and three 
European NGOs (Handicap International (France & Belgium), Mines Advisory 
Group (UK) and Medico International (Germany).  
Mine Action as an Agenda for the UN 
Endorsement of the campaign by the UN was reflected in the 1992 Agenda for 
Peace (AfP) which highlighted that “Increasingly it is evident that peacebuilding 
after civil or international strife must address the serious problem of landmines, 
many tens of millions of which remained scattered in present or former combat 
zones” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992 paragh 58) thus explicitly supporting the call to 
address the challenges presented by their presence, framing it within a 
peacebuilding agenda. Just as the AfP had provided the normative change in 
peacebuilding, it became instrumental in further shaping the debate on 
landmines.  Two years later in an article in Foreign Affairs, Boutros-Ghali further 
showed support for the movement when he suggested that if their effects were 
“better known, land mines would undoubtedly shock the conscience of 
mankind—the same public reaction that led to the banning of chemical and 
biological weapons” (Boutros-Ghali, 1994 p. 13).  Subsequently,  in his  
foreword to the proceedings of a 1995 symposium on landmines, “Clearing the 
                                            
18 The terms ‘Northern’ and ‘Western’ are used interchangeably, although ‘Western’ more often 
refers to states and ‘Northern’ more often to NGOs. 
19 The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ are used interchangeably, although ‘Western’ more often refers to 
states and ‘Northern’ more often to NGOs.  
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Fields Solutions to the Global Landmines Crisis” (Cahill, 1995 p. xiv) he called 
for the UN  to build widespread support for an international agreement on a total 
ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer, and export of mines and their 
component.  This clearly placed landmines within a humanitarian agenda 
endorsed by the UN.  Similarly, UN Peacekeepers became increasingly 
vulnerable as the UN mandated peacekeeping missions in contexts that had 
extensive mine contamination such as Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique and 
Bosnia20 increased.  Thus an urgency of finding a solution to the landmines 
crisis (Hubert, 2000).  
The conceptualisation of mine action as a sector or a distinct humanitarian 
discipline beyond merely the term can further be traced back to October 1988 in 
Afghanistan. The term mine action (the name) originated in Cambodia where, in 
the early 1990s, Canadian Army engineers suggested that the body set up to 
administer and coordinate mine-related activities in the country be named the 
Cambodian Mine Action Centre, with a view to stressing the dynamic nature of 
the enterprise (Horwood, 2000)  Mine clearance had been largely a domain of 
the national militaries, or carried out in the context of peacekeeping 
operations 21 , but Afghanistan presented a different case, as there was no 
functioning Afghan army, and with the Soviet troops unwilling or unable to clear 
mines before their departure, the humanitarian community, led by the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) stepped 
in, and the concept of humanitarian mine action was born (Filippino, 2006).  
Thus the UN in Afghanistan had set off establishing the first ‘humanitarian mine 
action’ programme by supporting the creation of a number of national Afghan 
NGOs who were trained in mine clearance.  Mine related activities became 
civilianised, with mainly NGOs and UNOCHA taking the lead role, but also 
engaging with military expertise (Harpviken, 2003 p. 812). The first of such mine 
clearance activities, with an objective of making land safe for civilians, took root 
and this became known as humanitarian mine clearance (Horwood, 2000).  
                                            
20 Akachi, Y. and Atun, R. (2011) Effect of investment in malaria control on child mortality in sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2002-2008. PLoS One, 6, e21309. noted that in spite of efforts to train UN and NATO 
peacekeeping troops to avoid mines in Bosnia, they suffered more than 300 casualties from mine 
accidents alone (pp: 145).    
21 Past the peacekeeping period, the activities were exclusively carried out by state institutions such as 
military or health professionals but with the state as the overall authority Harpviken, K. B. and Isaksen, J. 
(2004) Reclaiming the Fields of War: Mainstreaming Mine Action in Development. Oslo & New york: United 
Nations Development Programme. 
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Mine Action as human security 
Harpviken and Skaešra (2003) argued that whilst the way landmines cause 
death, injury, and fear to civilians may have been previously seen as a 
straightforward security issue, the manner in which this crisis was responded to 
lay beyond a traditional state-centric concept of security, and instead was 
directly embedded within the core of the new ‘human security’ paradigm 
(Harpviken and Skaešra, 2003 p. 815).  Cockell (2000), defines peacebuilding 
as a sustainable process having as its main purpose the prevention of internal 
threats to human security, which cause protracted violent conflict (Cockell, 
2000). Thus within such a conceptualisation of peacebuilding, mine action 
underlines the close relationship between the concepts of human security and 
post conflict peacebuilding,  addressing the overall objective on the need for 
people to  be ‘free from fear’. 
As a post conflict peacebuilding issue, and an activity within humanitarian action, 
it thus fits within the approach to ‘new’ security issues. However, unlike other 
areas of peacebuilding mine action is not substantially discussed within the 
academic peacebuilding literature. Likewise, the prominent grey literature on 
peacebuilding or peace implementation makes reference to mine action only 
marginally (Call and Cousens, 2007; Cousens and Kumar, 2001; Kaldor, 2007; 
Reychler and Paffenholz, 2000).   However, Faulkner and Pettiford (1998))  had 
argued that landmines presented a considerable threat to security and had 
called for newer, non-military definitions of security.  They argued that a people-
centered security was fundamentally compromised in the context of the most 
pernicious of weapons.  Though they had not implicitly used the terms 
landmines and human security, they had advocated the use of a human security 
framework to address challenges presented by landmines.  They highlighted 
that “de-mining and community coping strategies in living with mines can 
combine in leading to a genuine human-centered security” (Faulkner and 
Pettiford, 1998 p. 58).   
Therefore like peacebuilding, the human security concept provides a framework 
and direction to apply international efforts (such as mine action) that seek to 
protect people caught up in the rapidly developing and incredibly complex 
threats and challenges  (Ogata, 2004 p. 5). Mine action merges the 
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humanitarian, political and military roles,  but amongst analysts such as Barry 
and Jefferys (2002) such an approach is still contested as they argue for the 
need to keep separate ‘the mandates, missions and principles of formal military 
forces and humanitarian agencies’.  They argue that the military has a core 
mandate to foster security and protect civilians by establishing and enforcing a 
safe and stable environment. Humanitarian agencies, by contrast, have a 
mandate to directly implement humanitarian aid programmes. It is essential that 
these two roles – impartial humanitarian assistance as a response to an urgent 
and inalienable right, and peace operations with their inevitably partial and 
political mandates – are kept separate (Barry and Jefferys, 2002 p. 2). 
The description of the formation of the sector  has demonstrated how the call for 
a ban was based on humanitarian rather than security or economic criteria and 
also extended beyond international humanitarian law to encompass norms 
relating to state legitimacy by drawing on the need for states undergoing various 
forms of transition to demonstrate good international conduct (Bryden, 2010).   
Mine Action in support of post conflict reconstruction 
Beyond these intrinsic values of mine action’s enabling potential for 
peacebuilding the specific activities which ought to follow to gain these benefits 
are not that obvious. They depend on a non-linearity of interaction of various 
elements within a system. Thus, it is not the quality of a single factor which 
reinforces a conflict or helps achieve sustainable peace, what counts is the 
manner in which the different factors interact and the kind of context that they 
occur in. 
Therefore mine action as peacebuilding can also be explained when viewed 
from a systemic perspective, i.e. in the context of an integrated peacebuilding 
framework.  In this context, mine action facilitates the construction of roads 
which may be regarded as an important element of a larger peacebuilding 
framework. It creates jobs including for ex-combatants also aiding DDR 
programmes. Jobs may stimulate local economies. If the roads improve 
livelihoods are improved through having access to markets. It may stimulate 
local contractor capacity; open up outlying areas previously marginalised 
because of their inaccessibility and assist in the extension of the authority of the 
state into those territories; and it may contribute to overall economic growth, all 
 
 
68 
 
of which are important aspects of an environment conducive to a successful 
peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict. Following the 
implementation of mine action activities, research has demonstrated that there 
is a perception of improvements in safety and security; perceived improvements 
in socio-economic wellbeing and improved security and economic and social 
development (Hammond, 2013) 
As a sub-sector of the larger world of humanitarian aid; mine action supports 
the delivery of other elements of humanitarian aid, as a crucial element of this 
aid itself.  For communities that are recovering from conflict, safety and security 
are always an overwhelming issue for humanitarian action, not just because of 
the atrocious killings and injuries suffered by humanitarian workers, but 
because of the cumulative effects of challenges of access to vulnerable 
communities. Therefore mine action not only supports the security of post 
conflict communities but that of humanitarian workers and other civilians in 
general. Similarly mine action is linked to longer term rehabilitation and 
development in several ways; through activities that ensure risk reduction in 
other sectors, e.g. access to water and food security, and are therefore 
connected to more complex reconstruction and development related issues; 
and through the primary aim of mine action in the creation of indigenous 
capacity in mine-affected communities. 
Almost all humanitarian interventions are preceded by assessment missions to 
establish the planning and funding basis for projects.  In cases where the areas 
are inaccessible because the access roads have not been declared passable, 
populations are often not even considered for assistance, remaining beyond the 
reach and sight of humanitarian interveners.  The presence or even fear of 
mines has forced humanitarian and relief aid organisations to suspend relief 
operations during emergencies, a tragic consequence for civilians22. Due to 
                                            
22 For example in 1993 ICRC had to suspend its operations in isolated villages of Tesanj and Maglaj in 
Bosnia where 140,000 villagers remained hungry and without access to provisions.  Four months later, an 
attempt to deliver humanitarian aid was hampered when a convoy of 14 trucks had to turn back when the 
lead truck hit a mine which led to further delays of medical assistance and other humanitarian aid reaching 
this vulnerable population  ICRC (2002) Anti-vehicle mines: effects on humanitarian assistance and civilian 
populations  Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross.. In Angola, aid reached only 10 to 15% of 
the country largely as a result of logistic constraints (the poor state of airstrips and roads), the precarious 
security conditions, in the form of attacks on civilians and vehicles, and the presence of landmines. 
Humanitarian organisations had access to only 60% of the 272 locations where displaced people were 
concentrated and to approximately 73% of reported displaced populations Porto, J. G. and Clover, J. 
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such blockages, other means of accessing such populations were sought which 
end up increasing the cost of humanitarian assistance.  The aid can be airlifted; 
for example in Angola OCHA reported that "more than 70 % of all humanitarian 
assistance was transported by air due to restricted surface routes”  (ICRC, 
2002). Thus, a humanitarian plight can be made worse increasing the 
vulnerability and human insecurity of the local population, while decreasing the 
capacity of external bodies to provide assistance (GICHD, 2004).  
Mine Action as an ‘entry point’ 
Mine action may also serve as a foundation for conflict resolution. The problem 
of landmines, if and when acknowledged by all parties to the conflict, serves as 
a fruitful starting point for the development of joint solutions. At the inception 
stages interventions encourage various armed factions to buy into peace 
agreements forming the basis for disarmament and demobilisation of their 
fighters.  Similarly, demining removes the physical barriers created by 
landmines and not only serves as a powerful confidence building measure, but 
also as a platform for further inter-communal collaborations.  
Agreement to tackle explosive ordnance as a humanitarian problem provides a 
potentially neutral platform from which parties can agree to meaningful 
measures, and further engage.  Moser-Puangsuwan (2009) looked at all the 
peace agreements and noted that indeed initiatives to address mine and UXO 
contamination have formed integral parts of peace agreements and ceasefires23. 
According to  LeBrun and Damman (2009) the importance of addressing issues 
of contamination has become prominent, so that familiarity with key issues for 
                                                                                                                                
(2003) The peace dividend in Angola: Strategic implications for Okavango basin cooperation. 
Transboundary Rivers, Sovereignty and Development: Hydropolitical Drivers in the Okavango River Basin. 
Pretoria & Geneva: AWIRU & Green Cross International..     
23 As for the cases of Nicaragua (1990), Cambodia (1991), El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992),  
Angola (1994), Croatia (1994),  Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999),  Democratic Republic of 
Congo  (1999), Burundi (2000), Philippines (2001), Ethiopia/Eritrea (2000), Sudan (2004), Senegal  (2004), 
Nepal (2006). Similarly in Guatemala, one of the agreements signed on the 17th of June 1994 was an 
Agreement of Resettlement of the Displaced Population due to the Armed Conflict. However, for the 
agreement to take effect, there was recognition of the necessity to address the problem of munitions 
contamination and this was highlighted and was included in the agreement23 Pacheco, G. (2004) The 
Process of Demining and Destroying UXO in Guatemala. Journal of Mine Action, 8 (2).. A domestic 
approach was applied, and the Volunteer Fireman’s Corps (CVB) were called to serve as a neutral actor to 
mine action and also as a liaison between government authorities. This was because the population was 
reluctant to trust the military and cooperate with it in providing information needed to conduct clearance to 
meet the needs of its particular post-conflict situation (Fiederlein 2005).  More recent cases include Mali, 
Senegal and Niger where mine action projects have provided opportunities for former opponents from 
governments and rebel groups to cooperate to determine the extent of landmine contamination and clear 
the mines Moore, M. P. (2014) Demining a Road to Peace: The Continuing Role of Mine Action in 
Peacebuilding in Senegal. Landmines in Africa; Until every step is safe. online..   
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addressing explosive ordnance needs to become an integral element for those 
directly involved in peace negotiation and facilitation. 
Research by Unruh (1997; 2001; 2002) has also demonstrated that the problem 
of landmines can significantly complicate a peace process especially depending 
on the speed and timing with which such problems occur. He argues that 
“should issues of re-integration, land access, land conflict, food insecurity, and 
environmental emerge at particularly delicate or sensitive points in the process 
(e.g., ending UN subsidies for ex-combatants, onset of UN or government 
programmes regarding land reform, arrival of commercial interests in an area, 
etc.), it can have a much greater impact than at other times” (Unruh et al., 2003  
p. 857).  Thus through mine action opportunities for fostering cooperation and 
dialogue, building confidence, establishing governance structures and building 
national capacities are opened up. 
Facilitation of Demilitarisation, Demobilisation and Re-integration 
(DDR) 
In many post war contexts unemployment is high due to a highly depleted 
economy therefore providing employment opportunities to ex-combatants and 
the society in general may have the effect of improving security in volatile post 
conflict environments.  According to a report by the ILO (2009) In countries such 
as Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Bosnia demining has been used 
as “first-line response” in the initial stages of DDR, as it is a labour-intensive 
activity that can render quick results both for disarmament and reintegration of 
ex-combatants (ILO, 2009 p. 61).  In the Afghan context, Strand (2004) 
concluded that, by providing alternative employment to men who had largely 
been engaged in the anti-Soviet war of the 1980s, the mine action programme 
prevented their recruitment by armed groups in the 1990s.  Thus mine action in 
this way plays a dual role of facilitating DDR by preventing the danger of former 
combatants using their skills as ‘violence entrepreneurs’ as is frequently 
mentioned in DDR discourse and also through promoting socio-economic 
benefits through the provision of employment. 
Demining therefore contributes directly to these processes and has repeatedly 
proved to be vital to stabilising post-conflict situations through addressing the 
bigger concerns of the large number of ex-combatants that need to be included 
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in the recovery process. Mine action and specifically demining does this by 
contributing to reducing the likelihood of renewed violence, either because of 
relapse into war or outbreaks of banditry by relieving the pressure emanating 
from various sources such as insecurity; a weak economy; large numbers of 
returnees and IDPs that need reintegration into communities etc., thus 
effectively helping in facilitating post conflict society’s transition from conflict to 
normalcy and development. 
INTEGRATING MINE ACTION WITHIN A PEACEBUILDING 
PALETTE 
The international agenda on mine action places mine clearance and other 
activities as a part of the broader discourse of peacebuilding.  Other than 
conflict sensitive programming that is now a requirement for any organisation 
working in a post conflict environment, the Mine Action Sector developed 
the 1999 Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes from a Development-Oriented 
Point of View also known as the Bad Honnef Framework 24 .  Using this 
framework Harpviken traces the framing of the Sector as a component within 
the larger peacebuilding.  These guidelines stated the need for mine action 
programmes to be integrated within ‘a national and local peacebuilding and 
development framework’. The document further suggested activities where 
mine action could support peacebuilding processes, including in socio-
economic sectors.  The guidelines recognised that working towards the 
rehabilitation of post war societies was not only complex but also required a 
comprehensive approach that ensured that the conditions which had led to war 
in the first place were not recreated.  It therefore recognised that a few technical 
“inputs” were not sufficient suggesting concrete ways in which mine action 
might support peacebuilding, including promoting reconciliation (through the 
participation of diverse social groups), securing transparency (by involving civil 
institutions in all aspects) and helping to bring about awareness of collectively 
suffered injustice (through ban campaigns) (Harpviken and Skaešra, 2003).  
An alternative method of exploring mine action’s peacebuilding potential is 
through interrogating how the various pillars of mine action contribute to various 
                                            
24 Named after the venue of the conference where the guidelines were drafted.  Bad Honnef, Germany 
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sectors of peacebuilding; secondly, through assessing the way in which the 
various mine action organisations use their technical expertise and their 
capacities to operate in post conflict environments to address the bigger issues 
around human security through addressing the reduction of armed violence and 
promotion of public safety.  I will limit this illustration to just the ‘palette approach’ 
and explore the second option through the case study of Somaliland. 
The palette approach has been used by the FaFo/Landmine Action Report 
(Jennings et al., 2008); although this report only looked at the rhetorical 
narrative of how each of the mine action pillars can contribute to the 
peacebuilding palette; the aim was to demonstrate how the various elements of 
humanitarian mine action have important, tangible, political, socio-economic 
and justice and rehabilitation ramifications, in addition to the more obvious 
security gains. They took the peacebuilding palette as illustrated by  the Utstein 
Study as a starting point and expanded it in order to examine it from a 
humanitarian mine action point of view, they then developed a mine action 
Palette as illustrated: 
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Figure 5: Adapted Mine Action Peacebuilding Palette  
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Jennings et al, (2008) ‘Peacebuilding & 
Humanitarian Mine Action: Strategic Possibilities and Local Practicalities 
(p: 34)  
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Figure 6: Mine Action/Peacebuilding Web of Interrelatedness 
 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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EMERGING CRITIQUES AND LITERATURE GAPS 
The emerging critiques of mine action mirror those of post conflict peacebuilding; 
the initial programmes faced enormous challenges, with well-intentioned 
initiatives becoming regarded as ill-thought-out phenomena.  Focusing too 
much on technicalities rather than the affected communities, and the failure to 
coordinate with and learn from the larger humanitarian assistance programmes 
were typical of the criticisms that befell these initial programmes.  Just as with 
peacebuilding, Mansfield (2005) notes that the Sector fails to incorporate the 
lessons learned; for example he noted that though Afghanistan was seen as a 
successful programme with relatively good coordination and management its 
lessons were not applied to subsequent humanitarian challenges (2005 p. 210).   
Eaton et al, (1997) noted the preoccupation with clearing minefields to the 
extent that other key activities were relegated.  The issue of the removal of 
mines continues to dominate the Sector today; this is reflected in the on-going 
debate on the extent to which zero risk after clearance is achievable.  Zero risk 
is attractive to the Sector primarily because it is the reason they exist and it can 
be argued that it is their moral obligation and accountability should someone be 
injured on ‘cleared’ land (Wolf, 2001). The emphasis on safety and technical 
expertise can promote unsafe behaviour as affected communities are left to 
develop indigenous solutions with no technical input in the event that the Sector 
is unable to provide this on time as is so often the case.  Research suggests 
that local communities are less risk averse and they engage in activities which 
are considered high-risk fully  aware of the possible danger from injury but 
driven by poverty and the need to access limited land resources (Bottomley, 
2003; Moyes, 2004; Moyes and Tinning, 2005; Moyes and Vannachack, 2005).   
However, such strategies are often regarded by the Sector as reckless and 
rarely have efforts been made to build on local coping mechanisms or provide 
local communities with the skills, tools and knowledge required to minimise risk.  
Instead, as Chapman (2008) has argued, the rhetoric by the Sector concerning 
activities is that it is hazardous, high-risk and an inadequate practice with no set 
clearance standards.  This means that the Sector does not accord agency to 
those locals who take such risks; instead approaches tend to almost criminalise 
these activities. Indeed as Chapman further asserts, the volumes of literature  
that are produced by the Sector in the bid to ensure safety procedures all seem 
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to have a specific target that excludes village deminers (see for example 
GICHD, 2006b; GICHD, 2007; GICHD, 2008a; GICHD, 2008b).  
The volumes of Sector literature also demonstrate that in the absence of an 
engaged critical debate on mine action, a highly self-referential Sector has 
emerged; this is demonstrated by the growing ‘practitioner’ literature a plethora 
of often uncritical literature and narratives about the mine ban process. There is 
a significant parallel literature developed by practitioners on approaches, good 
practice and lessons learned in the field of mine action25.   However, as Bryden 
(2010) noted, there is a dearth of literature on implementation and mine action 
research has not been drawn together with the consequence that meaningful 
findings on the effectiveness of the treaty have failed to emerge. I concur with 
his observation, and conclude that research has been limited on the Sector and 
the implementation of policies in the various contexts. 
Whilst in practise the Sector was initially dominated by a technical focus, this 
was further reflected by the literature and research that emerged at the time 
focused mainly on the technical elements of mine action; i.e. clearance and 
clearance technologies (Bruschini et al., 1998; Buré and Pont, 2003; Gader et 
al., 2001; Harris, 2002; Hussein and Waller, 2000; Mather, 2002; Smith, 2003; 
Vistisen, 2006); indeed a Google Scholar search on landmine detection brings 
more than 13,600 entries26. Other themes that have dominated the literature on 
mine action and therefore framed our understanding of landmine use were the 
medical repercussions of mine accidents, framed within a public health 
                                            
25 For example the Geneva Centre has a database on every aspect of mine action including and not 
limited to; issues on impact GICHD (2004) Humanitarian Impact from Mines other than Anti-Personnel 
Mines. Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, ibid.; re-evaluation of areas that 
the Sector needs to engage in Bryden, A., McAslan, A. and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining. (2002) Mine action equipment : study of global operational needs. Geneva: Geneva 
International Centre of Humanitarian Demining, Filippino, E. and GICHD. (2002) Communication in mine 
awareness programmes. Geneva: International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Rebelo, P. (2010) 
Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership. Geneva: Geneva International Centre  for 
Humanitarian Demining. ;   Assessment of other mine action programs including donor related 
programmes Bohle, V., Handulle, M. A., Lor, C., Paterson, T., Wardak, M. H. and Wood, A. (2011) 
Evaluation of Dutch Support to Danish Demining Group (DDG) in Afghanistan, Somaliland and Sudan 
Geneva: GICHD, GICHD (2005) A Review of Ten Years Assistance to the Mine Action Programme in 
Mozambique. Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Ted Paterson, Vera Bohle, 
Léonie Barnes, Mohamed Ahmed and Rebelo, P. ( 2008) EC-Funded Mine Action in Africa: Volume 2 - 
Country Reports. Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Demining.; manuals and guides for various 
aspects of mine action including planning GICHD (2007) A Guide to Mine Action and Explosive Remnants 
of War. Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, ibid., GICHD (2008a) A Guide to 
Road Clearance. Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD (2014b) Quick 
start guide to strategic planning in mine action. Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining.. 
26 As per 11th of July 2014 
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discourse particularly in relation to mine risk education and victim assistance 
(See for example Ascherio et al., 1995; Giannou, 1997; Malanczuk, 2000; 
Mannion and Chaloner, 2006; Mannion et al., 2006; Meade and Mirocha, 2000).  
The literature on the process towards the achievement of the Mine Ban Treaty 
also provided scholars with a great opportunity to illustrate how new norms 
were being generated with an emphasis on mapping the strategy and process 
that achieved the mine ban treaty (Anderson, 2000; Brem and Rutherford, 2001; 
Maresca and Maslen, 2000; Maslen, 2004; Mather, 2002; Matthew et al., 2004; 
Matthew and Rutherford, 2003; Rutherford, 2000a; Rutherford, 2000b; Thakur 
and Maley, 1999).  
The actors that emerged to take the leadership role of the new sector included 
international agencies such as the various United Nations agencies; the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other humanitarian 
organisations.  Thus the context of mine action was undergirded by the 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and universalism and the 
humanitarian imperative to save lives (Bolton, 2010; Horwood, 2003b).  This 
brought about challenges to the extent that this neutrality limited the degree to 
which the Sector could fully address the core of peacebuilding.  The Sector 
could only do this by addressing concrete problems (such as demining, marking 
minefields, helping survivors) rather than addressing the politics of the conflict 
directly; thus, essentially 'depoliticising' the politics of peacebuilding.  However, 
with the emergence of critiques of humanitarianism and principles of neutrality 
and impartiality; it became clear that humanitarian actions must incorporate 
broader notions of human development and avoiding harm (Anderson, 1999; 
Duffield, 2001).  Harpviken and Skaešra (2003) highlight the dilemma of the 
Sector in taking such an approach; in their view, it would risk defeating the 
purpose, as it was exactly the ability to 'depoliticise' the landmine problem that 
gave mine action its potential. They further argued that at the most basic level; 
an explicit peacebuilding engagement increases the risk to mine action 
personnel and organisations being seen as political actors and hence becoming 
targets.  For example in Somalia where United Nations Somalia Mine Action 
Programme (UNSOMA) and anyone affiliated with them are targeted by the 
terrorist group Al Shabab.  Their continued position of neutrality and impartiality 
has been assessed as a contributing factor in these incidents, which escalated 
 
 
78 
 
when UNSOMA refused to pay registration fees.  Harpviken and Skaešra 
(2003) also illustrated how in mid-2003 this became a concern in Afghanistan, 
where it appeared as though attacks against mine action personnel were linked 
to the perception that mine action organisations worked closely with the US-led 
coalition forces. This is an issue raised by several observers such as (Olson, 
2006; Shannon, 2009; Stoddard et al., 2009) especially in the context of the war 
on terror.   Harpviken and Skaešra (2003) further acknowledged that neglecting 
the political impact of their interventions would be dangerous: to the locals, to 
mine action personnel and to the larger peacebuilding process of which mine 
action should ideally form an integral part.   
Various studies have further demonstrated that access to, and control of, 
resources such as land and other natural resources   remains one of the core 
issues driving the conflict (Alao, 2007; Le Billon, 2001).  Whilst mine action is 
generally a very positive experience in conflict‐affected contexts, taking unsafe 
land and returning it to productive use, through demining and land release27  
mine action actors directly interact with issues that are of great significance to 
the people in post conflict contexts.  In places where there is insecurity of land 
tenure, mine action can create or exacerbate land‐related disputes.  For 
example, in Mozambique and South Sudan, mine action has resulted in volatile 
negative outcomes when investors, demobilised ex-combatants, returnees, and 
local communities attempt to access the same land (Unruh et al., 2003). In 
Angola, Bottomley (2005) called for the need to engage with the traditional 
leadership and entire communities prior to and beyond demining. This was 
because of the need to address issues related to the distribution of land 
following clearance (hence engaging with politics). They argued that the end 
users of the demined land needed to be clearly identified to reduce any conflicts 
emanating from the use. The mine clearance agencies also needed to follow up 
after clearance to ensure that the cultural mechanisms for land distribution were 
functioning. Thus beyond the obvious material aspects of clearing contaminated 
ground and rendering it good for renewal and re-use, humanitarian demining 
offers a broader value in emphasising and embodying fair decision making (in 
                                            
27 Land Release is a term that has been used to describe some or all of the stages of the process by which 
land which has been suspected to contain mines can be reclassified as no longer hazardous, and formally 
made available for public use.  
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setting clearance priorities and ensuring those priorities relate transparently to 
immediate need) and in creating an operational bridge between affected 
communities and local military or governmental institutions, and between State 
and non-State actors (including former combatant factions). Shimoyachi 
Yuzawa (2013) research in Cambodia came to the same conclusion  and 
emphasised that that land management was key to linking mine clearance to 
peacebuilding as it is closely associated with rebuilding life after conflict, which 
includes the return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs and access to vital 
resources and social services, such as farmland, water, health care, and 
education. Thus, mismanagement of mine-cleared land can lead to undermining 
peace at the local level when it becomes a source of tension and grievance.    
Similarly, in Yemen a study by Pound et al (2006) showed how the use of the 
land after demining was not a rosy experience; the report noted that re-building 
of houses was not always a positive experience. It cited an account of one 
resident from Beer Naser (Lahij governorate) who lamented about the extent of 
intensive investment in construction of houses and business premises following 
demining.  The residents found themselves in the centre of an urban centre and 
the fields vanished, transformed into construction sites.  Similarly, land disputes 
erupted and cases of killing and shooting became a daily issue (Pound et al., 
2006).  Like humanitarian, development and relief aid, mine action is therefore 
never entirely apolitical. The role of aid has been a subject of importance within 
peace building, as it has been proven that it has the potential to prolong or 
shorten conflict (Anderson, 1999; Goodhand, 2002; Goodhand and Atkinson, 
2001). 
The Sector is part of the humanitarian aid spectrum where there is awareness 
that good intentions are no longer sufficient, yet research carried out in 2010 by 
GICHD found that mine action actors had generally not addressed issues such 
as land rights as part of their response to post‐conflict recovery (GICHD, 2011).   
Such an approach disregards the acknowledgement that just as mines were 
placed to create a ‘hostage’ to resources and limit warring parties’ abilities to 
fulfil their economic needs (Ascherio et al., 1995); a response that is informed 
by a political economy analysis should inherently inform programming.  
However, the Sector and the mine action academic literature avoids such an 
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analysis that addresses issues related with politics, power relations and 
inequalities. This is partly due to the perception that mines and other 
unexploded remnants of war are neutral, or that it is a technical area of 
engagement thus requiring a technical intervention. However, Bolton (2010) has 
engaged in providing the first of such academic scrutiny. His research focuses 
on the political economy of demining through a comparison of commercial and 
humanitarian demining organisations funded through foreign donor funding.  He 
has argued that mine action is embedded in a political economy of conflict that 
pumps large amounts of money into conflict (like other humanitarian 
organisations). PRIO and UNDP produced a report that sought to explore 
linkages that existed between mine action and development.  This report 
argued that both mine action and development stood to gain from greater 
synchronisation with each other (Harpviken and Isaksen, 2004).  
Research that seeks to assess the contribution of mine action to peacebuilding 
has recently begun to emerge (GICHD, 2014a; Shimoyachi-‐Yuzawa, 2013).  
This built on the exploratory work that organisations such as Landmine Action 
had engaged in (Cave, 2003; Jennings et al., 2008). Research institutions such 
as the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), spearheaded more 
substantive work in this field but these initial publications did not tend to draw on 
empirical data, but were rather theoretical propositions of ways in which mine 
action could be seen to engage in peacebuilding.  The works by (Harpviken et 
al., 2003; Harpviken and Roberts, 2004; Millard and Harpviken, 2000; Millard et 
al., 2002) are examples of this. Harpviken and Roberts, (2004) ‘Preparing the 
Ground for Peace; Mine Action in Support of Peacebuilding’, was more 
substantive and was based on case studies from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and 
Sudan.  This focused on what they called the ‘less tangible’ impact of mine 
action in the political sphere of peacebuilding.   
Therefore, there are gaps that remain within the mine action and peacebuilding 
literature.  This is highlighted by the limited availability of academic research 
that clearly demonstrates ways in which certain sectors of the peacebuilding 
community inadvertently, through the way they implement their programmes, 
limit critical scrutiny of their field of operation; and also how this manifests itself 
in academia.  The literature reviewed has also demonstrated that both fields of 
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study neglect ‘on-the-ground’ dynamics that limit or enhance the potential of the 
interventions.  Instead the peacebuilding literature engages in hyper-critical 
debates as to whether interventions are a success or failure.  Thus, this 
research will fill the gap in this existing literature.  Similarly, by critically 
examining mine action, this thesis will contribute to critical debates by offering 
an empirical case study that examines the extent to which the dominant 
critiques remain relevant.  This will not be judging the success or failure of mine 
action but presenting a context specific attribution to factors that may limit or 
enhance the peacebuilding potential. 
CONCLUSION 
The intention of this chapter is not to overplay the way in which mine action 
interacts and is part of peacebuilding but to illustrate how framing an issue 
within certain parameters develops a knock on effect on shaping of the 
academic literature that emerges.  It could be argued that the mine action sector 
might see the advantage of the lack of critical analysis from academia and thus 
carry on with business as usual; but the extent to which this is true is not the 
subject of this thesis.   I argue that the critics of peacebuilding tend to base their 
critiques on democratisation in the context of heavily militarised peacebuilding 
interventions that cannot be generalised to all post-conflict settings. Sriram 
(2009) makes a similar assertion on the issue of transitional justice and liberal 
peace, in which she argues that the liberal peacebuilding literature  often 
neglects this debate although the tools of transitional justice have been central 
to contemporary peacebuilding projects. She asserts that the critiques of liberal 
peacebuilding tended to focus on the two major pillars – marketisation and 
democratisation without considering some of the unexamined assumptions and 
potential unintended consequences that transitional justice shares with 
peacebuilding (p. 114). 
The liberal model presents uniform answers (standardised ‘one size fits all 
approach’) to context specific problems; similarly, the critics also take this 
approach and sweep a broad brush across a very diverse range of programmes, 
issues and activities that are indeed peacebuilding, as illustrated by the mine 
action case study.  The critics provide a narrow picture of reality that focuses 
mainly on western interveners and their local implementing partners with a 
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dominant narrative that tends to emphasises similarities between interveners. 
They base their critiques on systems, structures, and organisational values of 
international peacebuilding based on a single and simple interpretation of liberal 
peace thereby making a generalised conclusion on the failure of peacebuilding. 
Thus, I argue that they fail to examine diverse contextual, organisational, 
governmental and other phenomenal manifestations that specific activities and 
interveners might portray or encounter.   This means that they inevitably miss 
out the salient challenges that peacebuilding interventions encounter limiting the 
full potential of such interventions (this is what I intend to demonstrate 
throughout this thesis).   
Indeed Sabaratnam (2011b) has made a similar assertion that the mode of 
theorising and research is also limiting in terms of being critical theory, that 
engages and articulates alternative ways of thinking, and envisions dimensions 
of change; in short the ‘formulaic, top down and ethnocentric nature of the 
liberal peace finds some parallels in the analytical framing of its critics’ (op cit p. 
247).   
Similarly, this chapter has demonstrated that it is not just critics who fail to 
frame mine action within peacebuilding.  Though conceptually mine action is 
rooted within peacebuilding, the way in which the Sector operates limits its 
potential to integrate within the wider humanitarian sector and therefore be seen 
as part of peacebuilding.  This is a factor that I will illustrate further in 
subsequent chapters which look in detail at how mine action is operationalised 
both globally and in Somaliland. 
Peacebuilding interventions should be multidimensional in essence and strive 
towards coherency with other sectoral and disciplinary approaches. They ideally 
should encompass a broad range of activities throughout the entire span of a 
conflict. It can be seen that peacebuilding has evolved from a strictly post-
conflict undertaking, to a concept with a broader meaning and therefore broader 
activities. Tschirgi (2003) has highlighted that the term ‘peacebuilding’ has 
gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict 
at different phases of the conflict cycle (p.1).  Acknowledging that there are 
factors that have limited mine action’s conceptualisation as peacebuilding, I 
argue that as an activity and as a sector, mine action needs to be re-conceived 
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as part of peacebuilding. Through such a reconceptualisation, researchers can 
therefore engage in a more critical scrutiny on its role in post conflict contexts.   
I will hence contribute to the existing critical peacebuilding literature and through  
the case study of Somaliland will further demonstrate that  there is need for 
academic research to engage with other divergent case studies that do not 
necessarily render themselves naturally to scrutiny within the dominate 
references.  Marginal cases such as Somaliland and mine action tend to be 
ignored by critical scholars within peacebuilding even though as will be 
demonstrated throughout the rest of the thesis, they offer insights and may give 
more credence to the dominate critiques.  
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CHAPTER 3:  SOMALILAND: AN “OASIS OF 
PEACE”?  PEACEBUILDING WITHIN A STATE 
"One of the main obstacles for Somaliland is lack of recognition, but my 
government will never give up trying to gain it," – President Ahmed Mohamed 
Mohamoud Silanyo 28 
INTRODUCTION 
To explain the post conflict context of Somaliland, it is important to look at the 
period before conflict as it is through Somalia’s failure that we saw the re-birth 
of the Somaliland state as we know it today. Similarly some of the interventions 
that took place in Somalia have a great bearing on the way in which intervention 
is undertaken in Somaliland today.  There are a number of factors that can be 
argued to have led to the collapse of the Somalia State; these include the 
colonial legacy and Somalia’s own internal governance issues.  I argue that 
though these dynamics were at play, the major contributory factors were 
external factors, some of which correspond to Somalia’s strategic location, 
which rendered it susceptible to the global politics of the bipolar world at the 
time. These factors then play into the politics of the regional actors.  Together 
these two factors contribute to a large extent to conflicts that eventually led to 
state failure; following the failure of the state, largely driven by the changes in 
global politics, various interventions took place in Somalia and these have not 
been successful to date; it is against this failure of the state that Somaliland has 
emerged; a polity that challenges the view that the Somali people are 
ungovernable (Samatar, 1993).  
CONTEXTUALISING SOMALILAND 
Following independence from Britain, Somaliland was subsequently recognised 
by 35 states as well as being registered independent by the UN (ICG, 2006) .  
In what some authors have referred to as a ‘hasty reunion’, 5 days later, on the 
1st of July 1960, Somaliland joined the Italian Trusteeship Territory of Somalia 
                                            
28 President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Siilanyo on 18 May 2011, when the country marked 20 years 
since declaring unilateral independence from the rest of Somalia. See IRIN SOMALIA: Healthcare, 
education gains as Somaliland marks 20th anniversary; dated 18th May 2011 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/92769/somalia-healthcare-education-gains-as-somaliland-marks-20th-
anniversary accessed on 26th June 2012 
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to form the Republic of Somalia (Ahmed and Green, 1999); this left out those 
Somali people who found themselves in the French, Ethiopian, and Kenyan-
British parts (Van Beurden, 1999).  The Union was spurred by the notion and 
agenda for a Greater Somalia which obscured the underlying historical, political, 
and economic differences between the two regions (Lalos, 2011).   
The union was not well thought out, and had no procedures that had been put in 
place to integrate the different colonial traditions.  It quickly became obvious 
that the dual and disparate colonial heritages were a hindrance to the union 
(Bradbury, 2008 p. 32).  Such duality included not just the differences in 
language (English and Italian), but also the administrative, educational and legal 
systems, police forces, taxes and currencies (Lewis, 2008; Omaar, 1994). The 
two territories were therefore separated institutionally, linguistically and 
historically.  The legality of the union was also contested and an attempt to 
remedy this fundamental legal limbo was made immediately after 
independence. Pham (2010;  2012) opines that the legal validity of the merger 
became a subject of a number of international law scholars 29  who have 
questioned the legality of the act (p. 10).   
The merger saw British Somaliland remaining more isolated with Mogadishu 
becoming the capital. Major posts in the new government and a majority of the 
seats in parliament went to Italian Somalia, and measures were hurriedly 
adopted aimed at reinforcing rapid integration.  This served to alienate the 
former British protectorate, which remained underdeveloped with numerous 
problems inherited from the colonial administration (Ahmed and Green, 1999 p. 
115). The failure of the State became the failure of the promise of democracy 
and Somalia became an authoritarian, Centralist State whose elite adopted a 
predatory character.   This led to an armed coup in 1969 in which General 
Mohamed Siyyad Barre took over.   
Independence did not bring with it jubilation, as corruption, chaotic electoral 
politics and state programmes that did not deliver to the public became the 
                                            
29 Pham 2012 cites the works of Eugene Cotran, “Legal Problems Arising Out of the Formation of the 
Somali Republic,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 12 ( July 1963): 1010–26; Anthony J. 
Carroll and B. Rajagopal, “The Case for an Independent Somaliland,” American University Journal of Law 
and Politics 8 (1993): 653–62; and Michael Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-
Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of “Somaliland” (Leiden,ge Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 150–56 as some of the authors who have questioned the merger. 
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order of the day with administrative organs from each group taking up predatory 
characteristics.   The Northern people were isolated with Mogadishu becoming 
the capital. Major posts in the new government and a majority of the seats in 
parliament went to the Southern region, and measures hurriedly adopted aimed 
at reinforcing rapid integration.  This served to alienate the north, which 
remained underdeveloped with numerous problems inherited from the colonial 
administration (Ahmed and Green, 1999 p. 115). The failure of the State 
became the failure of the promise of democracy and Somalia became an 
authoritarian, Centralist State whose elite adopted a predatory character.   This 
led to an armed coup in 1969 in which General Mohamed Siyaad Barre took 
over.   
Initially the regime of Siyyad Barre enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy through, 
for example, the way in which they dealt with the drought of 1973-74; education 
and other social programmes and services expanded including the introduction 
of the Latin script for the Somali language making it into a written language for 
the first time30.  The regime also put effort into improving the literacy of the 
populace by introducing mass literacy campaigns in urban and rural areas and 
this proved hugely popular (Lewis, 2008). The regime’s military also enjoyed 
international support as will be demonstrated later in the chapter. However, this 
was short lived and soon Barre’s initial steps towards modernisation were 
clouded by his declaration that the clan system was backward and an 
impediment to progress.  Barre then introduced and imposed policies that 
favoured certain clans and sub clans; these were deeply resented, with protests 
against this repression being harshly suppressed.  This suppression was later 
to provide reason for mobilisation of resistance against his regime in the lead up 
to the outbreak of the conflict in 1988.  Thus, the Somali civil war that resulted 
was seen as the product of political, social and economic repression under 
Barre, which eventually culminated in the toppling of his regime in 1991 (WSP 
International, 2005).      
However, this was short lived and soon Barre’s initial steps towards 
modernization were clouded by his declaration that the traditional clan system 
was backward and an impediment to progress.  Barre then introduced and 
                                            
30 Previously Somalis had written in either Arabic or European languages. 
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imposed policies that favoured certain clans and sub clans; these were deeply 
resented, with protests against this repression being harshly suppressed.  This 
suppression was to later provide reason for mobilization to resistance against 
his regime in the lead up to the outbreak of the conflict in 1988.  Thus, the 
Somali civil war that resulted, was seen as the product of political social and 
economic repression under Barre and eventually culminated to the toppling of 
his regime in 1991 (WSP International, 2005).    
Somalia’s State Failure  
The total failure of the Somali State has given rise to the rubric that has 
continually held since state collapse that Somalis are too anarchic to form a 
strong central state.  Somalia had emerged as  the state most likely to form a 
coherent nation, based on the fact that the majority shared a common language, 
religion, ethnicity and other characteristics (Clapham, 2012; Steve and Walls, 
2009).  
Somalia has been unstable ever since the fall of the Barre regime Menkhaus 
(2008 p. 5) describes it as the  most dangerous place in the world for 
humanitarian workers,  and also as a completely collapsed state (2004, p. 149). 
Rotberg (2002b) has defined it as the model of a collapsed state: a 
geographical expression only, with borders but with no effective way to exert 
authority within those borders’ whilst Menkhaus (ibid) defines it as a failure 
amongst failed states. There has been some debate as to whether the fall of 
Siyyad Barre was indeed the beginning of Somalia’s statelessness. Some 
commentators have argued that pre-colonial Somalia existed as a ‘Stateless 
State’31 ruled by scattered tribal sheikdoms and a wide dispersion of power 
among clans and sub clans (Battera, 2004; Kaplan, 2008; Lewis, 1961; 
Mohamoud, 2006). Rotberg (2003), in his categorisation of failed and collapsed 
states, argues that by the onset of civil war in 1991 the Somali state had long 
since failed. The civil war destroyed what was left, and Somalia collapsed onto 
itself (Rotberg, 2003). Within academic circles, the dominant rhetoric post-Cold 
War was that of imminent danger of African states becoming a threat to human 
                                            
31 A political organisation where no formal centralised policy exist but which maintains social order and 
stability through moral, material and social sanctions.  
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and global security due to criminalisation, globalisation, privatisation and 
endemic violence (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009).  
The fall of Siyyad Barre and the consequent anarchy coincided with these 
emerging debates of which Somalia became a prime example. Since then 
academic literature has been replete with references to Somalia as an example 
of the world's most emblematic failed state (Lyons and Samatar, 1995; 
Marangio, 2012; Menkhaus, 2003a; Menkhaus, 2009; Menkhaus, 2004b; 
Milliken and Krause, 2002; Rotberg, 2002a; Sanei, 2014).  
One of the factors that contributed to the failure of the state was the continued 
state repression and the wanton destruction of the principal towns of Hargeisa 
and Burao. The continual repression of the Somaliland clans especially the 
Isaaq clan (which makes up 80 percent of Somaliland) led to the consolidation 
of opposition amongst the Isaaq and mobilised the diasporic intellectual 
community based in London and the Gulf into forming the Somali National 
Movement (SNM). This formation of the SNM led to “extreme and systematic 
repression at the hands of Siyyad Barre” including summary arrests, 
extrajudicial executions, confiscation of private properties by the government 
which targeted the Isaaq community as they were seen as sympathetic to the 
SNM (Bradbury, 2008; WSP International, 2005).  
The politics of the region cohered and Ethiopia’s enmity towards Somalia 
enabled the SNM to set up headquarters in Addis Ababa in 198132, where the 
Ethiopian  regime allowed it to train and arm its cadre of fighters (Bradbury, 
1997). The SNM dedicated their cause to the overthrow of the Siyyad Barre 
regime.  
The government responded by destroying Hargeisa, killing more than 50,000 
people (Gundel, 2002: pp 257).  The government bombarded the region with 
artillery and aircraft reducing the towns in the North to rubble and leaving 
thousands of unexploded ordnance.  This also forced the displacement of 
roughly half a million refugees across the border into Ethiopia. Isaaq dwellings 
were systematically destroyed, while their settlements and water points were 
                                            
32  In other publications e.g. Bradbury, M. and Healy, S. (Eds.) (2010b) Whose Peace is it anyway; 
Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking.  London: Conciliation Resources.  Cites 1982 as the 
year that SNM was formed. 
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extensively mined (ICG, 2003). The conflict devastated and virtually emptied the 
city of Hargeisa; people of all social groups fled to rural areas, to neighbouring 
Ethiopia and Djibouti, and further afield to the Middle East, Europe and North 
America (Africa Watch 1990).  
a) Geostrategic politics and the Cold War  
Other than being the sub-region that is the most conflict-ridden and unstable of 
Africa, the Horn of Africa stands out as the region most hit by geo-strategic 
driven politics. The region, and especially Somalia, is situated at the bottom of 
the Red Sea, on the Gulf of Aden, across from Yemen and Saudi Arabia.   
Somaliland is located in a  region that as a whole remains critical to the stability 
of the oil bearing region which the US defines as most vital to its interests (Elmi, 
2010).  In addition, the Bal el Mandeb and the Red Sea are the main shipping 
routes for goods from the Middle East and the Far East to Europe and the 
Americas (Sörenson, 2008 p. 8).  An important aspect of understanding the 
dynamics at play within the regions is through the politics created by the 
geostrategic position of Somalia and Somaliland in the region.  According to a 
study by the WSP, during the scramble for Africa, the British-shaped Somaliland 
border was mainly based on strategic importance.   The colonial powers 
ultimately arrived at Somaliland’s present shape – a territory determined not by 
geography or demographics, but rather by the arbitrary logic of international and 
regional politics (WSP International, 2005). 
Thus at the time of Cold War, the Horn of Africa attracted a lot of attention 
within global politics as the superpowers scrambled for strategic advantage33.  
This was the context within which the politics of Siyyad Barre were executed.  
The period saw the elevation of military assistance as the prime instrument for 
achieving these ends (Khapoya and Agyeman-Duah, 1985; Makinda, 1993; 
Mantzikos, 2010; Schwab, 1978). Military build-up through military aid became 
Siyaad Barre’s means of maintaining his hold on power, thus transforming 
Somalia  into what Gundel describes as an archetypal “Cold War client state”, 
receiving most of its aid from the Soviet Union and the “Eastern Bloc” during the 
                                            
33 This was also due to the Horn of Africa’s proximity to the oil rich Middle East and its significance as 
regards the worldwide defence strategy of both superpowers which placed it in the position of being caught 
up in the strategic military and political policies of both the Soviet Union and the United States (see 
Schwab, P. (1978) Cold War on the Horn of Africa. African Affairs, 77 (306), 6-20. 
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1970s, while the US took over this role during the 1980s (2002 p. 258).  The 
effect of this was a bloated civil service, corruption and an extensive military 
build-up that resulted in Somalia having one of the largest standing armies in 
Africa in the mid-1970s, meaning that 40% to 50% of its annual budget was 
spent on defence and security; heavily encouraged by external donors who 
underwrote nearly all of the human development activities and services 
(Marchal et al., 2000 online).  
The legacy of the Cold War generally led to the globalisation and regionalisation 
of conflicts in Africa, and an eventual militarisation of the societies.  Africa, and 
especially Somalia, became what Zartman calls a ‘global competitor for 
armament’ (Zartman, 1989pp 124). The result meant that with the failure of a 
central government, the countries remained richly endowed with armaments.   
Somalia became a testament to this, and as (Omaar et al., 1993) noted, the 
products of virtually every arms manufacturer in the world were found in the 
garages and warehouses of Somali militias and on the streets.  
Therefore the impact of the end of the Cold War was a virtual military 
disengagement of the continent and a void where the international community 
had no experience in coping with crisis.   It also marked the falling 34  of 
Somalia’s strategic value, bringing to the fore human rights abuses that had 
previously been ignored or downplayed.  Menkhaus and Ortmayer (2000) 
lament that ‘the strategic priorities were joined by bureaucratic incrementalism 
in both the U.S. government and other donors, which worked against any policy 
change calling for linkage of aid to political reforms and reconciliation’ (p. 218).  
Through courting the West, Siyyad Barre’s regime had been left with a 
dangerous legacy that included a massive amount of weaponry that contributed 
to the violent warfare that followed.   
Siyyad Barre’s regime had previously relied on  manipulation of the clan system 
for its political survival thus causing an atmosphere of inter-clan mistrust and 
hostility to take root; the Somali people thus inherited a deep distrust of any 
central government having suffered from massive abuse of power, repression 
                                            
34 This fall in strategic importance was only temporary as this has now changed with the recent upsurge in 
piracy on the high seas. This is indicative of Somalia’s importance in a globalised world economy Elmi, A. 
A. (2010) Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Identity. Political Islam and Peacebuilding, New York. 
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and corruption, including the amassing of foreign aid donations by individuals 
(Marchal et al., 2000).  The collapse of the state happened simultaneously with 
the fall of Barre’s regime and the installation of the Mengistu Haile Mariam 
regime in Ethiopia and thus triggered an enormous outpouring of weaponry and 
ammunition into public hands, so that the entire Horn of Africa was awash with 
inexpensive weaponry (Menkhaus and Ortmayer op cit). 
This strategic importance of Somalia’s location has in the past attracted outside 
interest, leading to international interventions often resulting in dire 
consequences for the stability, security and development of the whole region. 
Indeed the geo-strategic analysis has not only recently become part of the 
narrative of the region, but as early as the seventies the region had been 
dubbed the 'strategic magnet in the seventies' by J. Bowyer Bell.  Then, he had  
highlighted the Horn's geographic significance and had accurately forecast on 
the changing Soviet and American perception of the region's strategic value 
(Payton, 1980). Indeed it is to this strategic position that the longevity of the civil 
war is attributed to.  
Today, the Horn of Africa hosts a complex nexus of challenges that lead to 
warfare and humanitarian catastrophe, has large ‘ungoverned spaces35’ with 
weak and or failed states and hence is a target for illicit transnational networks, 
particularly terrorist and criminal groups (Eizenstat et al., 2004).  This means 
that post 9/11 the region has become an important battle ground in the 
framework of the so-called war on terror, driven principally by factors related to 
the collapse of the Somali state; the emergence of terrorist groups;  and 
escalation of piracy off the Somali coast (Bereketeab, 2013; Smith, 2010). 
Of interest, and a factor that has escaped academic analysis and one that could 
explain the continuing complexity of Somalia’s conflict, is the resource factor 
especially in relation to the possible availability of oil and natural gas.  
According to an article by Maria Kielmas geologists have speculated about the 
possibility of oil in Somalia for a long time (See Barnes, 1976 for example); 
                                            
35 Menkhaus, K. (2007) Terrorist activities in ungoverned spaces: evidence and observations from the 
Horn of Africa. In: Brenthurst Foundation’s ‘Southern Africa and International Terrorism’workshop. Tswalu, 
South Africa. pp. 25-27.(2007) defines “Ungoverned spaces” as a term meant to connote a general 
condition of weak to non-existent state authority in a defined geographic area (p:2).  According to the 
‘Report of the Commission on Weak States and US National Security’, illicit transnational networks, 
particularly terrorist and criminal groups, target weak and failed states for their activities,”  
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however, she argues that it took the US military intervention to bring this 
possibility to popular attention (Kielmas, 1991). A regional hydrocarbon study 
for countries bordering the Red Sea, funded by the World Bank and United 
Nations Development Programme, indicated the oil potential of the North of 
Somalia (present day Somaliland) Just prior to the collapse of the Somali State 
in December of 199036 (Elmi, 2010; Kielmas, 1991; Mubarak, 1997; Slind et al., 
1998). The region is reported to be geologically analogous, in parts, to southern 
Yemen, on the other side of the Gulf of Aden, and almost the entire area was 
under licence to companies by the time hostilities with the central government 
broke out in 198837.   
b) Regional dynamics 
Another factor that contributed to state failure is the political dynamics of the 
region. Most of the countries are ethnically and economically linked and thus 
unstable; neighbouring states including Somalia encourage proxy wars 
compounding the problems and prolonging regional instability and conflict within 
the region. A key reason for the persistence of conflict, for example in Sudan, 
and a characteristic of conflicts in the Horn of Africa is what Cliffe (1999) calls 
the doctrine of ‘mutual intervention’ or the practice of governmental or other 
forces supporting opposition groups in neighbouring states. The states of the 
region all act as enablers and multipliers of conflict to the detriment of their 
neighbours (Cliffe, 1999 p. 89). This regional dynamic is sufficiently powerful to 
act as a cause of conflict in its own right, especially where problems of 
governance abound. Neighbours prey relentlessly upon each other’s internal 
difficulties, ready to seize on any glimmer of ‘grievance’, and actively seek out 
                                            
36 Several concessions, nearly two-thirds of Somalia, were allocated to the American oil giants Conoco, 
Amoco, Chevron and Phillips and at least three key wells were scheduled to be drilled in the final years 
before Siyyad Barre was overthrown and the nation plunged into chaos in January, 1991.  Similarly 
according to Soma Oil, every potential hydrocarbon basin across East Africa is the subject of intensive 
interest and Somalia is at present the last remaining frontier on the region’s energy map.  Industry experts 
consider it to have huge prospective resources, both onshore and offshore.   Soma Oil and Gas 
Exploration Company is based in the UK and its executive director is the former leader of the Conservative 
Party in Britain, Lord Michael Howard has been Chairman of Soma Oil and Gas since May 2013.  
According to its website, Soma Oil & Gas will be the first exploration company in the 21st Century to 
commence activity across Somalia in consultation with the Federal Government, starting with 
seismic surveying to establish the full extent of the country’s oil and gas potential.  
37 Similarly, the geography of the region especially Somaliland, at the mouth of the Red Sea, favours oil 
exports.  Even the deepest part of the country is only a few hundred kilometres from a coastline that sits 
along one of the world’s busiest shipping routes. The Horn of Africa region has recently seen some major 
oil and gas discoveries in the world in recent years.  According to  Deloitte & Touché, Touche, D. (2013) 
The Deloitte Guide to Oil and Gas in East Africa 'Where potential lies'. Dar es Salaam. advisory, onshore 
oil discoveries in Uganda have been followed by discoveries in Kenya with world-class discoveries of gas 
in Tanzania and Mozambique 
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opportunities to fuel and amplify conflict. Healy demonstrates this by giving the 
example of Ethiopia’s support for Southern Sudanese rebels, matched by 
Sudan’s support for Eritrea’s independence war; Somali support for rebels in 
the Ogaden38 region of Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent the Eritrean and Oromo 
rebellions, matched by Ethiopia’s support for Somali rebel groups (Healy, 2008).  
Both Ethiopia and Eritrea compete in giving support and sanctuary to rival 
groups in neighbouring states.  
The conflicts within the region are linked, directly or indirectly. For example, the 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea led both governments to increase their 
military support to rival proxies in Somalia, thus igniting new rounds of deadly 
conflict, spreading instability to northern Kenya, re-legitimising warlords and 
destroying hopes for internal peace efforts. At the same time, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea have reduced their support for the Sudanese opposition, thus 
strengthening the hand of the Khartoum regime and reducing the likelihood of 
progressive change in Sudan. In addition, Sudan supports insurgent groups in 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda; Somali militias have launched cross-border 
attacks into Ethiopia and supported Ethiopian oppositionists, while Ethiopian 
troops have launched assaults into Somalia to create a protective buffer zone; 
and Uganda has supported the main rebel groups in Sudan. With each new act 
of violence, with each cross-border arms transfer, the regional dimensions of 
these conflicts deepen (Prendergast, 1999). 
SOMALIA’S FAILURE: THE POLARITY OF THE LIBERAL 
PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES  
Multiple External Interventions in Somalia 
The civil war erupted at a time of profound change in the international order, as 
global institutions, with the US at their helm, shaped up to managing an era of 
‘new wars’ and ‘failing states’. According to Bradbury and Healy (2010b), 
Somalia became the ‘laboratory for a new form of engagement when the 
international community responded with a humanitarian and military intervention 
on an unprecedented scale’ (p. 11).  This was the advent of the ideals of the 
                                            
38 The Ogaden is a region of Ethiopia, traditionally coveted by Somalis as grazing land for their 
livestock. 
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liberal peace agenda as laid out by the Agenda for Peace in 1992, thus 
coinciding with the failure of the Somali State. 
The international community embarked on the implementation of a liberal 
agenda in Somalia with the sole purpose of the re-creation of the Somali state.  
The process so far has produced dismal results, and has involved the UN with 
US leadership in (United Nations Operations in Somalia) UNOSOM I (April 1992 
- March 1993)39 Unified Task Force (UNITAF) (5 December 1992 – 4 May 
1993)40  and UNOSOM II (March 1993 - March 1995)41. These missions saw 
conflict prevailing leading to violent attacks on UN soldiers, leading the Security 
Council into unanimously adopting UNITAF, which was given an unprecedented 
mandate and very liberal rules of engagement that allowed the U.S. to use all 
necessary means to create a secure environment. In March 1993, the Security 
Council submitted recommendations for a transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM 
II on recommending that UNOSOM II forces be given the power to create a safe 
environment, and help the Somali people rebuild their country by uniting 
politically and socially.  Despite the legitimacy conferred on these actions by 
successive UN Security Council Resolutions, the interventions resulted in failure. 
Further interventions have included those in 2007 and 2008 by the African 
Union, spearheaded by Ethiopia and implicitly backed by the US.  Other 
attempts have been made by Somalia’s neighbours; Djibouti facilitated the 
creation of a Transitional National Government; Kenya also facilitated a 
considerable lengthy process in 2004, and this saw the formation of the 
Transitional Federal Government. In 2009, Djibouti gave it another go and this 
saw the appointment of a president within the Transitional Federal Governance.  
These interventions by both neighbouring and other states were mainly driven 
by geo-political, security and economic interests as concern to end Somalia’s 
                                            
39 UNOSOM I was established to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of 
humanitarian supplies to distribution centres in the city. The mission's mandate and strength 
were later enlarged to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres 
throughout Somalia. It later worked with the Unified Task Force in the effort to establish a safe 
environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
40 UNITAF was a US-led, United Nations-sanctioned multinational force with the mandate to 
protect the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid. 
41 UNOSOM II was established in March 1993 to take appropriate action, including enforcement 
measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. 
To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task 
begun by the Unified Task Force for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. UNOSOM 
II was withdrawn in early March 1995 
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political turmoil. Indeed Leonard and Samantar (2011) have argued that these 
external national agendas are being imposed on a set of Somali polities that 
have a very weak ability to define and defend their own interests.  
The key failures for these interventions have been the support of the unrealistic 
presumption that a central state is key to restoring peace. The United Nations, 
the European Union, the African Union and all other states that have been 
involved have continually had as their goal the restoration of a functioning 
central government, on the assumption that effective national governance is a 
prerequisite for both political and economic recovery.  Instead political factions 
have multiplied at every international peace conference since 1991 creating a 
recurrent dilemma of how to determine legitimate and authoritative 
representation. Efforts in tackling these issues have varied over time in terms of 
actors and actions, and have privileged different priorities such as security 
conditions, piracy and Islamic fundamentalism.   
While the project for a Greater Somalia failed politically, trade between the 
Somali inhabited territories flourished and was promoted through the free flow 
of goods and services and information.   The destruction of the state only 
marginally impacted them as the Somali state had previously undermined 
pastoral mobility (Little, 2003 p. 169).  
What has emerged from Somalia is the fact that even without achieving the 
ideal Weberian empirical state, and despite the war, famine, and the presence 
of the shadow economy, amazingly, Somalia’s economic life continues to thrive. 
That an economy can remain resilient despite the absence of a national bank, 
social services, public utilities, and public hospitals may seem contrary to logical 
conventional definition of total state collapse.  Somalia has managed to develop 
multi-million dollar enterprises, created efficient money transfer systems and 
established some of the cheapest and most extensive telecommunication 
networks in Africa.  Similarly, Somalia has continually demonstrated that a 
population can survive, despite the absence of a functioning government and 
public administration, by creating and reactivating ‘informal systems of 
adaptation, security and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a 
central government’ (Menkhaus, 2006 p. 74) 
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With the departure of UNOSOM, Menkhaus and Pendergast (1997) observed 
that there were centrifugal forces in contemporary Somalia  ̶political, economic, 
and social that outweighed centralising ones and cautioned against ‘obsessing 
over the re-creation of a centralised authority’. They argued that this would 
greatly exacerbate the conflict, as different competing groups would position 
themselves in readiness for the potential spoils of a new aid-dependent state 
(Menkhaus and Prendergast, 1997).  They further argued that the best 
approach would be to support those emerging authorities that were performing 
some of the most essential functions of governance within their communities as 
they were viewed as legitimate authorities in their neighbourhoods or villages, of 
which they are an integral part.  However because the entire international 
system is constructed around states there is a relentless quest for state-building 
to such an extent that these international systems cannot handle systems that 
do not conform to the arbitrary statelessness of such territories. It has been 
argued that such arbitrariness characterises the diagnoses of state failure within 
Western foreign policymaking. This, in turn, has implications for practices of 
intervention (Duffield, 2002; Ottaway, 2002) 
 Similarly there is the fear that the absence of a state may cause genuine 
problems for adjacent countries, e.g. in the form of crime.  The interventions 
have therefore been unsuccessful, and some of them may in fact have 
exacerbated the plight of the Somali population. Thus as Menkhaus (2010a) 
has observed ‘with each failed peace process, and or intervention,  the Somali 
crisis has become more intractable and difficult to resolve as distrust grows, 
grievances mount, coping mechanisms become entrenched and the percentage 
of the Somali population that has a living memory of a functioning central 
government shrinks’ (Menkhaus, 2010a p. 17) see also (Clapham, 2012). 
Due to the catastrophic failure of the previous interventions, the UN’s 
involvement has remained rather low-key, focusing mainly on humanitarian 
issues in which the organisation’s various subsidiaries and agencies have been 
the main actors, e.g. the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the WFP, the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
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(OCHA), and others.  Insecurity caused disruption to a lot of agencies’ work and 
sometimes led to the strengthening of security arrangements for aid workers 
thus limiting the levels of engagement of international organisations on the 
ground 42 .   Security conditions thus prevented international staff from 
International NGOs, including the UN subcontracted local ones, from being 
located inside the country.  In cases where the agencies continued working, 
they required relocation of offices and withdrawal of international staff.   Many 
operations became cross-border, where aid was managed remotely from 
Nairobi.  This included the Somali Red Crescent society, the only functioning 
Somali national humanitarian body that had its central base in Nairobi  (Wiles et 
al., 2004);  a phenomenon that still persists.  
Multiple efforts of Somaliland’s locally led process  
a) Reconciliation and State rebuilding 
 Following the defeat of their enemy Siyyad Barre, external interventions 
continually engaged in the revival of a central government in Somalia without 
any success. In the meantime the northern clans commenced an internally 
driven process towards reconciliation as a means to state building. It was 
largely based on the indigenous system of conflict resolution and started from 
the grassroots level and progressed to district and regional levels culminating in 
the Grand Boorama43 conference held between January and May 1993.   Thus 
out of the ashes of the North-South violence, the North West emerged as a de 
facto state, and reverted to being the Republic of Somaliland. This process was 
faced with numerous challenges including re-eruption of violence in 1994-96 to 
a point where the level of inter-clan conflict and anarchy had rapidly escalated 
to the levels that had prevailed in South Somalia.  It was thus urgent that the 
grievances that existed be addressed and the responsibility fell on the ready 
pool of conflict resolution mechanisms and the reconciliation base that was 
available through the traditional clan elders.   The Gadabursi clan, having been 
marginalised and isolated from the hierarchy of the SNM leadership, hosted the 
conference.  The basis of the peace conferences 'Shirka Walaalaynta Bee/aha 
                                            
42 The UN had adopted a security phase IV following tragic security incidents, in which the Head of the 
UNDP office in Mogadishu was killed in July 2008 suicide bombings that followed in October in Hargeisa 
and Bossaso in which the UNDP office was targeted, killing two UN employees and injuring six. 
43 Boorama is the capital in the predominantly Gadabursi Awdal region. 
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Waqooyi' (meaning 'The Brotherhood Conference of the Northern clans'), was 
to address grievances and mistrust, and also to restore the confidence between 
clans especially those that had fought on opposing sides during the civil war. 
The conferences achieved what one observer has described as the ‘SNM's 
conciliatory policy of peaceful coexistence between all the clans’ (Drysdale, 
1993). The clans made significant concessions and agreed on burying the past 
and working on a future that involved the restoration of peace. 
During the months of deliberations, outstanding issues between clans were 
discussed and debated in a manner that was open and inclusive. The clan 
elders (Guurti) together with hundreds of delegates and observers from across 
Somaliland, agreed on a peace charter that outlined the following; a transfer of 
power from the SNM interim government to a (‘beel’) community based system; 
election of a civilian president (Maxamed Xaaji Ibrahim Cigal) and a vice 
president (Cabdirahman aw Cali) and adoption of a National charter and a 
peace charter44.   Walls (2009) argues that even though the Borama conference 
did not end the cycle of conflict, it laid the foundation for the sustained stability 
that prevails today.  It is considered one of the most successful of Somaliland’s 
reconciliation meetings.  The conference was supported by a combination of 
external clan based facilitation and logistical support from low-key and minimal 
support from the non-Somali sources such as air transport for delegates 
provided by UNDP, NGOs, faith based organisations e.g. the Mennonites, 
Community Aid Abroad and some embassies (Norwegian, French and US)  
(APD and Interpeace, 2008 p. 50). 
The Academy for Peace and Development in Hargeisa, in collaboration with 
Inter-peace, documented the process that  brought peace and stability and they 
cite no less than thirty-eight clan-based peace and reconciliation conferences 
and meetings between 1990 and  1997 (APD and Interpeace, 2008 pp: 13; 
Ibrahim and Terlinden, 2010).  This process of reconciliation went hand in hand 
with the state-building process where grass roots peace negotiations served as 
the basis of constructing the State.   According to Debiel et al. (2009), “under 
circumstances where the state gained a foothold, it increasingly became a 
                                            
44 Adoption of a National Charter and a Peace Charter, intended to serve as the basis for efforts towards 
peace-building and state-building, during a further transitional period of two years 
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central ‘‘arena’’ of governance with formal rules of the game gaining importance” 
( p. 41).  
There are various factors 45  that can be attributed to the success of the 
reconciliation process that was seen as locally owned and materially supported 
by the communities and the diaspora Somalilanders; involving voluntary 
participation from each clan with a broad based consultation process; 
agreement was consensual  meaning that resolutions were inclusive (Ibrahim 
and Terlinden, 2010).    
The way in which Somaliland emerged from the ruins of Somalia is explained in 
various theories;  Spears (2003) credits Somaliland’s northern orientation and 
her proximity to the Gulf states, the trading patterns it consequently embraced, 
and its colonial history as having distinguished Somaliland from the south. Forti 
(2011) acknowledges flexibility in the way in which the colonial administration 
supported secular law, Sharia law, and traditional Somali law as having enabled 
the northern Somali pastoralists to use their own methods to resolve challenges 
and conflicts.  By incorporating local clan chiefs into the formal institutions, 
Fortis’ view is that this served to strengthen the traditional cultural practices and 
structures that Somaliland was to rely on following the disintegration of the state.   
Though slightly differing with Forti, Prunier (1998) has a similar view in which he 
attributes Britain’s ‘benign neglect’ of Somaliland as having contributed to the 
peace-making system remaining largely intact 46 .  He likens Somaliland to 
Southern Sudan, where the colonial masters’ only interest was keeping other 
colonial powers out of the region (Prunier, 1998; Prunier, 2010). Carroll and 
Rajagopal (1993)  and Prunier (op cit) assert that Britain’s main interest in 
Somaliland was driven by the need to safeguard meat supplies to Aden and to 
ensure the safety of the trade routes.  Jhazbhay (2008 ), drawing from the work 
of Marchal, comes to a similar conclusion “the strong possibility that 
Somaliland’s current stability is a function of its comparative conservatism due 
to British colonial policies that did not encourage assimilationist modernity”.  
                                            
45 See  APPENDIX 1:Factors that can be attributed to the success of the Somaliland reconciliation process 
46 To demonstrate the extent to which Somaliland was left to govern herself by the colonial master, Pham 
(2012) cites Iona Lewis’s account on arrival in Somaliland in 1955 “the entire Protectorate establishment 
consisted of less than 200 senior officials, of whom 25 were locally recruited Somalis”. Pham, J. P. ( 2012) 
The Somaliland Exception: Lessons on Postconflict State Building from the Part of the Former Somalia 
that Works. Marine Corps University Journal 3(1), 1-33. pp 5 
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Hence, he further asserts “in a sense, southern Somalia’s instability is a 
function of an urbanising modernity that fragmented the southern Somali social 
formation under the former Italian rule” (p. 175).  He however points out the 
views of Reno (2002), who sees no correlation between the colonial 
experiences of Somalia in shaping contemporary identity and political 
organisation but argues that they were important for their significant influence 
on shaping social categories and social distribution of resources.    
Thus upon independence in 1960, despite Somaliland having been 
economically underdeveloped, her native political institutions had remained un-
tampered with (Prunier, 1998  p. 225; Prunier, 2010).  This meant that with the 
disintegration and failure of Somalia’s central government, the leaders of SNM 
(though having been formed to fight the Somali government) met together with 
traditional elders in Burao to declare the dissolution of the 1960 Union and the 
restoration of the North West region as a sovereign state of Somaliland.  In the 
meantime there was a total collapse of the central government in the rest of 
Somalia.   
Today, Somaliland has developed a hybrid system of government that 
incorporates an elected president and lower house of parliament with an upper 
house that consists of traditional clan elders known as the guurti47.  The robust 
role of clan elders in managing conflict, applying customary law, and negotiating 
political disputes is widely viewed as a key ingredient in Somaliland’s success 
(Menkhaus, 2006a).   
Many of the factors that drove armed conflict in Somalia have played a role in 
managing, ending, or preventing conflict in Somaliland.  De Waal emphasises 
that it was the interaction of clan, class and the nature of State power that has 
continued to make the Somali conflict so intractable in the south, whilst in 
Somaliland the capitalisation of the same structures has made it possible for 
solutions to be found (ibid).  For instance, clannism and clan cleavages are a 
source of conflict––used to divide Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources 
                                            
47 Walls and Kibble (2010 pp 5) describe a guurti, as any individual or group who assumes a mediatory 
role. They argue that this term has more recently been institutionalised and, many would argue, politicised 
in the Somaliland context through its application to the upper house of the Parliament.  The etymology of 
the term refers to the necessary wisdom of any person or group responsible for mediating disputes and 
can be applied to individuals or groups at various levels (op cit, pg 8) 
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and power, used to mobilise militia, and make broad-based reconciliation very 
difficult to achieve (Kaplan, 2008).  It is vital to acknowledge the importance of 
the clan as the locus for physical security and military mobilisation.  
b) Responding to militarisation  
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (1982) defines 
militarisation as "a steady growth in the military potential usually accompanied 
by an increasing role for military institutions both in national affairs, including the 
economic, social and political spheres, and in international affairs”  (1982 p. 
393).  According to Kenneth Bush, the militarisation of the Somali society did 
not just refer to the size of its military and the influx of the weapons into the 
streets, but also to the  tendency to which intergroup relations and conflict were 
defined in narrow military terms in Somalia (Bush, 1998). 
After the collapse of the State, the culture of militarisation that had begun under 
Barre’s regime became rampant; guns and military force no longer remained 
the domain of the ruling elite. Rather, the complete breakdown of authority and 
the collapse of the Somali army led to the proliferation of militias and weapons. 
There is a robust association between arms availability and persistent insecurity 
in the Horn of Africa region and especially in Somalia.  This availability 
contributed to the militarisation of its communities and the prolongation of many 
on-going internal conflicts.  A combination of political manipulation with extreme 
poverty, deteriorating livelihoods, and environmental degradation contributed to 
people’s willingness to take up arms. Makinda (1993) argues that the availability 
of armaments in large quantities resulted in changing the magnitude of the war, 
its direction and intensity ( p. 57).  
External influences, reinforced by a ready supply of weapons, have contributed 
to the polarisation and escalation of violent conflict inside Somalia.  Virtually all 
armed conflicts had been fought with small arms which were easy to procure 
largely because of the collapse of Africa’s largest Cold War armies (Somalia 
and Ethiopia) which triggered a huge flow of weapons.   The arms included 
semi-automatic guns, RPGs, mortars and landmines, but also heavy weapons 
including battlewagons (modified pick-up trucks with a mounted gun) and 
occasionally an anti-aircraft gun.  Landmines were an important weapon of 
choice in 1989-92, but since have only been in sporadic use, For a snapshot of 
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preferred types of weapons and ammunition flowing into Somalia in recent 
years, see the detailed appendix of United Nations, “Report of the Monitoring 
Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1587 (2005),” (New 
York: United Nations, October 5, 2005).  Today, a long standing UN arms 
embargo to Somalia has not promoted a cessation of arms flow.  In 2005,  a UN 
report of the Monitoring report on Somalia reported “a sustained and dramatic 
upswing“ of small arms and ammunition into the country  on a daily basis by 
land, air and sea (UN Security Council, October 5, 2005 p. 6).    
The presence of thousands of armed youths presented a threat to the basic 
security of the residents of Somaliland thus addressing these was of great 
importance. This was recognised by the elders during the reconciliation process 
with the need for demobilisation being integral to the successive phases that 
coincided with the process of national peacebuilding. The conciliation 
conferences had the DDR issue as part enshrined and was included within the 
peace charter. The Borama conference created a climate for absorption of the 
militia into one of three territorial security forces: the army, police, and custodial 
corps (Bradbury, 2008; Jama, 2003).   This meant that the national army and 
police was a very large demobilisation project, guaranteeing a modest salary  to 
about 16,000 militiamen (Menkhaus, 2004a). The equivalent of 60% of 
Somaliland’s resources was allocated to the Somaliland security sector alone. 
Such an ambitious demobilisation process was huge and it was to prove 
expensive to maintain such an excessive security force. 
The process was not an easy one, as there were instances where those who 
initially demobilised and returned to civilian life later joined the many irregular 
militias that mushroomed  and who sought  to earn a living from banditry and 
extortion (WSP International, 2005 p. 61).   Another reason was the presence of 
a lot of former government soldiers and militias, who were stranded together 
with their families in the SNM held territories, fearful of reprisals and afraid of 
returning to the South Central region of Somalia which was still experiencing 
conflict.  Their presence meant that there were not just the SNM former soldiers 
to disarm but also former government soldiers, and the non –Isaaq clan militias. 
The initial disarmament process failed as the idea of uniting the militias under a 
single command starting from the Western region of Somaliland was perceived 
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as a hostile scheme by those from the Eastern region, this meant that they re-
grouped and inter-clan fighting erupted.  This conflict went on until 1992 when 
the elders negotiated a ceasefire (Adar, 2000).   The attempts in effect triggered 
violent clashes between two sub clans the Habr Yonis (supporting the 
government) and the Habr Jeclo (opposing the government)(Ibrahim and 
Terlinden, 2008).   
c) Responding to other challenges with external assistance 
Thus, following her unilateral declaration of independence, the Somaliland state 
inherited a number of challenges that required addressing. It is important to 
note that challenges were not just related to those that Somaliland had inherited 
from both the legacy of the Cold War and the civil war that followed but they 
also had their own internal problems, as mentioned earlier.,  These were  
marked by episodes of large-scale violence post 1991’s unilateral declaration of 
independence (Bradbury, 2008 p. 115).  
The reconstruction, especially of infrastructure, was and still is heavily 
dependent on external support. With the help of donors, the United Nations and 
international NGOs, the government was able to restore rudimentary education 
and health care services throughout much of Somaliland.  
The war had not only devastated the physical and economic base of the country, 
but also human and institutional; government and civic structures (Bradbury, 
1997). The post conflict reconstruction needs for Somaliland were therefore 
numerous, given the level and scale of physical destruction; the duration of the 
conflict; the number of refugees and internally displaced people; and the extent 
to which government institutions had collapsed. Therefore rebuilding included, 
to a greater or lesser extent, reconciliation and establishment of peace and 
security; physical reconstruction of houses and infrastructure; demobilisation 
and re-integration of former combatants; the re-establishment of systems of 
social services and governance; attendance to traumatised people; and the 
repatriation and reintegration of refugees.  
Therefore the post conflict peace building needs that confronted Somaliland 
included a militarised society, and therefore the need for disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration programmes and also the need to address the 
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grievances that the communities harboured, thus programmes on reconciliation 
and nation healing.  The physical landscape was littered with landmines and 
other Unexploded Ordnance. These not only hindered the return and 
reintegration of the community when conflict had ended, but also encroached 
on fertile land and grazing fields resources that were pertinent to post conflict 
recovery.   
I suggest that though the state building and reconciliation process is largely 
owned by the Somaliland community, different actors were and continue to be 
involved in other post conflict reconstruction processes, including NGOs and the 
UN.   
Return and Reintegration of refugees and IDPs  
The patterns and impact of displacement of the Somalia people was and 
remains complex and multifaceted, as is the response to the challenges raised. 
Following the declaration of independence, large numbers of refugees left the 
camps in Ethiopia and Djibouti and went back to what was left of the homes and 
possessions they had fled.  However whilst the war had come to an end, large 
scale war broke out in the south causing more displacement.  The southern 
Somalis fled into neighbouring countries and further afield, whilst others settled 
in the newly created Republic of Somaliland. Thus post war Somaliland was 
addressing different groups of refugees and IDPs who represented different 
challenges.   
Return of those initially displaced, though a good indicator of relative stability of 
host location, may also create pressure politically and economically for a fragile 
post conflict community that is trying to return to normality (Lindley, 2010).  
Immediately after the declaration of Independence, a lot of refugees and IDPs 
returned to Somaliland, with most repatriations being ‘spontaneous’ and ‘self-
organised’, as opposed to being organised by bodies such as the UNHCR. 
They were also returning to ruins; with scarcely a house that had been left 
intact, indeed Omaar notes that Hargeisa had become known as “a roofless 
town” (Omaar, 2010 p. 16) 
Somaliland lacked international commitment from the donor community and 
therefore suffered from a poor representation by UN agencies and other 
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humanitarian organisations at the time. This meant that there was minimal 
support for refugee reintegration programmes and also that there had been a 
lack of coordinated humanitarian response to the refugees whilst in the camps. 
Facing an already difficult situation, refugees had returned to a devastated 
Somaliland without basic food and non-food items, and without even minimal 
cash grants (Frushone, 2001 p. 17).  They relied on social networks, mobility 
and diversified investments to overcome the endemic insecurity that the whole 
region in the Horn was experiencing at the time.  These were social networks 
that they had mobilised both at the time of flight with the vast majority of 
refugees settling in their clan areas across the border;  and upon return relied 
upon charity from relatives (Ambroso, 2002 p. 28). 
Other factors that challenged the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs 
were the length of time spent in refuge; these were those who had initially fled 
into refugee camps in Ethiopia for supporting the SNM.  They had had huge 
grievances and their encampment had resulted to the containerisation of these 
grievances.  This containerisation had nurtured grievances and had become 
explosive providing them with common experiences48 of life in refuge and their 
common cause.  On the other hand, refugee flows have the ability to regionalise 
conflict through the stimulation of illegal trade in weapons and other contraband 
(Lyons and Samatar, 1995). Such protracted presence of refugees in camps 
has been linked to increased insecurity both to the host states and the region in 
general due to the refugee camps becoming militarised.49 The refugee camps 
were used as bases for guerrilla, insurgent or terrorist activities. Armed groups 
hide behind the humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and 
use these camps as an opportunity to recruit among the disaffected displaced 
populations. This happened in the refugee camps in Ethiopia, where the 
UNHCR and the government did nothing to stop the SNM from establishing 
relationship with the refugees.  Instead the refugee camps provided a ready 
pool for recruitment and also acted as supply centres for the military (Bradbury, 
2008) Indeed it has been argued that the SNM shaped the refugees into a 
                                            
48 They lived the common experiences of hardship and survival in a harsh, crowded and inhospitable 
environment.  There was inadequate food and clean water, and poor sanitation caused frequent outbreaks 
of malaria, jaundice, meningitis, dysentery and measles, which contributed to the death of many refugees.   
49  Refugee militarisation is described by Lischer 2001:4 as refugee camps and populations that are 
characterised by storage and trafficking of arms, the presence of active and ex-combatants, recruitment, 
military training and the use of refugee camps as military bases. 
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political community and this experience greatly influenced their decision to 
secede from Somalia (Bradbury citing Brons 2001 pp. 204-7). 
Similarly the length of time also created a dependency syndrome.  The refugees 
had become dependent on the rations and hand-outs as part of the camp life.  
Such dependency was also perpetuated by reliance on remittances from 
relatives in the diaspora.  Rations were distributed based on individuals; this 
promoted individualistic patterns of behaviour weakening the interdependence 
amongst families.  This interdependence had continually been observed and 
was evident in the settlement patterns of refugees. They had moved to areas 
inhabited by their kin as a way of ensuring protection and assistance especially 
before the arrival of relief aid.  The life in the camp had also encouraged 
sedentarisation, which had an impact upon return as most of them preferred 
urban settings to rural areas, something that brought about changes to the 
economy and social relations and put pressure on urban infrastructure.   The 
length of time had therefore greatly contributed to a shift in social and cultural 
norms including the clear divisions of labour (WSP International, 2005 p. 279). 
The challenge of addressing the issue of displacement was and still is further 
complicated by definitional ambiguities which add to the challenges of 
responding to an already marginalised entity. The UN Guiding Principles on 
internal displacement defines IDPs as those "persons or groups of persons who 
have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural 
or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognised State border"  (OCHA, 2003).  By definition, a refugee has to have 
crossed an international border.  Since Somaliland's independence is 
unrecognised internationally, UN agencies and NGOs do not classify those 
people from Southern Somalia as refugees and therefore the UN and other 
refugee agencies do not provide financial and material support.  However, by 
classifying them as IDPs, these agencies would technically expect Somaliland 
to offer them support yet the government is not given any support either as a 
federal body or state to address this.   Similarly, the government considers them 
as refugees in the view that these people have crossed an 'international border’.   
 
 
107 
 
Today there are several levels of displacement in Somaliland. Firstly those 
clans from south and central Somalia who fall under the conventional category 
of displaced persons. These are displaced communities that fled their home 
territories due to civil conflict and severe drought conditions, or both, and have 
found themselves in northern towns throughout northwest and northeast 
Somalia.  At another, more complex level, there are the "returnees", those clans 
and sub-clans that over the last decade have been displaced or made refugees 
two or three times and are only now returning to their ethnic home towns and 
villages. Finally there are those returnees who are returning from the Somali 
Region in Ethiopia where they resided as refugees during the civil conflicts of 
1988 and 1994.   These refugees and returnees receive better protection than 
the IDPs, because there is an agency that is clearly mandated to look after 
refugees' protection and assistance needs, and some authorities such as in 
Somaliland have recognised the right of returnees (UNCU/UN-OCHA, 2002 p. 
4).  
Demilitarisation, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes  
Since 1999, programmes such as Rule of Law, Small Arms, Demobilisation, 
Disarmament and Reintegration and mine action have come under the UNDP 
Somalia Somali Civil Protection Programme.  
With support from UNDP and with advice from a team of ex-combatants from 
Zimbabwe, a National Demobilisation Commission of Somaliland (NDC) was 
formed in 1993.  President Egal ensured that the demobilisation effort was led 
by representatives of all clans as it was imperative that the effort be seen not as 
imposed by the state or a mono-clan structure.  This policy was also reflected in 
the  principles of; voluntarily and universality i.e. open to all groups; centrally 
coordinated; locally implemented and representing all military forces (Bryden 
and Brickhill, 2010). 
This effort failed on two counts; there was public pressure to get the militia out 
of urban areas and into camps (this move was discouraged by the Zimbabwean 
advisors).  The encampment process went ahead and 5,500 armed militias 
were put in a camp near Mandhera.  Here they underwent six months re-
orientation and adult literacy courses. However due to a shortage of funds, and 
with the realisation by the militias that there would be nothing for them in return, 
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half of them deserted.   According to a report by Oxfam published in 1994, the 
organisation noted that with insufficient shelter, food, water or medical facilities 
for the militia, the situation was potentially explosive, and attributes the sudden 
rush of militia to the camp to anxiety over missing the benefits of retraining and 
employment within the security forces (Bradbury, 1994).  This episode became 
an important lesson to Somaliland; that donors, including the United Nations 
office for Somalia (UNOSOM) could not be relied on for funding.  The important 
lesson meant that NDC became more self-reliant. Earlier President Egal had 
expelled the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 50  (UNISOM II) from 
Somaliland, in what Jowhar (2005) considers as having been a positive action, 
as the interference of such a well-resourced external body in the internal 
relationships of the social forces of the emerging state would have prevented 
self-organisation. It was suggested, however, that UNOSOM’s  unresponsive 
nature was due to the fact that they were denied the opportunity to exert control 
over the process and continued to insist on the need to send uniformed and 
protected (armed) advisers to Somaliland if they were going to support the 
process (Bradbury, op cit).  Omaar (2010) argues that it was UNOSOM’s 
support for the judicial system (part of its mandate) that led directly to its 
expulsion when it refused to recognise Somaliland’s jurisdiction over the east 
Sool and Sanaag  (p. 31). 
With the presence of relative peace came prosperity and an inflow of 
remittances from the diaspora which meant a growth and interest in real estate, 
where land became an important resource.  This also saw disputes and conflict 
over land increasing, with such conflicts involving the use of small arms.  This 
reawakened the need to address the issue of misuse and control of small arms, 
an issue that previously was of low priority and had been incorporated as part of 
a broader interest in demobilisation.  Hence, UNDP started a project that sought 
to promote demobilisation through capacity building of the Somaliland 
government. However despite the introduction of a community-based and 
“knowledge-based” approach to demobilisation – one which placed emphasis 
on drawing on local knowledge as a foundation for demobilisation strategy and 
                                            
50 On 18 August 1994, President Egal ordered UNOSOM to close its office in Hargeisa and evacuate its 
staff. When the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, announced the closure of the Hargeisa office to 
the security council of the UN in New York he mentioned insecurity as a reason (Omaar 2010 p. 31) 
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which linked demobilisation to broader peace-building efforts – the SCPP  failed 
to produce results due to what DFID termed as “serious management and 
efficiency problems”. This was all part of the general crisis UNDP-Somalia was 
facing at the time (Menkhaus citing Douma, 2001p. 9).   
Another DDR project included one that was carried out by the German owned 
international cooperation enterprise Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit  (GTZ)51  and funded by the European Union.  GTZ’s core 
DDR activity was a pilot project to de-commission and re-integrate redundant 
Somaliland police and army soldiers by providing training for civilian 
occupations and provision of a lump-sum payment to each individual 
demobilised. The project also included a survey of ex-combatants and a 
comprehensive survey of all Somaliland security personnel. However, in March 
2004 there was a tragic ambush of a GTZ vehicle which resulted in the death of 
one Kenyan project officer and the wounding of a German project officer, 
resulting in the termination of all GTZ activities in Somaliland (Menkhaus, 
2006a). 
The gains of the DDR programme in Somaliland can be described as having 
achieved a modest level of success;  through the actions of communities and 
with assistance from the business community, the government was able to 
remove unofficial checkpoints from the main roads which brought banditry 
under control (Bradbury, 2008 p. 113). The business community played an 
active role in demobilising by providing rations to demobilised militia members  
and to a new government army and police force (Bulhan, 2004).  The 
community also intervened when fighting broke out over the main port of 
Berbera and, with the threat to the livestock export business, the businessmen 
intervened and became an active voice for peace (Bradbury, 2008 p. 112). 
                                            
51 Now known as Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH or GIZ in short. 
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SOMALILAND’S REMAINING PEACEBUILDING CHALLENGES  
International Non-Recognition: A failed State; ‘A Pocket of Peace’ or 
a ‘State’?’  
Somaliland has made a lot of progress; many of her refugees and internally 
displaced people have returned home, mines/UXOs have been cleared, 
integration of clan militias into mainstream police and military forces has taken 
place; a multi-party political system and successive competitive elections have 
been established.  However, irrespective of the notable progress achieved in 
building peace, security and constitutional democracy including that Somaliland 
is a de-facto independent state, it is still regarded by all other governments as 
part of Somalia. Largely nurtured by international isolation Somaliland’s rigorous 
political development can be defined as having been largely an internal affair.  
However Ethiopia has maintained close relations with Somaliland since its re-
emergence in 1991 and remains the only country that has a consulate in 
Hargeisa and treats Somaliland more or less as an independent state. 
Unfortunately, according to Herbst (2004), the rest of the world insists on 
clinging to the fiction that Somalia has a government that rules over a united 
territory.  Herbst (2004) laments Somaliland’s non-recognition as a 
demonstration of the imperfections of the international politics of recognition. He 
wonders why Somaliland isn’t recognised as a sovereign entity if the defining 
characteristic of a state is order (Herbst, 2004).   
Politically, Somaliland’s system has continually edged towards constitutional 
democracy, highlighted by a constitutional referendum in May 2001 which 
endorsed a new constitution and reaffirmed its status as an independent state 
(Arman, 2012; Bradbury, 2008; Hoyle, 2000; Lalos, 2011; Shin, 2003). In 2002, 
2003, 2005, 2010 and 2012, local government, presidential and parliamentary 
elections were held, in a reasonably free and fair manner (Adan Yusuf Abokor 
et al., 2006; Walls and Kibble, 2010a).    
The fact that Somaliland is not an internationally recognised State, means that it 
endures blanket references of ‘state failure’ whilst being acknowledged as a 
region of Somalia that is  an ‘Oasis of peace’ (Fisher, 1999; Riemann and 
Gregg-Wallace, 2009), a ‘pocket of stability’ (Forti, 2011),  ‘an oasis of security, 
reconciliation, and cooperation’ (Ahmad, 2011)  or a  ‘pocket of peace’ in the 
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midst of chaos. Thus because of its ‘political/formal’ classification as part of 
Somalia, which means that economic development and trade and progress are 
generally handicapped, as foreign investors are reluctant to become involved in 
a territory supposedly located within a “failed state” and war-zone. Somaliland 
cannot enter into bilateral agreements with donors as they shy away from the 
implication that such a provision of assistance may be seen as diplomatic 
recognition.  An ICG report citing the African Union notes that the lack of 
recognition, “ties the hands of the authorities and people of Somaliland as they 
cannot effectively and sustainably transact with the outside [world] to pursue the 
reconstruction and development goals” (ICG, 2006 p. 12). This lack of 
recognition therefore places real constraints on her capacity to function like a 
state, both domestically and internationally.  
The political rhetoric and images of insecurity associated with the term “Failed 
States” are often images of violence and complete anarchy that Somalia has 
become.  The rise of Islamic fundamentalists and the spill over of the same 
clearly illustrate that Somalia is not only a threat to her neighbours in Africa but 
to international peace and security. The range of diverse forcible and non-
forcible interventions by multiple actors and agencies, the United Nations; the 
AU and other regional governments are underpinned by the principles, values 
and practice of liberal peacebuilding and its commitment to democratisation, 
marketisation and public institution building.  
For those authors who challenge the labelling of Somalia as a ‘failed state’,  
Harper (2012) argues that this is a convenient label  for actors especially the US 
who have used it to justify interventions of whatever form towards Somalia.  She 
argues that Somalia generally does not fit into any paradigm of ‘statehood’ but it 
does not fit the failed state per se (p.108).  Murphy (2009) acknowledges that 
Somalia is a failed state but he argues that this does not mean it is a failed 
society. Central government has collapsed but other forms of authority remain. 
Some forms are local, restricted to individual towns and villages; some are clan 
or sub-clan related within which context elders are often able to exercise their 
authority using traditional means; some are focused on political figures who 
exercise authority. The critical point of this analysis of Somalia is that, in the 
absence of a central state, the result has not been widespread chaos. Instead, 
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endogenous rules and mechanisms that allow individuals to “get things done” 
have developed and created widespread co-operation. This, Murphy argues, is 
even more evident when compared to the widespread conflict that resulted 
when interventions failed to create a central state.  
This argument by Murphy (2009) and Harper (2012) conveniently places 
Somaliland as part of Somalia hence the reference by Murphy to ‘some form of 
authority using traditional means’. Hence one can argue that the role of 
Somaliland in the Somalia narrative supports the call for reconceptualising 
Somalia and therefore challenging the dominant discourses.  However, the 
reverse does not happen for Somaliland; even when Somalia is removed or 
added into the analysis, it does not project Somaliland into the academic 
peacebuilding discourse that critically engages in scrutinising how 
peacebuilding interventions are implemented. Thus, the critical peacebuilding 
scholars disregard it as a context that can either support or discredit their 
critiques.  This therefore supports my argument that state centric approaches 
are at the heart of most peacebuilding critiques.  
On the other hand, the very notion of including Somaliland within Somalia and 
then defining it as a failed state exemplifies the failure of the ‘failed state’ 
discourse.   This is a reflection of underlying beliefs based on a ‘problematic’ 
African culture and religion which lacks not only historical justification but also 
has resulted in misconceived and short sighted intervention policies.  The case 
of Somaliland helps to illuminate that under more conducive conditions and in 
the absence of external political agendas Somalis are able to restore peace, 
drawing on these same traditions, negotiations and compromises (Moe, 2011).  
Somaliland has, in its turn, disproven the assertion that Somalis are too 
anarchic to form a strong, central state (Walls and Kibble, 2010a).  
The key challenge for Somaliland is that it must seek separation within the 
framework of Somalia, which according to Clapham and colleagues ‘is unwilling 
to agree to a divorce a la Sudan, the United Arab Republic, or Czechoslovakia’ 
(Clapham et al., 2011). Similarly the African Union (AU) is an important factor. 
Support for recognition from the AU is not forthcoming as their policy of 
adherence to colonial boundaries is clear and the international community still 
recognises Somalia as a state, thus secession of Somaliland would violate the 
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territorial integrity of the state of Somalia. However,  Chang (2012) cautions the 
US State Department against recognising Somaliland arguing that this would 
raise political tensions within Somalia, as many within Somalia who feel that the 
country should not be fragmented would react violently at the prospect of what 
he calls a “balkanisation” process (p. 152).  
International recognition is not supported by all in Somaliland, however, and 
some cite the impromptu secession declared by Somaliland as not falling within 
United Nations Resolutions 1541 (XV) and 2649 (XXV) of the General 
Assembly which govern and arbitrate issues of secession  (Roble, 2007).  Roble 
further argues that Somaliland is not geographically, culturally, ethnically nor 
historically different from the rest of Somalia (ibid p. 3).  
Economic implications of non-recognition 
Economically, the implications for non-recognition are the lack of a body that 
can provide services for business transactions involving partners based in non-
recognised entities and jurisdictions.   Conventional international venues for 
adjudicating commercial disputes such as the American Association of Arbiters, 
the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International 
Arbitration, and the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes are inaccessible to the Somaliland businesses (Reno, 
2002 p. 29). Similarly the preferred standard of framework for hearing 
international business disputes remains the Anglo-Saxon common law which is 
non-existent in Somaliland (ibid). Somaliland cannot be part of the Universal 
Postal Union (UPU), neither can it belong to Interpol (world’s largest 
international police organization) or the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).  
Another economic implication is that non recognition continues to hamper oil 
exploration (Bryden, 2003) meaning that Somaliland has to rely upon 
exploration agreements from those willing to take the risk of doing business.  
Thus Chinese firms have played a dominant role in such agreements as their 
government provides business support for them, helping them fill these niches 
that international commercial law renders out of bounds for most other firms 
according to Reno (2002). This means that as recognition is delayed, 
Somaliland risks dealing with rogue firms against the cost of litigation if ever 
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recognition was achieved and such contracts were abandoned.  Thus, 
according to Reno, who cites an observation by an official,  this has created a 
difficult contradiction for Somaliland, for so long as western oil exploration firms 
are more competitive, Chinese authorities have a vested interest in frustrating 
Somaliland’s bid for international recognition, lest Chinese firms lose their 
protected niche (Reno, 2002). Thus, the pursuit for international recognition has 
with good reason become a sort of national obsession (Bryden, 2003).  On 
another level, there appears to be a level of economical recognition by the EU, 
the United Kingdom, China, Ethiopia and to a certain extent Turkey who have 
established significant economic relations with the region (Chang, 2012).   
Similarly, Somaliland has negotiated economic and trade relations with the 
United Arab Emirates, the Coca Cola Corporation and Western Union who have 
all invested in Somaliland.  
Somaliland’s private sector has sustained growth, this has been catalysed by 
low levels of regulation and a comparatively small government bureaucracy. A 
number of government services, such as vehicle licensing, are delivered 
through local businesses.   Similarly private entities have further moved in to 
provide basic infrastructure and institutions. Electricity and telephones have 
been offered to towns that never benefited from those services in the prior 
regime where government regulated the economy (pre-1991) (Nenova, 2004). 
When it comes to international duties of statehood however, Somaliland has 
been expected to shoulder some responsibilities, for example, the care of 
refugees (including those from Somalia and Ethiopia) whilst there is 
acknowledgement that Somaliland is safe and several European countries, 
including the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, have denied asylum 
to Somalilanders and repatriated them on the grounds that their homeland is 
safe and secure (ICG, 2006 p. 12). 
Limitations of non-recognition on reconstruction and development 
programmes  
The UN has continually placed and treated Somaliland as Somalia, leaving  the 
country largely to the sphere of NGOs and other agencies while the UN directs 
its attention to explicitly humanitarian rather than longer term development 
assistance (Hogg, 1996).  This policy of considering projects for Somaliland 
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under Somalia means that such projects are underfunded and poorly 
coordinated due to the perceived security challenges (this aspect is considered 
in depth elsewhere in this thesis).  Meanwhile Somalia continues to be a mass 
producer of refugees and internally displaced persons; where lawlessness 
prevails and violent inter-clan and sub-clan warfare continues unabated coupled 
with pervasive food insecurity (Frushone, 2001). 
Therefore most international engagement with Somaliland is  hampered by the 
fact that key donors and potential bilateral partners bind their relationships with 
Somaliland to the framework of their engagement with the radically different 
context prevailing in south/central Somalia (Albin-Lackey, 2009).  Where donors 
such as DFID are engaged, they provide institutional support but cannot do this 
directly with the government but through a partnership with the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP).  Unfortunately, even then, the UN works 
under the rubric of 'North west Somalia' when implementing such programmes 
on behalf of donors.  DFID funding is limited to capacity-building for ministries 
and local administrations. DFID also funded Somaliland’s democratic 
presidential elections in 2003, as well as the parliamentary and local elections in 
2005 (Othieno, 2003).  
The Government of Somaliland considers development aid to be donor-driven, 
bureaucratic, poorly coordinated and unpredictable doing little to support the 
emergence of a Somaliland state that is able to implement its own development 
agenda (DFID Somalia and Danida, 2011).  According to their report on aid 
effectiveness the Government of Somaliland (GoSL) cites  ‘lack of sectoral aid 
implementation coordination; lack of involvement GoSL in fund raising; aid 
target shortage, and the irrelevant sectoral allocation’ are some of the major 
causes of facing  Reconstruction and development Program (RDP) (Ministry 
Planning &  Development, 2010 p. 7).  Further the government cites the 
preference by donors to follow a direct implementation funding model, where 
they channel aid through the international implementing institutions without the 
involvement of the Somaliland government which undermines efforts towards 
aid coordination; resulting in inappropriate prioritisation, and increase of delivery 
costs; also transparency and accountability discrepancies exist (ibid p.7).  
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Political fragility and border conflicts 
Somaliland faces enormous challenges including but not limited to Governance 
and its institutions as these are primarily based on improving inter-clan harmony 
and mutual trust. Clan character continually permeates politics with many 
cabinet members owing their posts more to the need for perceived clan 
equilibrium in government than to their qualifications or political relevance. In 
every Presidential appointment a clan balance is the overriding factor.  Similarly 
seat allocations in both houses of parliament are also proportionally assigned to 
the clans (Othieno, 2003).   
Other underlying issues for the conflict centred on unresolved issues of power 
sharing, historical divisions within the SNM, and resource competition. Control 
over the port of Berbera and its revenues ignited violence in 1992; control over 
the Hargeisa airport and its revenues created the spark in 1994 (Lalos, 2011 p. 
794 footnote 53).    
Today, the struggle for control for these regions is claimed by both Puntland52 
and Somaliland, despite the Harti clans having signed the 1991 declaration of 
independence and the 1993 reaffirmation in Boorama in 1993.  There is 
constant redefinition of relations with either Somaliland or Puntland, with some 
Dulbahante-inhabited areas sometimes identifying and coming under the control 
of Somaliland and sometimes with Puntland.  Clapham and others (2011) argue 
that the constant redefining of these relations makes the clans prone to internal 
conflicts along sub-clan or sub-sub-clan lines (Clapham et al., 2011).  This is 
also a demonstration of the fluidity in clan identity which Lewis has argued is 
situational, and shifts according to the issue at hand (Lewis, 1994; Menkhaus, 
2010b citing ).   
Similarly, the contested border regions of Sool and Sanaag remain a challenge 
to Somaliland’s stability.  Puntland lays claim to most of Sool and Sanaag 
regions, a claim that Somaliland rejects. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland opts for 
                                            
52 Puntland was established in 1998. According to its constitution it is a part of the Somali state and works 
for the rebuilding of a unitary Somali government Its government in Garowe is based on an alliance of 
different Daarood/Harti clans. Apart from this genealogical identity the Somali national identity is adhered 
to. Markus V. Höhne on  
http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/en/people/d/mhoehne/project.html 
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an autonomous federal state and opposes the independence of Somaliland53.  
Though the struggle is largely about administration, the people themselves do 
not have a uniform position and are divided in their loyalties, with members of 
the clans’ political and traditional elites scattered between Somaliland, Puntland 
and Mogadishu. This creates disunity in their political aspirations and, according 
to an ICG report, the issue is seen as a deep fault line in the politics of Somalia 
more generally, and one would argue, in Somaliland, that is likely to worsen if a 
conflict were to breakout. 
Arman (2012) aptly uses a minefield to describe the clan politics and identities 
that shape Somaliland.  He argues that due to their ever-evolving and 
contentious struggle to reshape the region ‘they are minefields with the potential 
to blow at up any time’; tensions in areas such as Buhoodle lay latent waiting to 
explode at the slightest provocation.  In 2002 and 2004 conflict erupted from 
incompatible positions regarding the self-understanding and the political future 
of both de facto-states and their populations.  This threatens the achievement 
gained by Somaliland thus far.  
The Presence of Terrorist Groups and their Global Threat  
The on-going instability in Somalia and the presence of radical Islamist groups 
with cross-border tentacles remains the principal source of threats of 
destabilisation in Somaliland. There is a growing strong buoyancy of Islamist 
groups such as Al Shabab based in the Eastern part of the country and said to 
receive support in form of arms, finances and training from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, Kuwait Iran and Sudan (Adam, 2010 p. 130; 
Forberg and Terlinden, 1999; Marquardt and Shinn, 2009). Such groups can be 
described as political Islam because they express overt political objectives 
organised around the identity and principals of Islam. 
In 2003 came a number of killings of foreigners such as Annalena Tonelli, an 
Italian nurse killed at a hospital in Boroma on the 5th of October 2003; followed 
on the 21st by the killing of Richard and Enid Eyeington, teachers at SOS 
School in Sheikh; In April 2004, a GTZ (German NGO) vehicle was attacked on 
                                            
53 Puntland’s claim to most of the two regions, is primarily based on clan ties. About half of the residents of 
Sanaag and a higher proportion in Sool have sympathies with Puntland see Shinn, D. (2002) Somaliland: 
The Little Country that Could. Africa Notes Number 9. Available from  
http://www.somalilandlaw.com/AmbShin_on_Somaliland.pdf . 
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the road between Hargeisa and Berbera, killing a Kenyan woman and injuring a 
German project manager.  As noted in Chapter 1: Research Location; 
Somaliland on page 6,  the 2008, Al-Shabaab were linked to a series of 
coordinated bomb attacks that targeted the presidential palace, the Ethiopian 
consulate and the United Nations offices in Hargeisa (McGregor, 2008).   The 
bombings illustrated the risk that conflict in Somalia can spill over into 
Somaliland, even though Somaliland has not attacked targets in Somalia or 
otherwise provoked hostilities.  The suspected motivations is an attempt to 
undermine Somaliland’s emerging status as a peaceful stable place and to 
discourage any country into recognising it as an independent state.. 
Hence, threat of insurgent groups like Al-Ittihaad and Al-Shabaab is very 
relevant to Somaliland and the regional stability.  Specifically, Al Shabab has 
previously warned mine action organisations in south central Somalia to cease 
operations in areas under their control.  The accusation labelled against 
UNMAS is that it is paying the salaries of government police officers.  The group 
accused the UN of attempting to disrupt peace and justice by bribing various 
community elders and inciting them to rebel against the Islamic administration; 
they area also accused of surveying and sign-posting some of the most vital 
and sensitive areas under the control of the Mujahideen  (Omar, 2009).   
CONCLUSION 
I set out to illustrate the context and challenges that confronted Somaliland post 
her self-proclaimed independence. The chapter demonstrates that the 
challenges emanated from both external and internal factors. Following the 
disintegration of the Somali state, the responses of interveners in Somalia and 
the Somaliland people not only demonstrate two completely different outcomes 
but also help in unpacking some of the narratives and discourses that have 
emerged on issues around state failure and liberal peacebuilding. 
The international peacebuilding efforts in Somalia have failed to recreate a 
central state which in turn provides the critics with a good example of the failure 
of the liberal peace project; this failure is more accurately limited to south 
Central Somalia, however, when Somaliland is included within Somalia, and in 
which case the critique only holds to a certain extent.  This chapter shows that a 
state centric approach dominates the narrative of the liberal peace critics who 
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equate the lack of a central state in Somalia as an indication of the failure of the 
liberal peace project.  
The lack of recognition by the international community makes Somaliland 
ineligible for foreign aid persists, yet the reconstruction has endured, supported 
largely by the international community in various forms and by the Somaliland 
people themselves. The disengagement by the international community 
remained mainly within the realms of state building.  However, as the case of 
Mine action will illustrate other aspects of post conflict recovery processes 
largely involved external interventions, through the UN, and NGOs.  However 
those activities and interventions have not been subjected to any critical 
scrutiny by the peacebuilding scholars.  This I argue is because of Somaliland’s 
unrecognised status which means that it is lumped together with Somalia the 
‘failed State’.  More importantly, I argue that these peacebuilding interventions 
have escaped scrutiny because the process of creation of the ideal democratic 
state as the end goal in state-building and development projects is the most 
scrutinised Liberal Peace agenda.  Thus the critics of liberal peace is that by 
being state-centric in approach they fail to acknowledge ‘the pockets of peace’, 
that exist within the unit of a state or within an emerging polity like Somaliland.  
The tendency by the critics to offer generalised critiques across diverse 
contexts is evident in the way that they limit their focus to the failure of 
democratisation and state building through focusing on states that have 
received large militarised interventions such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. 
As such they omit ‘emerging’ ‘unrecognised’ ‘de facto’ states; and they fail to 
scrutinise other sectors that would offer more credence to their critiques. It is 
also indicative of the extent to which the critics tend to use a ‘standard one size 
fits all’ themselves in their critique of liberal peace.  
I therefore argue that outside the process of state building in Somalia and 
specifically Somaliland, there are other peacebuilding processes that are 
ongoing; and which have a liberal agenda; and which could contribute to 
offering more nuanced examples of the limitations of liberal peacebuilding.  
Applying the critiques to Somaliland does this; and the thesis goes further by 
taking a specific intervention, mine action, as the unit of analysis.   Thus, this 
thesis will contribute to the deepening of the literature on critical liberal 
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peacebuilding by offering a critical analysis beyond a state and beyond a highly 
militarised and huge external intervention.  
Somaliland therefore portrays the typical characteristics of a liberal 
peacebuilding context; normally a post conflict environment, which peace-
builders are accused of defining as traumatised, dysfunctional, irrational, and 
immature, therefore legitimising models and solutions defined by outsiders 
rather than local actors.  It is also strategically located; has possibilities for 
natural resources such as oil; and has a presence of terrorist groups and thus is 
within a region that presents security challenges viewed through the lens of the 
global war on terror.  
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CHAPTER 4: GLOBAL MINE ACTION SECTOR; 
PROGRAMME AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESSES 
The Mine Action Sector has become a hostage of its own success. (A personal 
observation). 
INTRODUCTION  
In CHAPTER 2:  PEACEBUILDING AND MINE ACTION; THE DEBATES AND 
CRITIQUES, from page 39, I demonstrated the extent to which the discourse on 
landmines, their impact, and hence the framing of the response needed to 
address the contamination, has been influenced by the broader global political 
and security discourses and processes of globalisation (see for example, Bolton, 
2010).   Beyond mine action being a microcosm of peacebuilding, the way it is 
implemented reflects the same dominant characteristics i.e.; it is standardised; 
technical and externally led.  However, I argue that this is the result of factors 
that have coalesced and shaped the Sector both from outside and within.  In 
this chapter I will demonstrate how this has happened.  A critical analysis of the 
Sector will illustrate how the interplay of the processes of Sector formation and 
contexts influence the definition of policy problems and hence choice of policy 
instruments.  I will do this by illustrating that the way the sector manifests itself 
is in response to the same global political dynamics which dictate the way in 
which the sector is formed; the process of formation of the Sector is also 
reflected in the actors who emerge and the normative framework that governs it.  
Similarly, the global context within which this process occurred also shaped the 
policies that emerged and the manner in which they were implemented.  This is 
because the process of formation of the Sector was populated by various 
disparate actors who then formed a networked governance structure that is 
global, multi-layered and multi-actor (Duffield & Waddell, 2006).  This concept of 
networked governance means that policies adopted reflect the interplay of all 
these actors; processes and contexts.  To demonstrate this, I will adapt a 
simplified model of the (Walt and Gilson, 1994) “Policy Analysis Triangle” that 
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has been used for health policy analysis (see Figure 7: An Adapted Policy 
Analysis Triangle) 
 Figure 7: An Adapted Policy Analysis Triangle 
 
 
Various studies have engaged in analysing Mine Ban Treaty implementation 
(Bryden, 2010; Thakur and Maley, 1999; Van Der Linden, 2007) without 
necessarily engaging with the Sector itself.  To illustrate that actors, processes 
and context all interacted to shape the mine action sector itself rather than the 
policy - in this case the Mine Ban Treaty. I adopt Walt and Gilson’s original 
framework but modify it using a basic Venn diagram to illustrate the overlapping 
or interconnected relationships.  I replace ‘actors’ with ‘content’ in the middle of 
the triangle (see figure 7 above and 8; A Mine Action Sector analysis diagram.   
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Figure 8: A Mine Action Sector Analysis diagram 
  
Adapted from the Walt and Gilson (1993) Policy Analysis Triangle 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold; to illustrate how actors have 
shaped the formation of the Sector and secondly contextualise how these 
policies have emerged.  This will demonstrate the justification behind the need 
to implement these policies; this will further illustrate the origins of standardised 
approaches to mine action implementation which is modelled around a checklist 
approach.  The dominant critique of liberal peacebuilding interventions is that 
peacebuilding interventions favour a standardised template-like approach, the 
way mine action is implemented by the Sector tends to support this critique. 
However, I argue that such an approach is not necessarily a deliberate attempt 
but is the result of several processes and factors that dictate such 
implementation modalities.  These include responding to donor requirements 
and adherence to treaty obligations and humanitarian norms that guide the 
Sector and the post conflict context that it operates in. 
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THE PROCESS OF THE MINE ACTION SECTOR FORMATION 
The Ottawa Process54  was a decisive factor in formation of the Sector; the 
central contribution of actors especially the mine action experts, the states and 
all the other key players remained influential in shaping the way in which the 
sector was to emerge.   I argue that the Sector that emerged reflects the same 
factors that coalesced to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty. The Sector is the 
result of an interaction of the actors that had been part of the Mine Ban Process 
and the formation of the Sector was shaped by a global context that was 
different from the one which the MBT emerged from.  Similarly, beyond the 
campaigning period and formation of the Sector, the dominant actors remained 
actively engaged in the governance (at global level) and implementation of 
policies of the Sector at the local level. My observation therefore is that the 
context within which any activity takes place is of great importance and I will 
illustrate this through the Somaliland context.   
COMPOSITION OF THE KEY ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES 
NGOs, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, played a huge role in 
transforming the landmine-use issue from a strictly political military problem to a 
humanitarian one. The organisations themselves were mainly involved in 
humanitarian relief work; this is reflected by the dominant NGOs who steered 
the mine ban movement, i.e. the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 
Medico International, Mines Advisory Group (UK), Handicap International 
France), Human Rights Watch (USA), and Physicians for Human Rights (USA). 
HRW and ICRC (human rights); HI, PHR and Medico International were 
involved in medical and public health issues whilst VVAF dealt with the 
consequences of war in a social and development sense and MAG was a 
demining organisation.  Similarly, the involvement and the work of the ICRC and 
the role of the UN further ingrained mine action within the realms of 
humanitarianism and the Sector within the broader humanitarian sector.  Indeed 
the role of the UN in mine action had begun when the office of Coordination of 
                                            
54 The Ottawa Process refers to the period between October 1996 when Minister Axworthy invited other 
countries participating in a landmines conference in Canada to return to his country to sign a ban treaty 
and December 1997 when the Ottawa Convention opened 
for signatures. The term was a term coined by diplomats to describe the events between the planning 
period/process. The mine ban process had begun in Oslo and therefore the entire process is also referred 
to as the Oslo Process.  
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Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) assumed the role for mine 
clearance.   
Initially, the term ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ was used to refer to the clearance 
of landmines and UXO in relief or emergency scenarios. Humanitarian Mine 
Action encompasses other elements, and is usually defined by the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) as:- 
“...not just about demining; it is also about people and societies, and how 
they are affected by landmine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) 
contamination” (IMAS, 2001: Online).   
Mine action encompasses several dimensions, all of which must be taken into 
account in order to address the full range of problems posed by ERW 
contamination. As defined in the IMAS, five major “pillars” support mine action; 
these are: (a) advocacy, (b) mine risk education (MRE); (c) humanitarian 
demining, often referred to as “clearance”, which includes all technical activities 
required during the clearance process (i.e. survey, mapping, marking, 
clearance); (d) victim assistance, which includes physical and psychological 
rehabilitation and reintegration; and (e) stockpile destruction. Mine action’s main 
objective is therefore to reduce the risk from landmines and ERW to a level 
where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health development 
can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW 
contamination, and in which victims’ needs can be addressed. 
The ICRC was one of the key actors on which the entire campaign relied as far 
as the process of reframing Anti-Personnel Landmines was concerned.  The 
landmines issue having been ‘humanitarianised’ by the mine ban process, the 
emerging Sector and its responses became imbued within the same 
humanitarian principles that guide humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC 
and United Nations. Whereas the ICRC has been seen as a specimen of 
traditional humanitarianism, the ICBL during the mine ban process emerged as 
an example of the so-called “new humanitarianism” i.e. “principled”, “human-
rights based” and politically sensitive. This concept of new humanitarianism is 
seen to mark a break from the past and a rejection of the traditional principles 
that guided humanitarianism with the new humanitarians rejecting the political 
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naivety of the past, able to assess the long-term political impact of relief and 
prepared to see humanitarian aid used as a tool to achieve human rights and 
political goals (Fox, 2001).  However, I argue that the evidence suggests that 
operationally the Sector is still guided more by traditional humanitarian 
principles of neutrality and impartiality although the various actors may vary 
considerably in terms of operational approach and methodology. 
The Sector is further underpinned by humanitarian objectives to make land safe 
for civilians; this has resulted in strong coherence around mine clearance based 
on the emphasis of risk elimination; this has therefore reinforced the Sectors’ 
technical approach with a lot of expertise and effort being enlisted in achieving 
this; thus each task is treated as a total mined area requiring 100% clearance.  
This humanitarian objective is further reinforced by the need to adhere to the 
international mine ban treaty and international standards that guide the Sector. 
Thus quality is prioritised over cost, speed and breadth (Bolton, 2010). To 
achieve this, the sector has therefore relied on high levels of technical expertise 
and technologies that are rarely available within post conflict contexts; and 
hence the Sector’s interaction with military expertise. This has resulted in 
dominance of military input; a technical approach and a Sector that is quite rigid 
in its operations. The nature of the operations also dictates a relatively high 
interaction with national and/or foreign military personnel which has its history 
with the Mine Ban process where the NGOs required knowledge of the issues 
posed by landmines in order to create awareness in the international community.  
The campaign and the entire processes therefore relied on retired and active 
military personnel to provide the ban movement with the technical expertise and 
knowledge required to make their arguments and call for a ban. For example 
the ICRC commissioned an analysis of the ‘‘Military Use and Effectiveness of 
Anti-personnel Mines’’ to assess the actual use and effectiveness of landmines 
in 26 conflicts since and including the World War II. Previously, the UN had 
hired Paddy Blagden, a retired British Army Brigadier, to develop a strategic 
plan to ensure a coherent UN approach to the mine issue, in which he was 
assisted by a military historian. The study was later presented to senior military 
experts from nine countries convened by the ICRC in which they questioned the 
military value of mines, and argued that their limited utility was far outweighed 
by the appalling humanitarian consequences.  The conclusions of the (Blagden, 
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1996) report ‘Anti-personnel Landmines; Friends or Foe?, is described by 
(Maslen, 1996) as having formed the basis of broader discussions including 
other military experts from Africa and it was on the basis of these findings that 
the consultations concluded that a ban on landmines needed to be pursued by 
governments and the international community as a matter of urgency (WHO, 
2010).   
Chapman (2010) and Bryden (2005) have demonstrated how the dominant core 
of the international NGOS that emerged mainly engaged in mine action e.g. the 
Hazardous Area Life-Support Organisation (HALO Trust) was founded in 1988 
by a decorated former British officer named Colin Mitchell, and set up in 
Afghanistan (Bryden, 2005).  It is worth noting that HALO Trust’s role in the 
campaign was minimal but they remain a dominant actor within the Sector.  The 
following year, 1989, another former British soldier, Rae McGrath, set up the 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG),  (Filippino, 2006).  MAG (UK) and McGrath were 
active in the Mine Ban process as co-founders of the International campaign. 
MAG remains a key actor within the Sector and went on to conduct the first 
survey of the impact of landmines in Afghanistan55. Although small in number, 
these operational NGOs have played a significant role in the development of 
technical and operational mine clearance. 
                                            
55 MAG (online). Available from: www.mag.org.uk (accessed: 20 July 2013) 
 
 
128 
 
Table 1: List of ICBL founding organisations and Coordinating Committee 
ICBL founding 
Members 
Area of Expertise Home State 
Handicap 
International 
Physical 
Rehabilitation 
France 
Human Rights 
Watch 
Human Rights USA 
Medico 
International 
Physical 
Rehabilitation 
Germany 
Mines Advisory 
Group 
Mine Clearance UK 
Physicians for 
Human Rights 
Medical support 
and human rights 
USA 
Vietnam Veterans 
of America 
Foundation 
Physical 
rehabilitation 
USA 
Source: Own compilation 
THE OPERATIONAL AND FUNDING CONTEXT 
For the purpose of this argument I want to define the context as the global 
funding environment that the Sector emerged into. Specifically the mine ban 
process occurred with the context of ‘new policy agenda’, a time that had seen 
a fundamental shift in the role of NGOs as they emerged as active players in 
efforts to mitigate and end conflicts through engaging in development and 
human rights advocacy.  This approach and philosophy was based on the neo-
liberal economists’ belief that “markets and private initiative are ... the most 
efficient mechanisms for achieving economic growth and providing most 
services to most people”(Edwards and Hulme, 1995 p. 188). Thus bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies pursued this agenda as it was believed to give them 
renewed prominence in poverty alleviation, social welfare, and within this 
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paradigm, they also came to be seen as part of an emerging ‘‘civil society” 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996 citing Robison 1993).   This period therefore saw for 
the first time activities such as mine action being funding by the World Bank. 
The timing of these supportive moves by different international organisations is 
significant and should be seen within the wider global context which led to new 
attention being given to NGOs and large quantities of aid resources being 
allocated to their efforts at building capacity.  
The success of the Mine Ban process was also significant; the treaty was 
signed by 122 states when it opened for signing on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, 
Canada making the Mine Ban Treaty56 one of the most successful multilateral 
arms treaties (Snow et al., 2008). This initial success resulted in more funding, 
for example at the signing conference in Ottawa some $500 million was pledged 
by governments for mine-related work (Björk, 2012; David, 1999).  According to 
Snow et al. (2010), citing the Landmine Monitor, funding from key donors for 
mine action programmes rose from $22 million in 1993 to $100 million in 1997 
and $169 million in 1998. Similarly, Goose highlights the observation made by 
Canada that 10 new donor countries and 98 new mine action programmes in 25 
countries emerged within the first year after the treaty being signed ( see also 
Gething et al., 2011 p. 41). The amount of funding available for mine action is 
quite high in comparison to other humanitarian challenges.  For example in 
2005 malaria was reported to kill over one million people per year, according to 
WHO, however the amount spent per year is between US$ 400-500M57,  whilst 
mines/UXOs kill about 20,000 per year yet on average over US$167 million 
went into mine action between 1989 to 2012 .  This is a factor that can 
undoubtedly account for the multiplicity of actors that became involved in mine 
action. This could partly be explained by the high levels of funding made 
available to NGOs by donors. 
                                            
56 The Ottawa Convention, Ottawa Treaty or the Mine Ban convention, Mine Ban Treaty are the short titles 
that are common however the treaty is formally known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (18 September 
1997). 
57 The annual funding in 2012 was reported to have increased 3-fold over the preceding five year period.   
See article Pigott, D., Atun, R., Moyes, C., Hay, S. and Gething, P. (2012) Funding for malaria control 
2006-2010: A comprehensive global assessment. Malaria Journal, 11 (1), 246. 
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Within the new policy agenda, what constituted an NGO quickly became bound 
up with these external donor agendas, and the opportunities these presented to 
local activists and entrepreneurs; and become the focus of criticism from many 
including liberal peace critics. For example, the ICBL received roughly one third 
of its funding from the Open Society Institute, one third from governments 
(particularly Canada, Norway, and Sweden) and one third from other NGOs and 
international organisations (IOs) such as UNICEF (Murray et al., 2012). 
According to Anderson this presented a disturbing trend of the growing 
dependence of the international NGOs campaign on sympathetic states such as 
Canada (Anderson, 2000 footnote no 59;  p. 100). He argued that this was a 
case of NGOs working as grantees and subcontractors for states from which 
they received funding.  
Thus, in tandem with the NGO explosion, the Mine Ban Process was taking 
place, and hence this is one factor that led to an increase in numbers of 
organisations that took up mine action related activities; joining the ICBL and 
other international organisations taking up landmine issues. Another factor was 
the success of the mine ban process itself, this resulted in mine action 
becoming politically attractive, and drew large numbers of diffuse actors. The 
United Nations Mine Action community today comprises 14 UN agencies. Such 
a high number of  organisations being part of the mine ban process can be seen 
as a response to the donor-driven nature, and the `spending spree' that was 
launched by donors and which gave birth to literally thousands of NGOs in a 
matter of two or three years (Edwards and Hulme, 1995, 1996; Bratton, 1989; 
Fowler, 1991 (GIBL, 1999).   
This “new policy agenda” is the context within which the Sector has emerged 
and had further implications on how it shaped its policy and programming and 
its performance and therefore explains its place within the wider humanitarian 
peacebuilding arena. The global context defined and shaped the Sector and 
indirectly contributed to the multiplicity of actors now involved in various 
activities of mine action. 
The transition from the Mine Ban Process to an established Humanitarian Mine 
Action Sector did not bring about significant changes in sector funding. The 
same relatively small number of ‘sympathetic’ states which had supported the 
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mine ban process such as Canada, Norway, and Sweden continued to be the 
key donors whilst other governments such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States and other actors such as the EU, corporate donations, and public 
donations also emerged as key sources of funding.  
The Sector was and remains highly donor dependent resulting in constant 
pressure to please potential donors with tangible and visible results.  Donor 
dependence also resulted in the Sector re-orienting its accountability upward 
therefore focusing more on reporting of quantitative outputs, in tandem with 
Edwards and Hulme’s observation of NGOs (1996, p. 962). Therefore mine 
clearance attracted the largest share of the funding and political attention, with 
significantly less effort or justification for other mine action pillars; i.e., stockpile 
destruction, mine-risk education, victim assistance and advocacy. Similarly the 
`acceptance of increasing amounts of donor funds’, resulted in complex 
requirements for the Sector hence very bureaucratic processes were put in 
place as will be illustrated (Zaidi, 1999).  
Another factor that can be gleaned from the dependence on donor funding is 
the dominant role of northern/western organisations both during the Mine Ban 
process and within the emerging Sector.  The campaign’s financial basis was 
heavily dependent on Northern governments, International organisations funded 
by Northern governments, and private foundations based in the west. These 
organisations had various advantages over their southern counterparts; they 
were from societies whose political systems were supportive of the notion of 
civil societies and hence had a better and less confined space to raise the 
issues. These provided countries affected by mines with a voice as they were 
located in the north with easy access to funding and therefore they also 
assumed the leadership of the ICBL and the ban movement. This seems to 
support the notion that civil society implies liberal democracies and therefore 
they may be limited to these political systems as Pearce (2005)) has argued;  
Operationally the agenda was imposed from the Western “Centre”, and a 
majority of non-governmental actors in mine-affected areas (the “Periphery”) 
were excluded from equal participation.  The NGOs themselves were not 
globally representative and a survey at the Ottawa Treaty Signing NGO Forum 
found that only 20% of the NGOs were non-European or non-North American 
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(Eisele et al., 2012 p. 128).  However, the periphery carried the primary 
responsibility for their mine-affected land and impacted population (Bryden, 
2005).   
Richmond has argued that  such dominance of states and their  institutions is 
represented as neutral, objective and benevolent for the most part; however, he 
further argues that behind these NGO agency or institutionally fronted 
interventions lies the financial and ideological presence of liberal states and the 
process is driven in particular by neo liberal approaches (Richmond, 2009 p. 59).  
Operationally, where mine action takes place it is implemented mainly by 
external organisations and experts making it mainly an externally driven 
intervention further supporting the liberal peace critiques that, where liberal 
peace is imposed externally  in conflict or post conflict zones,  such 
interventions tend to be neo-colonial or at best trusteeship forms of peace 
(Richmond pp 56);  The claim of  mine action as a form of a liberal 
internationalism  is supported by Anderson, a Sector insider seeing the mine 
ban movement as having been a genuine example of ‘liberal internationalism’ 
(Anderson, 2000). 
In conclusion therefore, the actors that emerged to form the new Mine Action 
Sector were established humanitarian organisations, however, mine action 
continued to be seen as an isolated sector within the broader domain that is 
humanitarian aid (Skåra, 2003).  Skåra attributes the isolation to a number of 
issues including mine action’s technical focus; a critique that is shared by others, 
including those within the sector itself (See for example Juergensen, 2007; 
Moyes and Tinning, 2005).  The view that the crisis was man-made with civilian 
populations being the victims of the situation thus meant that the problem was 
defined as an ethical responsibility of the international community.  Landmines 
were also defined by their impact rather than as a problem in their own right, 
and never in terms of how they affected individual communities making mine 
action delivery oriented, with minimal engagement of the local communities in 
addressing the problem.  There is no doubt that mine action is a complex 
activity, uniting demanding technical challenges with complex socio-economic 
contexts,  so the expertise needed is specialised and thus the Sector has 
continually relied upon  ex-military personnel for expertise.  This is what lay 
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behind the Sector adopting rigid military-like structures. Similarly, the 
governance process is led by what Bryden (2010) refers to as ‘western 
diplomats and lobbyists’ who tend to over-emphasise bureaucracy at the 
expense of practical work to solve the global landmine problem. 
The Sector is governed at the strategic level by the steering committee of the 
ICBL, the ICRC, the UN and the ‘sympathetic’ states who retained an influential 
role in the governance and implementation of the Sector. These organisations 
are also involved in implementation at international level. Policy, programme 
and strategy are the most prevalent forms of coordination and involve major 
agencies, such as those operating under the aegis of the UN, international 
NGOs, foreign ministries and donors.  Other actors who later joined the 
governance of the Sector and who were not part of the mine ban process 
include the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 
and Geneva Call; and various other governments who joined the band wagon.  
A full list is given in the table below. 
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Table 2: Key Mine Action Governance Actors and Roles  
Mine Action Actors and role at International Level 
Actors Role 
United Nations 
Department of 
Peacekeeping  
(UNDPKO) 
Department responsible for UNMAS; integrates mine 
action into peacekeeping, USG for Peacekeeping chairs 
Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action (IACG-
MA)  
United Nations 
Mine Action Service  
Overall policy coordination within and beyond UN system; 
provides mine action assistance in humanitarian 
emergencies; oversees international mine action 
standards (IMAS); coordinates planning for transfer to 
national authorities 
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
(UNDP) 
Supports development of national and local mine action 
capacity, promotes coordination between mine action and 
wider development community at country level  
UNOPS Service provider in design/implementation of mine action 
programmes 
UNICEF Supports development and implementation of mine risk 
education  
projects in cooperation with UN and other partners  
UNDDA Supports UNSG in relation to APMBC and CCW; 
promotes dissemination of annual State reports under the 
treaties  
OCHA Lead agency for information sharing on humanitarian 
impact of landmines and resource mobilisation  
UNHCR Addresses special needs of refugees in mine action  
OSAGI Advances gender equality and empowerment of women 
in mine action  
OHCHR Advances human rights aspects of mine action  
World Bank Resource mobilisation and agenda setting on landmines 
as an impediment to development 
WFP/WHO/FAO Linkages between mine action and respective mandates 
in food, health and agriculture  
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Donor states Funding/in-kind support for mine action  
ICRC Promotes development and implementation of 
International Humanitarian Law, victim assistance and 
mine risk education 
Geneva 
International Centre 
for Humanitarian 
Demining  
Operational assistance in mine action, research, 
development of International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS), support for APMBC process  
International 
Campaign to Ban 
Landmines 
Monitoring and advocacy for APMBC, research and 
production of Landmine Monitor  
Commercial 
companies  
Various, local and international, involved in range of mine 
action activities, but primarily clearance. 
Organisation of 
American States  
Military to military training in clearance/stockpile 
destruction; some other mine action activities  
European Union Funding largely through the European Commission, 
commitment to research and development 
State level 
Actor Responsibilities 
Government  Develop, articulate and implement mine action policies 
and programmes in accountable, transparent and cost-
effective manner. Draft and implement necessary 
domestic legislation. 
Parliament  Ensure compliance with legal obligations, scrutiny of 
budgets, projects etc. 
Judiciary  Prosecution of offenders under national law  
Military  Mine clearance, stockpile destruction  
Police  Ensure respect for land ownership following clearance  
Border guards Prevent weapons trafficking including landmines  
PRIVATE ACTORS 
Local authorities In some countries, engaged in selection of sites for 
clearance 
Communities Managing the risks from mines or UXO on a daily basis 
Red Cross & Red National and local level mine risk education and support 
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Crescent Societies for victim assistance  
Media  Provide spotlight/pressure on government decision-
making, focus on issues such as corruption. Key mine 
risk education role.  
Civil Society Advocacy role, assistance to victims, mine risk education 
Source: Adopted from Bryden (2005 p. 163) 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES 
Implementation has become increasingly systematic since the Mine Ban Treaty 
came into effect. The UN international mine-action policy promotes the use of 
modern technologies to map and measure the extent of the global landmine 
crisis (Mather, 2002). Mine-affected countries are encouraged to conduct 
national surveys, known as level one surveys, to measure the extent of their 
landmine problems. The results are stored in a standardised data management 
system (the Information Management System for Mine Action), which was 
developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD).  
Similarly, to ensure safety and improve efficiency in mine action, International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) provide guidance, establish principles and, in 
some cases, define international requirements and specifications for mine 
action implementation.  They provide a framework for the development of 
national mine action standards (NMAS), which ought to reflect specific local 
realities and circumstances in a given country.  Thus, over and above the legal 
norms, the Sector is guided by these standards which define the responsibilities 
and obligations of the Sector. Those working in the Sector within national mine 
action authorities, the donor community, mine action non-governmental 
organisations and commercial demining contractors, and even the mine action 
field workers use these guides for the proper and appropriate application of the 
standards in the conduct of their humanitarian work (Smith, 2001). 
Most UN mine action programmes are developed under the auspices of either 
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in humanitarian emergencies 
and peacekeeping operations or the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) for long-term capacity building programmes, and are frequently 
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executed with the support of the United Nations Office for Project Services 
(UNOPS). The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is the lead agency for 
mine risk education, and the World Health Organisation (WHO) leads on victim 
assistance.   
Theoretically, the UN envisages three different operational scenarios; (a) those 
constituting a humanitarian intervention when the national authorities are unable 
or unwilling to address the problem and a mission is established by a Security 
Council resolution, - this is led by UNMAS with centralised management in New 
York.  In such instances the establishment of mine action is within a peace-
keeping mission in consultation with other entities 58 ; (b) where there is 
contamination and UNDP or UNICEF is present, it is within their mandate to 
assist the national authorities within that country to address the immediate as 
well as the longer-term need. This is UNDP or UNICEF led and normally 
operates through country-level management with a small headquarters team; (c) 
the need for a rapid short term intervention, this is usually led by UNMAS within 
an emergency situation.  The assumption here is that all contexts will fit neatly 
within the three scenarios. Not all situations are that clear cut as will be 
demonstrated by the Somaliland context. Similarly for such an approach to work 
well, it requires a high-level of communication and effective information and 
coordination between the field and headquarters, in particular during the 
transition from a United Nations-managed to a United Nations-supported 
programme.  Unfortunately this is rarely the case.   
Of particular critical significance when developing and structuring mine action 
programmes is the state of the country at the time of implementation – in other 
words; where the country falls on the ‘emergency – development continuum;’ 
whether the country is considered to be in a state of complex emergency or 
whether it is in a redevelopment initiation phase is a very significant factor. The 
Sector envisages a context that evolves over time from conflict to stabilisation, 
reconstruction and longer-term development, and therefore anticipates that 
mine action priorities and the allocation of resources will evolve (GICHD, 2008b).   
                                            
58 In 2004, UNMAS’ participation in the preparations for the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) led 
to the first ever humanitarian mine action mandate designed to serve the general population. Previous to 
this mandate, mine action in peacekeeping missions had been limited to the protection of mission 
personnel. 
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Harpviken et al (2001) have argued that defining the context usually masks the 
intentions of the operations that are put in place. For example when situations 
are defined as emergency, he argues that this serves as an excuse for 
launching short-sighted operations, even though consideration of the broader 
and more long-term implications of an intervention is no less important in an 
emergency situation. Similarly for an organisational perspective, downplaying 
the context results from staff rotation, limited financial resources and therefore 
the tendency is towards standardisation and the generation and use of 
templates.  As a result, similarities are sought out and emphasised at the 
expense of context awareness. For mine action an emergency situation always 
requires a long term response as the most affected contaminated areas are 
addressed within the short time frame whilst the enduring problems warrant a 
long-term sustainable response. 
In a typical mine action programme, the United Nations supports the 
development of national mine action structures at three levels; (1) through a 
mine action regulatory and policy institution at the inter-ministerial level; (2) A 
coordination body that supervises the various mine action operations in 
consultation with key stakeholders; (3) Operating organisations of 
nongovernmental, commercial, civil defence, police or military nature. 
Planning and prioritisation tools 
In the immediate aftermath of conflict, when a mine action programme is set up, 
it is expected that the programme needs to know the extent and the nature of 
threat. Unfortunately, mine action generally occurs in post conflict emergency 
environments where getting reliable data is challenging.  To save life and 
alleviate suffering regardless of the intrinsic value of the land or its 
substitutability has been – in respect of the humanitarian imperative of Mine 
action – the primary driving factor for task prioritisation during the emergency 
period., Beyond that comes the need to collect data to enable prioritisation and 
strategic planning to face the complexity of balancing the objectives of saving 
lives, maximising output and economic effect, and maintaining or justifying 
future funding (Van Der Linden, 2003). 
A key requirement for proper planning and implementation of mine action is 
solid information in the form of data, such data is meaningless if it is not 
 
 
139 
 
collected and stored in a manageable format. Thus, the first step in information 
management is generally data collection as a poor data management system 
will amount to poor quality data.  The Sector utilises two tools, Landmine Impact 
Survey (LIS) which serves as the source of data, whilst the data is managed by 
a data management tool known as the Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA) (Benini et al., 2003).   
These are the dominant tools that the Sector has promoted, and although 
others are continuously being developed, I will limit my analysis to these two.  
These tools, especially the surveys, are cost intensive, whilst the data 
management tool is a complex process whose users continually need training; 
their utility remains doubtful as various contexts including Somaliland will 
illustrate.   
Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) 
The Sector suffered from endemic lack of comprehensive data therefore key 
demining organisations identified the need to put in place a more systematic 
and comprehensive method for the collection of information.  Indeed Horwood 
(2000), writing in commemoration of a decade of mine action describes the lack 
of centralised information at that juncture  as ‘both surprising and serious‘ (2000 
p. 28). However, efforts had begun in earnest to address this immediately after 
the signing of the MBT, back in 1998 when 11 mine action organisations formed 
a Survey Working Group (SWG) with the aim of developing a Global Landmine 
Survey (GLS) (Gasser, 2011).  Attached to the Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation (VVAF) one of the founding organisations, the SWG also 
established the Survey Action Centre (SAC) to execute the surveys. By the year 
2000, the SWG grew to its membership of 2159 international NGOs and UN 
agencies and continues to provide the general oversight for the Landmine 
Impact Survey.  
                                            
59The organisations that now form the SWG include; Association for Aid and Relief (Japan), Canadian 
International Demining Corps (Canada), Cranfield Mine Action (UK), Danish Demining Group (Denmark), 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (Switzerland), Geospatial International (Canada), 
Halo Trust (UK), Handicap International (France and Belgium), INTERSOS (Italy), Landmine Survivors 
Network (USA), Mines Advisory Group (UK), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (Afghanistan), Medico 
International (Germany), Norwegian People’s Aid (Norway), Swedish Rescue Services Agency (Sweden), 
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (USA), United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF, 
United Nations Mine Action Service and United Nations Office for Project Services 
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Through the surveys, the execution of the GLS aimed at strengthening the 
information baseline in the selected affected countries.  The GLS offers a 
powerful mechanism for surveying all affected communities in a systematic 
manner conforming to social-science survey norms  which include a rapid 
participatory appraisal technique, with focus group interviews conducted at the  
community level, to ensure a degree of ownership and legitimacy (Harpviken 
and Isaksen, 2004).  
The LIS is supposed to provide reliable data including collated victim data that 
should enable national authorities to develop national plans focusing on regions 
and areas of greatest impact while giving implementers baseline impact data 
that provide success indicators for mine action programmes (GICHD, 2006a p. 
12). With such efforts in data collection, the initiative helps in the 
institutionalisation of data collection with an aim of improving the overall 
management of mine-action programmes worldwide (ibid).   
All LIS therefore follows a standard methodology, recording their data in a 
standard database designed for this purpose (International Management 
System for Mine Action –IMSMA) and are monitored by a UN Quality Assurance 
Monitor whose reports provide the basis upon which the UN determines 
whether or not to “certify” the survey process (Filipino 2006 pp: 14). This 
methodology is the basis for all impact surveys, regardless of whether a survey 
was conducted under the direct auspices of the Survey Action Centre (the SWG 
secretariat) or by other parties familiar with the impact concept and the SWG 
protocols (ibid)  
The process starts with collection of the Opinion of Experts in the affected 
country where suspected positives i.e. known communities that are mine /UXO 
impacted communities are listed.  Such a process may eliminate communities 
within the country where there has been no conflict and therefore no known 
contamination (Gaser 2011).  The premise of this methodology is that ‘local 
people have a very well developed understanding of their environment, that 
they are continually innovating and adapting, and that the outsider will best 
understand local reality with and through the insiders’ (GICHD, 2006a p. 9).  
Like any other tools these have their strengths and weaknesses as I will 
demonstrate in CHAPTER 7: SOMALILAND’S CONTEXT AND SECTOR 
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PROCESSES:  IMPLICATIONS .  One of the advantages of the LIS is the 
extent to which it helps to divert attention from a purely quantitative 
measurement of mine/UXO threat to one that has at its core the community as 
the referent subject by qualitatively assessing the measures the impact of the 
threat on the that communities bear.  This brought about a paradigm shift from 
the overly technical approach to mine action.  Furthermore, the intention was 
that the data would potentially allow donors to apportion funds rationally to 
places of greatest human need as defined by impact on communities. However, 
although location of resources such as wells, roads etc. affect the impact of 
scoring, the LIS still places significant importance on the number of mine and 
UXO victims recorded in a community over the preceding two years thus the 
qualitative advantage is watered down. 
The first ever LIS  was carried out in 1999 for Yemen, the fieldwork and data 
collection took a year and was completed in  July 2000 (Kidd, 2000). The survey 
was conducted by the Afghan-based Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) 
on behalf of the Yemen National Demining Committee (NDC) and the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).  It was hailed as having initiated the 
debate about what the surveys needed to address in future and whether or not 
minefields or affected communities were to be the focus. The conclusion was 
that community-impact was important.  According to Filippino (2006) the Yemen 
LIS helped with prodding this consensus making it sink roots quicker than would 
otherwise have occurred (Filippino, 2006 p. 13). 
Over time, the modus operandi that governs the LIS process progressed in an 
effort to guide the survey so that the outcomes represent the initial goals as set 
out by the Survey Working Group (SWG); a process approved by the SWG and 
that now dictates the conduct of the LIS. The LIS attempts to make a major 
contribution by focusing scarce resources on the places of most need (Eaton, 
2003 p. 916). It categorises the impact on communities into three basic levels: 
high impact, medium and low impact. However, the prioritisation on which 
communities will be addressed first remains the onus of the national authorities 
thus a national strategic plan on how mine action is addressed is a key output of 
the LIS. 
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After several years of the LIS being undertaken, the Survey Action Centre 
contracted SCANTEAM to carry out an evaluation of the Global Landmine 
Survey (GLS) process in 2003.  The objective of the review was to identify 
lessons learned regarding the survey and to recommend ways in which the 
survey results could be made more useful; and also to identify ways in which 
the process could be modified (Yarmoshuk, 2005 p. 239).  The findings included 
the point that LIS was a "stand alone" event and externally driven by donors 
and as a process it was described as poorly integrated within national tools and 
tasks (Scanteam and DEMEX, 2003 p. 2)  
Similarly, the accuracy of the LIS remains contested; however, the overall aim is 
not better data but better planning and priority setting. The information from an 
LIS addresses several of these issues, but it has its limitations. In Mozambique 
the LIS was supposed to have provided the most comprehensive overview of 
mine contamination; however, this was not achieved due to lack of confidence 
in the quality of data which led to a lack of credibility and utility of the LIS as a 
planning tool  (Filippino, 2006). The scepticism by some mine clearing agencies 
in Mozambique and also by SAC can be interpreted as a ploy for rebellion 
against the choice of operator by the donor.  The operator in the case of 
Mozambique is reported not to have received support and cooperation from the 
Mine Action Sector.   
Other issues that challenge the accuracy of the LIS include methodology; for 
example several issues were raised with the Mozambique LIS; the methodology 
used was seen to be flawed because impact survey protocols required that they 
be conducted as a census, not on the basis of a sample of communities; 
however the operator argued that the LIS was designed to be carried out as a 
sample given the size of the country. The Scanteam evaluation upheld the 
position of the operator appreciating that CIDC had adapted the methodology of 
the survey to address the conditions that existed within Mozambique, but 
concludes that “these adaptations did not change the fundamental 
methodological approach” of impact surveys (Scanteam and DEMEX, 2003 p. 
200). 
Cost of the LIS is another factor; the average LIS takes over one and a half 
years and costs over $2 million USD (SAC website).  Gasser observes that due 
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to the fact that surveys are conducted as defined by international protocols, the 
process accounts for what he has calculated and comes to a fairly constant 
fixed cost of more than US$900,000 per country  (Gasser, 2011 pp: 62-63). 
Maslen (2004) cites an observation by a Sector insider, who equates the LIS 
exercise to ‘building a Ferrari for people who ride bicycles’. Similarly, regarding 
a follow-up on a national LIS was reportedly rated as ‘shit’ by an expert who 
was involved in the design and implementation of the LIS (ibid p. 33).   The 
analogy of cars was also used to describe the Angola LIS which Filipino (2006) 
reported as being described by an observer with detailed knowledge of Angola 
and mine action as akin to putting a Rolls Royce engine into a Fiat 500.  The 
general failure of the process in Angola was the lack of technical skills yet the 
SAC did not make provision for training ( p. 44).    
Maslen (2004) also describes the surveys as an indirect product of the 
unwillingness by donor states to give funding without the Sector undertaking 
baseline surveys that would guide their support and enable them to assess 
progress made in clearance.  Thus in countries where donors have interest, LIS 
have been undertaken at their request; for example because Canada was 
providing a considerable amount of funding for mine action in Mozambique60 
and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was not confident 
that the resources were being prioritised well, they proposed a LIS.  CIDA 
further dictated that CIDA only employ a Canadian company for the Survey thus 
opening a bidding process in Canada whereby the Canadian International 
Demining Corps (CIDC) which recruited an implementing partner, Paul F 
Wilkinson and Associates, a company that had no previous experience in the 
mine action sector.  The evaluation report points out that such a process of 
determining which countries should be surveyed, and prioritising among them, 
should ideally have followed more planned procedures with the more heavily 
mine-affected countries coming first. However, the report acknowledges that the 
reality on the ground is that several factors intervene making such prioritisation 
more ad hoc (Scanteam and Demex, ibid). 
                                            
60 In 2003 and 2004, a corruption scandal erupted over   funds from ‘adopt a minefield’, involving the head 
of an international demining agency, the Deputy Director of IND and a UNDP official, all of whom were 
dismissed. This was followed by press reports of abuse of funds by the incumbent IND director and his 
predecessor. 
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Table 3: Cost of Landmine Impact Survey's by year 
Country Year 
of LIS 
Cost US$ Suspected 
Positives 
Before 
Visits 
Post-LIS 
Actually 
Impacted 
notes 
Senegal No 
Data 
No Data No Data No Data  
Kosovo 2000 111,000 No Data No Data  
Yemen 2000 1,645,000 1,294 592  
Chad 2001 1,842,000 1,361 249  
Mozambique 2001 2,272,000 2,057 791  
Thailand 2001 1,656,000 1,491 530  
Cambodia 2002 1,360,000 13,908 2,776 No 
sampling 
Azerbaijan 2003 1,236,000 610 480  
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
2003 2,006,730 2,939 1,366  
Lebanon 2003 1,500,000 1,065 306   
Eritrea 2004 2,291,992 352 132  
Ethiopia 2004 4,029,672 3,281 1,492  
Afghanistan 2005 3,004,494 4,655 2,365  
Armenia 2005 669,800 99 60  
Iraq 2006 No Data 12,010 2,117 No 
sampling 
Mauritania 2006 No Data No Data No Data  
Angola 2007 6,778,163 4,384 1,988  
Somalia (all 
three phases) 
2007 1,906,900 496 482  
Sudan 2009 No Data Not 
aggregated 
296  
Source: Compiled from Various Landmine Impact Survey reports available 
on http://www.sac-na.org/ 
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For an exercise that is so costly, the utility of the LIS is therefore called into 
question as it does not give accurate technical information at a given location 
and normally a technical survey is required, a lesson that cost Mozambique 
handsomely as this was not carried out and clearance contracts were awarded 
for clearance of roads and only 6 mines uncovered.  It is the usual pre-curser to 
clearance, with the primary aim being to collect sufficient information to enable 
the clearance requirement to be accurately defined, including the area(s) to be 
cleared, the depth of clearance, local soil conditions and vegetation 
characteristics. 
In Thailand, the LIS as a resource has largely been under-utilised due to the 
fact that the survey is only available in English and the NGOs working in the 
Mine Action Sector have no access to the survey data due to UNMAS having no 
budget for distribution (Maslen 2004).  The LIS identified more than 2,000 km² 
of mine suspected land. Subsequently re-surveying was undertaken, and the 
overall size of suspected areas was reduced to approximately 530 km2 greatly 
reducing the time and cost it would have taken for the whole 2,000 km2 to be 
cleared. One expert notes that in spite of a fairly successful land cancellation 
process that Thailand has adopted in order to safely reduce the erroneous 
figures from the LIS, the legacy still lingers on, and clearance resources have 
been used to indiscriminately clear suspected-hazardous areas as well land 
already declared as not contaminated.  This, they argue, means that the real 
lifespans of the minefields are prolonged and as a result accidents can occur 
(Bach, 2011). It also effectively means that Thailand cannot meet its obligations 
towards the MBT on clearance. There is an obvious risk of respondents inflating 
the impact of mines when researchers come in and announce their interest in 
the landmine issue. Thus, the limitation of the LIS data is acknowledged by 
Bach amongst others who argues that ‘exaggerated assessment of the area 
contaminated by mines, highlight weaknesses not of implementation but of the 
impact survey process. An impact survey, by definition, is only as good as the 
knowledge of the people it taps for information’(Bach, 2011).  
The LIS thus only provides a tool for ranking communities by severity of mine 
impact that can aid and/or inform the allocation of resources and even then, 
when the data is questionable, that function is sometimes not achieved.  An LIS 
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is also not a clear indicator of an existing minefield but just a record of all known 
Suspected Hazard Areas (SHAs), as identified by the communities under threat 
and therefore excluded from community use.  Reliance on such information has 
its own drawbacks as such information can be erroneous, yet such information 
remains the basis on which UNMAS determines the size and scope of the mine 
action component of the mission, its Results Based Budget (RBB) objectives 
and indicators and its budgetary requirements (UNMAS, 2012b p. 6).   
After an LIS, there is usually therefore a need for a Technical Survey follow-up 
for operational planning; development of IMSMA as the comprehensive 
database for mine-action programme management; updating of national impact 
scores to reflect results of actions undertaken; community involvement in 
operational planning and priority setting; and measurement of the progress and 
impact of mine-action programmes nationally and globally (Downs, 2006).  
Other methods and other survey methods have been suggested also based on 
the use of a standardised survey.  Such an approach  was  introduced by 
AMAC, this was adapted to meet the needs of individual mine-affected 
countries, basic modules of the survey were used to cover household 
information and issues about community structure, whilst specialised modules 
were custom-made to address specific requirements for particular contexts, for 
example, the aspects of war-related migration (Millard and Harpviken, 2001).  
Such an approach is probably more suited to the disparate contexts in which 
mine action is carried out.  
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
In order to be able to coordinate and manage operational activities, the Sector 
needed a standardised information management system. Hence, requirements 
for a data management system were collected and developed into an 
information management system which was released in 1999 in Kosovo having 
been field tested in Somaliland in late 1998 (Mulliner, 2000).  This was 
developed by the Technical University of Zurich in Switzerland and became the 
basis of tool for a standardised mine action information management system. 
Aptly named, Information Management System for Mine Action, (IMSMA) 
combines a Geographical Information System (GIS) with a relational database.  
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The GICHD started developing IMSMA in the late 1990s with the goal of 
providing the mine action community with one comprehensive IM package. 
IMSMA is now in use in over 65 countries. So far IMSMA has undergone 
several updates since its first release in 1999. With every new version and 
modification responsibility is added on to the mine action programmes as 
training has to be incorporated; similarly, for  the IMSMA providers, it means 
redesigning the training manuals61 (Martinez and Eriksson, 2011).   All this no 
doubt has a cost implication.  It is distributed free of charge by the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), however the national 
programmes  wishing to run the database cover for the cost of the necessary 
hardware (Ahmed, 2006). According to GICHD, the aim of the tool is to help 
make mine action safer, faster, more effective and efficient by allowing mine-
action practitioners to enter pertinent data, and access, edit and manage that 
mine information efficiently and quickly. The value added of IMSMA lies in its 
ability to meet this target and therefore assist in better planning, monitoring and 
recording of mine action activities.  
In order for the IMSMA system to run effectively, there are some bare minima 
that need to be met, including a facility to safely store the computers, power 
supplies and permission to use the system.  Also required is availability of 
funding and technical competence within the organisation for the system to 
work.   Ahmed (2006) underlines the importance of not just competent staff, but 
those with a familiarity with the contents of the database including the meanings 
and concepts associated with the data stored i.e., computer savvy and with the 
benefit of the knowledge of mine action technical issues in order for them to 
appreciate the needs of operations.    
The quest for quality and standardised data has not received the same amount 
of attention as other areas in the sector due to the fact that poor or inadequate 
data has no direct impact on security or safety of those working.  However, it 
has been pointed out that poor quality data collection, analysis and 
dissemination can cause an increase in costs through the additional allocation 
of resources to deal with the consequences of data-management problems.  
                                            
61 The IMSMA user manual is a three hundred plus page document. 
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Such allocations result in non-conformance quality costs argues Harutyunyan 
(2011).  This is illustrated quite clearly in the case of Somaliland.  
With the need for standardisation comes a desire for integrating data from 
different sources and sectors which has a genuine chance of generating 
valuable new insights for policy and decision support, an observation that has 
been made by Barlow (2003).  However, Benini and colleagues argue that 
sometimes the costs involved might be high and the added value may not be 
certain and may just increase the complexity of the tool and not raise efficiency 
especially in instances where the externally involved do not understand the 
landmine issue (Benini et al., 2003 p. 291). 
Thus the most important aspect of any data system or tool is that the data 
generated is widely available to a great number of people; therefore, 
transparency should guide its dissemination.  What is still unclear is how the 
IMSMA is actually utilised beyond the specific authority that possesses it.  
There is no established chain of communication from the community level to 
coordination level.  Similarly, if such information is not made available, then 
other stakeholders including researchers and even other operators cannot 
make practical requests to those in possession of the database making the 
existence of a database redundant.   
Other than the rhetoric on the need for making mine action safer etc., the 
Sectors’ need for a good data management tool was partly driven by the need 
for collaboration in a highly donor competitive environment that was witnessing 
a plateauing in donor funding (ICBL, 2002).  Today IMSMA is currently in use in 
more than 80 % of mine action programmes around the world and is the United 
Nations’ preferred information management system for mine action. APPENDIX 
3: IMSMA Theoretical Overview shows a diagram illustrating the theoretical 
overview of how the IMSMA tool is utilised.  Though illustrating a flawless 
process, the process and the tool in general is not without challenges when it 
comes to utilisation in the field as will be demonstrated in CHAPTER 7: 
SOMALILAND’S CONTEXT AND SECTOR PROCESSES:  IMPLICATIONS . 
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Coordination: Efforts towards National ownership and capacity 
building  
According to the report of the Secretary-General on Assistance in Mine 
Clearance, coordination and complementarity, both in the field and at 
headquarters, could only be achieved if national ownership, sustainability and 
capacity building were ingrained into the programmes especially in countries 
that had long term needs (UNGA, 1998).  The Sector through the UN therefore 
follows the principle that ultimately addressing the problem of landmines and 
explosive remnants of war rests with the state under whose jurisdiction the 
contamination exists. Therefore support to mine affected states to fulfil their 
responsibilities and reinforce national ownership is based on demand driven 
approaches, and by identifying, mobilising and providing specific expertise. 
According to (Kjellman, 2008) the task of mine action policy in theory is one that 
should foster ownership under whatever circumstances prevail in  any given 
country, rooted in a sound assessment of social and political realities.  As such 
local capacity building is a central goal with an aim of handing responsibility for 
mine action back as soon as possible to the legitimate national authorities.   
The need for a body to coordinate and regulate day-to-day mine action activities 
in a country became apparent fairly quickly in the evolution of the Sector.  Thus 
the establishment of National Mine Action Agency (NMAA) and its implementing 
partner, the Mine Action Coordination Centres (MACC) became the means by 
which the UN could coordinate and also enhance ownership and capacity as 
the government or recognised authority, wherever possible, technically have 
ownership (Mansfield, 2002; Mansfield, 2005). The NMAA is an over-arching 
organisation, set up to ensure that all relevant Government ministries are able 
to state their requirements for mine action, and to set national priorities. It is 
also required to state the national strategy, and formulate long-terms plans for 
clearance, including the financial structure necessary to carry them out. The 
MACC, as the NMAA’s operating partner, carries out day-to-day control of all 
mine action. It ensures that all mine action is within national priorities, allocates 
clearance and MRE tasks to NGOs and commercial companies, and is 
responsible for Quality Assurance on the cleared sites, and subsequent 
acceptance of the cleared land on behalf of the NMAA. In practice, these 
organisations rarely start with the necessary skills to undertake their work; they 
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have to be developed, a process usually referred to as institutional capacity 
building. In most cases the United Nations undertakes this capacity building. 
Initially technical advisers (TAs) are seconded from donor country militaries 
(often as in-kind donations) or are employed under direct UN Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS) contracts to provide advice and technical assistance. TAs 
contracted to UNOPS or other international donor agencies are generally 
referred to as civilian TAs; a misnomer as those TAs assigned at the start-up of 
MACs are generally serving or retired military officers who adapt their military 
training for the benefit of humanitarian mine clearance and generally work in 
close collaboration with national counterparts, transferring skills and know-how 
as in most instances post-conflict societies lack the human resources (Elliot, 
2000 p. 19).   
 It is generally recognised that creating an effective capability at this level can 
be difficult and there are challenges as will be demonstrated in the case of 
Somaliland. In part, those failures of MACs can be blamed on a lack of 
international interest and support leaving them under-resourced and lacking 
encouragement and motivation. 
Another focus of capacity building is the technical mine clearance work as this 
is seen as an important element of providing both a disciplined environment and 
jobs with standing in often difficult areas recovering from conflict.  However, 
operationally there appears to be less explicit attention on a) what a National 
Mine Action Authority should do over the longer term, around the technical and 
managerial aspects of Mine Action and b) on how the NMAA needs to link to the 
wider economic development planning within a country. This is particularly 
important when a country is not necessarily interested, willing or able to take on 
genuine ownership. 
Conway, in an article written on the eve of the Review of the Mine Ban treaty, 
noted that the Sector has a great deal of descriptive/historical information 
reporting quantifiable "outputs" achieved (e.g., national plans completed, 
standards established, the IMSMA operationalised, etc.), but has very little to 
show on the capacity-development outcomes of the sector’s work, whether 
directly or indirectly.  He also noted that the vitality of the institutions and 
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systems established to help modernise and enhance national capacity to realise 
its ownership and leadership responsibilities have failed  (Conway, 2004).  
The contexts within which mine action takes places are often post conflict 
environments where the capacity of the State to assume mine action is 
frequently compromised and or reduced.  This is due to several factors; while 
the Mine Ban Treaty mandates that states assume responsibility for mine action, 
there is more often than not an inability to do so at the level of national 
government, rendering national ownership difficult at best.  
Mine action is an externally managed activity mainly dominated by international 
organisations and therefore as with other externally supported peacebuilding 
efforts, suffers from the ‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’. As Maslen  (op cit) notes, ‘the 
generosity of donors can make it less likely that the recipients exert the 
necessary efforts to help themselves’ (Maslen, 2004 p. 103).  There is evidence 
of over-reliance by governments on international programming and the 
distribution of aid and expertise that have caused countries hosting mine action 
actors to have little interest in initiating or supporting mine action operations 
themselves. This is because they realise the saliency of the landmine issue 
internationally and, thus, they know that outside resources will likely be 
forthcoming  with or without their interest (Spearin, 2001).  
 National ownership of mine action is thus often confronted with a type of Catch-
22.  Similarly the over dominance of external actors in the Sector is a challenge 
from the perspective of national ownership, as it raises a number of challenges 
in terms of the extent to which responsibility for mine action can been 
transferred to national authorities and institutions, and how policy can be 
designed and implemented to facilitate national ownership. Research has 
demonstrated that organisations can lose (a part of) their empowering effects 
due to heavy donor dependence (De Feyter, 2011).  In the case of the Mine 
Action Sector this dependence on foreign aid means that donors tend to drive 
the actual activities on the ground, depriving national mine action authorities of 
oversight and coordination. Similarly these donors often lack the capacity or 
willingness to support long term projects, slow careful work and gradual (often 
non-quantifiable) results which characterise successful local institutional 
development. Thus, the extent to which the programmes get transferred from 
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the International organisations to local authorities and national governments 
remains slow and unsatisfactory. It has been noted especially that  in almost 
every case where mine action programmes were originally established as 
directly managed programmes under the UNDP or another international entity, 
the process of transitioning them to national ownership has either been painfully 
strung out or failed altogether. In countries where mine action is of relatively low 
profile nationally, then national authorities may not be keen to get involved.   
The way in which the Mine Action Sector operates has resulted into a desire to 
exclude (or not to actively seek) active government involvement in mine 
governance processes. In addition, concerns over patronage and corruption on 
the part of government officials and weak or non-existent government capacity 
have been cited as reasons for this non-involvement.  Lack of engagement by 
national governments in mine action is partly because there are other issues 
perceived to be more important.    
CONCLUSION 
Cousens and Kumar (2001) have argued that underpinning the criticism of 
liberal peacebuilding is a recognition that peacebuilding activities, imposed or 
otherwise, are largely imported to post conflict societies by the  ‘international 
community’ of international and regional organisations, bilateral donors and 
international NGOS.  Such activities have resulted in a set of peacebuilding 
activities that reflect Western forms of governance and institutions.  In tracing 
the formation of the Sector, and the actors that have emerged, the same 
conclusion and therefore criticism is evident within the Sector and in their 
undertaking of mine action related activities.  When understood in this broader 
sense  Cooper (2011) has argued that the role of the UN as an early actor in the 
realm of mine action was hardly an objectionable programme and argues that 
the emergence of the landmines agenda was related to a hegemonic 
construction of security and military technology that emerged in the post-Cold 
War era and thus was  not unproblematic.  
Most of the programmes are formulated by external actors especially the UN, 
GICHD, reflecting the preferences of international organisations and donors 
(mainly western donors) that they offer technical expertise and also engage with 
international NGOs who are predominately western.  Similarly, like 
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peacebuilding interventions, the preference for standardised templates is driven 
by the desire for mine action to have measurable outputs, outcomes and impact 
leaving no room for context specific approaches.  This will be aptly 
demonstrated by the implementation of the LIS in Somaliland. 
Thus the Mine Action Sector has become a hostage to its own ‘success’. The 
data that the Sector has collected indicates that the number of injuries and 
deaths from landmines is decreasing (See APPENDIX 6: NUMBER OF 
MINE/UXO CASUALTIES PER YEAR (2000-2011) thus a positive contribution 
of the efforts. Similarly, the mine ban process effectively led to a focus on actual 
landmines from an almost exclusively military and technical outlook. The 
urgency of addressing the issue was stressed, albeit based on an exaggerated 
number of mines on the ground, which highlighted not just the humanitarian 
imperative to address the problem but also the need to put in place legal 
instruments and resources to support military / technical approaches to their 
removal.  
Similarly the success of the treaty resulted in the multiplicity of disparate actors; 
complicating coordination and raising concerns for the need to ensure safety 
which in turn called for the articulation of standards to guide operations.  The 
change in policies and panic-like urgency amongst the donors to address this 
seemingly insurmountable problem led to the development of tools and 
standards which have become a formal bureaucracy that dictates how the 
Sector is governed.  The Sector has thus professionalised through the 
development of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the design 
of planning tools such as the LIS and the IMSMA. While improving the quality of 
the technical side of mine action, the move to standardisation has had a 
tendency to make mine action intervention inflexible in responding to the needs 
of people living in mine affected communities. This has taken place within a 
global context that has defined that process, leading to the Sector being 
externally driven and isolated within the wider humanitarian sector.   
Those who see the development of the IMAS as serving to protect the public 
against malpractice see the process as a move towards professionalisation of 
the Sector, for example the GICHD.  However, others maintain that the purpose 
that the standards serve is ‘to dictate the terms and conditions that must be met 
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in order for an operation to continue to enjoy the benefits of that monopoly in a 
given country environment (as any number of codes of practice serve to ensure 
minimum standards in other professional contexts.)’  (Moyes and Tinning, 2005 
p. 2).  The IMAS cover a wide range of topics including maps and symbols, use 
of demining dogs etc., therefore the language used is difficult and complex as it 
is based on the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). The need 
for a simpler and easier to use version (including training) has been suggested 
by Sector insiders as noted by Maslen (2003, pp: 44). Likewise the standards 
are stringent and unrealistic and are seen as counterproductive, for example, 
99.6% achievement of clearance may divert funds away from other risk 
reducing activities where more deaths and injuries could be avoided at lower 
costs (Marsh, 2006 online). There is evidence that donor policies are now 
marked by pragmatism whether in mine action or in humanitarianism in general 
(Devlin, 2010; Devlin and Naidoo, 2010; GICHD, 2011; GICHD, 2012; Naidoo, 
2013).   Such pragmatism has contributed to changes that have crept into donor 
policy languages as evidenced in a survey of donor countries carried out in 
May-June 2010 by the GICHD.  The survey report indicates preference for a 
results-based approach instead of proposals that have a narrow focus of just 
getting mines out of the ground.  Aid effectiveness is the force behind the 
criteria in which the donor preferred project proposals are those that have a 
broader focus aimed at minimising the toll of new victims and giving priority to 
impact of mines on lives and livelihoods (Devlin, 2010).  
Part of the Sector’s aim of improving operational effectiveness and safety, 
meant it established recognisable and measurable degrees of uniformity hence 
the requirement for quality data and the need for LIS which as the evidence 
demonstrates have not achieved much for the Sector.  Their utility is questioned 
even within the Sector itself. The need for consistency and commonality and 
‘standardisation’ means that the Sector follows a ‘template like’ format when 
establishing and undertaking mine action activities. A management 
infrastructure is established which includes a quality management system; a 
mines information system (MIS) which includes data collection and 
management;  institutional arrangements providing an enabling framework for 
undertaking  mine awareness and risk reduction education; minefield surveys 
and marking; training of key management staff and de-miners in all aspects of 
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mine action and support (usually undertaken by experts); mine clearance and 
explosive ordnance disposal; and  victim assistance and the socio-economic 
reintegration of victims. Efforts to implement this across different contexts result 
in inefficiency, lack of coherence and coordination. 
Similarly, the Sector now faces the realisation that meeting the obligations spelt 
out by the MBT treaty such as ownership, capacity building, and mine free 
status is challenged by the urgency of time, depletion of resources and the 
Sector’s own stringent standards.  Similarly the Sector lacks self-criticism and 
has been slow in engaging in a pragmatic change that focuses beyond technical 
progress or the super systems that it has created and which misses the "softer" 
side of the process.  This is because technical advancements, networks and 
systems all need to be maintained and nurtured (at the minimum) and are thus 
dependent on nontechnical capabilities (relations, learning, coordination, etc. 
(Harpviken and Roberts, 2004; Harpviken and Skaešra, 2003; Jennings and 
Ruge, 2003; Jennings et al., 2008; Maslen, 2004).  
Jennings et al. (2008) lament the disconnection between the principles of 
humanitarian mine action and the practise.  They argue that, in principle, the 
problem of  mine/UXO contamination comes about through a combination of an 
‘external’ threat (threat from the mines/UXO  themselves) and  the internal 
vulnerabilities of individuals, communities and societies normally living in 
poverty and having to continue eking a living and generating a livelihood in the 
face of this threat  (2008 p. 15).  For example having to use land that is 
contaminated, or tampering with ordnances for the scrap metal trade etc.  
Whilst in practise the sector focuses on the external elements of efficiency, 
effectiveness, accountability mechanisms, and the need to reduce the external 
threat, they are blind to other social, economic or political outcomes (from 
cleared land) which are not considered as important or are not considered at all 
and which can be either positive or negative (see for example Unruh et al., 
2011). 
As the case of Somaliland will illustrate, many challenges occur when the 
Sector attempts to apply standard solutions to different contexts. I argue that 
this process has resulted in mine action being implemented in a stylised 
standard approach that tends to be based on a standardised template.  I argue 
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that this process is more a response to the funding and global factors that 
dictate the need for standardisation and professionalisation in order to compete 
and fulfil donor requirements.  
Having illustrated how the Sector arrived at standardised approaches and 
template based implementation of programmes, the next chapter contextualises 
mine action in Somaliland, looking at the historical context that the formalised 
Mine Action Sector encountered. 
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CHAPTER 5: SOMALILAND CONTEXT: THE 
OPERATION OF THE STANDARDISED 
APPROACH TO MINE ACTION 
The Somaliland mine clearance programme was ‘plagued with logistic and 
‘Somali’ domestic problems. (RIMFIRE report; dated 13th of April 1992) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Mine action in Somaliland as an event, or an issue, should not be looked at 
without placing it in its context.  I have argued that the global context within 
which Global mine action occurred defines the policies that emerged and the 
manner in which they were implemented.  Similarly, mine clearance 
programmes in Somaliland took place immediately after the cessation of 
conflict. During this time, the Sector was in its infancy and was still under 
formation as an organised humanitarian sector.  The first section of this chapter 
therefore covers the period between 1991-1994 when mine clearance took 
place and was led and implemented as an immediate response to the 
contamination that had taken place; I highlight the challenges that the 
programmes faced.  The Second section then looks into the entry of a 
formalised sector and the challenges of implementing mine action programmes. 
Bendaña (2012 ) reflecting on UNDP’s engagement in Somalia (under his 
tenure 2008-2012) observed that unless there was appreciation of how the 
context influences the programmes, it would not be possible to capture how the 
programme impacts on the context.  Similarly unless the analyses were right, 
understanding an intervention’s success or failure was going to be difficult as 
well.  Understanding whether it was the intervention’s design, or the strategy, 
the management, the nature of the work itself, or factors beyond the 
programme’s capacity to influence, was important.  He observed that were 
these factors considered, many mistakes could have been avoided with proper 
investigation of how existing social structures carried out governance and 
conflict resolution, as opposed to the promotion of a politically correct donor-
driven Western procedural Rule of Law state building template (p. 3).  Dr 
Alejandro Bendaña was the Programme Manager for the Rule of Law and 
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Security, from 2008 to 2012, under which mine action was a part within UNDP 
Somalia.   
THE CONTEXT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION  
The war and humanitarian disaster that occurred in Somalia coincided with the 
increased availability of funds in the early 1990s which in turn permitted rapid 
expansion of humanitarian activities in Somalia and elsewhere.  Humanitarian 
and relief aid thus became a common feature in the landscape of Somalia; in 
the wake of the Ogaden refugee crisis, a number of International aid agencies 
rushed to help.  Unfortunately operations in Somalia overlooked the links that 
existed between the dynamics of the complex political emergency and the 
interventions that ensued.  Such an understanding was necessary in developing 
an effective aid strategy for the relief operations that followed (Cliffe and 
Luckham, 1999; Cliffe and Luckham, 2000).  Due to the famine, the human 
imperative to help the victims of the conflict became the primary focus of most 
of the International NGOs.   
Wiles et al. (2004) further argues that the response to the crisis saw a multitude 
of agencies with contrasting mandates, structures, procedures, operations and 
capacities operating in Somalia.  This complicated the coordination of the 
intervention in an already complex disaster as these interventions were not 
clearly defined in terms of relief and rehabilitation, nor was the relationship 
between them.  Through increased government and UN agencies transfers and 
public donations, many of the NGOs were in the theatre primarily ‘to curry 
favour’ with the media, in an effort to mobilise name recognition and funds 
(Ahmed and Green, 1999 p. 122). The high profile media coverage of the crisis 
also created other problems, which undoubtedly affected the quality and 
delivery of humanitarian assistance.  
The involvement of aid agencies in Somalia was further complicated by acute 
security problems.  These complicated the work as the intervention had to cope 
with the looting of relief supplies and even burglaries where those who received 
the aid were effectively taxed by the warlords.  With the worsening of the 
security situation, some agencies looked to the warlords for help in the 
distribution of humanitarian relief; others hired them as armed guards for 
protection whilst some other agencies simply left.  These security arrangements 
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helped in promoting clannism through legitimising some clan factions and 
leaders whilst marginalising others (Gundel, 2002).  It also helped in supporting 
a violent political structure.  The dependence on the warlords concentrated 
political and economic power in the hands of unscrupulous armed individuals 
(Dobbins et al., 2003). Furthermore, engaging with the war lords meant that the 
agencies lost their neutrality whilst trying to add legitimacy to their work.  The 
impact of this was that the agencies indirectly became involved in the conflict, 
thus feeding and perpetuating it.   The UN humanitarian operation encouraged 
a war economy by paying large amounts of money to the militia, thereby 
sabotaging future efforts towards disarmament (Kenning, 2011).  The UN, the 
donors and the NGOs failure to address the conflict itself meant that the whole 
initiative became caught up with the conflict itself (Gundel, 2002).    
As security degenerated, many international agencies withdrew from Somalia, 
prompting an increase of local NGOs in order to fill the void. Those who did not 
pull out completely subcontracted to local NGOs, which was seen by 
commentators such as Gundel as not only having had the ability to undermine 
local sovereignty but also having encouraged what he terms as ‘patronisation 
and disempowerment’ (2002).  The rise of many local NGOs was also 
encouraged through a US$3 million fund set up by the World Bank, and training 
offered by USAID for local NGOs who were encouraged to implement projects 
in basic social services (Abdillahi, 1997).    
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With the failure of military interventions in the country,  the UN agencies, the 
donors and the International NGOs deliberated and  came up with an approach  
called the ‘peace dividend’, mainly based on agencies having joint approaches 
rather than separate agency initiatives.  Hence strengthening local NGOs 
became a focus for a number of international NGOs in 1994.  This approach 
prompted the establishment of the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB). This 
was in line with the idea that international assistance for rehabilitation should be 
grounded in local initiatives, and relevant for peacebuilding. A code of conduct 
was applied in 1995, which stipulated conditionality of international aid to 
Somalia to this effect. The peace -dividend strategy required, for a start, a 
sustained commitment by both donors and humanitarian agencies, which, 
unfortunately, was not demonstrated.  This made the Somalis deeply sceptical 
about the new co-ordinating body, seeing SACB as nothing but a political 
instrument of the donors.  Such an approach is based on the need to empower 
local structures and organisations; which in turn should be closely connected to 
sustainability, and the creation of collective power to combat and overcome 
common problems.   Due to lack of staff to take care of their projects, 
International NGOs subcontracted local ones.  This was precipitated partly by 
fluctuating security conditions that meant fewer International staff were able to 
work in the field.  Insecurity caused disruption to a lot of agencies’ work and 
sometimes led to the strengthening of security arrangements for aid workers 
limiting the levels of engagement of international organisations on the ground.  
In cases where the agencies continued working, they required relocation of 
offices and withdrawal of international staff.   Many operations became cross-
border, where aid primarily was managed remotely from Nairobi.  This included 
the Somali Red Crescent society, the only functioning Somali national 
humanitarian body that had its central base in Nairobi (Wiles et al., 2004).  To 
date, this phenomenon still persists to some degree.  
This was the backdrop against which humanitarian and relief aid in Somaliland 
unfolded. During the entire crisis, the concentration of humanitarian aid had 
been in and around Mogadishu which limited the operation’s impact and drew 
people from rural areas to urban centres where relief camps had been 
established causing further displacement for populations that had escaped 
forceful displacement  (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Kirsty Bisset et al., 2010). 
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POST WAR MINES/UXO CONTEXT 
Mine/UXO contamination in Somaliland mainly stemmed from various periods of 
warfare with majority of the minefields being laid during the Ogaden war 1977 – 
1978 and the Somalia civil war in 1988-1991.  The post war contamination 
context included contamination from both anti-personnel landmines and anti-
tank (AT) which were laid mainly by the Somalia National Army (SNA) and were 
both anti-personnel (AP). During the Ogaden war, after an initially successful 
pre-emptive strike, the Somali National Army (SNA) was beaten back by a 
superior Ethiopian force that had the backing and benefit of training and 
weapons from The Soviets.   
During this time, mines were also used for the protection of refugee camps for 
the benefit of Ethiopians living inside Somaliland, and also along strategic roads 
and tracks likely to be used by an invading force.  They were laid defensively, 
predominantly along the Ethiopian border to hinder infiltration by the rebel 
groups, especially the Somali National Movement (SNM), who had their 
operating bases mainly in Ethiopia (Omaar et al., 1993).   As the conflicts 
intensified, the armies resorted to using mines for counter insurgency purposes.  
Faced with inaccessible terrain and with attacks coming from within Somalia, 
the Somalia and Soviet troops responded to attacks with the random use of 
scattered mines (RIMFIRE final report 1993). During in the post Ogaden period, 
the SNM laid mines along the borders to protect their own bases (Physicians for 
Human Rights (U.S.), 1992 p. 15). Additional minefields were laid during clan 
skirmishes in 1992-1994, and it is also believed that some additional minefields 
were laid during conflict over border disputes between Somaliland and Puntland 
between 1994 and 1995. 
Similarly, following the cessation of all hostilities, the country had vast amounts 
of ammunition which were abandoned as armies and rebels retreated, 
contributing significantly to the abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)/UXO 
contamination. These large quantities of Abandoned Unexploded Ordnances 
(AXOs) such as missiles, were abandoned by withdrawing Soviet forces in 1977, 
and have presented a particular danger (Landmine Action, 2003).  ERW are 
found in former military camps as well as in battlefield areas (Eric, 2003).  For 
example, the North Kudbur area on the northern outskirts of Hargeisa, an area 
 
 
162 
 
favoured by the warring groups, because its natural trenches and cliffs were 
used for their offensive and defensive tactics, was left littered with UXOs.   
Other areas include a defunct marine camp on the outskirts of Berbera, which 
was a battle area and was left with a high level of UXOs within wreckages of 
vehicles and construction material.  This area was also littered with scrap metal 
and other detritus that became a magnet for scavenging locals after scrap 
metals. The country further has all manner of Explosive Remnants of War 
(ERWs), including ground launched munitions, mortars, hand grenades and 
small arms ammunition, which litter the Somalian landscape (including 
Somaliland).  The 1988 government bombing of Hargeisa left resultant 
contamination, which was found in all areas.  In other areas where fighting took 
place, large amounts of unexploded and partially exploded battlefield ordnance 
were left, including hand grenades, mortar shells, anti-tank rockets, large 
artillery shells, heat seeking missiles, air dropped ordnance and surface to air 
missiles.  
Another factor that contributed to the extensive contamination was the presence 
of a number of Ammunition Storage Areas (ASA) which constitutes a major risk 
in a post-conflict scenario. Thus the mine/UXO contamination problem in 
Somaliland was compounded by the presence of such extensive former battle 
areas, which sometimes have abandoned and/or damaged stockpiles of 
ammunition and explosives. Generally, due to inadequate and/or inappropriate 
munitions storage,  explosive events in ammunition storage facilities take place 
frequently (Greene et al., 2005). Such events result in ERWs being dispersed 
and scattered over large areas around the storage facilities.  Such places 
included areas in Daraweyne, a former military base originally constructed by 
the Russians, with four Soviet-built ammunition bunkers. The Somali National 
Army occupied it before it was captured by the SNM. It is located 30 km North 
East of the capital city of Hargeisa, in the Galbeed region of Somaliland. The 
base was protected by a fenced mine belt consisting of minimum metal 
Pakistani P4 Anti-Personnel (AP) mines. In the mid-1990s, as a result of a fire, 
three of the bunkers exploded showering ammunition over a wide area and 
burying large quantities under rubble and steel.   Unlike UXOs which normally 
affects one or more individuals, an uncontrolled or accidental explosive event 
within such an area has a far reaching impact on the whole community; it will 
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also result in the scattering of UXO over the surrounding areas, denying the use 
of that land to the local community. 
Similarly RIMFIRE in reported finding 350 anti-tank mines outside a corrugated 
tin shed on the main road between Hargeisa and Berbera. Inside the shed were 
approximately 25000 detonators and crystallising explosives, cracked trip flares 
and other explosive devices. The hut was home to six refugees who were 
smoking and cooking inside.  There were also huge stockpiles of missiles 
(SAMs) at both Hargeisa and Berbera airfields. At Berbera in January of 1994, 
there were still 250 SAM missiles some of which had begun to leak their volatile 
liquid fuels. At Hargeisa there were armed anti-aircraft missiles and 1000 lb 
bombs scattered around the airfield, many in an advanced state of decay 
(RIMFIRE Final Report, January 1993)  
According to a GICHD study, the risk emanates from the danger posed by 
ammunition and explosives, the  deterioration of the ammunition or the 
conditions under which it is being stored, and the security of the site (GICHD, 
2002; See also; Greene et al., 2005). In Burao, Togdheer region, degraded and 
dangerous munitions held by the military existed in huge numbers, presenting a 
substantial threat to this major city.   
Post War Response; the role of Humanitarian Mine Clearance 
Pioneer Corps and RIMFIRE (1991-1994)  
As the reconstruction process progressed in Somaliland, chaos continued to 
reign in the rest of Somalia coupled by the presence of the intervention led by 
the US.  As the civil war continued, famine threatened the lives of many, forcing 
a humanitarian intervention in 1992.  This was plagued by lethargy, lack of 
coordination and outright incompetence.  By the end of November 1992, the US 
president ordered 30,000 combat troops into Somalia to facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian relief. UNOSOM I was formed with a mandate to monitor the 
March 3rd ceasefire, protect UN workers, and safely escort humanitarian aid 
supplies.  However conflict prevailed, leading to violent attacks on UN soldiers, 
which led the Security Council into unanimously adopting the United Task Force 
(UNITAF), which was given an unprecedented mandate and liberal rules of 
engagement that allowed the U.S. to use all necessary means to create a 
secure environment.  Before much progress could be made, the Security 
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Council submitted recommendations for a transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM 
II on March 3, 1993, recommending that UNOSOM II forces be given the power 
to create a safe environment, and help the Somali people rebuild their country 
by uniting politically and socially.   
Whilst UNOSOM II was trying to bring some semblance of order to Somalia, 
Somaliland was going through its own reconciliation process as, noted in 
Chapter 3 mine clearance was one of the main programmes that had been 
agreed upon during reconciliation process. The elders were unanimous in their 
agreement during the peace process that mine clearance was a necessity 
(WSP International, 2005).  Mine clearance was a prerequisite for any 
reconstruction and/or humanitarian work that needed to be undertaken.  Thus, 
the first coordinated mine clearance immediately after the war in 1991, was 
performed by a group of 60 former SNM volunteers many who had served as 
combat engineers (probably laying mines) during the war and formed the 
Somaliland Humanitarian Pioneer Corps. It was typical of this period that 
serving or ex-military personnel carried out most of the clearance work 
(Horwood, 2000). They worked formally under the Somaliland Ministry of 
Defence on a voluntary basis with basic equipment that had been salvaged 
from the national army.  Their work was inadequate compared to the need, and 
40% of the initial group lost their lives or were injured (Omaar et al., 1993 pp. 
54-55).  One of the Pioneers interviewed contends that demining at this time 
was done in a haphazard way, and led to a high level of casualties amongst the 
deminers, mainly due to the lack of proper equipment, but also because of the 
way in which the mines had been laid (Abdikadir Jirde62; Interviewed on 24th 
November 2010 in Hargeisa).   
Given the humanitarian impact the mines had, the EEC delegation in Nairobi 
requested RIMFIRE International Limited, a commercial organisation that 
claimed speciality in humanitarian mine clearance and post conflict population 
                                            
62 Abdikadir Jirde was one of the Pioneers who then became the Deputy Director of NDA from 1995-1997.  
At the time, he participated at the Bad Honnef conference in Germany.  From 1997 to 2005 he was the 
vice chairman of the House of Representatives.  At the time of the interview he had been a member of 
House of Representatives since 2005 as the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly; He was also a 
University of Bradford Peace Studies Alumni. 
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resettlement requirements, 63  to conduct a survey of mines and munitions 
remaining in Somaliland, the report was to be submitted through Medicins Sans 
Frontiers (MSF) Holland64.  The report concluded that international expertise 
was needed in order to supplement and extend the work of the Pioneers. 
Therefore in 1991, in an unprecedented move, a commercial company was 
awarded a contract for a ‘humanitarian mine clearance programme’ in 
Somaliland. Through a funding proposal from MSF and UNHCR, RIMFIRE 
International Limited put forward a proposal to train and equip a Humanitarian 
Mine Clearance Pioneer Corps65.  RIMFIRE was mandated to select and train 
1966 highly qualified and experienced explosives clearance operatives to train a 
much larger number of local staff.   This approach was favoured for a number of 
reasons; (a) it was going to be far more cost effective than employing large 
teams of expatriates; (b) engaging local staff will have a positive impact in the 
economic reconstruction of the country meaning that donor aid will be doubly 
effective; (c) a pool of local expertise would be created67; (d) The provision of 
these services would provide otherwise scarce employment opportunities and 
help in restoring morale and self-confidence (RIMFIRE Final Report 1994). The 
scope of the proposed training and equipment was limited by funds available, 
but it was nevertheless decided that the training programme would be adequate 
to achieve the initial objectives of the project. The training took the form of a five 
week programme during which students underwent four one week sessions 
designed to acquaint them with the basic skills required. Additionally they were 
issued with equipment to enable them to carry out the work so that at the end of 
their training there would exist, in Somaliland, a Humanitarian Mine Clearance 
Pioneer corps of 139 men. This would include six Clearance Sections of 20 men 
together with a command and control element (RIMFIRE Report dated January 
1993). 
                                            
63 Omaar’s report indicates that RIMFIRE was a private security firm initially and that Somaliland was its 
first venture into mine clearance.  However a report seen by the Researcher written by RIMFIRE indicates 
that they were a commercial company specialised in humanitarian mine clearance. 
64 The report indicates that the request was as a result of injuries sustained from land mines by  German 
nursing sisters 
65 During this period there were only two Humanitarian mine clearance organisations worldwide (HALO 
Trust and Mine Action Group UK) 
66 RIMFIRE reports indicate that these were graduates of the Defence Explosives Ordnance Disposal 
School ( DEODS ), Chattenden, Kent, UK who all had at least 10 years of experience in their trade. 
However further reports indicate that the some of the Pioneers had more experience and expertise than 
some of these Expats. See Omaar et al. 
67 In today’s speak this would have been referred to as ‘capacity building; and local ownership’. 
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It is important to note that the limited funding, including availability of expertise, 
was set against the background of the more than 30,000 US soldiers deployed 
in the rest of Somalia, and that such a force would have certainly have 
represented an immense potential capacity for mine clearance, within Somalia 
and Somaliland (Omaar et al., 1993 p. 52).   
Efforts on data collection 
In the absence of a proper survey, RIMFIRE relied on rudimentary sources of 
data.  Within the constraints imposed by the prevailing security situation, and for 
the purposes of better planning and implementation of the programme, 
RIMFIRE designed a simple data collection tool in a questionnaire format, 
designed to be understood by anybody who would be going into the field.  
These questionaires68 were to be completed by those out in the field as a form 
of mine survey for the HMCPC without special training.  The data thus collected 
represented a rudimentary indication, for planning purposes, of the impact of 
landmine contamination at the time.   
Information was collected from:- (a) records and observations of the officer 
corps of the HMCPC who had fought on one side or the other during the civil 
war, and had invariably laid some of the mines; (b) visual sighting of mines and 
munitions around Hargeisa and outlying villages; (c) monitoring of accidents to 
personnel and livestock; (d) information given by NGOs and others such as 
water works employees, school staff, orphanage staff  etc., who had either seen 
mines and munitions, or required a clean bill of health in a particular area of 
field operations; (e) old military installations and ammunitions bunkers.   
Challenges faced by RIMFIRE mine clearance efforts 
Mine action in Somaliland went through the same challenges as the 
programme’s first attempts in Afghanistan.  The programme was well-
intentioned but ill-thought-out, revealing challenges that would befall many 
clearance efforts around the world in the years to come.   In particular, RIMFIRE 
faced various challenges including contractual challenges, politicisation of the 
project and funding issues.  These challenges are examined more broadly 
below; 
                                            
68 See APPENDIX 4: Sample of RIMFIRE Data Collection Tool 
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a) Politicisation of mine clearance 
The politicised context within which the programme occurred cannot be 
overstated.  The challenges were numerous and the issues were complex, and 
it is fair to say that any other humanitarian programme at this time would have 
struggled.  Any humanitarian actions conducted at this time, either by the 
military or otherwise, were bound to be seen as political decisions. Whichever 
role RIMFIRE would have taken meant identifying with either the victims or 
belligerents.  The context within which RIMFIRE operated was characteristic of 
the international relief efforts of the decade.  Such efforts suffered  poor 
coordination, and lacked the benefit of overall planning, amongst other issues 
(MacCormack, 2007).   
Mainly driven by the immense danger the mines/UXO presented to aid workers 
and the local populace, the programme ignored basic essential requirements for 
an effective programme.  There was a lack of comprehensive strategy for 
dealing with a complex humanitarian emergency of such magnitude.  The 
programme started without a proper survey and clearance plan, meaning that 
the programme became vulnerable to the clan politics that prevailed at the time.  
The programme also failed to take steps towards setting up structures that 
would eliminate political vested interests. As RIMFIRE was a commercial 
company, the donors failed to offer the necessary humanitarian guidance that 
would perhaps have guided the project better. 
In the absence of a comprehensive solution to the conflict, there was always a 
risk that the parties would return to armed clashes, and continue using 
landmines. There were high political tensions between parties, which frequently 
led to halts in the operations during the initiation period.  The mines were of 
huge political significance, both in terms of use, and in their clearance, and this 
was demonstrated by the engagement of a Director of Mine Clearance during 
the period.  In particular, the Director of Mine Clearance at the time, Mr 
Abdullahi Bihi, assumed enormous personal powers and had a huge vested 
political interest.  He continually used RIMFIRE’s resources to advance the then 
president’s political programme.  During the civil war that ensued, Pioneers from 
his own clan and from the President’s clan were promoted, whilst others were 
dismissed or unpaid.  This practice of hiring exacerbated inter-clan conflict; 
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priorities for demining were driven by clans, rather than by areas that truly 
needed it.  The destruction of mines was also done selectively with those stocks 
from other clans being prioritised.  There was also failure to follow safety 
procedures when the landmines were disposed. 
The deminers were technically employees of the Ministry of Defence, and under 
the control of the Director of Mine Clearance; hence, they were part of the 
security forces of the government.  During the political tensions, RIMFIRE, 
through the Director, provided logistical support to the government’s security 
operations69.  Some of the deminers were also seconded to guard the Director’s 
house and other senior figures (Omaar et al., 1993 p. 64).   Some of the 
deminers with RIMFIRE also took part in re-laying mines themselves.  Omaar et 
al confirmed that the Pioneers laid mines on behalf of the government during a 
conflict in the Berbera area in 1992, where 40 deminers under the leadership of 
the Director of Mine Clearance were reported to have assisted one of the armed 
groups to lay landmines on the approaches to Berbera town (1993 p. 65).   
Similarly, most local Somali communities associated the presence of demining 
with opportunities for employment and procurement of contracts, which were 
seen as more important than the removal of landmines.  This led to problems 
with hiring and subcontracting.  Menkhaus notes that ‘in some instances the 
lucrative business that demining contracts generated resulted in Somali 
communities actually planting new landmines in order to create new demining 
opportunities’ (Menkhaus, 2006a p. 9).  The warring clans also viewed mine 
clearance assets and the cleared mines as their own resources that could 
advance their cause, thus looting of vehicles and other assets such as radios, 
vehicle antennas, ballistic jackets and helmets belonging to RIMFIRE became a 
common occurrence and this sometimes led to injuries.  Similarly, the mines 
once cleared were seen as the property of the individual clans and they 
therefore laid claim to the same.  Twenty six Pioneers were wounded by 
gunshots during hijackings and ambushes during the operation.  The hijacking 
and looting was also attributed to disgruntled Pioneers especially one which 
ended up with the fatal shooting of the driver as he had resisted.   Abdikadir 
                                            
69 They allowed the use of their batteries, fuel, hired vehicles and radios etc. 
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Jirde referred to the looting and ambushes of this calibre as clan capture70.   
He noted; 
What happened is that it was clan capture of RIMFIRE.  People who 
were doing the demining were hired by RIMFIRE and they would say 
they were coming from a certain clan.  When hostilities broke out, they 
joined their clans.  With their expertise, with the stock of landmines they 
had, with the explosives, with the trenches and everything.  They created 
havoc in certain regions in the country (Abdikadir Jirde).     
The problem with looting forced RIMFIRE to stop operating its own fleet and 
resort to hiring locally owned vehicles in support of the operations which 
brought with it other dynamics, including sometimes those supplying the 
vehicles refusing to hire them out and/or charging exorbitant prices.  The 
problem also meant that some of the vital equipment could not be carried 
around easily because of the risk of capture. This no doubt had an impact on 
operations.   
The RIMFIRE programme operated without the benefit of the knowledge of 
predatory political economies that characterise many of today’s conflicts and 
complex emergencies.  Therefore the risk of aid diversion was particularly high. 
However, the programme quickly learnt that they possessed assets quite 
beneficial to the clans.  There was an attempt at some reflection, even though 
rudimentary, which can be deciphered from the various reports filed by 
RIMFIRE.  The reports indicate that there was a certain level of appreciation of 
the context within which RIMFIRE was working, and their feeble efforts to 
mitigate the impact, for example, the movement of their demining assets from 
Djibouti to Hargeisa was planned to take place during Ramadan when 
‘everyone is calm and on extra rations of khat and too tired to attempt a hold up’.   
Also to mitigate the problem with access to areas where demining needed to be 
undertaken, complex arrangements and agreements had to be drawn up with 
                                            
70 Rather than what is referred to in the mainstream as elite capture. A phenomenon where resources 
transferred for the benefit of the masses are usurped by a few, usually politically and /or economically 
powerful groups, at the expense of the less economically and/or politically influential groups. See Dutta, D. 
(2009) Elite Capture and Corruption: Concepts and Definitions. Bibliography - with an overview of the 
suggested literature. Available from  http://www.ruralgov-
ncaer.org/images/product/doc/3_1345011280_EliteCaptureandCorruption1.pdf  
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the clan elders around equal clan distribution of tasks and jobs.  This did 
sometimes lead to increased cost, but it allowed work to proceed.   
Similarly in a report by the Monitor dated 1 November 1993, RIMFIRE was 
reported to have declined a request from the government to clear what had 
been a former Russian airfield near Daraweyna.  RIMFIRE had declined on the 
grounds that this was not a humanitarian requirement and it was suspected that 
at the time, they (the government) wanted to pressure NGOs to use that airfield 
as they were not getting any share of the fees charged at Hargeisa airport. In 
yet another report RIMFIRE underlined the requirement that the ‘mine clearance 
programme must be seen as humanitarian, technical and neutral’, in order to 
achieve this, RIMFIRE argued the need for Sections of the HMCPC be recruited 
from across the country.  Similarly, the report spelt out that decisions regarding 
deployment should be taken by international staff in consultation with the 
Government (RIMFIRE Report dated January 1994).71  
In particular in areas donors had raised concerns as they (RIMFIRE) had 
compared the Somaliland project with a similar programme in Afghanistan that 
had fallen into difficulties due to rebel forces who were selling cleared mines for 
re-laying.  The donors had raised concerns that the project should not be seen 
to be connected to the military, as this would have been construed as giving 
military aid to the North. Ironically, even though this had been raised as a 
concern at the beginning of the project, the project went ahead, implemented 
through the Ministry of Defence, and ended up having a similar impact.   
Political challenges therefore had adverse impacts on mine action during 
conflict. The generally sensitive, difficult and uncertain situations were 
specifically singled out. Political tensions between the different clans frequently 
led to halts in the operations during the initiation period when the Pioneers set 
up clearance in Somaliland. In the absence of a comprehensive solution to the 
conflict, there was always a risk that the parties would return to armed clashes 
and continue using landmines.  The political use of the mine issue was a real 
problem at the beginning as demonstrated by the engagement of the Mine 
Director during the time. 
                                            
71 Annual Report on the Maintenance and Supervision of the Humanitarian Mine Clearance Pioneer Corps 
in Northern Somalia 1993 filed in London, January 1994. 
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Mine action remained a highly political activity due to the fact that, like 
humanitarian aid, it involved engaging with political authorities in the conflict 
affected country.  Post clearance in various contexts the highly political nature 
of land claims after conflict means that mine action remains intricately 
connected to politics.  The clearance organisations often desire to remain 
neutral and this hinders them from acknowledging the complexity that is conﬂict 
politics in this context.  This is evident especially in contexts where land and 
property rights remain contentious after the cessation of conflict (Unruh, 2012).   
The context within which the Somaliland mine clearance programme was set 
had a history replete with politicisation of aid (be it bilateral, relief or otherwise).  
Thus mine action and specifically mine clearance was doubly disadvantaged in 
as far as the politicisation was concerned.   
The initial mine clearance programme in Somaliland suffered a number of 
misfortunes; politicisation however was one of the major drawbacks that 
challenged mine clearance programmes.  According to reports by RIMFIRE 
dated 13th of April 1992, they were ‘plagued with logistic and ‘Somali’ domestic 
problems’.  This can be interpreted in various ways, however, through reading 
other independent reports, it soon becomes clear what the ‘Somali’ domestic 
problems may have meant. Problems included the allocation of mined 
Government buildings for RIMFIRE to use as control centres, only to be taken 
from them as soon as they had been cleared, cleaned and repainted.  
b) Contractual challenges 
As mentioned elsewhere, RIMFIRE International Limited was a commercial 
organisation that claimed speciality in humanitarian mine clearance and post 
conflict population resettlement requirements.  However, RIMFIRE had been 
until then a private security firm with very little knowledge of mine clearance.  
Somaliland was its first venture into mine clearance (Omaar et al., 1993). A 
report by Physicians for Human Rights indicates that the organisation was first 
organised in May 1990 (Physicians for Human Rights (U.S.), 1992).  
The terms of the RIMFIRE contract were not clearly spelt out.  They were 
contracted to provide technical expertise to the Somaliland government, who 
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had the Pioneers running the programme. This meant that they, RIMFIRE, had 
limited control or sanctions over the employees.  
Due to technicalities with the contract, the issue of salaries became a thorny 
one from the beginning. As the Pioneers were employed by the government, 
RIMFIRE thought it best to delegate salary payment to the government.  
However on several occasions the salaries were not paid.  This caused a 
backlash with RIMFIRE, who were sympathetic with the Pioneers who were 
oblivious to the subtleties of their employment status.   Though the salary 
payments were a ‘tedious and frustrating job’ according to reports filed by 
RIMFIRE, they took on the responsibility (Rimfire  Annual Report, 1993).   
In January 1994, UNOSOM took over the responsibility of demining in Somalia, 
including Somaliland.  UNOSOM requested RIMFIRE to continue work, while 
they (UNOSOM) developed their future strategies.  During this time the 
Pioneers went on strike demanding a salary increment.  With advice from the 
government, UNOSOM held out.  This led to a situation in which 13 RIMFIRE 
contractors were held hostage by the Pioneers thereby forcing UNOSOM to 
agree to their demands, an incident that was reported widely by international 
media (AP Reporter, 1994).  The Pioneers ended up with a pay increase, and a 
3 month salary, even though they had not worked for the 3 months.  Following 
this wage dispute RIMFIRE withdrew on the 19th of February as it had become 
unsafe for them to continue; however, it was reported that the local authorities 
and United Nations representatives were not satisfied with RIMFIRE’s hence 
their withdrawal (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 26 Feb. 1994, pp: 4; Interview 
with Abdikadir Jirde). 
There are a number of factors that compounded the salary process and were 
extremely difficult to explain to the Pioneers; a fluctuating exchange rate meant 
that at the time the Pioneers were engaged, the promised salaries suffered a 50% 
decrease, a concept that was difficult to relay. This resulted in a deep 
deterioration in the purchasing value of pay offered to the Pioneers. RIMFIRE 
agreed to increase their payments, but they did not have that amount of money 
in the country and therefore couldn’t make the payment immediately.  Before 
the issue could be resolved, the Pioneers had caused considerable insecurity, 
leading to  a major strike from the 6th of June till the 12th of July 1993 (Rimfire  
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Annual Report, 1993 : Annex M).  The strike ended up with the loss of 
equipment and revealed the deterioration of the relationship between RIMFIRE 
and the Pioneers.  During this strike the expatriate staff did not leave their 
compound fearing for their safety (Omaar et al., 1993). The lack of intervention 
by donors on what the mandate of the organisation was vis-à-vis the 
government, meant that a lot of misunderstandings occurred, which caused a 
lot of tension with the local communities.   
The expatriates also lacked cultural sensitivity, which led to further conflict with 
the communities.  Waldron and Hasci (1995) identified such insensitivity in 
Somalia as a major problem that permeated the expatriate policy formation and 
administration of aid.  They argued that ‘outsiders were usually ignorant of 
Somali culture and the realities of Somali life’ (p. 16).    
Post war mine clearance achievements  
Though these early demining efforts were fraught with challenges, they enabled 
the re-population of the city of Hargeisa, the clearance of Hargeisa Airport, and 
many outlying villages and towns were also cleared.  The Ogaden war of 1977-
1978 had provoked a massive refugee movement, displacing thousands of 
people in Somalia. The UNHCR reported that by 1981, refugees constituted 
perhaps as much as 40 per cent of the population of Somalia (UNHCR, 2005). 
Mine clearance contributed to the return of a high number of them and the 
repopulation of Hargeisa.  
Demining contributed to the elimination of the weapons of war, and reduced 
perceptions of insecurity. The employment of former soldiers in the demining 
sector supported the demobilisation process and contributed to reducing the 
potential for violence. This is usually followed by the long-term process of 
reintegration that includes the reform of the security sector to meet post-war 
security challenges and to create an enabling environment for sustainable 
peace and development. The clearance and destruction of mines/UXOs is 
possibly the most well-known and well-supported form of practical disarmament.    
Landmines and UXOs posed multidimensional problems in many post-conflict 
countries, other than the loss of life, disability, psychological problems and a 
continuous state of fear and insecurity between and among affected 
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communities. In 2001, one in every 652 returnees had become a mine victim 
whilst 5,000 mine casualties (3,500 fatalities and 1,500 amputations) were 
recorded for the period between 1991 and 2001  (UNDP, 2001 p. 64).   Similarly, 
the social and economic well-being of communities is impacted in various ways. 
For example, they deny populations access to agricultural land; destroy 
livestock; reduce ability to generate income; restrict children's access to 
schools; prohibit repair and use of irrigation systems; and inhibit national 
reconstruction and development strategies. Most significantly the impact was 
felt from blockages.  This can either be blocking of access for  humanitarian 
organisations trying to deliver crucial aid to populations in need or  these 
populations being blocked from accessing alternative sources of livelihood e.g. 
fertile land, wells etc. thereby trapping them in poverty and denying them 
external assistance.  
The Role of RIMFIRE in reducing the threat has been acknowledged:   
When we went in in the early 90s, the whole security, the operational 
situation was very difficult.  Even as late as 1999 it was bad so there is 
no doubt that RIMFIRE worked on an incredibly difficult situation.  
Security was a lot worse than when we were there.  And I think and I 
believe now, and I’ve said that I take my hat off to those guys.  I think 
they did a great job.  Because in absolute terms they cleared a lot of stuff 
and the NGO subsequently spent a lot of time completing the clearance 
of several of those big mine fields down near the border that RIMFIRE 
weren’t able to complete because of insecurity problems and all the rest 
of it.  And yes they missed mines undoubtedly and I saw mines that went 
off but the thing is they reduced the risk in those areas to a point where 
for sure there were still mines left (Nick Bateman72; Ex DDG and HALO 
Trust Programme Manager Interviewed in Nairobi on 13th of September 
2012).  
Though they were highly criticised, prior to 1991, no humanitarian mine 
clearance organisation existed, so the expertise for carrying out humanitarian 
                                            
72 Nick Bateman previously worked for HALO Trust as Technical advisor from September 1994 and then 
as Programme Manager from 1999 to 2000; he then joined DDG in 2003 to 2008 where he worked as the 
Somaliland Programme Manager and also as Acting DDG Regional Director for the Horn & East of Africa 
regional office in Nairobi. 
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demining in the complex emergency did not exist.   It was noted by the then 
Monitor, and advisor to the project, that the co-author of the report that highly 
criticised the role of RIMFIRE in Somaliland was the co-founder of Mine 
Advisory Group (UK), a demining organisation that had been set up around the 
same time. With MAG’s experience in Afghanistan, it would have been 
expected that the critics would have appreciated the context of mine clearance 
but they didn’t, the sincerity of the authors was therefore questionable. 
In two years work in Somaliland, with 440 deminers, RIMFIRE sustained only 
two deaths from a single mine incident. The rest of their casualties resulted from 
gunshot wounds during attempted kidnapping and looting.  During the same 
operation period after the Kuwait conflict there were 85 serious mine casualties 
in less than 10 months, whilst in Afghanistan the UNOCA lost 16 deminers 
whilst clearing 68 sq km of land (ICRC, 1992).  This was the achievement of 
RIMFIRE in two years in Somaliland. 
Upon RIMFIRE’s exit, the UN Monitor compiled a comprehensive report on 
every aspect of work undertaken during the period.  These reports, which were 
made available to me, address every aspect of challenges encountered (in 
detail) and include comprehensive advice on the way forward for mine 
clearance in Somalia in general and in Somaliland in particular.  These reports 
would have formed a very good basis for the UN, and the Sector in general, as 
a point of reference for the implementation of future programmes; they were 
provided to UNOSOM and to donors with copies being held by the Monitor’s 
consulting company.  The UN Monitor confirmed that he was never approached 
by anyone for advice or information that could have guided the work that 
followed (Email correspondences with J. Craib) 
Thus, RIMFIRE began by clearing large areas of minefields especially around 
Hargeisa and the surrounding villages, the airport and several former military 
camps, water tanks, refugee camps and some roads.  This operation was 
widely criticised by human rights groups (see Omaar et al., 1993) at the time. 
However, it has been acknowledged that the work undoubtedly resulted in 
significant reduction of the threat of mines and UXO around Hargeisa and in 
other parts of the region (Lardner, 2008).   
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When the security situation improved, various international Humanitarian mine 
action NGOs, through funding from various donors, started mine action 
programmes in Somaliland.    
FROM MINE CLEARANCE BY RIMFIRE TO A UN LED MINE 
ACTION SECTOR 
With the exit of RIMFIRE, no serious mine action programmes were carried out 
till 1998, when humanitarian mine clearance organisations started being 
operational.  However, in the intervening period, internal clan based conflict 
broke out, and between 1994 and 1995 there was hardly any attempt at 
demining.  There were no new programmes initiated, and indeed, according to 
Landmine Monitor, and as noted elsewhere, this period saw the laying of new 
mines in the central city of Burao.   It was not until 1998/9 that the UNDP funded 
a three month demining project with Mine Tech of Zimbabwe, and Greenfields 
consultants.  Initially contracted to do a feasibility study with a group of 
previously trained Somali deminers, Mine Tech cleared 73,000 sq meters in 
Burao and also cleared a 1.5km road in the town of Sheikh (Landmine Monitor, 
1999). 
In 1998, Mine Tech, a commercial demining organisation from Zimbabwe, was 
contracted on a $202,000 funding by the UNDP for three months to carry out 
mine clearance in the city of Burao.  Mine Tech was founded in 1992 and used 
demobilised Zimbabwean soldiers for mine clearance under the direction of Col 
Lionel Dyck, a former army officer, who is reported to have commanded an elite 
Zimbabwean paratrooper unit which operated in Mozambique against the 
Renamo (Landmine Monitor, 1999 p. 58). These Zimbabwean soldiers were the 
same advisors who in 1993 had under the command of Jeremy Brickhill their 
commander had come to advice Somaliland on demilitarisation. 
1999 saw the arrival of international mine clearance organisations such as the 
HALO Trust, Santa Barbara, Mine Tech and the DDG in Somaliland increasing 
the number of actors involved in mine action.  The increase resulted in a call by 
the UN Secretary-General in his October 1999 annual report, for improved co-
ordination and institutional support for the demining organisations that were 
involved in Somaliland (UNGA, 1999).  Thus, UNDP having been previously 
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implementing direct clearance tasks in places such as Burao shifted its focus to 
capacity building through setting up a National Mine Action Coordination.  This 
saw the establishment of the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC) in 
February 2000 which they directed but was implemented through the UNOPS.  
The Role of the UN in establishing a national programme 
According to UN standard practise engagement in post conflict contexts 
involves the former warring parties asking the international community to 
provide assistance in the form of peacekeeping or within broader peacebuilding 
missions; however the case of Somaliland was different as it was not a 
recognised state (Paterson and Filippino, 2006).  Similarly, within mine action 
programmes, UN involvement generally takes place either within the 
humanitarian context under the overall authority of a Humanitarian Coordinator, 
or as part of a development programme under a UN Resident Coordinator; 
within a peacekeeping operation it takes place under a Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG). None of these instances relate to the 
Somaliland context. 
According to the Sector’s own guide on global mine action implementation 
strategy, the process of programme implementation starts with the 
establishment of a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) which is responsible 
for the regulation, management and coordination of mine action in a mine-
affected country (UNMAS, 2012b).  This NMAA is tasked with ensuring that the 
national and local conditions enable the effective management of mine action 
programmes. It is therefore ultimately responsible for all phases of a mine 
action programmes within its national boundaries, including surveys and 
assessments that might be undertaken. In particular, the NMAA seeks to 
establish and maintain a system and procedures for the collection, collation, 
analysis and dissemination of information on the mine and UXO threat and its 
on-going impact (Morete, 2003).  The establishment of a NMAA is also one of 
the strategic ways that the UN seeks to reinforce national ownership and build 
capacity of a mine affected country so that mine action functions may eventually 
be transferred to national actors and enhance their capacity to fulfil mine action 
responsibilities (UNMAS Strategy).  
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However, for the case of Somaliland, upon formation of a government, a body 
to address the issue of landmines was put in place.  The National Demining 
Agency (NDA) had been formed under the Ministry of Resettlement, 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (MRR&R) in 1996.  The office of the Vice-
President headed an inter-ministerial Steering Committee; as an active 
government body, the NDA issued a policy paper on landmines in 1998 in which 
it proposed polices that were approved by the President’s Cabinet on 26 
October 1998.  Similarly on the  1st of  March 1999, the Somaliland House of 
Representatives passed an amended version of the NDA policy in which in 
Article 1 it declared that “the State shall undertake to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that 
are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible” (Landmine Monitor, 
1999 citing the government paper). This was important given the historical 
claims by clans to cleared and stockpiled mines and other UXOs. 
From the onset, the UN encountered a formal structure that could have been 
adapted as an NMAA but was not.  Rather than improve on what was already in 
existence the UN embarked on a process of establishing the Somaliland Mine 
Action Centre in 1997, a year after NDA had been in operation.  Having 
disregarded the existing official structure that was in place, the UN went on to 
establish a parallel organisation and imposed it on the National Mine Action 
structure that the government had put in place.  According to the 
implementation process, a MACC normally plays the role of an implementing 
partner for the NMAA and is only put in place once a NMAA is in place.  From 
its inception the NDA had nominally coordinated mine clearance (Landmine 
Monitor, 2003). Thus the process of creating SMACC was problematic because 
it was seen both by the government and other stakeholders as a deliberate act 
of disregard to existing institutions.  According to the NDA’s first Director, the 
decision can be explained purely in terms of the need for the UN to serve its 
own interest. ‘There were no good reasons for the need to create a parallel 
institution by the UN to carry out the same tasks’, he argues. 
This position was elaborated further by the first National Director who recalled 
being approached (presumably to head SMAC) and challenging the offer to set 
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up a the organisation by asking for the existing organisation to be improved 
instead; he said  
I remember the first time I heard that UNDP was setting up a mine action 
organisation, I was the NDA Director.  A South African guy who was 
working from Nairobi and came here for this mine action thing, he 
approached me and said ‘I want to establish an office’ and I challenged 
him to think about it.  He asked me why he had to think about it and they 
were already here to establish a mine action office.  He told me, we are 
making an office of Somaliland mine action which will be under UNDP.  I 
challenged him and he replied that he is doing the actual mine action, 
and that I should go and support them.  I replied that I was also doing 
mine action.  His reply was ‘well Mohammed, think about it and come 
back to me in a few days’.  He then approached a friend of mine asking 
him to convince me to support that office.  I asked my friend why should 
we?  If he is genuine, this office is doing the same thing so he should 
come and support me but not make another office.  So my friend replied 
that if I refuse I would not get capacity because the UN has the funds. He 
explained that it was up to us to go to the  UNDP, as the international 
community is the one that has the funds you will not get the funds and 
neither will you get the support as NDA’ (Mohammed Ali Ismael- Former 
NDA Director (1996-99); DDG (1999 -2005); interviewed in Hargeisa on 
26th October 2010) 
According to Nick Bateman, ‘The UN came in and created SMAC for 
convenience.  The NDA just died because they had no resources and 
everything went to SMAC’; According to Ahmed Essa73, the issue was purely a 
turf war and he acknowledges the fact that NDA never received any support;  
NDA has always been marginalised by SMAC by UNDP focusing on 
SMAC, it’s a turf war.  UNDP have always had this, they have had a 
money pit that they used to capacitate SMAC and not help NDA at all. 
                                            
73 Ahmed Essa is the Director Institute of Practical Research and Training; he was also the founder of 
Somaliland Campaign to Ban Landmines; and the Landmine Monitor Researcher for the region.  He 
ceased campaigning and any work involving landmines as he felt that mines were no longer a threat or a 
priority in Somaliland.  He now concentrates his efforts wholly on education especially the training of 
medical students. A service that he insists is needed in Somaliland. 
 
 
180 
 
(Ahmed Essa; Landmine Campaign Activist and Researcher; interviewed 
on 26th September 2012). 
A Senior UN official referred to the process as ‘a political thing, more than 
anything else’. He spoke of the need to disassociate from NDA due to the 
political history of the NDA and its’ relation to the military;  
As we know the history of the NDA has been that is was part of the army 
and then part of the military defence and now part of the Ministry of 
Interior.  The NDA has been one of these posts that government promote 
to give good positions out with not much effort to these positions. 
(Graeme Draemu Abernethy – Programme Coordinator, United Nations 
Somalia Mine Action (UNSOMA),  UNOPS office, interviewed in Nairobi 
on 15th December 2010) 
During an informal chat with a Senior UNDP official, especially after I had been 
frustrated by the absence of a vibrant mine action sector and was contemplating 
abandoning Somaliland as a location for my study, the UNDP official specifically 
highlighted the need for more critical research especially on ‘the role of the 
international community in insisting on establishing a parallel institutions whilst 
the government of Somaliland had had an operational capacity for the same’,    
This, he argued ‘did not only bring about confusion and frustration within 
mine action during a very crucial time, but it left some of us disillusioned 
by what we saw as disregard and disrespect of local structures’ (Senior 
UNDP RoLs Programme official) 
It has been generally acknowledged that neither organisation has been effective, 
though SMAC did begin to become effective around 2008; whilst other than the 
policy paper, the NDA had not had any capacity to undertake any other 
assigned activities (ICBL 2009).  This was primarily due to the lengthy period 
marred by political in-fighting.   SMAC has suffered mainly from its lack of an 
overall coherent and coordinated approach.  However, the ineffectiveness was 
a direct result of the presence of these two coordinating bodies without clear 
segregation of responsibilities and mandate, which meant that mine action 
coordination suffered from repeated friction between the government of 
Somaliland and UNDP. The relationship between SMAC and NDA having never 
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clearly been defined suffered from claims of overlapping responsibilities and this 
became a major source of friction.   In the wake of these repeated 
disagreements the UNDP failed to renew SMAC’s contract after it expired on 28 
February 2002 (Landmine Monitor, 2002).  This was to have quite an impact on 
mine action programmes and the implementation of other policies as will be 
illustrated in the next chapter.  
Redressing the challenge of the SMAC/NDA impasse  
In 2002, as a response to the challenges that the sector found itself in, and in 
adherence to the Global mine action strategy, representatives from national 
authorities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and civil society 
organisations led by UNDP met to develop a strategic plan. During the 
workshop it was agreed that the government, through SMAC, needed 
assistance with the prioritisation of activities as a matter of urgency. This was 
also a requirement of the Global Mine Action Strategy, which stipulates that a 
national strategic plan is needed in order to define where a mine action 
programme is going, how it intends to get there, and the measure of success. 
Such a strategy encompasses an entire national mine action programme whilst 
individual organisations, working within the programme, normally have their own 
action plans, which should be consistent with the overall national strategic plan.   
Thus, following this meeting, UNDP mobilised resources for a comprehensive 
Landmine Impact Survey for Somalia in general. The aim of the survey was to 
assess and analyse the socio-economic impact of the mine/UXO contamination 
on a village-by-village basis. This information would, in turn, be utilised to 
update the mine action priorities. The view was that there would be centralised 
control over data collection and management activities and this would inevitably 
ease the transfer of responsibilities to the local Somaliland authorities 
(Landmine Monitor, 2001 online). 
Unfortunately, the impasse between UNDP and the government (SMAC and 
NDA) lasted throughout the period of the first phase of the LIS. This impasse 
was finally addressed and SMAC participated in the second phase of the LIS 
and in 2004 a National Mine Action Policy was proposed and adopted.  The 
policy fully mandated both the government’s bodies, and clarified their 
relationship with the Sector agencies and other stakeholders.  SMAC was 
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defined as the coordinating body for mine action and quality management, while 
the NDA was to be the body responsible for demining and other activities such 
as Mine Risk Education (DDG Annual Report 2004). Similarly, a National Mine 
Action Policy was adopted by Parliament and this clarified the respective 
bodies’ relationships with the mine clearance agencies and other stakeholders.   
SMAC also received Institutional support from DFID through UNDP Bureau for 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)  (MASG, 2005 pp: 15).  The emerging 
structure proposed included the Mine Action Commission (and underneath it the 
Mine Action Centre) under the President’s Office.  Its objectives were 
coordination, planning and quality assurance of mine actions operations, 
maintenance of records and databases, accreditation and licensing of mine 
action organisations. Technically SMAC was to work under the direction of the 
vice-president who is supposed to also chair the Somaliland Mine Action 
Committee (the national authority) that comprises of eight ministers74.  However 
enquiries on how or when the last meeting took place reveals that this has 
never happened.  The same is reported in a DDG evaluation report (Lardner, 
2008). The idea was to give the Commission broader access across the 
ministries if handled by the Vice President; meaning that both the NDA and 
SMAC would report directly to the Vice President (Interview with Senior UN 
official, Hargeisa, 2010).  
In the short-term the strategy meant continued UN support to strengthen the 
capacities of SMAC and the police EOD teams.  By the end of 2009 it was 
envisioned that the Somaliland government would take on greater financial 
responsibility. The strategy also called for UNDP to support the construction of 
an EOD Police Command and Training Centre, and expand SMAC’s survey 
capacity (Landmine Monitor, 2008).  
Before 2009, the plan was reviewed and extended to 2010 (Landmine Monitor, 
2008).  This became the medium-term strategy (2010–2012) with the aim of 
ensuring that a resource mobilisation plan was developed and implemented to 
ensure SMAC could operate independently. The strategy also was to ensure 
                                            
74 Lardner (2008 pp 7) citing the draft National Policy states that these might include the Ministries of 
Rehabilitation, Repatriation and Re-integration (MRRR), Planning, Health and Labour, Education, 
Information, Interior and Foreign Affairs. 
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that residual medium-priority areas of contamination identified by the LIS were 
dealt with. Within the medium-term strategy, other elements of mine action such 
as victim assistance, advocacy and stockpile destruction strategy were to be 
developed and implemented.  
Under long-term plans (beyond 2012), SMAC was to be in a position to 
coordinate and undertake all mine action activities without the need for 
international supervision (Human Security Unit, 2009 p. 298). The strategic plan 
rarely addressed in detail other elements of mine action such as mine risk 
education and or victim assistance. Similarly whilst other countries such as 
South Sudan’s strategic plans drew on policies such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) the Somaliland one incorporates themes of 
capacity-building and the rule of law found in the Somalia Reconstruction and 
Development Programme 2008–2012 (Landmine Monitor, 2008). 
 Whilst the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC) is Somaliland’s coordination 
body, the visibility of the strategic plan was limited to the written documents 
and, during the study period, NDA was not functional whilst SMAC’s ability to 
coordinate was hampered by various factors including intermittent funding from 
UNDP and lack of capacity as will be illustrated in the next chapter.  
In the immediate post conflict period in some contexts there is a lack of 
government institutions that they could work with; specifically, due to the fact 
that Somaliland is not recognised, the UN had to invite local NGOs as partners.  
However though this was the practise, the UN did encounter a vacuum vis à vis 
mine action but instead chose to create SMAC to fulfil this role even with the 
presence of the NDA.  This approach of working through NGOs partly 
conformed to Boutros-Ghali’s quest for the search for new ways of intervening 
as had been outlined by the Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). It was 
informed by the realisation that the NGO communities can and did play a vital 
role in peacebuilding (Richmond, 2001).  This could have been what informed 
the mine action Sector’s policy of setting up National Mine Action Centres.  
The aid history had also shaped the relationship between the international and 
the local NGOs which was skewed and took the shape of donor-recipient 
relationship.  Similarly the context within which these processes had taken 
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place had been based on a legacy of distrust in government from the 
international communities.  This therefore resulted in a desire to exclude (or not 
to actively seek) active government involvement in mine governance processes. 
In addition, concerns over patronage and corruption on the part of government 
officials and weak or non-existent government capacity were, and still are, cited 
as reasons for this non-involvement.  
This is illustrated further by the role of the UN in its provision of coordination for 
mine action.  The issue of non-recognition further complicates the matter.   
OTHER MINE ACTION ACTORS IN SOMALILAND & THEIR 
ROLES 
Mine action in Somaliland is implemented by a multi-actor, multilevel process 
and therefore the governance of the national mine action programme is 
informed by the actions of all these actors at various levels; these actors include 
to a very small extent the civil society; the state; the UN and international NGOs.  
The UN provides strategic leadership as is standard with other programmes.  In 
its basic notion, mine action governance in Somaliland refers to the structures 
and processes whereby the Sector (primarily the UN) – tries to steer the 
process from a centralised position.  
The following actors implement mine action on various levels in Somaliland;  
Table 4: Mine Action organisations in Somaliland 
United Nations 
UNMAS Overall policy coordination within and 
beyond UN system; provides mine 
action assistance in humanitarian 
emergencies; oversees international 
mine action standards (IMAS); 
coordinates planning for transfer to 
national authorities 
UNDP Supports development of national and 
local mine action capacity, promotes 
coordination between mine action and 
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wider development community at 
country level 
UNOPS Service provider in 
design/implementation of mine action 
programmes 
UNICEF Supports development and 
implementation of mine risk education 
projects in cooperation with UN and 
other partners 
International NGOs 
HALO Trust Demining 
Danish Demining Group Demining (until 2004); Armed Violence 
Reduction and Mine Risk Education 
Handicap International Mine Risk Education and Rehabilitation 
Government bodies 
SMAC Mine Action Coordination, Quality 
Assurance 
NDA Demining Authority 
Police EOD capacity EOD clearance, stockpile destruction 
Organisations that have ceased operations 
Santa Barbara Foundation Mine Clearance (1999-2000) 
MineTech of Zimbabwe A commercial demining company  
RIMFIRE UK Demining Company  (between 1991- 
1993) 
 
Source: Own compilation from fieldwork sources and also various Landmine 
Monitor Reports; I have omitted various organisations listed by the Landmine 
Monitor as working on Mine Action in Somaliland as on the are not visible on 
the ground and I could not establish contact.  Other than the UN, the other 
organisations which have dominated the Sector in Somaliland conform to the 
global composition i.e. mainly northern/western based organisations. 
CONCLUSION 
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Mine clearance gave the international community a significant early entry point 
to contribute to post conflict peacebuilding in Somaliland.  It should also have 
provided good lessons to inform programmes that followed.  As mine clearance 
was a very labour intensive and specialised undertaking, the Pioneers provided 
a ready pool of trained workers that could have been selectively utilised.   
RIMFIRE collected and collated data that could have provided a good starting 
point in the fulfilment of data collection that is key to mine action programmes.  
Similarly, the experience and detailed reports would probably have provided 
good information for contextual analysis for the Sector upon its arrival in 
Somaliland.  This means that crucial key lessons were not learned and 
opportunities were missed.  
The role of RIMFIRE and mine clearance in general has helped in illuminating 
the intrinsic nature of Mine Action’s role and potential for peacebuilding through 
highlighting the post war clearance achievement.  However, I will argue in the 
next chapters that this intrinsic value depends on a non-linearity of interaction of 
various other elements within a system; patterns of interaction and the dynamic 
of relationships within the system’s actors rather than on individual 
characteristics of a single activity.   
Further, through this chapter I have outlined the process in which the UN 
engaged in when setting up the mine action programme.  I have outlined some 
of the fundamental failings that the UN made in the process of setting up the 
coordination centre for mine action.  In its approach to setting up the mine 
action programme, the UN made assumptions and ignored the resilience and 
institutions that existed within the society. These assumptions are based on 
what the external actors assume of post-conflict societies; and hence their 
approach is characterised by the problematic assumption that “a vacuum exists 
prior to the arrival of international staff” (Chesterman 2004 p. 5); local capacity 
is assumed to be missing and therefore is needed to be rebuilt; that war had 
created a tabula rasa where post conflict contexts needed rebuilding.   
Thus the Sector upon its engagement with Somaliland made some key 
mistakes that critics accuse peacebuilders of; they ignored the context (both 
political and historical) and disregarded the capacity that existed at the time 
including a rich source of data that they could have utilised.  
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I illustrate how the Mine Action sector is inherently guided by the need to apply 
a standardised set of protocols (such as establishment of NMAA, LIS, IMSMA) 
to most mine contaminated countries irrespective of context, within a rhetoric 
that these standards are only a guide and that national context should guide 
their application, however in reality this appears far from the truth especially in 
Somaliland’s context.  
When the Sector was implementing the programmes, the failure of the 
humanitarian intervention and the role that aid had played in Somalia was still 
very much an issue.  However, sector failed to learn from that and disregarded 
the politicised context within which they were implementing the programme. 
These should have provided the Sector with a clear entry point on how not to 
implement programmes.  However, beyond the challenges of having 
standardised processes of implementing programmes, the sector also ignored 
both the larger humanitarian lessons of implementing aid in Somalia and that of 
the predecessors RIMFIRE.  According to the UN inspector at the time; none of 
the organisations ever asked to talk to them or for the records which they had 
kept.   
The role of the UN in setting up SMAC edifies a well-founded concern and 
critique that NGOs are external actors usually in pursuit of external objectives.  
The UN and international aid agencies in Somaliland have demonstrated a 
preference for implementing relief, rehabilitation and development interventions 
through local partners. Similarly, these actors, especially in the case of Somalia, 
became entities which are not just artificial but are also unsustainable and this 
normally results in dissolution as soon as external aid is withdrawn (Menkhaus, 
2006b).   
The implementation of the programme was imposed without local ‘buy-in’, which 
according to Cooper, Turner and Pugh (2011) contributes to failure. Similarly, 
setting up a coordination centre was based on a template that dictated the 
actions that the UN should take once on the ground.  Such an approach 
disregarded the existing capacity within the country and in the Somaliland 
context contributed to tensions for most part of the cycle of mine action.  This 
chapter has highlighted the tensions of these standardised approaches, and 
therefore the long term implications for the programme especially the role of 
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SMAC in coordinating the Sector.  SMAC’s coordinating role is limited and it 
appears to be a coordinating body just on paper. Other than what has been 
cited as poor political will and the lack of a legal basis for the SMAC and NDA 
which resulted to intermittent (UNDP) funding other factors have contributed to 
its limitation in achieving its main objective which was to establish and maintain 
a sustainable National Mine Action capacity in Somaliland by September 2003.  
The UN is seen to take a very patronising attitude in regards to SMAC, they are 
viewed as unable to stand on their own feet, and raise their own funds; they 
don’t know what they are doing.  Whichever UN body that happens to be taking 
the lead role in Somaliland (either UNOPS or UNDP or UNMAS) has failed even 
think of allowing SMAC to be an independent, self-sustaining, domestic entity. It 
thought of them as outgrowths of the UN.  Such an approach to managing 
SMAC has translated to consistent lack of capacity which is not just limited to 
funding.   
However, I argue that the coordinating role of the UN and therefore SMAC is 
complicated by other contextual factors such as the state of political non-
recognition of Somaliland.  The next chapter addresses the extent to which the 
context of non-recognition challenges the role of the UN in coordination as this 
dictates the framing of context and the therefore the programmatic implications.    
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CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL NON-RECOGNITION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF MINE ACTION 
ACTORS & PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESSES 
“The challenge is there is no actual distinction between Somali and Somaliland. 
Most of the programmes/projects are designed in Nairobi and predominantly in 
the minds of humanitarian issues in South Central” Ahmed Adan75. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter further addresses how the Somaliland political context of non-
recognition challenges mine action implementation.  Goodhand (2006) in his 
study of NGO’s capacities for peacebuilding has argued that NGO action is 
limited not only by structural constraints but also that the context of a conflict 
zone must also be taken into account when assessing interventions on the 
process of peacebuilding. The importance of context holds true for the case 
study of Somaliland as this chapter will demonstrate. Somaliland’s political non 
recognition dictates and defines the framing of the context and therefore 
challenges the implementation of mine action by the Sector, especially by the 
UN.  Thus, this context framing further dictates the programmatic and security 
perceptions that are assumed. These include challenges to SMAC’s role 
including the UN’s remote management of the programme; lack of clarity on the 
lead UN agency at any given times. Similarly according to various evaluation 
reports, Mine Action has not been seen as a priority by the UN or by the 
government of Somaliland meaning limited interest.   
IMPLICATIONS OF NON RECOGNITION ON SECTOR 
COORDINATION 
Governance of mine action by the UN in Somaliland is subject to the same 
operational context that the UN operates in i.e. the de jure constraints of having 
the obligation to treat Somalia as one country; however for operations and 
donor programming purposes, there are three government counterparts in 
                                            
75 Ahmed Adan is the Head of Policy and Programme Action Aid International Somaliland (AAIS) 
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Somalia: Puntland, Somaliland and South Central (Bendaña, 2012 ). This 
means that Mine Action within the UN for Somaliland comes under the umbrella 
of the UN Somalia Mine Action Programme (UNSOMA).  However the three 
jurisdictions have different mine/UXO contamination patterns and profiles 
including operating environments. Thus the approach to mine action is that 
activities are divided conveniently according to their respective political zones of 
Somaliland, Puntland, and south-central Somalia. In each of the zones the 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) implements activities in line with 
the priorities and strategies of the respective authorities responsible for mine 
action (UNMAS, 2013).  In south central Somalia UNMAS takes the lead and 
incorporates UNICEF, UNHCR and UNDP.  UNMAS works with Somali National 
Mine Action Agency (SNMAA) as the national body in south central whilst in 
Somaliland UNMAS supports the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC) and 
in Puntland, the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC).  According to the UN 
MASG newsletter these three entities were to be coordinated under the UNDP 
Somalia Mine Action Coordination Centre SOMACC in lieu of a National 
Structure for the entire country (MASG, 2007). 
Defining the lead UN Agency  
The ability for SMAC to coordinate is hindered by an incoherent UN governance 
structure.  During the lifetime of Mine Action, the role of the various UN entities 
is unclear. Interviews with other mine action players reveal the same 
conundrum.  In an off the cuff discussion with one mine action senior manager, 
there was reference to the fact they never quite knew which UN agency they 
were dealing with and business cards from the UN Mine action did not reveal 
whether they were UNMAS or UNDP with UNOPS being the service provider. 
In June 2005 the UN Interagency Coordinating Group endorsed the role of 
UNDP as the lead UN agency for mine Action capacity development through 
their policy document entitled “Mine Action and Effective Coordination-the 
United Nations Inter-Agency Policy”, which concentrated on establishing the 
Somaliland Mine Action Centre, arranged for training courses and tried to put 
quality control systems in place.  In 2009 there was yet another Interagency 
Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) which included representatives of 
UNMAS and UNDP in which a decision was reached that UNMAS conduct mine 
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action in South-Central (SC) Somalia, and UNDP continue in Puntland and 
Somaliland (MASG, 2009 p. 16). 
The extent to which these decisions are communicated or discussed with those 
on the ground remains unclear, as this research encountered unclear and 
incoherent responses in trying to understand the lead UN body at any given 
time.  This was both from UN Officials and from other stakeholders within the 
Mine Action Sector in Somaliland. According to Mark Belford76 in 2010:  
UNOPS took over the management of Mine Action in Somaliland since 
May 2010 after taking over from UNDP who had been managing from 
probably 10 years before’. (Mark Belford; UNSOMA Capacity 
Development Officer; Interviewed in Hargeisa on 8th December 2010) 
SMAC as the implementing partner on the ground would have been the best 
placed to offer clarity but a senior official gave this response; 
UNDP started SMAC but UNOPS was doing the facilitation, 
implementing with funding was coming from UNDP.  In 2009, UNMAS 
took over south central because UNDP could not be able to go there so 
the UNOPS team that was implementing the programme for UNDP 
moved with UNMAS.  UNDP said they would implement directly for 
themselves for Somaliland and Puntland. In June 2009, we became fully 
with UNDP” (SMAC Official, Interviewed in Hargeisa on 23rd November 
2010) 
According to a Senior UN official: 
UNOPS is involved in mine action and is predominantly as immediate 
response.  It is the precursor to UNDP to conducting national capacity 
development.  In conflict and post conflict portions in the country, 
UNOPS are normally the first people to be called mine action, UXO 
clearance or mine clearance. So, we work in areas like indicated in 
Sudan roads, post conflict and UNDP that belong to national capacity 
development.  We do a lot of work ourselves in terms of coordination.  
                                            
76 Mark Belford is the only official who was still in his role during this research period.  However, he was 
leaving for a different posting the same week I arrived in Hargeisa for the 2nd phase of data collection. 
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UNDP would establish a national body that would fulfil those functions.  If 
you supply that principle to Somalia, UNOPS was working in Somalia a 
number of years ago, the programme was handed over to UNDP to start 
basic development and then UNDP decided for whatever reason to hand 
back over to UNOPS for management (Senior UN Official)  
Yet another UN official explanation was:  
In Somaliland in particular, the environment was more of development 
and reconstruction. So UNDP was focused on engaging the Somaliland 
government to help them build capacity to manage the explosive items in 
long term. So it involved helping them build internal capacity which 
involved setting up SMAC to manage information so they would know 
what was where and so on. They were sort of coordinating what was 
going on in the country. This was mainly to help the government make 
plans for development and so on. UNDP then decided that Somaliland 
wasn’t going to be a strategic area of mine action that’s when UNMAS 
decided to continue with the same strategies that UNDP had started 
because we didn’t want to see all the efforts wasted  (UNMAS Senior 
Official, Interviewed in Nairobi on 15th October 2012) 
Interviews with the UN staff did not help in defining who was who other than that 
the UN was working under the UNSOMA umbrella.  This same confusion was 
highlighted in interviews with other actors within the Sector. HALO Trust 
indicated that for a long time they had been trying to establish who the UN lead 
was.  The business cards I got from the UN did not clarify this either.  The result 
was not only confusion in Mine Action management, but also in the Sector and 
SMAC’s understanding of the roles of each UN organisation. 
This is not peculiar to Somaliland, as the role of the UN has historically been 
challenged with a lack of clarity, and also what seemingly appears as a system 
that lacks overall knowledge of responsibility for specific tasks.   
When such neat categorisations meet reality, then this becomes a challenge for 
implementation of programmes. For mine action specifically, the framing 
dictates the lead UN agency; hence in contexts where there is mines/UXOs 
contamination and where UNDP is present, it is within their mandate to assist 
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the national authorities within that country to address the immediate as well as 
longer-term need. This is undertaken within UNDP’s overall goal of assisting 
national and local authorities to plan, coordinate and implement national mine 
action programmes.  Likewise if a Security Council Resolution mandates the 
establishment of mine action within a peace-keeping mission, then UNMAS will 
manage such a programme in consultation with other entities77.    
The context of Somaliland challenges this clear demarcation in various ways; 
the government is non-recognised, meaning that it is not a ‘national 
government’ in the politically neutral UN system; thus the UN had no 
Peacekeeping mission that established a Security Council Resolution with a 
mandate for establishing a mine action programme.  The evidence from the 
interviews carried out presents a blurred and distorted image on the role of the 
UN especially as to which UN agency was the lead agency at any given time. 
The result was not only confusion in Mine Action management, and 
coordination but also in the sector’s and the communities’ understanding of the 
various roles of each UN organisation.   
The clear demarcation based on this conflict is acknowledged in an evaluation 
report which notes that: 
 The Rule of Law (ROLS) programme under which mine action was part, 
was designed for a post conflict environment and yet according to the 
evaluation report, it was required to deliver during a time of continuing 
conflict, particularly in South Central where there has been a marked 
decline in the influence of traditional leaders’ (Molloy, 2008). 
                                            
77 In 2004, UNMAS’ participation in the preparations for the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) led 
to the first ever humanitarian mine action mandate designed to serve the general population. Previous to 
this mandate, mine action in peacekeeping missions had been limited to the protection of mission 
personnel. 
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Evidently there were ripple effect as a result of the problems of establishing a 
National Mine Action Authority; the ability of SMAC to effectively manage and 
coordinate mine action was greatly hampered.  According to DDG’s MRE 
Advisor, there is no coordination at all, ‘as far as being on the ground, HALO 
does their thing, DDG we do our thing’ (Jessica Buchanan).  The UN 
acknowledges that they, through SMAC play a limited role in coordination:  
I don’t think we do coordination at the moment.  I think this is probably a 
key concern in that the technique is not in place and is not as robust as it 
needs to be.  I think a lot of the agencies, HALO, DDG and HI, look at 
what is required where they are working and SMAC knows that these are 
the priorities that have been given and therefore they decide that these 
are going to be our working priorities.  So it is probably in reverse, wrong, 
so to speak.  You would want to think that in the near term, SMAC will be 
able to implement a work scheme based on priorities for each region and 
then give it back to the organisations in terms of a priority list clearance 
for each handling each year (Graeme Draemu Abernethy). 
In the past the UN has also been bogged down by unwillingness of certain 
elements within the UN to be coordinated or to work within an agreed chain of 
command (Eaton et al., 1997).  These challenges appear to persist in various 
contexts.  The view of those interviewed was that the UN’s role is characterised 
by slow mobilisation of resources and a reactive approach, which are totally 
inappropriate to the context. Budgetary allocations for SMAC are still under the 
mandate of the UN and not under the direct management of the SMAC which is 
tasked with coordinating all Mine Action activities in Somaliland thus 
compounding the problems. 
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Figure 9: Stages of Mine Action Programme 
 
Source: Figure taken from (Paterson and Filippino, 2006) ‘The Road to Mine 
Action and Development: The Life-Cycle Perspective of Mine Action’ available 
online http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/9.2/feature/paterson/paterson.shtml 
 
Context framing; ‘post conflict; relief or development?’  
Due to non-recognition the Sector faces challenges as to how to frame the 
context; whether they are in conflict, post-conﬂict or even development.  This is 
important for the Sector as Mine Action is implemented in an outmoded linear 
‘relief –development continuum’ that guides aid policy.  For programme 
implementation, such occurrences add to the challenges of security implications 
inferred while considering projects implementation in Somaliland under 
Somalia.  Programmes are underfunded and poorly coordinated due to 
perceived security challenges.   
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The process by which people develop a particular conceptualisation or reorient 
their thinking about an issue is best understood through frames theory (Chong 
and Druckman, 2007).  Frames help us to interpret the world around us and 
represent that world to others. They help us organise complex phenomena into 
coherent, understandable categories. When contexts are labelled as post 
conflict, then meaning is given to some of the aspects that are observed within 
that context; and similarly framing helps to exclude or discount other aspects 
because they appear irrelevant or counter-intuitive. Frames therefore help 
define the way in which any organisation intervening in Somaliland will define 
the context.  Such a process of framing the context challenges operations 
arising from lack of clarity resulting from ambiguity in Somaliland brought about 
by non-recognition. Although it is a recognised fact that conflicts do not follow 
this linear path and vary across sectors and countries, there seem to be 
idealised phases which define what/who and how aid is provided within a frame 
of reference for setting priorities.  Inevitably this brings confusion to the way the 
Sector is coordinated because the UN works within this theoretical linear path of 
conflict ---> post conflict --->peace ---->development (see Figure 9: Stages of 
Mine Action Programme). 
The UN’s mine action intervention is hence theoretically guided by an 
assumption based on this linear process of contexts moving from conflict and 
war into peace and normality, therefore tailoring its responses based on the 
concept of the ‘relief-development continuum’ rather than the reality of the 
affected communities. The continuum of interventions is based on the idealised 
phases of conflict, whilst the intervention model is based on the ‘natural 
disaster’ relief models of the 1980s where the role of relief assistance was to 
sustain people through short periods of stress until the crisis was over.  This 
would then be followed by rehabilitation into normality or the process of 
development and reconstruction (Bradbury et al., 1996; Macrae, 1995).  Such a 
separation of relief and development activities is seen to reflect the institutional 
organisation of the aid system, rather than the realities of affected communities, 
as an application of criteria which confine relief interventions to basic survival is 
ineffective and counter-productive. 
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The ambiguity of the Somaliland context challenges any framing within this 
idealised conflict process and continuum linear assumptions as it does not fit 
the way post conflict societies are conceptualised for example (Zeeuw and 
Kumar, 2006) definition of post conflict societies; i.e. those where cessation of 
conflict is followed by the International Communities’ recognition of the 
government as legitimate.  
Likewise, the end of the Somaliland conflict is also difficult to define as, more 
often than not, it is a time when violence is prone to re-erupt in some parts and 
not others78. Therefore the term post conflict that has generally been used for 
Somaliland’s case is a misnomer as the first two years following unilateral 
declaration of independence involved the non-Isaaq groups engaging in conflict 
and war with the Issaq dominated SNM  so the early period was characterised 
by persistent warfare (Bereketeab, 2012; Höhne, 2006; Renders and Terlinden, 
2010).   
Programmatic Responses  
This means that the linear sequence model that is preferred by the UN and 
other international organisations and donors in response to conflicts and crises 
is problematic in practice because the peacebuilding and aid community cannot 
move into a developmental phase.    
Similarly, according to dominant conflict narratives, while post conflict implicitly 
signifies the end of violence and return to a peaceful normal situation; 
Somaliland has continually presented a blend of conﬂict, post-conﬂict, 
humanitarian and development characteristics.  Thus,  as (Crisp, 1999) has 
argued, framing of contexts as  'post-conflict' conceals distinct ideological 
agendas such as the international community’s unwillingness to ensure that 
reductions in relief are replaced by a corresponding transfer of development 
resources. This is because, embedded within this approach to categorisation, 
are discrete subdivisions of activities and actors into the different phases with 
the classification of such activities remaining arbitrary.  
The process, even where the state is recognised, is problematic anyway as 
from the perspective of affected communities, a conflict situation is not split into 
                                            
78 Inter-clan clashes did occur including two serious wars in 1994 and 1996  (Gundel 2006) 
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different ‘phases’; it is part of an on-going cycle of tackling post conflict 
challenges, with recurring problems contributing to both complex emergencies, 
where natural disasters such as drought, localised violence,  risks and other 
uncertainties related to long periods of armed conflict make  one-off approaches 
based on uniqueness fatuous.  Thus, the relief development continuum that is 
assumed is mostly conceptual rather than a reality.   
Dealing with Somaliland either within the Somalia rubric, or as post conflict, 
means that it is seen as requiring humanitarian aid and relief rather than 
development aid.  This is reflected by the myriad of humanitarian aid agencies 
that dot the Somaliland landscape and as observed by the following quote;  
Sometimes we see these small cars that are in the town, donated by 
UNHCR or something like that and for a country that has been destroyed 
by so many years of civil war then a donation of a car or digging of a well 
is almost nothing. These international organisations, mostly most of them 
work with the UN (UNHCR, UNICEF or UNDP) and so on, but most of 
them are here because of that lack of political recognition.  Yes, they are 
contributing to an extent to the development of the country and at least 
they employ some people, who are bread winners and they are feeding 
empty mouths.  We need assistance from the international community to 
go into bilateral relations in order to maintain the peace and stability of 
our country, we need economic advancement. The international 
community needs to stop looking into relief or post relief assistance. 
What we need now is development through bilateral funding which 
unfortunately we cannot get. We are beyond relief; we need to talk of 
poverty eradication. (Boube Yusuf Duale79 ; Programmes Coordinator, 
Academy for Peace and Development; interviewed in Hargeisa on 22nd 
October 2010) 
It was also reflected at a meeting that I attended in 2010, where the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs requested most of the NGOs present to identify the areas they 
                                            
79 At the time 22nd November 2010, Boube Yusuf Duale was the Programmes Coordinator of the Academy 
for Peace and Development.  He later became the Somaliland Information Minister but his tenancy as a 
Minister was short lived. Media reports suggest that his efforts to streamline and fight corruption in the 
ministry did not find favour with the Presidency and was he therefore dismissed.  He appears to have 
served no less than 6 months at the ministry. He left office in May 2012. 
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were working within; the exercise reflected the lack of organisations that were 
addressing issues around infrastructure i.e. development related activities, 
rather the majority were addressing the usual humanitarian and relief 
programmes. 
This way of framing and sequencing phases of conflicts presumes a neat 
transition, and that crises are temporary. For example, one aid worker in 
Somaliland insisted that Somaliland is neither in conflict, post conflict or in 
development phase but is in emergency phase: 
Yes it is an emergency because of the drought. But now we are looking 
at it in terms of the development aspect as we try to largely integrate 
sustainability development kind of approach. At the same time we have a 
huge part of our programme which is still emergency response especially 
in droughts (World Vision International Aid worker; Interviewed on 4th of 
October 2012 in Hargeisa). 
The use of such terms is a result of preconceived notions that are implicit in 
defining contexts and is semantic in nature  for example the prefix ‘post’ implies 
that the conflict has ended and the situation is returning to normal, hence the 
term indicates a supposed unidirectional dynamic from a period of war to a 
period of peace.   
However, in programmatic terms the way in which a context is categorised is 
not just an issue of semantics, whether defined as a humanitarian crisis or a 
post-conﬂict, peacebuilding and/or development impacts directly on the posture 
that agencies assume vis-a`-vis the government and the other forces at play.  
The same is true for the assumptions, patent or latent, that are made about how 
the security situation might evolve. This neither benefits any programmes nor 
the operationalisation of any activities on the ground because the reality does 
not conform.  This dilemma was encapsulated by the following response by a 
Senior SMAC Official:  
Last year (2009) I had a discussion with the World Food Programme, we 
did not have funding for Mine Risk Education, and so I asked then how 
about setting up a programme ‘Food for Work’ because Mine Risk 
Education is really needed in Somaliland.  People are still being injured 
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and killed.  The response I got was No, because Somalia is in a 
humanitarian phase, or like emergency phase, the same phase as 
Somaliland because it’s a region of Somalia.  Again non-recognition 
hampers the development of Somaliland because of the fact that it is 
seen as part of Somalia and not independent. (Hibaq Mujahid Abdikadir 
Kosar - Mine Education Officer SMAC, Interviewed on 23rd November 
2010 in Hargeisa). 
IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY ON PROGRAMME DELIVERY  
The way the country is viewed – as a humanitarian emergency or as a recovery 
context – affects the way security is approached, including the assumptions 
made regarding the context. For example contexts such as South Sudan are 
seen as post conflict, and therefore the emphasis is on development, jobs 
advertised in that particular context fall under the ‘recovery and development’ 
banner (Guerra et al., 2010). This may have implications for applicants that the 
context is safe, with the consequence that many aid workers arrive mentally 
unprepared for the actual conditions.  In contrast, framing Somaliland within 
Somalia dictates the perceived security complexities associated with Somalia, 
and unfortunately defines the perceived security challenges. 
Somaliland does enjoy relative peace and stability following what has been 
referred to as ‘a gamble by President Egal’s government’ to heavily invest in 
creating a secure environment through the investment of over 50-70% of the 
total national expenditure (Bradbury, 2008; SCPD, in Jhazbhay, 2008).  
Immediate post war programmes included the successful absorption of 
militiamen into the Somaliland army without any external assistance for the 
demobilisation or security sector reform programmes.  The result of this was as 
described by (Menkhaus, 2004a) as ‘better levels of public order and security in 
northern Somalia than almost anywhere in the Horn of Africa’ (p. 160).   Thus, 
Somaliland’s level of security has remained relatively high thanks to the robust 
application of customary law and blood compensation, administered by clan 
elders. In cases of crimes such as killings, elders will encourage investigative 
work and negotiate with the kin of the accused for his or her handover. The 
police are requested to assist with arresting suspects and to take them into 
custody. Thereafter, the crime is the subject of inter-clan negotiations and is 
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usually resolved according to the customary practices of blood compensation. 
Customary law exists as a complement to, not a contradiction with, formal 
police and judicial systems; it resolves more than 80% of all cases (Gundel, 
2006 p. 11 footnote no. 12).  Where such arrangements with the clan are not 
enforceable, sometimes the relevant ministries step in as outlined here by the 
Director of Internal Security: 
Most of our time is spent on conflict resolution. We play a role of major 
role in clan mediation and to ensure that the customary practices for 
example of blood compensation are applied.  We also say for example a 
policeman kills a person, and then when necessary the ministry pays the 
compensation rather than a clan in order to protect this policeman/ 
woman and maintain peace.  We try to limit insecurity through dealing 
with registration of small arms owned by the citizens. (Mohamed Ahmed 
Mohamoud, Director of Internal Security, Ministry of Interior, interviewed 
on 9th Oct 2012) 
Indeed it was because of this security that the Sector was able to implement 
most of their programmes in Somaliland whilst the same was impossible in 
Somalia.  Security did not seem to hamper programme implementations for 
mine action and indeed most of the annual programme reports to donors by the 
various mine action actors repeatedly reported that security risks to their 
programmes remained within manageable levels and had not impeded the 
progress of their operations (DDG and HALO Trust Annual Reports 2003-2005).  
In terms of humanitarian access, UN OCHA described Somaliland as having a 
high level of peace and security across largely homogenous clan lines, which 
ensured relative unhindered humanitarian access (OCHA, 2005). The only 
exception remained within those regions where the military standoff with 
Puntland over control of parts of Sool region remains unresolved (Interview with 
Rory Logan, HALO Trust Programme Manager).   
The incidents that had occurred in 2003, temporarily damaged Somaliland’s 
reputation for security (Menkhaus, 2006b); and prompted changes in security 
policies, including tightening of security procedures stipulated in the Minimum 
Operating Security Standards for Somalia (MOSS) which included not just 
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Somaliland but also Somalia (Gundel, 2006). It also fed into enhancing a 
perception of general ‘insecurity’ especially within the UN. 
As a response the UNDP RoLS programme together with the government set 
up a new security force, the Special Protection Unit (SPU), to protect UN 
agencies and International NGOs.  For the NGO sector, each agency has its 
own security rules, which often refer to the given agency’s global security 
standards.  The SPUs are the only legal armed protection available for 
humanitarian and development workers. SPU operations are designed to 
ensure the ability of the international community to implement humanitarian and 
development activities. At the request of the agencies/actors, they provide  
security on a 24/7 basis to UN/INGO staff residences and offices as required;  
provide armed escort teams to UN/INGO missions in country;  offer a quick 
response capacity during an emergency situation as required; and provide 
mobile security patrol services to UN/INGO staff residences and offices.  
In regard to the implementation of the security measures in Somaliland, Gundel 
(2006) argues that though the attacks prompted the implementation of such 
policies, in reality these programmes had long been in the pipeline following the 
Baghdad bombings in 2003 when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
1502 which emphasised that; 
“…there are existing prohibitions under international law against attacks 
knowingly and intentionally directed against personnel involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission undertaken in 
accordance with the charter of the United Nations which in situations of 
armed conflicts constitute war crimes, and recalling the need for states to 
end impunity for such criminal acts” (UN Security Council, 2003: 
paragraph 5). 
This raised the perception of danger within the UN, and saw the speedy 
implementation of security procedures in places like Somaliland (Somalia) and 
this led to ‘bunkerisation80’ and demands for dedicated security officers, safety 
and protection.   The security arrangements that were thus put in place had 
                                            
80  The term “bunkerisation” was used by Mark Duffield when giving a lecture in 2011 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/global-insecurities/news/2011/7.html  that built upon the key concepts of Duffield, 
M., Development, Security and Unending War, Polity Press, 2007 
 
 
203 
 
several implications for the management of mine action programmes in 
Somaliland; directly for the UN operations as they had to be MOSS compliant.  
This had a huge impact on the role of the UN in terms of programmes and less 
so on the operational capacity of the NGOs within the mine action sector as 
explained by Graeme Draemu Abernethy of UNMAS; 
Security levels are UN security levels.  There are really few NGOs who 
feel the impact. If they want to work there, they are free to work there.  
The difficulty for us in the UN is because of restricted mobility, getting 
around to the locations is challenging.  I think the important thing is that 
in Somaliland we are working with the national authority.  So we mostly 
are around and move around within Hargeisa, to support the SMAC and 
police EOD teams.  (Graeme Draemu Abernethy) 
However, many agencies invested in improving their internal procedures to 
facilitate their work in insecure environments. They were obliged to adopt 
stricter security measures as security management became professionalised81; 
they had to undergo standardised training programmes due to insurance 
obligations and the need to comply.  
Between 2004 and 2008 there were hardly any security incidences reported, but 
there were concerns about the possibility of the jihadist infiltrations that it was 
feared would extend regional terror networks into Somaliland threatening the 
foreign expatriate presence that has come to make that country the base of its 
operations.  Thus on-going instability in Somalia and the presence of radical 
Islamist groups with cross-border tentacles remained the principal source of 
‘threats’ for security in Somaliland. The  growing strong buoyancy of Islamist 
groups such as Al Shabab  based in the Eastern part  fed into these perceptions 
(Adam, 2010 p. 130; Forberg and Terlinden, 1999; Marquardt and Shinn, 2009).   
                                            
81 With initiatives such as the SPHERE Project  (which provides information on minimum standards which 
agencies should work to attain in disaster assistance), Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – 
International (HAP)   aims to make humanitarian action accountable to the beneficiaries of such action, 
Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief  The code of conduct provides a set of standards for the 
behaviour of agencies when working in disaster relief, and  ALNAP which was established in 1997 
following a multi-agency evaluation of the Rwanda Genocide. It works to improve humanitarian 
performance through improved learning and accountability. 
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The above process can be explained within a global context; specifically, the 
attacks in Somaliland. Justification for such policies was influenced by the 
global context which was a heightened change in perception of an increasingly 
hostile operational environment due to framing within a changing aid context.  
There was a growing perception among aid agencies that they were facing 
increased external risks and as a result aid workers were being targeted and 
attacked.  This resulted in the need for professionalisation of security within the 
aid and peacebuilding contexts and hence extensive security measures were 
adopted by aid agencies.    Attacks targeting aid workers generally had 
increased from round 30 a year in the mid-1990s to over 150 in 2008 primarily 
due to the humanitarian organisations being seen as ever more complicit with 
state militaries and a western liberal intervention agenda. There was an 
acknowledgement that in contexts of integrated missions, and based on 
growing international interventionism and internal changes within the UN 
system, humanitarian and development work has become part of the 
peacekeeping missions. This has therefore eroded the universality of values of 
neutrality and impartiality promoted by the UN and therefore they no longer 
guarantee the security of its access in conflict situations. Hence humanitarian 
aid has become politicised in places such as Afghanistan leading to a paralysis 
of the humanitarian aid sector (Donini, 2009).   
In response to these challenges a dominant aid response became either remote 
management of programmes or  ‘bunkerisation’ as a way of strengthening 
protection and more readily adopting deterrence measures’ together with 
adaptation of generic industry-standard training templates on security for field 
workers (Duffield, 2012b; Van Brabant, 2000)82.  The field-security training left 
little room for ambiguity regarding the outside world;  the threat for the 
humanitarian sector was no longer the threat of disease (Fast, 2007), but 
threats present from  insurgents.  Therefore the rhetoric became the need to 
                                            
82 It has been noted that the aid sector in general (of which mine action is part) has opened up a fast-
expanding market for security advice and training that many from the security services and private security 
companies have been quick to exploit see  Guerra, C., Howes, R., Patil, A., Gething, P., Van Boeckel, T., 
Temperley, W., Kabaria, C., Tatem, A., Manh, B., Elyazar, I., Baird, J., Snow, R. and Hay, S. (2010) The 
international limits and population at risk of Plasmodium vivax transmission in 2009. PLoS Negl Trop Dis, 4. 
Pp;19.  One of the key people interviewed for this research is now the managing director of one security 
based company that has branches in Stabilization & Development, Mine Action, Construction & Camp 
Services,  Medical Services, Specialist Training & Capacity Management, Risk Management, Conflict 
Mitigation and Information Operations – all offered to high risk contexts and emerging markets. 
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manage the threat environment with constant vigilance and risk-minimisation 
(Duffield, 2012a).  Such approaches to security that relied on separation and 
fortification alienated aid workers from those in need, representing both a 
symptom and a cause of crisis in the humanitarian system (Fast, 2014) . It 
meant that for the UN or INGO to comply with the security requirements 
international staff would not live in the local community, and had to avoid 
informal interactions with local inhabitants. This inevitably led to reinforcing 
global hierarchies and divisions between aid workers and excluded populations. 
This has resulted in a predilection towards risk aversion in response to the 
fulfilment of requirements by insurance policies83 taken by the organisations that 
expect establishment of strict security procedures and structures.  
This led to further consolidation of the security policy decisions including a 
blanket classification of Somaliland by the UN as Security Phase IV from 
Security Phase III.  This had a huge impact on the implementation of mine 
action in Somaliland; it led to partial withdrawal of expatriate staff which meant 
the remote management of UN programmes from Nairobi as outlined below.   
Remote management as a result of the perceived security 
challenges 
Despite improvements, by the time of this research in 2010 the security 
categorisation was still at phase 3 in Hargeisa whilst the rest of the country was 
phase 4.  Such categorisation by the UN happened at a crucial time for mine 
action implementation.  White and Cliffe (2000)  have in the past argued that the 
lack of flexibility in some situations is a reflection of formal divisions of labour 
and inflexible practices within and between UN agencies, ( p. 335). 
The need for a better thought process in regards to the security classification 
was raised by Hibaq Kosarl during the interview; she questioned the logic by 
comparing to the September 11th bombing of New York and the July 7th 
Bombing in London; to which they ask:  
                                            
83 For example Flavia Wagner, an aid worker who was abducted and held for three months in Darfur in 
2010, filed a lawsuit against the organisation that she was working for on the grounds that they had 
insufficient contingency plans to deal with the threat of kidnap; see article ‘Why western aid workers are 
coming under threat’ available on  http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/may/27/western-aid-workers-under-threat. Accessed on 13th October 2014. 
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 When 9/11 in New York, or 7/7 July occurred in London, did travelling 
stop in London?, was that phase 4 or 5 as far as UN expatriates travel?  
Nothing like the security phases we have here happened and yet they do 
this for Somaliland. Somaliland has had just one suicide bomber for 
maybe 15 years, and immediately the security level and travel slots for 
UN workers are put in place.   
The Somaliland mine action programme at the time of this research came under 
the UNDP Somalia country office (based in Nairobi) under the Rule of Law and 
Security Programme for Somalia (UNDP - RoLS), whose stated objective in 
relation to mine action was ‘to build the capacity of national mine action 
institutions whilst ensuring coordination and quality management of mine 
action’.  This was implemented by UNMAS.  Following a recommendation from 
an interagency assessment mission to Somalia in June 2007, organised and led 
by UNDP/UNMAS, a programme officer was recruited by UNMAS to work on 
mine action within the UNDP RoLs office Nairobi. The RoLS programme in itself 
was described as lacking coherence but was rather a grouping of discrete, but 
worthwhile activities.  The main tasks for the programme officer included 
preliminary planning for potential mine action activities in South Central 
Somalia, fundraising, and liaison with African Union planning staff in Addis 
Ababa (MASG, 2007b). Thus, whilst the Programme officer oversaw the UN 
support to Somaliland, Puntland and the South Central region of Somalia, 
UNMAS’ primary area of interest remained the latter (MASG, 2008). 
The management of Mine Action from Nairobi was not without its challenges, as 
donors and UNDP’s concentration in Nairobi, rather than in-country, led to a 
highly ineffective ‘virtual management’ i.e. management by proxy (UNDP, 2010 
p. xiii). A situation where interventions by the international community, be they 
of a political, humanitarian or developmental nature, are governed from the 
comfortable distance provided by operational bases in Nairobi. This means that 
the programmes are ‘remotely managed’ and the staff have only limited 
opportunities to make short field site visits.  A reduction in access, information 
and a limited capacity for analysis increases the operational risks regarding 
effectiveness, cost efficiency and accountability.  This phenomenon has 
produced what Menkhaus (2003b) refers to as an acute “field versus 
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headquarters” tension in almost every aid agency working in Somalia (p. 44).  
Similarly the costs of maintaining offices and personnel in Nairobi are 
exceptionally high, so that much (some would argue most) of the total aid 
allocated to such projects never leaves Nairobi (ibid). In terms of peace building 
(Opongo, 2011) refers to those carrying out peace building remotely as ‘satellite 
peace builders’. 
Individual agencies are then allocated a number of authorised personnel 
(‘slots’), which are revised, regularly by the UNCT. UNDP was allocated 4 
rotating slots for RoLS with 1 additional rotating slot at a time for Somaliland 
and the same for Puntland.  Slots are time based and availability is dependent 
upon demand. This particularly affects those employed under UNDP contracts 
who are often unable to perform their functions when out of country.  
This arrangement saw the number of International UN staff reduced from 75 to 
32 with UNDP only having 18 in Somaliland. Of these seven are permanent 
whilst the others were rotating. Somaliland had 35 slots in total. As explained by 
Hibaq Kosar:  
After the bombing of 2008 the UN security phase became Phase IV84.  
There were restrictions of mostly international staff having slots to come 
in and out.  Mine action within UNDP was under the RoLS programme.  
So it was one of so many other programmes.  It had to share the 
allocated RoLS slots.   
A blanket classification of Somaliland as Security phase IV was seen as 
‘reactive rather than part of a planned strategy’ whose consequence according 
to Hammond and Vaughan-Lee (2012) in relation to the longstanding problem 
of maintaining authority outside led to mistrust and negative feelings, as 
Somalis questioned whether the utilisation of the money intended for aid in 
                                            
84 Suicide bombings occurred in Hargeisa and Bossaso on 29 October 2008. In Hargeisa, the UNDP office 
was targeted, killing two UN employees and injuring six.  Somaliland was raised from Security Phase 3 to 
Phase 4 after the bombing.  This is the same level with Afghanistan 
 Security Phase 5 is a total suspension of operations 
 Security Phase 4 places immediate restrictions on access; activates the slot system allowing 
only emergency humanitarian and crisis actions. Armed vehicles must be used 
 Security Phase 3 implements family relocation – single person posting 
 Security Phase 2 requires heightened alert 
 Security Phase 1 requires precautionary measures 
 Security Phase 0 allows total freedom of movement 
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Somalia was, and is, being spent on management outside of their borders.  As 
illustrated by this interviewee:  
The challenge is there is no actual distinction between Somali and 
Somaliland. Most of the programmes/ projects are designed in Nairobi 
and predominantly in the minds of humanitarian issues in the south. 
Then based on that the objectives, outcomes are being decided there 
and that’s where majority of the funds are actually spent. (Ahmed Adan; 
Head of Policy and Programme; Action Aid; Interviewed on 7th October 
2012, Hargeisa).  
Similarly the view of one Senior SMAC official was that not only were the funds 
utilised remotely, but also that some the funding used to beef up the security 
would have been funds utilised in other important areas: 
The other thing is that with the UN agencies, there is a security issue.  
Somaliland had one suicide bomber since its existence.  Elements from 
the south central have come.  Before and after, nothing has happened 
and yet immediately decision was made from phase 3 to 4.  And it took 
more than two years for that phase to come down.  This meant that not 
only Mine  action but a great deal of other activities have lost out 
because obviously funding that was earmarked for Somaliland was spent 
in the offices in Nairobi because the people who were hired to do the job 
were unable to come to Somaliland.  They remained in the offices there 
and some of the funding also went to security that was being marked for 
an activity because security was beefed up for these agencies.  The 
funding was channeled to say, build a big wall, build concrete slabs 
instead of digging a well for a community that needed.  It was during a 
drought period in 2009.  So many other needs building schools, roads 
and other activities.  So really, Somaliland does lose out a lot when it 
comes to UN security phases. (Hibaq Kosar).  
 Thus due to the perceived increase in threat, remote management of the 
programme meant shifting responsibilities for programme delivery to SMAC, a 
most common programmatic strategy for adaptations to insecurity practised in 
varying versions in challenging insecure environments (Stoddard et al., 2010).  
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Such strategies are used for extremely insecure areas where international staff 
and organisations have been targeted and they are seen to represent a 
pragmatic approach to ensuring the provision of humanitarian aid to individuals 
and communities in need.  However, for Somaliland it was driven more by the 
perceived security challenges than real risks. 
At the time, comparing the security classification of Afghanistan to that levelled 
on Somalia across the board, a UNDP evaluation report called into question the 
appropriateness of such an undifferentiated approach.  The whole of 
Afghanistan including Kabul, was classified as a phase 3 situation, with the only 
exception being Kandahar, where phase 4 had been applied (UNDP, 2010).  
This reflected what is perceived as a slow UN reaction to realities of security in 
the field, which ultimately affects access in terms of swift responses to 
programmes. Another perception is that reluctance to decrease security phases 
by the UNDSS is related to UN insurance concerns.  
a) Prioritisation of Mine Action within the RoLs Programme 
Within the RoLS there are other components such as Judiciary, Law 
Enforcement (strengthening police services), Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR), coupled with Small Arms Control, Mine Action, and 
Gender and Human Rights.  Patterson et al (2008), citing an evaluation report 
on UNDP,  pointed out that the managing of the Mine Action component under 
the RoLS programme suggested that it wasn’t a priority; he noted that ‘there 
was persistent failure to allocate a Mine Action specific budget in the proposals.  
Every year, the Reconstruction and Development (RDP) reports for Somaliland 
failed to include any need for Mine Action.  Similarly he noted that ‘the UNDP 
Country Strategy paper dropped any mention of Mine Action even though some 
key donors asked for the same to be included during consultation meetings that 
took place in April 2007’.  According to DfiD this was an indication that UNDP 
RoLS management did not see Mine Action as a programme that they were 
directly executing thus failing to capitalise on clear synergies that existed 
between mine action and other security components e.g. DDR and Small Arms 
and Light Weapons management (Paterson et al., 2008 pp. 19-20) 
Similarly, the RoLs programme went through a number of evaluations which left 
out the Mine Action component as falling outside the remit of these evaluations; 
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an indication  that as a component,  it was not considered important.  It also 
means that it did not benefit from a critical evaluation that could probably have 
helped in the way it was structured and undertaken.  It also fell outside of the 
Strategic Partnership and therefore was not evaluated during the evaluation of 
the UNDP Strategic Partnership for Somalia  (ASI, 2009) neither had it been  
evaluated during the UNDP RoLs – DDR/SAC Program, Somalia  (Molloy, 
2008).  This suggests that opportunities to capitalise on any positive synergies 
or even correct any anomalies to capitalise on mine actions potential was 
consistently been missed. 
b) Limiting potential for capacity and skills development 
The Landmine Monitor acknowledges the good institutional structure that exists 
in Somaliland for Mine Action, but notes that there has been lack of adequate 
technical support from UNDP. The fact that SMAC is managed from Nairobi 
meant that the UN’s impact in regards to building SMACs capacity is limited. 
Although previous UNDP personnel arranged training, equipment, facilities, and 
funding for SMAC personnel, and advice on policy matters, the Landmine 
monitor, (2009) acknowledges that this was not followed up with ongoing 
support to help in the application of training. Even when Senior Technical 
Advisors were employed, their responsibilities extended to the whole of Somalia 
meaning that they were unable to spend any significant time in Somaliland 
(Interview with Senior SMAC Official).  
Additional problems included unclear job descriptions and travel/logistic 
problems for the UNDP staff resulting in poor, or lack of, coordination by SMAC 
(Landmine Monitor, 2009).    
The lack of technical skills was partly due to the absent or remotely located 
UNDP Operations Technical Advisers who were mainly based in Nairobi as 
acknowledged by Neil Feraro who attributed SMAC’s lack of capacity to: 
The UN keeps talking about capacity building. How long does it take to 
train and set up a small capacity like SMAC? I mean how big is it? There 
are only like 10/15 staff members in that SMAC compound and they’ve 
got some very good intelligent people there. But because there is no 
management oversight, everybody is doing their own things. 
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 According to a Hibaq Kosar, the security categorisation of Somaliland after the 
2008 bombing weakened the technical support that UNDP was providing for the 
programme: 
It became extremely weak to support as far as the technical support was 
concerned.  Yes they did arrange for training, equipment, facilities, and 
remuneration for SMAC personnel, and advice on policy matters; 
however they failed to provide an on-going support to help SMAC 
personnel apply their training.  This led to the UN asking UNMAS to take 
over fully with support of SMAC and PMAC. . 
The reality is that SMAC is just an organisation that rubber stamps what has 
been undertaken.  Similarly, SMAC’s role includes quality assurance, to ensure 
that demining for example is carried out to acceptable standards.   
Possibly about 2004/6 period when I was with DDG, they had a quality 
assurance team.  DDG did a lot of technical training for them both on the 
demining side and for the medical staff.  And they would go to our sites 
but at a technical level, it was kind of ridiculous because of the minimum 
land to person on mines, and the limitation at that time to technology.  
We excavated everything.  They were doing their quality assurance with 
a technology with was basically not good.  Not as effective.  So it was 
just complete window dressing and as soon as there were the regular 
gaps in the UNDP funding, of course they stopped doing their work.  It 
was very stop start etc.  And it was totally ineffective and they weren’t 
sampling the areas to any proper plan.  They would go down there, 
spend 10 days until their per diems run out and then they’d come back to 
Hargeisa.  I mean we never saw any reports.  There wasn’t any formal 
quality assurance reporting.  So again it was just another employment 
generation exercise (Nick Bateman).   
There is actually a sense that the involvement of SMAC in any of the tasks 
seems to slow down the work rather than help.  This is because SMAC lacks 
the assets needed to carry out their work effectively.  For example in order for 
demining tasks to be signed off by SMAC, they have to be physically at the site 
where demining has just been completed.  However, unless the demining 
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agencies provide the transport for the SMAC personnel, their presence is never 
guaranteed.  This causes a lot of frustration and slows down the work 
adversely.   
RECOGNITION AND THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN MINE 
ACTION  
SMAC has limited capacity not only in coordination or tasking and prioritisation. 
The mine action actors are all essentially self-tasking, although all operators 
ensure endorsement of their tasks by the SMAC.   
Limited role in mine action governance 
The governance of Somaliland within the rubric of Somalia has had an impact 
on the coordination and management role played by the UN.  At the time of the 
field work it was still being supported by UNDP Somalia from Nairobi. Bimonthly 
mine action coordination meetings involving other sector stakeholders are 
organised by SMAC, as is a Risk Education working group supported by UNDP. 
The National Demining Agency (NDA) which is part of the Ministry of Defence is 
to coordinate all demining, mine awareness and victim assistance programs by 
the government and national and international NGOs but is not operational.  
Similarly support from the government has not been forthcoming, the Vice 
President is supposed to chair the Somaliland Mine Action Committee (the 
national authority) comprising eight ministers.  However enquiries within the 
various ministries and with SMAC on how or when the last meeting took place 
revealed that this had never happened (2010 and again 2012).  
The Somaliland government does not engage in Mine Action, for various 
reasons, including what a majority of those interviewed highlighted as the 
pursuance of the recognition agenda to the detriment of other areas of concern; 
and partly because mine action is not a major priority: 
The idea that the government, for instance the NDA or SMAC are a 
perfect success story for national capacity would be that international 
funding or government budgetary would go through SMAC or NDA and 
they would manage their budget. Equip, train, deploy their staff to provide 
100% national solution to a national problem. That’s not going to happen 
because the government has got other priorities and this country doesn’t 
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have any significant85 mine problem. So in my opinion the government 
has rightly different priorities. (Southern Craib 86 , DDG Programme 
Manager, interviewed in Hargeisa, on 25th September 2012) 
Similarly there is evidence in other locales of over-reliance by governments on 
international programming and the distribution of aid and expertise that have 
caused countries hosting mine action actors to have little interest in initiating or 
supporting mine action operations themselves. This is because they realise the 
saliency of the landmine issue internationally and, thus, they know that outside 
resources will likely be forthcoming  (Spearin, 2001).  This was illustrated by Mr 
Southern Craib: 
I think the government has got other things to worry about and frankly 
that is not unusual. And in the Somaliland context, I don’t blame them. 
The Afghan government shows very little interest in mine action and yet 
its mine problem is significantly worse. The Angolan government shows 
next to no interest in mine problem because it doesn’t affect them. It 
doesn’t affect the well to do, it affects the poor. So as long as there aren’t 
mines on major roads or cities then they don’t care but it still has a 
significant problem. Somaliland doesn’t have a significant problem. 
Mines generally speaking don’t impact infrastructure. They are not 
negatively impacting the national economy. They are not around 
suburban population so I think in Somaliland the government has got 
bigger things to worry about. 
This lack of cooperation, or disengagement of the Somaliland government was 
highlighted by some within the Sector as a challenge they faced and it impacted 
on their work.  The HALO Trust, for example, argued disengagement has 
contributed to the lack of impetus by the government in incorporating the need 
for mine clearance into support of huge infrastructure projects within the 
National Development Plan in order for mine clearance priorities to be set 
                                            
85 This is the present state of mine contamination at the present.  Previously as outlined before 
Somaliland did have a significant mine problem that has since improved with the demining 
efforts. 
86  Southern Craib previously worked with HALO Trust Somaliland as Programme Manager from 
September 2000 to July 2008; He then went to Afghanistan as Programme Manager for DDG; during the 
2nd phase of my data collection in 2012 he was Programme Manager for DDG Somaliland. 
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coherently with the identified needs.  For example the government was carrying 
out some infrastructure rehabilitation at Hargeisa airport, including the 
construction of a departure terminal. It was not until the work had started that 
the Ministry of Aviation approached HALO Trust with a request to undertake 
some work around the vicinity of the airport to ensure that there were no mines.  
(The airport had been very heavily mined and the risk of residual impact is 
always high). HALO Trust expressed frustration over such a late request by the 
authorities, lamenting that had this been prioritised then such a requirement 
would have been reflected within the National Development plan.  As this had 
not been the case, HALO Trust had not planned nor budgeted for the task, and 
it was only by luck the heavy equipment required for the task had been at the 
area and they were able to respond to this request.  Such random requests 
meant that a layer of accountability to their donors was added.  This was a 
demonstration that there is a certain level of disinterest within the government in 
ensuring mine action coherence with national plans; which in turn indirectly 
interferes in the practical aspects of the work, by disrupting the organisation’s 
own schedules and plans as much as it can, without crossing the line of total 
non-cooperation (Interview with HALO Trust Program Manager). On a positive 
note it also showed the adaptability and responsiveness of HALO Trust in 
responding to such needs.   
Limitation in adherence to treaty obligations 
Since 1997, in acknowledgement and appreciation of the impact of mines/UXOs 
in Somaliland, the authorities have continually and perhaps strategically 87 
expressed their commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty and, on 1 March 1999, its 
House of Representatives passed a resolution in favour of a total ban of 
landmines. Similarly on 14 November 2002, during a ceremony marking the 
handover of military landmine stocks to the DDG for destruction, the 
Commander of the Somaliland Armed Forces said, “The army’s move was a 
practical testimony to the willingness of Somaliland to implement international 
standards for mine action and the Mine Ban Treaty.  However, Somaliland is not 
an Internationally Recognised State, and therefore cannot accede to the Mine 
                                            
87 Somaliland’s quest for international recognition means that the government is always more than eager 
to engage and endorse international norms and practises.  This includes participation and undertaking 
democratic practises such as elections etc. 
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Ban treaty. Somaliland considers itself to be a state; the authorities are reluctant 
to sign the Geneva Call ‘Deed of Commitment’, which is an alternative 
instrument that the international community provides for Non-State Actors 
(NSAs).  The Deed of Commitment is a response by the International 
community following  the realisation that the Mine Ban Treaty was an inter-state 
treaty which was insufficient to eliminate anti-personnel mines amongst Non-
State Actors to comply with international humanitarian norms and persuade 
them to renounce the use of these weapons.  This instrument was put together 
by an organisation called the Geneva Call and was established in 2000 by 
members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).  The Deed of 
commitment promotes ownership of the International Mine Action Standards 
and Non State Actors (NSAs) are encouraged to sign the formal instrument to 
express their adherence to specific humanitarian norms and to be held 
accountable for their pledge (Geneva Call and PSIO, 2006 ).  
Not surprising though, the mere fact that the Deed of Commitment is aimed at 
NSAs is problematic in various ways, as Baker (2012) has argued, ‘the very 
categorisation of a ‘non-state’, is indicative that subtle questions remain on 
whether these groups are or ever can be professional, effective, reliable or 
authorised’ (p.27). In a sense, even though arguing in relation to access to 
justice, this would seem to be inappropriate for Somaliland as they perceive 
themselves as a legitimate government. Although the language of policy makers 
is slightly changing, the predominant assumption by donors and security 
scholars has been that such groups are not methodical and not recognised.  
They are defined as armed groups that operate beyond state control and 
include, but are not limited to, rebel opposition groups (groups with a stated 
incompatibility with the government, generally concerning the control of 
government or the control of territory); local militias (ethnically, clan or otherwise 
based); vigilantes; warlords; civil defence forces and paramilitary groups (when 
such are clearly beyond state control) (Baker, 2012  p. 27). 
Thus in 2004 Presidential Decree No. 016/2004, was issued to regulate mine 
action.  It stated that all mine action organisations and government entities must 
comply with its provisions.  This led the civil society organisation that had been 
part of the mine ban process, the Institute of Practical Research and Training 
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IPRT (representing the local campaign), together with the Geneva Call and the 
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Internal Affairs, Security and 
Defence to draft a bill to illustrate Somaliland’s commitment to the Mine Ban 
Treaty. (Interview with Ahmed Essa, Director of IPRT, Hargeisa 24th November 
2011) see also (Landmine Monitor, 2008).  This Act came into effect in March 
2009, and it mirrors the Mine Ban Treaty; it bans the use, possession, 
development, production, acquisition, and transfer of antipersonnel mines by 
any civilian or government official. It also requires citizens who possess mines 
to arrange for their immediate collection for destruction by the authorities. 
Similarly, it includes obligations for mine clearance within 10 years, stockpile 
destruction within four years, and victim assistance (VA). It provides for penal 
sanctions for persons found violating the prohibitions in the legislation, including 
extraterritorial violations of the prohibitions by its citizens. 
Limited sources of funding  
Somaliland’s lack of recognition places real constraints on her capacity to 
function like a state, both domestically and internationally.  Just as it is usual for 
donors to be generally cautious in granting recognition to transition authorities 
before a legitimate government is formed, the same principle is applied to a 
non-recognised state. Thus Somaliland cannot access some international 
development assistance which normally depends on the existence of an 
internationally recognised government, and hence what has continually been 
provided is humanitarian assistance i.e. relief and to some extent rehabilitation.   
Somaliland is ineligible to enter into bilateral agreements with donors as they 
shy away from the implication that such a provision of assistance may be seen 
as diplomatic recognition88.   This means that there is a limit as to what authority 
the government can impress on those working in Somaliland.  
The lack of recognition by the international community means that Somaliland is 
ineligible for foreign aid; however, this does not mean that Somaliland does not 
receive any external aid from donors although claims have been made that 
“Somaliland has never been eligible for foreign assistance,” (Eubank, 2012 p. 
446) or that it receives “little outside assistance” (Kaplan, 2008 p. 147). On the 
                                            
88This is changing, for example Department for International Development (DFID) UK, does fund some projects but 
through the UNDP. 
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contrary, Somaliland receives considerable foreign assistance; for example in 
2004, 37 percent of all aid going to Somalia went to Somaliland, while 41 
percent went to South Central Somalia (Bradbury, 2010 p. 8). However, this is 
not bilateral aid that can be given to Somaliland directly but it is channelled 
through the UNDP and other international organisations. 
Indeed before the recent peacekeeping mission in Somalia, most of the donor 
funding given for mine action for Somalia went into Somaliland as the only place 
in Somalia where programmes could be implemented.  For Mine Action 
assistance in 2009: eight donors contributed US$2,997,842 for mine clearance 
and risk education in Somaliland, which was  a decline of approximately $1.3 
million from 2008 (Landmine Monitor, 2009).  Since the launch of mine action 
programs, and except for periods of intense conflict where only limited mine 
clearance was taking place (between 1991 and 1993), mine action funding has 
been on the increase from US$546,000 in 1998, to about $6.65 million in 1999 
and early 2000 as illustrated in Graph 1: Mine Action Funding for Somaliland 
1998-2011.  
Graph 1: Mine Action Funding for Somaliland 1998-2011
 
Sources: Own Compilation from Landmine Monitor Reports89 
 
                                            
89 For funding figures from 2012, Landmine Monitors reports give figures for the entire Somalia without 
desegregation between regions. 
£0.00
£1,000,000.00
£2,000,000.00
£3,000,000.00
£4,000,000.00
£5,000,000.00
£6,000,000.00
£7,000,000.00
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
To
ta
l A
m
o
u
n
t 
in
 U
S$
Year 
Mine Action Funding for Somaliland 
Column1
 
 
218 
 
However, the funding modalities to a non-recognised entity limit the extent to 
which they have control or are otherwise involved in governance of the mine 
action sector on the ground.  Political non-recognition means that this funding 
does not go through the Somaliland government as bilateral aid, but through the 
UN and or directly to the various NGOs in the Mine Action Sector.  
I think the biggest difference that you can see in the way the UN and 
international community engage in Somaliland is because Somaliland is 
not a state; it is not eligible for majority of bilateral funds like other 
countries. So as a result bodies such as the World Bank cannot support 
directly and as a result everything is channelled through the UN or 
through the civil society.  (UNMAS Senior Official, interviewed on 15th 
October 2012) 
According to the global Mine Action strategy, funding is through the trust fund or 
a cost sharing modality that is established and managed to offer the 
international donor community an entry point and mechanism to channel funds 
directly to the field where they are needed most (Mine Action Strategy). 
Applying this mechanism in Somaliland has a limitation factor because of its 
non-recognition status. 
 Definitely for Somaliland, because of the issue of recognition, obviously 
you cannot have bilateral agreements with countries so you are always 
under UN agency and often you have to convince the UN agency to 
support you in that program and in turn they go to the donor on your 
behalf.  (SMAC official) 
Unlike other contexts like Afghanistan where the UN fund 52 humanitarian and 
commercial organisations that comprise one of the largest mine action 
programmes in the world, in Somaliland, the UN does not directly fund any of 
the humanitarian NGOS to undertake mine action.  Indeed most of the funding 
by the UN was to undertake the LIS; most of the rest of the funding is what the 
NGOS in the Sector raise as explained by Nick Bateman;   
It’s not as if the UN really raised a lot of funding for the NGOs.  I can’t 
remember a single funded UN project there that either HALO or DDG did 
in Somaliland.  And all of the funding was not bilateral.  It was generated 
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by those NGOs.  There might be some commercial money or money for 
commercial contracts that had gone through the UN in the past before 
the arrival of NGOs for mine clearance but in my time there – there was 
no single project funded by the UN and they were absolutely peripheral 
to the mine action process (Nick Bateman). 
Thus, the non-recognition status means that the range of funding sources 
directly to the Somaliland government are limited, including whether it is from 
the African Development Bank or from the World Bank. When funding is 
available from such institutions it goes through the UN as the only channel and 
then the UN contract NGOs to carry out projects through what the UN calls 
‘Direct Execution’ (DEX) instead of having the government to implement and 
take control of the budget through ‘National Execution’. This further challenges 
the implementation of programmes.   
For Somaliland, it means that the implementing partner, SMAC, suffers from 
endemic funding problems.  Until 2006, the Landmine Monitor highlighted the 
fact that the Somaliland Government had not allocated any funding to SMAC, 
which gave the impression that SMAC was a UNDP rather than a government 
agency. In 2006, the government did allocate US $15,000 (but disbursed only 
US $7,000), and included the same amount in the 2007 budget (Lardner, 2008). 
This mode of funding also limits the visibility of Somaliland as an equal partner 
in mine action and compromises the position of the government in being able to 
drive the process and therefore limits local ownership.   
Whatever help that the US, Britain or the international community is 
going to give us, it has to pass through these international organisations.  
It passes without our knowledge and we don’t have the capability of 
knowing what has been sent to them.  Maybe you can hear from the 
United States that they have that amount of money to be transferred to 
some of these agencies, but the accountability is between them and the 
agencies.  These international organisations, mostly work with the UN or 
the UNHCR, UNDP and so on, but most of them are here and working 
instead of the government because of that lack of political recognition.  
(Boube Yusuf Duale.) 
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According to an SMAC official, the biggest challenge is not that funding for their 
work has to be channelled through the UN but it is because of the increased 
bureaucracy that creates inefficiency:   
Even if it means the funding will go through the UN agency let SMAC be 
the end receiver and at least let SMAC make its case to the donor 
directly.  So that the donor can see or be convinced but first SMAC has 
to convince the UN agency, then the UN agency puts it back to the donor 
and back again.  To us, the challenge is a major challenge and that is the 
number one challenge that there is no direct relationship with the donor. 
(Hibaq Kosar).   
The same observation was made by a UN official who highlighted the limited 
ownership of mine action from the government: 
 It means that the Somaliland government hasn’t been given same level 
of ownership capacity as you see in other countries. So this means 
lesser capability. Because from World Bank are loans to the government 
and thus it is liable of paying them back and making sure that the money 
is well spent’ (UNMAS Senior Official Interviewed in Nairobi on 15th 
October 2012). 
Reduced accountability of Actors  
It has been noted that accountability for interveners, even where states are 
recognised, tend to be oriented towards external donor entities and not towards 
their beneficiaries (Autesserre, 2014).   It can therefore be argued that the 
status of being unrecognised lends itself to an interest in those who play on 
external actor’s non-engagement with the government. Thus the NGOs, both 
international and local, may not be obliged to be accountable to the government 
but only to their specific donors and neither does it extend to their beneficiaries. 
An observation that was noted here:  
Well you should understand that you cannot call it a bilateral relationship 
with any country because of the lack of political recognition from the 
international community. Whatever help that the US, Britain or the 
international community is going to give us, it has to pass through these 
international organisations.  It passes without our knowledge and we 
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don’t have the capability of knowing what has been sent to them.  Maybe 
you can hear from the United States that they have that amount of 
money to be transferred to some of these agencies, but the 
accountability is between them and the agencies. (Boube Yusuf Duale).  
Such institutions include those that continually get funding and continue their 
engagement with very little accountability.  This is because the Somaliland 
authorities see such organisations as the only way that aid can be channelled 
into the country and therefore may not demand much from them. The issue of 
accountability was also highlighted by a respected Somaliland Statesman who 
noted that due to the fact that bilateral funding is not a possibility, funding is 
channelled through international aid agencies for onward transmission meaning 
that accountability by the International community to the people of Somaliland is 
lacking.  
Similarly the same is said of the Mine Action Sectors accountability which only 
extends to their donors and not even to their beneficiaries.  According to the 
Landmine Monitor (2001), though not reporting directly on accountability, there 
were indications that some Sector Actors that received funding for various 
activities did not disclose the funding levels. Landmine Monitor reported that 
Handicap International and UNICEF had received funding for Mine Risk 
Education during the reporting period of 2000, however, ‘Landmine Monitor was 
not aware of the funding levels’ (Landmine Monitor, 2001).  
General availability of funding is always a constraint; not only in the overall 
amount of available funding, but it has often been the case that donors 
effectively block priority-setting discussions by tying funding opportunities to 
specific programmes or geographic areas. 
This accountability was not just limited to the Sector but also to the government 
and the view of some of those interviewed was that the lack of recognition 
meant that the government lacked the impetus towards accountability to its 
people.   
The reason is currently this government if it wants to they can get things 
done but right now there is no accountability maybe only the donors can 
hold back fund but they feel the people can’t say anything because they 
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don’t pay taxes and the people do not have the capacity to organise 
themselves to bring the community back up. I think what can happen is, if 
it is internationally recognised the international community and bilateral 
donors can bring it to account. Still their accountability to the people will 
be weak but maybe that can help. (Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, NAGAAD, 30th 
September 2012) 
The view of another interviewee was that recognition would promote stronger 
government institutions which would mean that funds would be channelled 
through the government rather than through the international agencies.  The 
view was that accountability might be strengthened by stronger institutions.    
Because Somaliland is not recognised, there is institutional weakness 
and because of the institutional weakness now the aid is turned to NGOs 
and other International agencies. It hardly goes to the government 
institutions. The little that goes through the government, the government 
is not accountable because they hardly give satisfactory accounts on 
how funds are spent. There is hardly any documentation to justify the 
expenditure. So the donors and the UN become reluctant of interacting 
with the government institutions. So they refrain from the money aspect 
of their relationship and try to maintain the political side of it. Then they 
will never be satisfied because whenever they ask for funding there is no 
accountability. If the country is recognised then the accountability will be 
easier to track (Ahmed Adan, Head of Policy and Programme; Action Aid, 
interviewed on 4th of October 2012). 
As noted even in other contexts there is generally a lack of downward 
accountability however, the non-recognition context does tend to make it 
easier for organisations, including those within the mine action sector, to 
ignore this at all levels.; Even where there was upward accountability, to 
the donors, it was quite evident that they lacked a critical eye in the 
reports that they received as will be explained in the next chapter.  The 
evidence gathered from the reports submitted to donors clearly indicated 
that they did not take the question of accountability seriously as some of 
the recurring problems could have been highlighted and probably 
addressed. 
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NGO involvement has been noted to further weaken the service delivery 
potential of state structures and ‘crowds’ them ‘out’: generates dependency and 
shifts accountability towards donors instead of state structures, reinforcing 
citizens’ perceptions of incapability of their political leaders  (Rosser, 2006 p.11; 
Vaux and Visman, 2005 p. 24). When states seek to re-enforce their role in 
service delivery they frequently suffer from funding problems and the lack of 
qualified personnel. Furthermore, services operated by humanitarian agencies 
are often offered for free, creating a problem for ‘regular’ state services which 
will need to be charged for (Dijkzeul and Lynch, 2006) 
CONCLUSION 
There is a lot of attribution to non-recognition as an overriding theme in defining 
the role of the state and the way in which organisations respond and undertake 
their work in Somaliland. Accountability is minimal as the government has no 
control over the organisations working in Somaliland. Similarly the government 
is accused of pursuing the recognition agenda to the detriment of other issues 
that need addressing.  It certainly seems that the issue of non-recognition 
remains a genuine stumbling block not only to the implementation of mine 
action but to other development programmes in Somaliland. It is evident that the 
perception of a lot of the people is that recognition will help solve a number of 
problems; this may not necessarily be true but for now it serves a particular 
narrative that conveniently works for all sides within Somaliland. 
This chapter therefore helps to illustrate how important aspects of post conflict 
reconstruction and peace building have been when undertaken within a context 
where Somaliland has continually been marginalised and neglected by the 
international community which continues to draw no distinction between 
Somaliland and Somalia. The UN has continually placed and treated 
Somaliland as Somalia, leaving  the country largely to the sphere of NGOs and 
other agencies while the UN directs its attention to explicitly humanitarian rather 
than longer term development assistance (Hogg, 1996).  Similarly, Menkhaus 
(2013) has noted that the UN does not take into account the resilience of the 
communities that it seeks to serve, instead, it tends to carry out security 
assessments by the UNDSS  focusing on security threats rather than on 
resilience. 
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Specifically for mine action, It has been noted that coordination within the 
Sector appears as an additional component that does not seem to be 
incorporated within the Sector’s own definition and one which Jennings et al. 
(2008) argue is surpassed within demining as a costly factor.  Coordination is 
subsumed within various levels of mine action and is one where nominal 
meeting of different humanitarian functions cohere around demining as the 
greatest focus of resource mobilisation (op cit p. 16).  The role of the UN 
demonstrates the way in which it has relegated coordination as a less important 
component to the detriment of and with far reaching implications on the Sector 
and mine action in Somaliland in general. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the Somaliland context, like other post 
conflict contexts, is complex and that each element has a political connotation 
and therefore presents its own particular challenges.  Somaliland’s unique 
political non recognition status presents the Sector with a challenge when 
implementing programmes using standard approaches.  The challenges 
encountered in Somaliland highlight the need for knowledge and awareness — 
specifically in terms of how intervention activities, actors, and methods impact 
on, and are perceived in, the immediate local and national environment.  It 
further highlights the call for interventions to be tailor-made to reflect such 
unique contextual aspects.    
 
 
225 
 
CHAPTER 7: SOMALILAND’S CONTEXT AND 
SECTOR PROCESSES:  IMPLICATIONS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A LANDMINE IMPACT 
SURVEY 
“As a tool in general (the LIS), in Somaliland has been widely inadequate due to 
its own inherent quality problems” (UNMAS official in Hargeisa). 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I use the implementation of the Landmine Impact Survey to 
illustrate the challenges and limitations of standardised approaches and also 
the importance of context in programme implementation.  As noted in Chapter 4 
(Global Approaches to Mine Action) the Mine Action sector is guided by the 
need to apply a standardised set of protocols irrespective of context and history 
of the specific country. Efforts to pursue such standardised responses in 
Somaliland have largely been driven by the efforts of the UN through UN Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS); the rhetoric by the Sector is that these standards are 
only a guide and that national contexts should guide their application, however 
in reality this appears far from the truth.   
As discussed earlier the purpose of implementing a LIS is ‘to provide the three 
major partners of mine action-national authorities, donors, and implementing 
agencies with a common database. This database is constructed to give 
national authorities the ability to manipulate the data in a transparent way that is 
responsive to national priorities. International donors will have data that 
conforms to an international standard that will put individual countries in a global 
perspective. And implementing agencies will have detailed information for 
tasking resources and measuring progress across all areas of mine action’ 
(Eaton, 2003 p. 915) 
In this chapter I will demonstrate the failure of the LIS to map and measure the 
extent of contamination.  The Sector uses the same tools and methodology 
irrespective of context; the data that is collected, irrespective of its validity, is 
stored in a standardised data management system (the Information 
Management System for Mine Action), and the Sector insists on using both the 
data and the data management tool.  The implementation of this process is 
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challenged by the context as will be illustrated below.  Similarly, most of the 
challenges and limitations highlighted in other contexts continue to recur within 
the Somaliland context.  
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY  
Having identified the need for a survey UNDP mobilised resources for a 
comprehensive Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in 2002. With funding secured 
from a multi-donor group (The EC, the Swedish International Development 
Agency (SIDA), the government of Finland and the Canadian International 
Development Agency, CIDA) through the Survey Action Centre (SAC), a 
memorandum of understanding between the DDG and the Ministry of 
Resettlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (MRR&R) was drafted and 
signed. The Survey Action Centre (SAC) executed, and the DDG implemented, 
the survey in accordance with the principles and operating protocols established 
by the Survey Working Group.  DDG engaged four international staff members 
and more than 60 national staff during data collection. Field staff members were 
organised into two survey groups of one field supervisor, two field editors and 
eight interviewers each, and with four interviewers operating out of the Hargeisa 
office. During this time, SMAC and NDA had entered into a restructuring that 
lasted almost the entire survey operations period and therefore did not play the 
active role that the survey had originally envisioned. Technical support and 
material assistance was provided by the UNDP and the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining. UNMAS and the UNOPS provided a quality 
assurance monitor to assist with the certification process. The purpose of the 
survey was to access and analyse the socio-economic impact of mine/UXO 
contamination on a village-by-village basis. It was envisaged that this data 
would then be utilised as a basis for prioritisation of mine action activities in 
each region and in turn the data would be utilised to update the mine action 
priorities in the region.  Due to the uncertain security conditions in the rest of 
Somalia; data collection was to start in Somaliland as the first phase. This 
phase covered Awdal, Galbeed, and Sahil regions and part of Togdheer region 
and this took place between 2002 and 2003 and was completed in March 2003.  
In 2006-7 the security situation improved allowing access for the LIS team to 
the remainder of the areas, Sool, Sanaag and the remaining 33 communities 
that were not reached in Togdheer districts (Survey Action Centre, 2004).   
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THE OUTCOME OF THE LIS: VALIDITY AND QUALITY OF DATA 
The surveys identified 982 Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs), affecting 447 
communities. This corresponded with the results of Knowledge, Attitudes, 
Practices (KAP) survey previously done by Handicap International in 2002, 
which registered the Togdheer region as having recorded the highest positive 
answers (72.1%) in regards to people who felt that they lived in an area that had 
mines/UXO. Other areas were  Awdal (62.5%)  and Galbeed (52.8%) (Handicap 
International, 2002). The most important widespread resource blockage, 
according to the LIS, were roads and pastureland, whilst serious blockages in 
respect of safety and socioeconomic security were sources of drinking water 
and irrigated cropland (Survey Action Centre, 2004).  
The Sector acknowledged that much of the data collected was of partial or poor 
quality (Lardner, 2008).  The susceptibility to errors can be attributed to a 
number of reasons. 
Factors contributing to poor quality of data  
a) Data sources and the culture of opportunistic aid 
As indicated in chapter 4, the LIS follows a standard methodology that is based 
on social science; this involves the reiterative process of collection of “expert 
opinion” to establish the location of possible mined communities; starting at the 
national level and proceeding through each subsequent administrative layer, 
gaining detail until a comprehensive list of all impacted communities is 
generated; interviews are then conducted in each identified community in order 
to assess the nature of the mine impacts.  This involves interviewing people 
who are deemed to be knowledgeable such as national authorities, former 
combatants and medical professionals, as well as conducting a review of 
relevant databases, mined area records and any existing data (Kidd, 2000).   
These methods and practices of engaging local communities are the most 
widely used forms of local involvement within the Sector and they acknowledge 
that the data collected in this way is only as good as the community sources 
providing it (GICHD, 2006a).  The communities are approached through group 
interviews or individuals and are requested to share information on landmine 
contamination.  In Somaliland, for example, the networks used included elders, 
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community leaders and religious leaders in order to use established networks to 
gain access to local knowledge. The data from the survey was therefore bound 
to be flawed; the extent of the contamination areas was overstated; 
dependence on local knowledge meant that the survey data was compromised 
by the fact that the local communities had learnt to associate a survey with mine 
clearance and hence the communities tailored the information they provided to 
steer mine clearance to suit such motives.  This phenomenon has been 
described by Hammond and Vaughan-Lee (2012)  as ‘culture of opportunistic 
aid,  both on the part of Somalis and as part of the response’ (p. 8).  They base 
the concept on the modern history of humanitarian engagement in Somalia, i.e. 
assessing needs, negotiating access and delivering assistance. In Somalia, it 
has involved engaging with those in positions of power, who often seek to 
manipulate aid for their own ends. In Somaliland I would argue that this 
manifests itself with the communities, who see the political and economic 
benefits of humanitarian assistance as an incentive to create opportunities for 
humanitarian actors to provide assistance. Thus the local communities knew 
that overstating the problem had potential economic or employment benefits 
from clearance operations that they assumed would follow. This was not just a 
challenge for the implementation of the LIS but it was a response that the 
Sector could have anticipated given their own engagement with the demining as 
acknowledged by Nick Bateman (formerly DDG) and Southern Craib (DDG and 
formerly HALO Trust):  
The concept of the LIS, I think was sensible and clever since they were 
trying to get the donors a clear picture of the social and economic impact 
of landmines.  Somaliland I think is possibly the worst place in the world 
that they could have chosen because of course the local communities 
they were so used to adapting to interventions; they would try to look at 
their side of vehicle, if it said ‘water & sanitation’, they would quickly tailor 
their responses.  What happened was that the problem and because 
DDG was very naïve and at that time myself included we were all 
interested in creating a problem and having a problem there rather than 
saying that there’s no problem here and we shouldn’t be here. So the 
problem got so over-reported and so blown out of proportion in 
Somaliland because the local community just reported Willy nilly on 
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where there were mines and where there weren’t.  And the problem was 
because there wasn’t proper verification of what the LIS teams were told.   
It went into the database. It was subsequently adapted by the UN and 
became de facto.  And as late as 2006/2007 myself and colleagues in 
DDG were fighting a battle with the UN in Nairobi at the true scale of the 
problem.  Whereby they were saying the LIS is the definitive document 
and that is what we have to use.  They understood the reality but nobody 
within their system had the guts to say that’s not the case.  They were 
just empire building as well as everybody else.  So the LIS did a massive 
dis-service to Somaliland because it has diverted millions of dollars into a 
virtually non-existent problem. 
Southern Craib noted that:  
The biggest problem with survey is that mine clearance is associated 
with jobs so if your main source of information is usually conversation or 
interviews with local population, if your interview target also understand 
that presenting a mines problem is likely to get a mine action agency 
involved in the area given they understand the usual policy to raise 
security and safety  in the area is to employ locals and train them;  then 
very quickly they work out that indicating that there is a significant mine 
problem is likely to generate jobs. This completely skews survey 
information. By the time the mine action organisations discover that 
there’s nothing there they’ve already had several months’ salary.  That’s 
a major flaw with the impact survey done here.  That is more significant 
here than anywhere else that I can think of that a survey has been done 
partly because Somaliland people do not speak as individuals so they 
very quickly learn how to play the game.  I think DDG will accept the fact 
that if they knew then what they know now, they could have queried an 
awful lot of data. 
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The LIS was undertaken by a demining organisation therefore who had the full 
knowledge of this ‘culture of opportunistic aid’, especially the relationship 
between employment and demining as the same culture had continually dogged 
the work of the clearance agencies.  The Sector had long recognised this 
pattern as their respective annual project reports indicated (HALO Trust and 
DDG Annual Project Reports).  Similarly, Mohammed Ali Ismael, a DDG ex-
deminer illustrated the same: 
What we traditionally did when we went to carry out demining was ask 
the local people “where are the mines?”  And they said “that area”.  Then 
we started, not realising what is the motive of the local people, for us to 
do demining there because we had to employ people. (Mohammed Ali 
Ismael - Director NDA, 1998-99; DDG Deminer 1999 – 2005 interviewed 
in Hargeisa on 26th October 2010)  
Nick Bateman in a consequent response to the failure of the LIS responded 
that:  
The subsequent criticism was therefore with the benefit of 20:20 
hindsight when we actually understood much more about the Somaliland 
context (via Skype message dated 15th January 2013).   
Another problem associated with dependence on local knowledge for 
Somaliland is the fact that as a community, the Somalis are a very mobile 
therefore local experience and knowledge may be limited to a certain degree as 
communities have implications for how well they reflect local realities.  
b) Role and knowledge of the survey teams 
GICHD has acknowledged that there is usually an overestimation of total 
Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs) and this has been observed in most of the 
countries where an LIS survey has been undertaken. This appears to happen in 
circumstances where the survey teams are not well trained to fully determine 
boundaries which appears to have been the case in Somaliland (GICHD, 
2006a)  
The lack of local knowledge had a great impact on the LIS with regard to 
multiple and / or incorrect names. The Somali language borrows many elements 
from Arabic.  The process of transcribing it into the Roman alphabet, however, 
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allows words such as Ali, for example, to be spelled in three different ways; 
Cali, Hashi, and Xashi. So names of the same location may be found more than 
once in an alphabetical listing, depending on whether the inventory’s author had 
chosen a Somali or English spelling as these changes depend on the impulse of 
the spokesperson of the day or whether the name is given in Somali, Arabic, 
English, or Italian. Unfortunately, this had the effect of increasing the total 
contaminated area and reducing credibility of the survey.  This was an issue 
that Mark Belford established to his dismay: 
The last thing I heard literally only last week is that there was also going 
to be some sort of problem in regards to locality names and things like 
that because the actual LIS wasn’t particularly accurate in naming name 
of places90.  There was a bit of double up, and that is a good indication of 
the technical accuracy of the LIS, they weren’t doing a very good job in 
that respect.  I don’t know whether that was what they were told to do or 
what they chose to do.  (Mark Belford; 1st October 2012). 
Such information can only be verified by detailed local knowledge that a short 
term researcher like those working on the LIS might understandably fail to 
grasp.  Thus, others have raised the issue of the qualifications of the survey 
teams.  In the case of Somaliland the survey was supposedly carried out by 
‘university graduate students’, and not qualified, experienced mine action 
personnel as noted by this interviewee: 
These landmine impact surveys if they are done properly by well 
experienced mine action agencies they are great. But often that is not the 
case.  The one in Somaliland I believe was done by ‘University 
Graduates’ with no mine action background or experience. And so you 
can imagine, the problem was hugely exaggerated. And that’s been the 
case not just in Somaliland but in many other countries as well and many 
other contexts as well. (Interview with Neil Feraro91; Ex HALO Trust 
Programme Manager 2004-2010 in Nairobi on 13th September 2012)  
                                            
90 LIS have been undertaken in 2003, and 2005, this anomaly was only realised in 2012. 
91 Nick Feraro had just left his position as HALO Trust programme manager and he made it clear that this 
represented his personal views and did not reflect the position of HALO Trust. 
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The results of the LIS were challenged as having been highly exaggerated and 
hence the validity of the data was called into question. DDG having been part of 
the survey process have maintained their belief that the LIS inadvertently over-
reported the scale and significance of explosive ordnance and the related 
accidents92.  However their position was that the skewed data can be attributed 
to the fact that in 2003 the LIS process was still new and little understood which 
meant that the first few country surveys were poor.  
Nick Bateman argues that the issue of questionable data was raised with the 
relevant authorities during the process, however no one was bold enough to 
admit the mistakes and the LIS has continued to serve as a baseline for for 
measuring the extent of the problem in Somaliland.  According to the UN:  
The LIS is the base document for mine action in Somaliland and you 
can’t change it and that’s the unfortunate thing, the LIS is there so you’re 
not going to go back and say let’s cancel it. The only thing you can do is 
to discredit particular SHAs but it will always be there so that should at 
least be reflected somewhere in the database. (Mark Belford; 1st October 
2012) 
Mark Belford further acknowledges that the usefulness of LIS is thus 
questionable:  
As a tool in general in regards to Somaliland, it has been widely 
inadequate due to its own inherent quality problem.  
The Sector argues that ‘the methodology and professionalism of partners 
means the risk of bias is modest, while the benefit of working with implementing 
partners already in the country brings critical contextual insight and language 
skills’. However, the Somaliland LIS proved that this was not the case (Filipino 
2006 p. 14).  The contextual insight to guide the LIS was certainly missing and 
the language skills did not seem to have been applied. 
                                            
92 Danish Demining Group and Cranfield Mine Action were the implementing partners for the LIS phase 1 
in 2003.  DDG is a member of the Survey Working Group, however for Phase 3 2006, only SMAC and 
PMAC are listed as implementing partners.  
 
 
233 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIS ON THE SECTOR 
It has been pointed out that poor quality data collection, analysis and 
dissemination can cause an increase in additional costs through additional 
allocations of resources to deal with the consequences of data-management 
problems.  Such allocations results in non-conformance quality costs argues 
(Harutyunyan, 2011).  The LIS was met with scepticism by the Sector and this 
prompted DDG and HALO Trust to undertake a more detailed process of 
resurveying the communities that came through as highly impacted. This was in 
2004 and 2005, and involved returning to those communities previously 
surveyed and identified as being highly impacted and undertaking more detailed 
analysis.  
There are conflicting views on the scale of the contamination problem in 
Somaliland from many of the key stakeholders involved. Previously Somaliland 
was quoted as having had between 1 -2 million landmines deployed (Landmine 
Monitor, 1999).  In 2000 UNICEF commissioned a feasibility study in which 
these estimates were seen to have been ‘questionably calculated and 
implausibly high’, the reality (the report estimated) could have been as low as 
50,000-100,000 (Taylor, 2000 p. 5).   
There is also a limitation of the extent to which the LIS has provided any 
guidance to informing the work of the other stakeholders.   
The idea with the LIS is great because it is supposed to be the guiding 
tool and in areas where it is well done it works well. In areas where you 
have a strong government mine action centre it works well. But you don’t 
have a strong mine action centre here. They guys are great and 
enthusiastic but it still leaves a lot to be desired. So we have different 
agencies doing their own stuff and nothing is fed in the system even 
though UNMAS is trying to streamline, it has never really gotten to the 
stage that we want it to (Karina Lynge, DDG Head of Programme 
Development AVR; Interviewed in Hargeisa on 26th September 2012). 
It can therefore be deduced that it would have been challenging to use the LIS 
as a tool to guide Somaliland’s national plan as the data was flawed.  The aim 
of the survey was to provide a clear understanding of the impact that mines 
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have within communities so that the response of Mine Action could be 
prioritised based on a clear understanding. The view is that a LIS provides vital 
nationwide data that helps facilitate sector planning and integration (Eaton, 
2003).  However, DDG as the LIS implementing agency acknowledges that the 
LIS  provided little information at the technical level to accurately guide the 
activities of mine action operators, or indeed to assist the Somaliland Mine 
Action Centre (SMAC) with the development of annual national mine action 
work plans. As such, more data needed to be collected in order refine the data 
produced through comprehensive technical survey (DDG Report Annual Report 
2003). 
Limited use of the IMSMA data management system 
The Mine Action Sector pursues LIS with an aim of providing for improved 
collaboration between the primary stakeholders of the process: national 
authorities, donors and implementing agencies, and provides for the utilisation 
of the same dataset.  The Sector is driven by preference for quantitative data as 
quantification provides standardisation where the same attributes can be 
measured anywhere in the world. The UN emphasises and almost demands a 
method and model which is universalisable and thus utilises the International 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)93 data management programme. 
Thus, once data is collected, it is then fed into the IMSMA programme which is 
the UN approved standard information system. However, this system is reliant 
on well-collected and well-interpreted data from the ground; unfortunately the 
UN insists on relying on such information, even where it is flawed.  This offers 
little relevance for a national mine action programme and it could, as argued by 
Rae McGrath, be replaced with a far simpler and country and task specific 
system.  The continual  imposition of the IMSMA has therefore become an 
encumbrance to mine action programmes such as Somaliland’s as  it serves 
little purpose beyond the perpetuation of its own existence (cited by Björk, 2012  
p. xvi).  The continued need for standardised data means that mine action 
programmes expend significant resources to “clear the database” rather than to 
clear minefields (GICHD, 2006a p. 15) as evidently significant human and 
financial resources and time are needed to address the problem.   The quality of 
                                            
93 The IMSMA programme was developed for the UN by the Centre for Security Studies and Conflict 
Research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.  
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data is not the only problem with the utilisation of the system, as with other 
technologies utilised by the Sector, these are developed in a technologically 
savvy world, and thus are mainly externally managed, too-complex and have 
been accused of being pacifying mechanisms for mine action rather than 
assisting in the creation of nationally adaptable, appropriate and sustainable 
measures to solve the problem. This means that the programme continually 
relies on training that is offered by expatriate staff.  In 2010 during my first field 
trip I arrived at the same time as three expats from Geneva, whose task was 
specifically working on the database under UNMAS. 
Post the LIS, SMAC still had version 3 of the IMSMA system installed and had 
data from the LIS stored, however, this data was not used to task operators and 
neither was there any recording of the survey and clearance work done by 
operators (Lardner, 2003).  
However international technical advisors have continually been assigned to 
SMAC and have mainly concentrated on establishing the IMSMA, staff and 
building their capacity to develop a mine-related database. However, 
immediately after the LIS, at the most data intensive period, the post of 
operational advisor was vacant, leaving a significant gap. In addition, the 
Country Technical Advisor at the time was given responsibility for the whole of 
Somalia, and relocated to Nairobi and was therefore not available to spend 
significant time in Somaliland (Interview with SMAC; Lardner, 2008). 
As highlighted by a Senior SMAC official:  
The biggest contribution So far right now, as far as SMAC is concerned, 
is that we have a Swiss in-kind contribution which UNMAS secured from 
the Swiss government.  This is for updating our IMSMA programme as 
the version and therefore the information system we have is very poor 
due to the fact that we have never had any formal training.  The software 
was put in there but no formal training.  Also the programme is updated 
continually and we still use a very old version.  
Similarly, the local computer operators who had been received training from the 
GICHD had subsequently left their positions and leaving a gap in the already 
limited capacity that existed.  This is the status that I encountered when I visited 
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SMAC.  During both research periods, I was unable to get any data due to lack 
of computer operators.  However, I was also informed by various people within 
the Sector that the lack of data is not simply from lack of capacity and that it 
was also due to the fact that the data was simply not available. Similarly, the 
DDG Evaluation noted that “the operators had no copy of, nor access to, 
IMSMA, and any encouragement for operators to report is tempered by the well-
founded suspicion that the data simply do not get entered into IMSMA. This is 
reinforced by the fact that the operators have been asked for their complete 
data sets to be entered into IMSMA several times over the last couple of years” 
(Lardner, 2008 p. 13). 
Due to this issue with data, HALO Trust continually kept their own database, 
whilst SMAC has its own which presents particular challenges as expressed 
here by Mark Belford; 
This comes back to this disagreement between HALO and SMAC. SMAC 
have sometimes incorrectly chosen to use HALO figures and sometimes 
haven’t. Certainly a couple of months ago I was trying to come up with 
new figures for of how much more there is to do and I picked up a SMAC 
annual report for last year and the year before and I had a look at it and I 
thought it didn’t look right. Then I picked up the baseline survey report 
and SMAC had taken some of those figures and you just couldn’t get a 
correlation. HALO indicating there were so many LIS SHAs, SMAC was 
saying so many but in another report SMAC says so many, when you 
added them up it showed something else altogether. That made me start 
to query what’s wrong with the database or more particularly the 
verification side of the database. Have we not loaded all the SHAs into 
the database? That’s what I’m still waiting for a really good answer on 
which one is right (Mark Belford; October 2012). 
According to another UN official there was a feeling within HALO that their data 
was more adequate and therefore there was resistance in combining the two. 
The end result of this means that the national database is not a current national 
database and the operators have been keeping their own records since they 
began operating. 
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Limited use of the LIS as a prioritisation tool 
The role of the data produced as a standard reference and its utility for priority-
setting remains questionable in general as was highlighted by the Global 
evaluation report citing Mozambique and Cambodia.  The findings of this report 
highlighted that local actors ‘had shown little interest or even hostility’ towards 
the survey and that local Mine Action actors appeared to ignore the LIS outputs 
(Scanteam and DEMEX, 2003 p. 36).  The same was demonstrated in the case 
of Somaliland.   
As explained by Southern Craib, DDG: 
Operationally not at all because it is an overview so none of it can be 
used as specific information for a particular mine field. Where they are 
quite useful is in preparation of documents for argument of donors. It 
would be useful if you are the single or leading landmine organisation in 
the country because it would establish for you where you should base 
your main operation centers. That likelihood falls down because the mine 
clearance organisations would have been on the ground for years before 
the LIS was done.  So they’ve already established themselves where 
they want to operate. Now there are economic impacts that are making 
them have to re-organise themselves. The other issue is that the mine 
action authorities themselves are often involved in generating the 
information that goes into the LIS. (Southern Craib,) 
The same views were reflected by Graeme Draemu Abernethy: 
A lot of the agencies, HALO, DDG and HI, look at what is required where 
they are working and SMAC knows that these are the priorities that have 
been given.  We are going to be working with these priorities.  So it is 
probably in reverse, wrong, so to speak.  You would want to think that in 
the near term, SMAC will be able to implement a work scheme based on 
priorities for each region and then give it back to the organisations in 
terms of a priority list clearance for each handling each year. (Graeme 
Draemu Abernethy). 
Given all the clearance effort, one thing that is still unclear is what the current 
levels of contamination are and how long it will take to tackle the remaining 
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residual problem.  The (Landmine Monitor, 2012)  indicates that HALO 
estimates the remaining area to be released, as of April 2012, as approximately 
242 suspected mined areas covering 12km2 and 18 BAC/explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) tasks covering 15.5km2.  
HALO Trust uses a prioritisation of tasks which is set against standard factors, 
such as the risk of accidents if the land is not cleared; the number of 
beneficiaries that will benefit from the removal of threat, and subsequent use of 
land, for example access to the community by aid agencies; the socio-economic 
impact of use to which the land will be put following clearance; technical, 
security and access issues. 
Limited utility of the LIS as basis for donor funding 
The LIS is seen as an important tool by the donors as it is the basis for funding 
and also for prioritisation.  The main intention of carrying out a LIS is so that the 
available resources are utilised for maximum benefit to the mine affected 
communities, and to enable communities to be cleared countries must prioritise 
mine action activities. Such information is also needed for strategic and 
operational planning and is made available in a timely manner to planners at the 
national level—normally the staff of a mine action centre (MAC),to implementing 
partners such as demining non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and to 
other stakeholders such as the donor community (Morete, 2003).  Thus the LIS 
for Somaliland was not very useful, in terms of mobilisation of donor interest it 
had a negative impact on other prospective areas such that there is less donor 
interest in future LIS even in other regions such as Puntland. As highlighted by 
Mark Belford    
And when we address the utility here but also raises it up in Puntland 
because we can’t get anyone to do any landmine clearance work in 
Puntland because they don’t believe in the LIS. At the moment we have 
got DDG looking for specific funding, they’ve just done specific training to 
get teams back out in the field and to do surveys  particularly in the areas 
where they think are going to be high impact. Down in the south west 
and areas like that. But on the basis of that concrete information they 
should be able to attract donors. But unfortunately for the rest of 
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Puntland there is maybe if or what type of things because people 
understand the LIS wasn’t built up. 
A follow-on survey was undertaken in 2004-2005 by DDG and the HALO Trust 
with the support of SMAC, in order to attempt to clarify some of the data and 
conclusions presented by the LIS. Similarly, HALO Trust, with agreement of 
SMAC/UNDP, undertook another resurvey from September 2008 to October 
2009 and confirmed 346 SHAs, of which 329 were mined areas and 17 were 
battle area clearance (BAC) tasks. The total contaminated area was 18.9km2 
(ICBL-CMC, 2011). 
The phase which the mine action programme in Somaliland is at now, is not a 
phase that would naturally be heavily reliant on data as Mine action systems are 
not data-entry intensive at the late stage of the project. On the contrary, data 
entry is the only meaningful activity that can be done at the early stages of the 
project, and this is the data-entry intensive phase (Grujic, 2002).   
Incoherence within the Sector; unintended impact of the LIS 
Thus rather than the intended impact, the LIS can be seen to have contributed 
to unnecessary and seemingly negative distraction within the mine action sector 
in Somaliland. In 2006, after seven years of implementing mine clearance in 
Somaliland, DDG decided to cease its clearance operations and focus on 
village-by-village clearance of UXO and small arms control, a decision based on 
a re-survey of several identified high and medium impacted communities in 
2008, which confirmed that mines were not having as serious an impact on 
communities as previously believed. As a result DDG believed that the funding 
received for mine clearance would be better spent on other activities. Having 
been the organisation that implemented the LIS, in the first place, the decision 
was reported to have caused a certain amount of bad blood between DDG and 
SMAC/UNDP. SMAC claim they were not consulted during the decision making 
process whilst DDG believe that SMAC were part of this process. SMAC felt 
that they were presented with a fait accompli rather than being able to form a 
part of the strategizing process. 
Nick Bateman defended this decision as noted earlier, and argues that it was 
based on a fundamental feeling that all indicators in Somaliland showed that it 
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was time for DDG to leave mine action – and mine clearance.  During the 
interview in Nairobi, he repeated the question he previously posed to the 
evaluation team (2008): 
 How would a community choose to allocate resources if they were 
offered the funds required to clear suspected mines close by to their 
village? He wondered whether they would choose to clear the minefield, 
build a school, a health post, drill a well for clean water, or some other 
risk reduction strategy? 
Mine Action had been undertaken for more than a decade without a LIS, its 
result, instead of bringing coherence and clarity within the Sector, created 
divergent views within the stakeholders as it was fraught with controversy and 
the results continually dominated the discussions between the clearance 
agencies, the local authorities and the UN.   
Nick Bateman, the then programme manager, argued that Mines and UXOs in 
Somaliland had been a context in which although there was a humanitarian 
impact, the situation in Somaliland was well-managed by the local population 
and, therefore not too severe."The problem is manageable and could, with the 
necessary international assistance, be resolved within a limited timeframe” 
(IRIN 2004b; online).  UNDP’s position was  that  progress in clearance would 
be slow and cautious adding that some factions were still planting mines; the 
civil society represented by Ahmed Essa highlighted the decrease in the annual 
rate of incidents from two reported incidents per day in Hargeisa alone, to 
approximately 100 per year throughout the country (IRIN, 2004b). This article 
highlighted the lack of coherence within the Sector at the time.    
The clearance agencies did not utilise the LIS for their planning.  Indeed 
following the LIS, there was acceptance that mine action was no longer a 
priority for DDG, a position that was surprising and has proved divisive within 
the Sector in Somaliland. This was especially because DDG had been an 
implementing partner for the Survey Action Centre and for the LIS: 
We took a conscious decision in 2007 not to ask the Swedish 
government, which was our main donor, for more funding for the 
demining because it was pointless.  We felt that HALO Trust still had a 
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large capacity there, and the evidence was that contamination was not 
that bad; it would have been immoral to ask for more money at that stage 
because of all these arguments (Nick Bateman).  
 Other than credibility the LIS has generated a lot of disagreements with the 
Mine Action actors and remains a bone of contention.  
Similarly, resources that would have otherwise been used in carrying out other 
activities seem to be used in re-surveying.   Due to such anomalies and claims 
of over-reporting and validity of the data, HALO Trust and SMAC agreed to do 
some resurveying.  This was carried out between September 2008 and October 
2009.  Out of the original 982 SHAs, 346 were confirmed SHAs, of which 329 
were mined areas and 17 were battle area clearance (BAC) tasks (Landmine 
Monitor 2009). However, there is still contradiction and lack of guidance on the 
levels of contamination and the impact of the same but all data points to a 
decline in accidents and limited impact.  However, this information is from 
various sources and not primarily from the LIS.  For example, HALO Trust’s 
documentation indicates that since 2009 there had been a declining number of 
accidents in the various regions of Somaliland (presentation given to 
Researcher by HALO). Similarly, the Landmine Monitor (2011) reported a 
decrease to 36 mine/ERW casualties reported by SMAC for 2010 which was 
significantly lower than the number of casualties recorded in 2007 (97) and 
2006 (96).  The evidence is that there have been a decreasing number of 
accidents and or incidents involving mines/UXOs. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, within the Sector, implementing organisations’ have had an 
incentive for high-figure reporting in order to get more donor funding and 
interest; similar tactics were used during the mine ban process when the 
international media quickly seized the opportunity to report on the highly 
sensational, but poorly supported, statistics of more than 100 million landmines 
throughout the world.  Mine-affected governments realised that it was in their 
interests to publish the 'worst case scenario' statistics and estimates to the 
international community to encourage donor funding (Bottigliero, 2000; Elliot 
and Mills, 2000). In other contexts such as  South Sudan over reporting was 
used as a fundraising strategy  (Bolton, 2010).  In the case of Somaliland, this 
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was a contradiction as the implementing DDG used the LIS as a basis not to go 
for more funding. 
This also means that the implementation of centralised control over data that 
was supposed to ease the ultimate transfer of responsibilities to SMAC and 
NDA could not be undertaken without challenges.  
According to the Sector, the LIS was the first attempt to ‘gain a strategic 
perspective’ on the problem of mines and UXO on Somaliland (Lardner 2008 pp 
9), and  was supposed to be the creation of an invaluable benchmark for the 
government of Somaliland, international donors, the UN, NGO’s and demining 
operators. However it failed to achieve this and therefore the LIS had its 
limitations as a tool for prioritisation and as a guide national planning.  The data 
was of poor and questionable quality and therefore the validity was questioned; 
this meant also that with questionable data, the implementation of the data 
management programme was hampered.  Effectively, this means that there was 
no clarity on the contamination levels nor are there clear goals to guide the 
Sector.  
According to the evaluation report by Scanteam and DEMEX on the LIS, where 
the LIS were undertaken they were a "stand alone" event and externally driven 
by donors and as a process it was described as poorly integrated within national 
tools and tasks (Scanteam and DEMEX, 2003 pp: 2). This evaluation was done 
prior to the results of the LIS in Somaliland, however a lot of the conclusions 
apply to the Somaliland case as has been illustrated. 
Therefore the chapter demonstrates that the implementation of the LIS reflects 
the peacebuilding critique of being implemented based on ‘standardised 
templates’ that ignore local context. The implementation of the LIS supports the 
critique as articulated by Sending (2009b) that ‘peacebuilders are both “blind” 
and “arrogant”. He argues that they are “blind” to local factors that are central to 
effective peacebuilding because their frame of reference is mainly drawn from 
universal templates for how to build peace which draws heavily on western 
experience, expertise and institutions’ ( p. 1).  This is exactly what the 
implementation of the LIS demonstrated.  As observed by the Sector workers 
themselves, the LIS highlighted that those carrying out the data collection were 
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‘blind’ to the local context; the lack of knowledge of the context was 
demonstrative of this.  The LIS follows a specific standard methodology and by 
the Sector’s own admission whether implemented by the UN or other partners 
this methodology needs to be followed; this demonstrates the ‘arrogant’ nature 
of the process.  The Sector fails to take into account the different contextual 
factors that inevitably would challenge such standardised approaches thereby 
sacrificing context specific approaches to universal templates. 
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CHAPTER 8: SECTOR ACTORS AND 
SOMALILAND CONTEXT; IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MINE ACTION’S PEACEBUILDING POTENTIAL & 
CONCEPTUALISATION 
"Peace isn't ‘Kumbaya’ or a dove and a rainbow," – Jody Williams94 
“For the Somaliland people Peace is something that you cannot measure” – 
Shukri Ismail95 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, I argued that mine action is conceptualised in similar ways in both 
academic peacebuilding literature and by the Sector.  I argue that the same 
factors that dictate this mode of conceptualisation are reflected within the 
Somaliland context.  In this chapter I demonstrate the extent to which mine 
action actors and the context of Somaliland have interacted to contribute to 
such a narrow conceptualisation. The chapter is informed by Goodhand’s 
(2010) “peace auditing” methodologies which he employed to assess the 
outcomes of NGO activities in terms of peace building impacts.  The approach 
uses the idea of a peace audit which assesses the ‘peace-ability’ of the Sector 
by looking at the Sector’s relationships and linkages, using a multiple 
stakeholder analysis which addresses questions around the organisational 
identity and values of the Sector, and how these are transmitted to 
stakeholders.  
Using the peace-ability approach I analyse the extent to which there are 
endowments of “peace capital” accrued or undermined by Sector activities;, the 
types of activities, at which time, and in which particular context, have had a 
positive or negative impact.  
I demonstrate in this chapter that the extent to which the Somaliland community 
conceptualises mine action as peacebuilding is informed by the Sector Actors; 
including their relationship with the communities; the Sector’s identity and 
values and most importantly the Sector programmes.  This then shapes the 
                                            
94 Jody Williams, co-recipient with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1997 Nobel Peace Prize 
95 Shukri Ismail, Head of Candlelight the largest local Somaliland NGO; recipient  of ICG’s award the 
International Crisis Group for Commitment to Peace, Justice and Security 
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perceptions of the communities and a narrative is formed based on the 
historical association with peacebuilding, Sector behaviour and Sector 
programmes.   Evidently from the narratives, the mine action’s ‘peaceability’ 
potential is increased by its intrinsic capacities that support peacebuilding and 
peacebuilding processes; however the Sector’s behaviour, and some factors, 
limit or enhance that potential or capacity for peace.    
FACTORS LIMITING MINE ACTION’S ‘PEACEABILITY’ 
POTENTIAL 
Mine action achievements are conceptualised in terms of its role in increasing 
or decreasing probabilities for peace, rather than as precise cause and effect 
relationships. This is because “impact” is a concept that is inappropriate for the 
examination of peace-building for a number of reasons. The problems of 
attribution, time frames and the lack of the counterfactual mean that it is difficult 
to talk with precision about the contribution of Mine Action programmes to 
peace building or conflict fuelling processes.  At best, I can only talk about the 
general direction of change and the probabilities that Mine Action interventions 
have had an impact on peace and conflict dynamics (Goodhand, 2002) 
The Mine Action Sector globally seeks to be viewed as one homogenous entity 
that is driven by a common goal.  This may have been the case when they 
called for a ban; the reality now is that the Sector is not as homogenous, as 
they have different mandates and therefore there is a need to differentiate 
between actors and types of impact on development. 
Mine Action Sector relationships and linkages 
Goodhand’s peace audit methodologies call for interrogation of relationships 
and linkages of organisations; specifically looking at the nature and quality of 
linkages with stakeholders; how organisational identity and values are explained 
and transmitted to stakeholders; how the organisations position themselves in 
relation to their various constituencies; how they manage conflicting pressures 
and demands and the extent to which they are reactive or proactive in 
influencing stakeholders. (Autesserre, 2014) observes that the social lives of 
international peacebuilders, their personal relationships and their informal 
actions carry an enormous significance in post conflict zones.  There are 
however several factors that determine this behaviour; and these, as Autesserre 
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(2014) has observed, are based on daily work routines driven by the security 
requirements that dictate their operational contexts.  These routines dictate 
procedures which in turn have an impact on the how the perceptions of local 
communities emerge.  These arose as a result of a changing humanitarian 
operational context in which mine action and other interventions were taking 
place; and, as highlighted in the previous chapter, the ‘perceived’ or real danger 
that was associated with the context that had led to the humanitarian aid sector 
‘bunkerisation’  or ‘conflict proofing’  and hence eschewing direct relations with 
local populations (Duffield, 2012a; Goodhand, 2006). The lack of interaction 
with ordinary people due in part to security concerns means that the Sector 
Actors do not interact with the local people who might challenge the dominant 
ways of acting and suggest alternate solutions. The result of this was a culture 
of distrust between the mine action sector and local communities; however, the 
distrust was not entirely due to the disconnect but also due to the extent to 
which the Sector was deemed sincere in their operations’ as explained below. 
Distrust between Mine Action Sector and Local communities 
The aforementioned policies contribute as noted earlier to the formation of 
hierarchies between local and international staff, and also between International 
organisations and the communities they seek to serve.  The policies did not just 
create physical  barriers but also made it difficult for the Sector Actors to 
appreciate or understand the people and societies they are engaged with 
(Guerra et al., 2010).  Bunkered compounds, restricted and protected 
movement and short deployments all have been seen to contribute to aid actors 
‘substituting acquaintance for knowledge, activity for understanding, reporting 
for analysis, [and] quantity of work for quality’.  As Van Brabant (2010) observes 
‘anybody who spends some time in the Western-dominated aid world cannot 
but be astonished by the pervasive levels of distrust: distrust within agencies, 
between agencies, between agencies and their alleged “beneficiaries”’ ( p. 10). 
Local populations comprehend mine action interventions through the daily 
activities of the Sector Actors on the ground, their contrasting lifestyles, values 
and behaviour. Arrogant or derogatory attitudes towards local populations were 
highlighted by many of those who were interviewed, specifically the HALO Trust 
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and the UN.  These attitudes were perpetuated by little or no contact with local 
people therefore building an air of arrogance by Sector workers.   
These attitudes were pointed out by majority of the interviewees.  I also was 
privy to conversations within the Sector and the anecdotes exchanged during 
informal conversations about the Sector; for example members of the 
community highlighted that they saw HALO Trust only in their very badly driven 
vehicles, and only heard of them in relation to the various labour disputes that 
were on-going and that were reported in the local media. The drivers were seen 
to drive carelessly which led to a number of road accidents mainly involving the 
numerous livestock that roam around Hargeisa.  The running joke amongst the 
expatriate community is that if HALO Trust hits a goat, the owner always 
insisted that the goat was always a she goat and pregnant at the time (even 
where the goat is proven to be a he goat). The cost of which sometimes is as 
high as $300 per goat (Research diary notes).  This is because it happened all 
the time and the local communities learnt to take advantage of the numerous 
accidents and saw them as economic opportunities.  
Similarly, the behaviour of the expat staff in general in Somaliland and specially 
that of HALO Trust employees, including the local ones, often was a subject of 
resentment. Thus even where the values of the Sector and its operations might 
not necessarily have contradicted their local views of the world, the baggage, 
modus operandi, technique and personal behaviour of expat mine action 
workers often did.  Thus, for those interviewed, mine action and the employees 
were always linked with the vilification of HALO Trust in the media and this 
overwhelmingly negative perception of their role at the local level contributed to 
a serious credibility crisis.  
Other than the credibility of the organisation, in several cases the labour 
disputes amounted to project terminations and delays as highlighted in various 
annual reports to donors by HALO Trust. This was also reflected by Nick 
Bateman who recalled being driven out of sites at gun point by the local 
communities partly because there had been lack of communication with the 
communities and hence lack of appreciation of the what each party expected 
(interview notes).  
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HALO Trust as an organisation did not seem to address such negative 
perceptions. This can be attributed to the common approach of the operations 
of Sector agencies’ access to communities being widely through the 
relationships of their staff and partners with local power-holders. HALO Trust 
and SMAC did not assess or monitor local perceptions of their presence and 
activities and their senior managers’ direct presence on the ground was often 
limited. This may have meant that they remained largely unaware of how 
negatively they are viewed among the majority of their client populations.   
Another reason for distrust was lack of communications whether explicitly or 
implicitly about the Sector’s projects and lack of clear information on what the 
Sector was trying to achieve.  The Sector lacked any systematic or reliable 
approach to understanding or engaging with the interests and agendas of other 
stakeholders, a problem significantly compounded by the social and physical 
detachment and weak contextual knowledge of many sector workers especially 
the decision makers within the organisations.  The view of those interviewed 
was that, generally, mine action organisations were very secretive. This was 
especially with HALO Trust, which is known to be generally secretive.  Such 
views were common, and I was constantly asked ‘so what are those people 
doing?’ whenever I mentioned that I was looking at the role of mine clearance 
agencies.    
The secrecy might be seen as a carry-over that the Sector has to overcome 
because of their reliance on personnel from a military background.  Those 
employed by the UN on mine action related activities, and other mine action 
implementing organisations, largely rely on the same competence in advisory 
and leadership positions of  former military personnel – and are therefore less 
different in orientation than their basic mandates might suggest. While national 
armies are the most common government body in terms of engagement in mine 
action, both NGOs and commercial companies seek military competence when 
recruiting internationally. This explains their secrecy in carrying out their work 
which contributes to a negative perception of the community towards Mine 
Action which is seen as part of a western conspiracy. The majority of those 
interviewed perceived mine action as an activity that is shrouded in secrecy, 
externally driven (by foreigners) and not responsive to the immediate needs of 
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the Somaliland people.   Mine action workers being primarily ex-military means 
that their motives are questioned by the members of the communities that they 
are trying to help.  
The Sector does not seem to see the importance of informing the local 
communities about what is being done so that they could fully understand and 
appreciate what they were aiming for, especially since there was lack of visibility 
of what their output was.  For example, a number of interviewees were sceptical 
as to what the deminers were doing and aiming to achieve as previously mine 
clearance was always accompanied by public demolitions; this was no longer 
the case. The perception of those interviewed was that there were indeed no 
mines and no need to demine:  
I don’t think these institutions responsible for the mines clearance are 
very sincere with what they are doing.  I think it is some kind of business 
so that they stay here for long.  Yes in 1991 you could hear that they are 
collecting some amount of mines, explosive shells whatsoever and they 
are exploding them somewhere so that you could see.  Since 1995, or 
1997, I have never heard of that.  You see them having tents in 
agricultural areas with a line of stools with line making them white etc.  
(Boube Yusuf Duale) 
Similarly the impact of mines was no longer being felt as there are fewer 
accidents from landmines and their impact was no longer curtailing movement 
including that of animals.  This was dramatically illustrated when I first visited a 
demining site just outside Hargeisa, (HALO Trust Makadra demining task), in 
November 2012; deminers were using heavy machinery but this did not appear 
to deter or hinder the daily activities undertaken by those living in and around 
the areas.  The local people were grazing their animals, and going about other 
normal activities with full view of the demining activities but total disregard for 
‘safety’ and or whatever was going on in their vicinity.  
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Figure 10: A family herding their goats within the vicinity of an on-going 
demining task.  ©Sarah Njeri   
 
 
 
The above illustration can be interpreted as a display of lack of awareness and 
knowledge of what was taking place within their own community through non-
engagement with the deminers or a diminished sense of danger.  
The lack of communication; the secrecy; the use of ex-military (as programme 
managers) and the diminishing need for mine clearance added to the commonly 
believed myth that HALO Trust was actually placing mines in some of these 
areas in order to justify their existence ; 
Some people even have the perception that the agencies are putting the 
mines because for as long as they have been doing demining they 
should have cleared all by now. It is an overdue program (Senior NGO 
worker interviewed in Hargeisa on Thursday 11th October 2012). 
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The lack of communication is not just with the local communities but also across 
the Sector, as the relationships between HALO Trust and the UN are tepid.  
Similarly, HALO Trust resists collaboration with others within the Sector such as 
DDG as reflected by one Senior DDG official:  
We have very good collaboration with Handicap and SMAC and PMAC & 
MAG a while back when we did some material together to address mine 
action education for children then HALO decided they did not want to be 
part of it. (Senior DDG official) 
The Sector’s culture of ‘self-justification’  
Mine Action like humanitarianism is bound with a strong culture of self-
justification; this is driven by dependence on external funding, there is therefore 
a tendency to portray themselves as indispensable (Goodhand, 2006); This is a 
similar culture that seems to prevail especially within SMAC and HALO Trust 
and less so with DDG (who are playing a different role all together).  The 
evidence of this self-justification can be found in a dominant rhetoric that the 
sector has continually upheld. Some of the claims made may have been 
relevant at the beginning of the mine action activities, however, over time, these 
claims can no longer be justified.  The withdrawal of DDG from mine clearance 
related activities may have challenged these and therefore cause a certain 
amount of consternation within some parts of the Somaliland mine action 
sector. Following the decision, DDG invited the GICHD (Lardner, 2008) to carry 
out an evaluation report which concluded that part of this was ascribed to poor 
communications by DDG in terms of explaining to their partners the full reasons 
for the decision and partly it could also have been seen as a slight to some 
elements of the Sector who continually state that Somaliland still needs 
significant resources to be allocated to mine action. 
HALO Trust’s own documentation indicates that since 2009, there has been a 
declining number of accidents in the various regions of Somaliland 
(Presentation given to Researcher by HALO).  Similarly, the Landmine Monitor 
(2011) reported a decrease with 36 mine/ERW casualties reported by SMAC for 
2010, significantly lower than the number of casualties recorded in 2007 (97) 
and 2006 (96).  The evidence is that generally there has been a decreasing 
number of accidents and or incidents involving mines/UXOs as illustrated in 
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Figure 11: Graph on Mine/UXO Casualty data for Somaliland (2000-2011).  
However, on one of the donor reports, justification is made for the reason for the 
drop as: 
The reasons for this decline are obvious: a large number of mines and 
UXO have been cleared by international organisations, military engineers 
and the local population since the cessation of hostilities in 1991. 
Importantly there has been no significant remining during this same 
period. 
 “However the apparent drop in victims to almost negligible levels 
indicates a trend only; there are many accidents amongst the pastoral 
community, particularly in border regions, which go unreported each 
year”. (Excerpts from HALO Trust Annual Report; The HALO 
Trust/Ireland Aid 6 month Report for 1/4/03-31/12/03) 
Nick Bateman also attributes lower impact to a community that was well 
informed about the dangers and more importantly having had to learn to live 
with the contamination:  
HALO worked on the mine fields on the border of Ethiopia.  They were 
also clearing UXO from villages and had some mobile teams that were 
doing that survey.  We (DDG) however, very quickly began to realise and 
this was re-enforced time and time again, over a period of the 10 years 
that I was around, that those mines, (there are mines no question about 
it) were not in huge numbers.  There were UXOs there, again not in huge 
numbers as well but with DDG we had the village by village clearance 
program when I was there.  Every month they would take the teams that 
were clearing 100-150 items from villages.  So there was stuff there. The 
nagging thought that grew in my mind was that those mines there, the 
UXOs there, were not creating any significant problems.  I came to the 
realisation relatively quickly to that in terms of impact on communities the 
mines and the UXO had a very minuscule or decimal impact in terms of 
security.  And the reason I say that is that both with HALO and DDG we 
cleared mine field after mine field after mine field where deminers will be 
out in the morning and 15 minutes later a local guy would come with 30 
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camels and goats and graze though the whole area.  And they would just 
sit there looking at the deminers like what on earth are you doing?  And 
you quickly come to a realisation that we are clearing these mines in 
these minefields and the last recorded accident was 5 years ago, a goat 
or something like that.  The land is in use so what are we doing here?  
And I spent a lot of time focused on risk assessment and risk 
management and the perception of risk and on how local communities 
manage.  I did not do this in a formal way at all but I was very interested 
in the way the Somalis approach this issue of this minefields by their 
communities.  They actually had a very good understanding of not 
necessarily where the mines were or had been but of the risk that they 
now presented.  And within their context, they essentially were quite 
happy with the situation where they would allow their children and 
livestock into those minefields or close to them and they would accept 
the fact that every 3 – 5 years there would be an incident.  And I really 
suspect they worked hard that within their norms that were acceptable.  
The trade-off of having access to that land against the outstanding risks 
was an acceptable one and a loss of the 3-4 years was so be it, Insha 
Allah.  
According to Karina Lynge Head of programmes at DDG, such an observation 
had informed DDG in the lead up to the cessation of mine clearance activities 
by the organisation: 
I started working with DDG and at the time, the mine action funding was 
up in 2008 and they were considering whether or not to apply for new 
mine action funding. At that time all of the high impact mine fields had 
been cleared in Somaliland, almost all of the medium impact mine fields 
had been cleared. So there were only a few medium impact and quite a 
number of low impact mine fields left.  At this point DDG had already 
stopped doing the mine field clearance and had since 2003 been 
carrying out village by village UXO clearance. For the first couple of 
years we gathered round 17 UXOs per community visit by 2007 it was 
down to 2 or so per visit. It seemed the need was dropping. DDG began 
worrying about whether the cost of a mine action program was 
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proportionate to the benefit it would have for the poor population. (Karina 
Lynge). 
Handicap International, an organisation that carries out Mine Risk Education in 
Somaliland, supported this view: 
Much more awareness having been carried out within Somaliland and 
the clearance of fields which have been taken place.  The numbers of 
people that are currently affected or maimed because of mines is 
therefore lower as compared to those who are generally with disabilities. 
(Charles Ameso - Programme Manager, Handicap International:  
Interviewed on 24th November 2010).   
According to one deminer who had (at the time of this research) over ten years 
of mine clearance experience, having worked previously with Minetech and 
Santa Barbara, mine incidents in Somaliland were not as prevalent as they had 
once been.  He however acknowledged that where there were, most of the 
accidents or incidences were isolated and far between.  He believed that it 
would take less than two years for Somaliland to be mine/UXO free96. 
The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)97 in assessments 
on community safety reported that perceived threats and presence of mines and 
UXOs isare only relevant in Togdheer district.   Out of those interviewed for 
these assessments, only 21.4%  of respondents declared that mines and other 
unexploded ordnances were present within their own communities whilst the 
perception of 78.6% was that there was no threat at all (OCVP, 2012).  
However, according to an IRIN report dated February 2011, there had been a 
notable increase of child victims of landmines in Somaliland, the article cited Dr 
Ahmed Ali Maah, the Director of SMAC (IRIN, 2011).  However the reality on 
the ground was different.  There was no evidence of a significant increase of 
victims and neither did any interviewee substantiate this.   The report noted that 
a child protection officer with a local organisation Comprehensive Community-
                                            
96 This information was not given during a formal interview.  The discussion took place as I waited for a 
meeting with another official who failed to turn up. 
97 An institution that has the backing of, and funding by the UNDP, and prides itself as being an ‘apolitical 
and neutral Somali institution, which is independent of governments and civil society’, according to its own 
website  See  http://www.ocvp.org/ as of 29th January 2013. 
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Based Rehabilitation in Somaliland (CCBRS)98 was calling out for an increase 
on effective continuation of mine-risk education and psychological rehabilitation 
of landmine survivors. The report also noted that civil society organisations 
including the National Demining Agency were calling for awareness-raising 
mine education programmes, especially in schools99.    
Interviews with both SMAC’s Mine Education Officer Hibaq Kosar and Jessica 
Buchanan, DDGs Education coordinator in 2010, indicated that there were 
efforts towards the inclusion of Mine Risk Education (MRE) programmes into 
the school national curriculum.  DDG had been part of a curriculum 
development committee (CDC) whose mandate initially was to review a new 
curriculum that was being written, and to translate it into the Somali language.  
This was done in collaboration with a consultant for UNESCO.  DDG were 
approached to develop an MRE text book that was to be incorporated in the 
social science/ studies text books.  This process brought together Handicap 
International and DDG to developing the material (Jessica Buchannan, DDG 
Education Coordinator).  
Unfortunately the efforts to get Mine Risk Education included in the school 
syllabus were stalled by unscrupulous government officials.  The 
sensationalisation of the IRIN report can therefore have been an attempt to 
draw the attention of the authorities in regards to the importance of MRE in 
schools.   
The continued presence of the mine action sector in Somaliland in spite of the 
fact that there is no need can be understood from what Duffield argues as a 
view of the agencies wanting to see their presence as a reflection of 
organisational criticality (p. 485), it is also true that, in order to maintain market 
share, they have little choice but to follow the money.  For international NGOs, 
especially, not having a visible presence in today’s challenging environments 
threatens brand loyalty, weakens financial sustainability and brings into 
question an agency’s capacity for humanitarian rescue (Van Brabant, 2010) 
                                            
98  During the fieldwork, none of the mine action agencies or the UN ever made reference to this 
organisation as carrying out any work on mines/UXOs.  However the Landmine Monitor lists the 
organisation as a provider of Victim Assistance. 
99 The evidence suggests NDA is a dormant organisation that has 2 teams working under HALO Trust and 
would be the most unlikely organisation to issue statements. 
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I therefore encountered a lot of cynicism in regards to the role of mine action in 
Somaliland in general as a direct result of the Sector’s operational practises.  
Regarding the role of DDG, I argue that their withdrawal from mine action 
related activities had the unintended consequences of raising this cynicism 
even more.  In spite of the figures and the evidence as highlighted, the Sector 
has continually maintained a narrative that justifies their presence in 
Somaliland; I highlight some of the dominant rhetoric. 
Figure 11: Graph on Mine/UXO Casualty data for Somaliland (2000-2011) 
 
Source: Own Compilation from data available from Landmine monitors 2000 – 
2011 
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Examining the rhetoric vs reality 
a) The Mine Clearance challenges 
There are claims made regarding the challenges that have affected clearance; 
these include the problem of accurately defining the limits of suspect areas due 
to the lack of any minefield maps; the predominance of relatively low density 
minefields and that there is an existence of large numbers of ‘grey areas’ 
throughout the region, which it is claimed are both costly and time-consuming to 
clear.  With at least 24 different types from different countries, it claimed that 
this challenges clearance due to the fact that the majority of mines found are 
plastic-bodied i.e. minimum metal mines.  The implication for this is in clearance 
terms is that it is an arduous task, because of the minimum levels of metallic 
components; however according to Colin King,100 a respected military expert the 
Sector has continually relied on for military expertise has argued that ‘many of 
the pressure- operated blast mines are plastic cased and have a minimal metal 
content that does makes them difficult to detect.  However, he argues very few 
are truly non-metallic or ‘undetectable’ and the most universal clearance 
method that uses metal detectors and probes although slow and dangerous is 
effective.  He further highlights two points in favour of such mines, ’that the fuse 
requires direct and often fairly substantial pressure and secondly, that the 
plastic casing creates a very limited fragmentation hazard and is rarely lethal 
hence the reason that many deminers have escaped with minor injuries when 
detonations occur’.  Thus according to King,  in situations where the operator 
strictly adheres to standard operating procedures, such antipersonnel mines are 
not the greatest threat; he further asserts that were it the only major problem 
faced by deminers, clearance rates would have been higher  (King, 2004 p. 
142).    
Similarly, HALO Trust has continually made the claim that the combination of 
these hard to detect mines (plastic),  with rocky, laterised, metal contaminated 
ground and inconsistent depths at which the mines were laid, allegedly makes 
detection of mines especially difficult to detect in Somaliland. King 
                                            
100 Colin King is an EOD consultant, who served 14 years in the British Army, mostly in EOD, including 
operations in the Falklands, Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo; he also led the first British team to train Afghan 
deminers. He was an instructor at the British EOD School, and spent six years as an EOD intelligence 
analyst before his final tour with the Gurkhas. King also writes two reference yearbooks Mines and Mine 
Clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal for Jane's Information Group. 
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acknowledges that there has been very little formal research into the effects of 
ageing on mines and other types of ordnance. His opinion is that there are 
many instances in which it would be difficult or foolhardy to second-guess how a 
munition may change, and there are many environmental factors and other 
variables that might prove critical (King, 2008).  Thus, in his view there is the 
prospect that some mined areas might already be safe, while others of low 
priority could possibly be fenced and abandoned for a number of years to 
gradually self-neutralise. Certification of this ground might then be more akin to 
area reduction2 than to full-scale clearance. 
b) Impact on Economy 
There have been repeated claims that Mines/UXOs had an impact on the 
livestock and agricultural sector especially by HALO Trust (including the ex-
programme manager).  The same claim is made by  HALO Trust on their 
website; the claim is that minefields principally block agricultural and grazing 
land; two activities that HALO Trust cite as forming the backbone of 
Somaliland’s economy  (HALO Trust Website as of 29th January 2013)101.   And 
also cite in their annual reports to donors: 
However the apparent drop in victims to almost negligible levels indicates 
trends only; there are many accidents amongst the pastoral community, 
particularly in border regions, which go unreported each year. It is this 
socioeconomic grouping which HALO is most concerned to target 
through its mine clearance and survey activities. Whilst there is a 
diminishing but still significant presence of mines in Somaliland, the 
threat posed by UXO is of equal concern. (Excerpt from HALO Trust 
Annual Report; The HALO Trust/Ireland Aid 6 month Report for 1/4/03-
31/12/03) 
According to Neil Feraro: 
Mines/UXOs made a huge impact on livestock; this has been the result 
of contamination of most of the grazing land, making the availability of 
land limited. When there is pasture land or when areas have good 
                                            
101 See more at: http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/somaliland#sthash.mxZPS4EA.dpuf accessed on 
19th of March 2015 
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potential those have a mine problem. There could be an accident that 
happened 10 years ago but they will not move on to that place because 
of the history. It could have been the only mine but of course it is very 
natural for human beings to avoid the area if they know there has been 
an accident before and people have been killed. So they are deprived of 
that grazing land and as a result it impacts and then what’s happened is 
there are all those other issues which have come into play. You know 
land is a big issue in Somaliland. Conflict also revolves around it.  (Neil 
Feraro) 
There was however no evidence to support this.  The view of DDG’s program 
manager regarding the impact on livestock was:  
I don’t think anybody knows. It is an easy one for people to throw out. But 
the reality is that if a herdsman has a stock of 50 goats and one of them 
steps on a mine and is killed then arguable he has lost 2% of his worth. 
He can obviously sell the meat. The religious connotation here is that if 
they died they are worthless. If that was a significant issue they wouldn’t 
be herding their goats in these areas. The fact that they continue to use 
areas that may or may not contain a mine threat would strongly suggest 
that there isn’t a significant impact on their livestock numbers. Otherwise 
they would change their behavior. (Southern Craib) 
This view was shared by Ahmed Essa:   
I haven’t heard anybody really worrying about landmines as an 
impediment to what they would normally do. I have been to some farms 
where they’ve spotted things that look like mines but I don’t know of any 
area that has been blocked. Maybe some roads like the one that goes 
from here (Hargeisa) to Burao, so it is not used anymore and probably it 
is mined. I think it would have been demined if it they were very critical. I 
think it is not being focused on because they are other roads that people 
can take.  There is still an impact but it is not a priority.  It is not our top 
priority.  
In 1996, an estimated US $155 million was the revenue gained from livestock 
exports, the following year; this went up to US$ 176 million. Such gains in 
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revenue contributed to the demobilisation programme by enabling the 
government to pay civil servants and security personnel thereby keeping them 
away from militia and banditry (Ambroso, 2002 p. 8).   Any impact on livestock 
would therefore raise concerns with the relevant ministries or with the 
government in general.  According to interviews carried out at the Ministry of 
National Planning and Development (MNPD, 2011), the various Director 
Generals confirmed that indeed the livestock sector contributes to and accounts 
to more than 60% of the GDP and 85% of foreign exchange, 70% of the 
population also finds employment from the sector.  It would therefore follow that 
if mines still had an impact, the ministry would be fully aware of this.  According 
to an economist at the ministry the impact of mines and UXOs on the economy 
in general or on livestock was not significant;  
I don’t think the impact is that much significant at the moment but when it 
happens it can impact.  The impact has been declining over time. I don’t 
see from the public and media anything to suggest that this is a major 
problem. (Economist at the Ministry of National Planning and 
Development) 
Similarly looking through reports such as one by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development entitled ‘Securing Pastoralism in East and West 
Africa: Protecting and Promoting Livestock Mobility’, there is no evidence that 
mines/UXOs cause any impediment on the mobility of livestock in Somaliland 
(Birch, 2008).  In another study by Save the Children entitled The Resilience of 
Households' Livelihoods to Hazards in Somaliland; carried out in 2012 and 
based on the Todgheer region (a region that is seen to be highly impacted)102 
there is no reference to mines/UXOs impacting on livelihoods (GebreMichael, 
2012). Instead the report highlights other hazards such as drought, livestock 
diseases, population pressure, private land enclosure, flooding, invasive weeds, 
charcoal making, resource base conflicts and chat chewing as those impacting 
the livelihoods of communities living in this regions.  
                                            
102 About 30% of the population in the area resides in urban area, while about 65% of the population is 
engaged in nomadic pastoralism, and about 5% practice agro-pastoral livelihoods. 
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c) Challenging return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs 
As noted above, the Ogaden war of 1977-1978 and the continued instability in 
Somalia provoked a massive refugee movement, displacing thousands of 
people in Somalia. The UNHCR reported that by 1981, refugees constituted 
perhaps as much as 40 per cent of the population of Somalia (UNHCR, 2005).  
The UNHCR had previously repeatedly reported103  that the repatriation and 
reintegration of these refugees was constantly hindered by their reluctance to 
return for fear of mines/UXOs, especially in the coastal area (Awdal region) to 
which some returnees, especially those from Djibouti, would have proceeded.  
Mines/UXOs were not the only limiting factor for repatriation. Reports also 
indicated that a limited absorption capacity in Somaliland, been caused partly 
by the detrimental effect of a livestock ban104, had compelled UNHCR to adjust 
its original target for returns from eastern Ethiopia from 80,000 to 30,000 in 
1999.  This meant that by the end of 1999, only 23,200 Somalis had returned 
from Ethiopia (UNHCR Global Report 1999 p. 155). 
One of the reasons for UNHCR’s allegations that mines/UXOs were hindering 
the return of refugees from Djibouti is that the French government was putting 
pressure on UNHCR to repatriate the refugees. Djibouti has a precedent in 
breaking the principles of refoulement of refugees.   By 2001, UNHCR had 
anticipated closing most of the camps situated in the neighbouring countries, 
but continually failed due to the largely real or perceived presence of mine 
fields. By June 2004, about 670,000 refugees, either on their own or with 
UNHCR assistance, had gone back to Somaliland over a 13 year period 
(UNHCR, 2004).  The voluntary repatriation of Somalis from Ethiopia to 
Somaliland was finally completed in June 2005, leading to the closure of seven 
Somali refugee camps, Aisha camp being the last one.  To enable the safe 
                                            
103 This was reported on the UNHCR Global Report, Somali, as an impediment to repatriation in 1998, 
1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 (UNHCR Global reports) 
104 In 1998, Saudi Arabia suffered the first ever outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outside of Africa. 
This resulted in a regional ban on imported livestock from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, and 
Djibouti. In 2000, Yemen also suffered an outbreak of the same.  This resulted in a further imposition of a 
ban on all livestock imports from the region by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Yemen and the UAE.  
Although most of these countries lifted the ban the following year, Saudi Arabia maintained it until 
November 2009. The livestock trade form is a major economic system that continues to provide jobs and 
livelihoods for majority of the people not only in Somaliland but the whole region in general. See Majid, N. 
(September 2010 ) Livestock Trade in the Djibouti,  Somali and Ethiopian Borderlands. Chatham House 
Briefing Paper. Available from  
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/0910majid.pdf  for more details. 
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return for Aisha's Somali refugees, a UNHCR-funded road ensured that the 
area was checked for mines/UXOs. In November 2007 the final phase of the 
voluntary repatriation programme helped some 1,800 Somali refugees return 
home to Somaliland, from Djibouti, by the end of the year.  
However, reports to the USDOS by HALO Trust during the reporting period 
reflecting the work carried out from 1st January 2000 to 28th February 2001 had 
indicated that mines did not seem to represent a threat to returning refugees in 
the Awdal region.  “From our Awdal experience it is possible to state that mines 
do not represent105 a significant threat to refugees returning to the region. This 
stance was reiterated by all three demining organisations in Somaliland on the 
17.02.01 to Ms Wendy Shapiro, Programme Officer of BRRM in US DOS and 
UNHCR representatives. The border roads are well used by traders and are 
considered safe. The few areas of inland mined roads are well marked and 
bypassed” (HALO Trust Report to USDOS). 
Since 2007, continued armed conflict in southern and central Somalia has  
caused widespread and massive violence, causing the internal displacement of 
more than 1.3 million persons,  and more than 450,000 refugees, from southern 
and central Somalia (Amnesty International, 2009 pp 10 Citing OCHA figures).  
Many of these refugees can be found in settlements of displaced persons in 
Hargeisa. These settlements were originally for returnees to Somaliland.  
Interviews with organisations currently working with these groups, either 
returnees, IDPS or refugees, revealed that mine/UXOs had no impact on this 
sector of the communities.  According to Mr Valentine Ndibalema, the UNHCR 
Head of sub-office Somaliland, there were very few incidences and/or reports of 
Mines/UXOs (Valentine Ndibale, Interview on 3rd October 2012).  This was 
collaborated in an Interview with Khadar Qorane Yusuf, Protection Officer with 
Norwegian Refugee Council Horn of Africa.  The National Development Plan 
2012-2016 indicates that mine clearance in Burao has allowed 70,000 residents 
to return to the city (Ministry of Planning & Coordination, 2012 p. 170). The 
report gives no indication whether that figure is for just one year or for the entire 
period that mine clearance has been on-going.   
                                            
105 my emphasis 
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d) Length of time remaining for demining 
The target for achieving an Impact free status in Somaliland has continually 
changed even where acknowledgement has been made about the levels of 
contamination. The Landmine Monitor in 2006 quoted a UNDP Chief Technical 
Adviser for mine action, saying that the impact of mines/UXOs throughout 
Somaliland was not as severe as had sometimes been claimed, and the greater 
threat came from Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs).  The concern, according 
to the UNDP, was the amount and availability of stored or stockpiled ordnance 
and explosives which, if not controlled, could be used for lethal, unlawful means 
(Landmine Monitor, 2006).  In the same year, in a donor report dated January, 
HALO had reported that ‘HALO believes that continued donor support will be 
required for a further 2-3 years of clearance operations across all regions of 
Somaliland’ (HALO Trust Report 2006 submitted for Grant. No. 6607 
(DMV0018273 to the Royal Netherlands Government).    
Similarly during the period of my fieldwork, 5-6 years was given as the projected 
completion, this was back in 2010 and again in 2012.   On  the 12th of March 
2013, in a statement issued by HALO Trust to coincide with the visit of Guy 
Willoughby, then Director of HALO Trust,  they are quoted as estimating 
another 5-6 years of mine clearance in order to get Somaliland mine-impact-
free (HALO Trust, 2013).  
According to one deminer who has over ten years of mine clearance 
experience, having worked previously with Minetech and Santa Barbara, mine 
incidents in Somaliland are not as prevalent as they used to be.  Still working 
within mine action, he acknowledges that most accidents or incidences are 
isolated and far in between.  He believed that it would take less than 2 years for 
Somaliland to be mine/UXO free. 
This shifting completion deadlines also added to people’s suspicions alarming 
even those working within the Sector. For example Mark Belford noted that the 
figures’ in spite of all the clearance efforts, did not add up; the area remaining to 
be cleared seems remain constant.  He explained: 
In the two years that I have been here, the length of time that it is going 
to take to clear hasn’t actually reduced.  HALO Trust is still talking of 4 or 
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5 to 6 years. They were saying that two years ago when I got here. This 
is one area that is of interest; the figures in the annual report and those 
from the LIS figures don’t really collate, the amount of land left to clear 
from 2 years ago was may be 20KM2 as listed in the HALO report; this 
was also reported by SMAC and is what was in the database. You then 
look at the HALO clearance records and they report to have cleared 15 
KM2 but they are still saying they still got about 20KM2 to clear. I would 
think that within the LIS there were estimates on the area because that 
was part of what they did and it was very unclear.  However, when the 
verification survey and benchmark survey and some of the areas are 
discredited area on accepted as SHA you still get discredited area. (This 
could be called reduced area as opposed to discredited). I can see why 
there are reasons for inaccuracy but why we’ve done much clearance 
according to the reports for the last two years and we actually haven’t 
gone down in terms of square kilometres, I don’t know because we’ve 
reduced so many SHAs under the benchmark survey. No I don’t know 
(Mark Belford; October 2012) 
SMAC reported that there are more than eighty minefields in Somaliland, sixty-
three of which were reported to have been confirmed. The majority of these 
minefields are found near the Ethiopian border (MNPP, 2011). As of 2012, the 
Landmine Monitor reported that  Galbeed, Togdheer, and Woqooyi are the most 
heavily affected regions in terms of accidents and casualties (ICBL-CMC, 
2011).  The areas where conflict has previously prevented any meaningful 
clearance activities from taking place such Sanag, Haag area and Todgheer 
and the border region with Ethiopia remain highly contaminated.  According to 
Rory Logan, Programmes Manager of HALO Trust, the only organisation in 
Somaliland that is actively carrying out demining, a lot of the work is on-going in 
these parts of the country.  Recently HALO Trust has opened up a new base in 
Burao in order to address access in that part of the country; Burao is the capital 
of the Togdheer district, and is bordered by Ethiopia to the South, and the 
regions of Woqooyi and Galbeed to the West, Sanaag and Sool to the East. 
A lot of clearance work is to the West of Somaliland. One of the reasons 
is that there was a lot of contamination due to the fighting that actually 
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happened in this area. Security in the eastern part was not necessarily 
always conducive for us to engage in work. Also this year we have 
started clearing these areas in Western Sool with a view to raising our 
profile in the area. (Rory Logan; HALO Trust Program Manager 2012; 
Interviewed in Hargeisa on 25th Sept 2012). 
The evidence indicates that the contamination and the remaining challenge are 
within manageable levels.  However, the Sector, and specifically HALO Trust 
and SMAC, are unwilling to establish a specific timeframe for the cessation their 
efforts.  
Within a post conflict setting such as Somaliland, managing perceptions 
requires that the messages an organisation projects are consistent throughout 
the organisation, and across contexts. The sector, particularly the UN and 
HALO Trust, lacks a systematic approach of assessing their humanitarian 
operations through the eyes of recipients.   By contrast, far more positive 
actions have been taken by other sector actors such as DDG who incorporated 
the perceptions of the communities in guiding and informing their work.   
The view of those interviewed was that the presence of a high number of 
demining organisations over a long period equates to less contamination and 
therefore a diminished need for mine action (See APPENDIX 5: A TIMELINE of 
MINE/UXO RELATED EVENTS AND ISSUES IN SOMALILAND). Mark Belford, 
also acknowledges that: 
The actual landmine impact on Somaliland is decreasing through 
clearance and through the operations that have been conducted so far 
(Mark Belford).  
His view was shared by most of those interviewed, who believe that, after 20 
years of constant demining work, the threat should now be low or non-existent.  
Indeed as early as 2001 the Landmine Monitor began to report that Somaliland 
was 7 years away from being declared mine free.  This however came with a 
caveat that to achieve that status the prevailing funding levels and clearance 
activity at the time were to be maintained (Landmine Monitor 2001).   
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There is however an acknowledgement that there is a residual problem of 
mines/UXOs, but that these levels of contamination are low.  Mr Boube Yusuf 
Duale, accepts that he may not be fully aware of the number of mines/UXOs 
present in his country, but argues that over time and given what he thinks has 
been invested, the problem should have been addressed fully.   
I don’t know the number of mines we had but by 20 years, the amount of 
mines that have been cleared by what has been invested, I think by now 
they should have cleared everything (Boube Yusuf Duale)    
These views support the pragmatic perspective taken by DDG in recognising 
that within the communities that they had worked with, or close by, mines had 
become an insignificant factor in the lives of the communities, who have 
developed (as yet not really understood) coping mechanisms to deal with the 
presence of mines and which posed a lower level of risk to those communities 
than the presence of small arms, or indeed the presence of a main road close 
by, with fast moving vehicles. 
Nick Bateman summarised the impact as follows: 
 Somaliland is not and was not Cambodia.  There is not a desperate 
attempt of pushing to land or wanting to return to it. And even with the 
roads, there was a big thing made of road closures but that’s just how it 
is like in Somaliland.  The roads are sort of 2km wide in many areas 
because there are so many diversions. I can hardly think of a single 
community in my 10 years of engagement there that was genuinely 
isolated because of landmines or whatever else that was there.  (Nick 
Bateman).  
In terms of peace writ large, it has been acknowledged that support from local 
actors is essential; similarly, it is important that international actors are sensitive 
to how their policies and policy choices shape and affect local perceptions.  I 
have argued elsewhere that the perception of Somaliland people matters a lot 
and as (Talentino, 2007) has argued “perception seems to matter a great deal 
in the arena of nation and peacebuilding”. The humanitarian sector in general 
and the Mine Action Sector in particular have highlighted the important fact that 
peacebuilding and Mine Action  are more than technical exercises in creating 
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political structures (for peacebuilding) or removing mines on the ground (for 
mine action);  it is also about teaching people to believe and to build trust as 
failure to secure the trust and confidence of the affected population in the 
demining operation can negate most of the impact such an operation might 
have.    
Therefore, as observed by one of the interviewees, when the needs (in general) 
were obvious, then the responses by the international community were targeted 
and responded to the needs of the Somaliland people at that time.  The 
priorities were in sync with those of the beneficiaries.  The same is true for mine 
action in relation to the impact or potential to be perceived by the local 
community as contributing positively to peace.  
THE SECTORS’ OPERATIONAL PRACTISES 
The Sector primarily operates as though the State does not exist meaning that 
there is no recognition whatsoever of the structures that exist.  This means that 
the government does not feel obliged to be involved in Mine Action.  Macrae 
(1999) recognised that such an approach which fails to operate through the 
state breaches the traditional idea that accountability of aid rests upon the 
recipient state sanctioning and monitoring aid flows (1999, p. xv).  Thus, apart 
from violating accepted codes of humanitarian conduct, on a political level this 
approach undermines the Keynesian social welfare state ethos and social 
contract that states are, or should be, responsible for service provision (Schuller 
2009, p.86).  In this instance therefore, The Sector, especially the NGOs, ‘lets 
them off the hook’, by allowing them to shirk their governmental responsibilities; 
this is clear even when the government pledges funding – it does not honour 
this.   The Sector thus garners its legitimacy and power from its ability to raise 
funds, usually from outside the country, rather than from any social contract with 
the local people.  The result of this can range from resentment of organisations 
to situations where communities just accept what is available because there is 
no choice.  For example, Ahmed acknowledged that Mine Action was donor 
driven and not based on national priority however in its absence the funding 
would be put elsewhere; 
The donors’ mind is set few years down the road on mine action and if 
HALO Trust leaves now, those funds will not be directed into other things 
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that are useful for us they will just dry up. And we won’t get any.  So as 
long as far as we are concerned  for as  long as HALO Trust is here and 
is got funding, then they can do what they want as without them we 
probably won’t get that funding anyway. Which is such a pity. 
The UN’s:  Neutrality and impartiality approach 
The UN is fundamentally guided by the principles of humanitarian assistance, 
namely, humanity, neutrality and impartiality (General Assembly resolution 
46/182).  This principle has been translated by the Mine Action governing 
structures (IASG) that  “as a matter of principle, the military and civil defence 
assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in 
combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities”.  This principle is 
part of the United Nations policy on mine action (A/53/496, Annex II, para. 10, 
dated 14 October 1998) which the General Assembly welcomed at its fifty-third 
session (A/RES/53/26 dated 13 November 1998).  Hence even though most UN 
mine action projects are focused on the development of a government’s 
capacity to manage a national mine action programme, as a rule the emphasis 
is on the creation of indigenous mine action NGOs rather than to adapt or 
enhance an existing related capacity within host nation military organisations, 
this is pursuant to policies that desist from providing assistance to former 
belligerents including armed forces and ministry of defence of the host nations 
and the opposing former insurgent armed combatants.  
 I think there might have been a few externalised internationals trying to 
push the quality of NDA but as far as we know the history of the NDA has 
been part of the army and then part of the military defence and now part 
of the ministry of interior and the NDA has been one of these posts that 
government promote to give good positions out with not much effort to 
these positions.  (Mark Belford; October 2012)  
Similarly this meant that opportunities to build on existing capacity through the 
utilisation of a well-established pool of experienced deminers that had been 
trained was not utilised.  This means that resources are wasted in training as 
was observed by this interviewee; it also raises a security concern as the mine 
action training involves the use of explosives: 
 
 
269 
 
Another factor on capacity was the training that takes place every time 
the Sector trains a group of deminers; what people are worried, you have 
hired a lot of people, you train them to international standards.  
Whenever there is need to hire new people after you have got funds, you 
should give priority to those you have trained or other agencies have 
trained.  Don’t start from scratch every time. (Abdikadir Jirde) 
Similarly when DDG wound down its demining programme, it provided a list of 
trained deminers to HALO Trust in the hope that they would absorb the existing 
capacity.  This was not taken up and instead HALO Trust was still training the 
NDA deminers even at the time of this research.  There is no doubt that a 
considerable amount of resources goes into these trainings. 
Thus, UNDP could not work for or contribute to the mine action capacity that 
existed through the Pioneers that had been trained by RIMFIRE and that had 
established National Demining Authority.  This is because it could be seen as 
having provided assistance to belligerents even though they outline that it is 
imperative that there are cooperative and collaborative arrangements with 
national institutions so long as they do not hinder the United Nation’s neutrality 
and impartiality.  The need to be neutral therefore meant that they could not 
utilise this capacity and instead set up a parallel Somaliland Mine Action.  This 
set UNDP with a collision path with the government, as a result mine action 
coordination suffered from repeated friction between the government of 
Somaliland and UNDP and both bodies became ineffective due to the lack of 
clear separation of responsibilities and clear mandate.  This impasse caused 
intermittent (UNDP) funding, poor political will and the lack of a legal basis for 
the SMAC and NDA and therefore their effectiveness in the management and 
coordination mine action.   The UN’s role was characterised by slow 
mobilisation of resources and a reactive approach, which are totally 
inappropriate to the context. Today, the capacity of SMAC remains weak with 
budgetary allocations still under the mandate of the UN and not under their 
direct management. 
The ‘community’ has often proven to be resilient in contexts of post conflict 
reconstruction, providing survival and coping mechanisms for insecurity and 
fragility. Mine Action, especially the role of the Humanitarian Pioneers corps, 
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illustrated that even in areas of sheer desolation, life and organisational 
systems can readily re-emerge within communities.  However, the Sector 
through the UN, disregarded and overlooked this resilience and the available 
local resources.  This has been  observed by Skåra who has argued that “local 
capacities [for mine action] are too often disregarded and overlooked” (Skåra, 
2003 p. 292). Similarly with the UN insisting on working with just SMAC, it 
portrayed their lack of lack of appreciation for the coping mechanisms that the 
local communities had demonstrated and their efforts through the HMPC to 
clear mines. Such arrogance by aid workers was noted by Donini (2009) who in 
reference to Afghanistan argues that the sometimes arrogant externality of the 
aid enterprise led to dominant–dominated perceptions. 
Funding remains scarce for SMAC, also funding is required for the NDA to 
become operational as explained by Mark Belford, who attributes the lack of 
funding to issues around accountability and transparency: 
The problem is that they don’t have a budget for it so there is a problem 
on that side.  The NDA coordination mechanism, command structure is 
still being developed.  The deminers are very good but they are using 
HALO Trust equipment and I think they might be paid by HALO Trust.  
NDA doesn’t have the coordination mechanism, operation mechanism in 
the office so that needs to be established.  The main thing is the funding 
mechanism.  It has to have a government funded mechanism. 
International agency is not ready to give NDA money because there is no 
transparency as to who is receiving the money and producing results.  If 
you’ve got an entire list of 50 mine fields that you need to clear then you 
go to the international community to give you the money to do it and you 
end up not doing it, then there is no accountability and transparency.  
The main thing is to build the confidence to have a central government 
funding to say 3 teams to do 3 tasks per month.  We expect to get them 
done within this period if we get the money.  If there is a reason why you 
can’t do them then you just need to explain it. (Mark Belford; October 
2012). 
However, SMAC attributed the lack of financial support for NDA to the UN’s 
policy of neutrality meaning that they do not fund mine action agencies under 
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the authority of a Ministry of Defence (Landmine Monitor, 2008 citing an 
Interview with Dr. Ahmed Ali Mah, SMAC, Hargeisa, 16 February 2008.)   
Although not an invested ‘party’ to the conflict in the traditional sense, by the 
very fact that they are engaged in the context the UN (and the Sector’s) role as 
a third party becomes a part of the political landscape that defines the conflict. 
Even where due diligence is taken when implementing programmes, given the 
historical association of humanitarian aid in Somalia, for the UN or the Sector to 
perceive impartiality of their actions and the neutrality of their identity is what 
has been labelled  a self-created fantasy. The politics of conflict are an 
inescapable, omnipresent reality third parties ignore at their peril and to the 
detriment of others.  
Although no specific threat to mine action in Somaliland, in Somalia, Al 
Shabaab has previously accused and forced Mine Action organisations in south 
central Somalia to cease operations in areas under their control.  The 
accusation labelled against UNMAS is that it is paying the salaries of 
government police officers.  The group accused the UN of attempting to disrupt 
peace and justice by bribing various community elders and inciting them to 
rebel against the Islamic administration; Furthermore, “they have been 
surveying and sign-posting some of the most vital and sensitive areas under the 
control of the Mujahideen," (Omar, 2009 online).  
Lack of conflict sensitive approach to interventions   
There is a need for external actors, whether in humanitarian mine action or 
peacebuilding, to think through the implications and ramifications of their work in 
order to forestall or minimise unintended consequences and maximise positive 
peacebuilding and confidence-building effects.  In so doing, they employ a 
conflict sensitive approach to their interventions; this means the ability of an 
organisation to: understand the context in which you operate; understand the 
interaction between their activities and the context; and act upon the 
understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and 
maximise positive impacts.  
The Sector, although operating within the humanitarian assistance rubric, has 
neither embraced its own framework – Bad Honnef Guidelines on Mine Action - 
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nor incorporated lessons from the work of Mary Anderson’s approach on Do No 
Harm. Only one of those interviewed made reference to the Bad Honnef 
guidelines for mine action and that was because they had participated in the 
drafting. None of the Sector actors had ever heard of them.  Questions 
regarding the same were met with responses like:  
 Maybe my HR would know about such guidelines;  
Another response was:  
In most cases, practices developed by most agencies are shared.  Maybe they 
are new. 
Apart from individual awareness of conflict sensitive programming there does 
not seem to be a great effort towards this. In spite of conflict sensitivity being 
implied in most of the organisations that were interviewed, out of all those 
interviewed within the various organisations, none made reference to the ‘Do 
No Harm principles’ and during an informal conversation with a senior manager 
within the Sector, the response to my use of the term indicated the obvious fact 
that the person had never heard of the term.  Indeed in a different informal 
discussion – the person made reference to a line of discussion as to ‘oh similar 
to Sarah’s Do No Harm approach’.  In yet another conversation with a different 
senior manager within the sector, the response was – ‘I do not deal with that 
part of the work, it would be best for you to refer to XYZ’, as they are the ones 
who are best informed’ a clear indication that such principles are not 
mainstreamed within the Sector.  
Programming for mine action lacked such an understanding and though there is 
evidence of efforts to track conflict, it appears that this was mainly driven by 
concerns for security and safety of the organisation and its assets rather than 
the need to track the interventions to identify patterns and trends that were 
presenting challenges.  If this was at all part of the intentions it was not clarified 
and was minimal at best.    
At the beginning of their interventions in Somaliland, both DDG and HALO Trust 
employed local staff at demining sites for the duration of a task; deminers, 
cooks, security and others were recruited from the local communities.  They 
would then undergo training, with deminers going through a specified period of 
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intensive training; a local deminer or anyone working at the site could have 
expected to work for 6-12 months while the team was working at this location.  
This had both a negative and positive impact; it was an important factor for the 
provision of local employment opportunities for those living in these 
communities.   Such instances are inevitable in a resource strained context 
where opportunities for employment are scarce. Using a political economy 
approach, some of the challenges that the Sector has experienced would have 
been teased out, for example the extent to which the communities inflate the 
mine action incidents with a view to getting the Sector engaged in their 
communities. Mine clearance agencies were at times been denied access 
whenever jobs were not negotiated beforehand and thus access is used as a 
political tool.  
They view those mines and the NGO (you know the aids circus) as an 
economic opportunity.  So, at the beginning of every task we would have 
to send out senior Somali guys going to the areas for negotiation with the 
local elders. We negotiate how many jobs they would get for the 
duration.  If we hadn’t done that there is not a chance they would let us 
anywhere near those mines.  So negotiation was done. And all the 
various clans and sub-clans were happy that they would get a bit of the 
spoils. And that would be we would employ 20 locals for 8 months, 6 to 
the clans, 4 to the sub-clans. They would sort all that out determine the 
split.  I think they just basically laughed at us behind our backs (Nick 
Bateman). 
One of the areas I encountered that was not addressed at all was the issue of 
how the work of the sector was likely to impact on resources such as land and 
land rights.  Research has shown that mine clearance is likely to impact land 
rights as post-conflict and conflict-affected countries have weak or non-existent 
property enforcement in place to deal with land conflicts and this can lead to 
instability and land grabbing. Humanitarian and development organisations 
cannot use neutrality as an excuse to avoid dealing with land issues. Removing 
landmines raises the risks of raising competition and even violence over land 
ownership. Answers given by the various Sector actors regarding how this is 
addressed revealed that it is not considered important at all.  
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As evidenced in this quote:  
Each community needs to have a system in place that when the land has 
been cleared or is being cleared, there must be a record of who owns it.  
Because that land needs to go back to the owner for their use.  Good 
governance, good rule of law, good community practices should tell you 
who owns the land.  It is not for the clearance agency to tell you who 
owns the land.  We determine through SMAC who the land belongs to.  
The national authority (SMAC) would hand the land for clearance and 
ensure it is done to required standards and hand back to the owner. 
(Graeme UNMAS) 
Although the issue of land ownership post demining is not a huge issue, the 
lack of reflection and action planning is indicative of the potential of reversing 
the progress made by humanitarian and development organisations by 
releasing land haphazardly.  The Sector indicated that they tended to be 
unaware of the exact status of contaminated land (i.e., legal status, ownership, 
etc.) before commencing work in an area. This also meant that they generally 
did not know how survey and clearance affected adjacent land and land rights 
once they have handed over an area to a community. Some believe that 
because they do not encounter many land disputes during survey and 
clearance, land problems are therefore few or minor.  An intervention that is 
conflict-sensitive would have identified and anticipated such constraints and 
factored in ways to ensure that such areas of potential conflict were covered. 
This lack of foresight in relation to conflict sensitivity was also reflected by 
Handicap International. In response to a question on the extent to which conflict 
sensitive programming informed their actions the program manager responded 
that:  
We do not necessarily engage in conflict programming. Our mandate is 
straightforward to create awareness and that’s it.  Social-economic 
impact or any other impact comes as a by-product of that.  It is not like a 
main requirement (Charles Ameso, Handicap International Programme 
Manager, interviewed in Hargeisa on 24th November 2010). 
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The Sector is embedded in the interconnected nature of the post-conflict 
contexts which are usually exacerbated by scarce resources.  Thus external 
actors are usually (though not always) the bearers of new resources, in the form 
of contracts, employment, development projects, and humanitarian aid. Thus 
these actors, many of whom are external actors, need to be cognisant of this 
context as their point of departure (Sending, 2009b). To operate in such 
contexts the Sector needs to appreciate that everything is political, and 
therefore it is vital that they understand how interventions are perceived in the 
immediate local situation. This means that context is very important in the 
shaping of their programmes. Thus, in tandem with working towards achieving a 
peaceful end result, the programmes need to be well implemented as even very 
careful, well-informed strategies for negotiating resource allocation can easily 
set off communal clashes. When outsiders are not well-informed or are rushed, 
they may in effect contribute to armed violence.   
One of the interviewees highlighted the ignorance of international actors in 
accepting the political realities that they work within.  This illustrated that there is 
some level of acceptance of these realities and some effort to work within them. 
One informant specifically underlined the importance of knowing and 
understanding not only the national perspective, but also the micro-dynamics of 
the situation. 
I suppose it depends because mine action is such a broad range of 
activities as well as peacebuilding involves a broad line of activities. An 
activity might not be related to peace building at all but because of the 
situation, it does. In Somaliland, removal of explosives in communities, 
increases stability but that doesn’t necessarily bring peace building 
(Tammy Orr, UNMAS) 
The need for a conflict-sensitive approach had long been recognised by the 
Sector globally when the ‘Bad Honeff guidelines’ for mine action were 
developed. However, none of the interviewees engaged within the Sector had 
ever heard of the guidelines.   Instead, those addressing conflict did so as a 
result of their intrinsic practical attributes. 
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National ownership and local capacity  
Brinkerhoff draws attention to the shortfalls of ‘stand-alone’ operations which 
‘fail to integrate with country practices and procedures’ (2010, p.70).  He argues 
that the propensity for bypassing capacity development at the local level is 
‘heightened by the emphasis on assistance templates that assign performance 
roles to external actors in situations where capacity is weak’ (Brinkerhoff 2010, 
p.70). 
Most UN mine action projects are focused on the development of a 
government’s capacity to manage a national mine action programme, and of 
implementing agencies established to execute the mine action plan. The lack of 
a recognised government with the capacity to develop a mine action authority 
has prevented this approach in Somaliland for various reasons; mainly financial 
incapacity to do this, lack of political will, and the fact that mine action is not a 
priority. The UN takes a very patronising attitude in regard to SMAC, they are 
viewed as unable to stand on their own feet, and raise their own funds; they 
don’t know what they are doing.  Whichever UN body happened to be taking the 
lead role in Somaliland (either UNOPS or UNDP or UNMAS) failed to see or 
even think or allow SMAC to be an independent, self-sustaining, domestic 
entity. It thought of them as outgrowths of the UN. 
This is their initiative but for ownership, we are in charge. They are the 
administration and they are accountable to their government. Their 
engagement is much better than it is in some other countries. (Senior 
UNMAS official) 
Though it has proven to be difficult to determine how the UN determines when a 
MAC has developed sufficient capacity to function with reduced assistance or 
even without UN or other donor assistance. According to the UN: 
‘indigenous capacity is achieved when the indigenous entities have 
acquired the capacity to define  and articulate overall policy and 
direction, to co-ordinate, and manage a programme that is capable of 
addressing the humanitarian implications of landmines, to generate and 
allocate resources in line with, clearly defined priorities, and are able to 
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ensure that the overall endeavour is accountable and undertaken in a 
cost-effective manner’ (Eaton et al., 1997 p. 29)  
Significant questions remain over the development of capacity to govern mine 
activities by national authorities; According to a government official:  
Though a lot of local people have been trained, I still don’t think they 
have that capacity yet. The people are just given basic information but 
not the technical bit of it.  (Mohamed Ahmed Mohamoud; Senior Official 
in charge of Internal Security, Ministry of Interior)  
The National Mine Action Centre (itself probably a focus for capacity building – 
see below) may be able to advise on the correct procedures. In this way the 
contractor will create good working teams with experienced local managers, 
with a good working relationship with the National Mine Action Centre and, 
perhaps, even the government. These operational capacities can function very 
well when the international NGOs are still in place. It is through them that the 
local teams will get their funding, their tasking and the supervision. The 
Situation within the Sector has created  what Brinkerhoff’s (2010) analysis calls 
the ‘two-track problem’ of service delivery and public sector capacity building, 
whereby the ‘two tracks of NGOs and government have fundamentally different 
strategies and time frames’, meaning that when the Sector staff exit, the country 
projects have no further viability (p.70). Similarly, donor aid for mine action is 
generally short-term.  
So the international demining agencies are the shakers and the movers.  
They are the people who come up with the funds and programs will 
happen with supervision.  Even with the presence of a ministerial board 
chaired by the Vice President, which sets the policy.  Demining is 
actually done by the international NGOs – HALO Trust, DDG, Minetech, 
and St Barbara.  When funds dry up, they pack and go or leave some 
skeletal staff. They come and go depending on funds availability 
(Abdikadir Jirde) 
Somaliland has now seen concerted Mine Action programmes for nearly two 
decades.  Unfortunately over this period the reality is that there isn’t a local 
institution that has been empowered enough to take up the role once the 
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international organisations have left.  Unfortunately, it has been demonstrated 
that international attention, effort, and financial commitment cannot be 
sustained for as long as is required.  The NDA still works under the supervision 
of HALO Trust, though the manpower needed for undertaking demining may be 
available, the ability of the organisations to thrive, to fundraise and to manage 
on their own has not been nurtured. Indeed as noted by this senior UN official, 
supporting the NDA is just a by-product and not a priority: 
As we move inside, we are also looking at supporting the police EOD 
teams in terms of capacity development, equipment and training.  The 
full aspect of our support requirement is to be in discussion with 
peacemakers to induce the political mood information clearance in terms 
of national strategies, national policies documentation and the rules and 
guidelines for legislation and things like that.  As a by-product, we are 
also looking at supporting the NDA.  That has got to be the national 
capacity in terms of migrants and development of teams who are 
supported financially through the Somaliland government but 
operationally they are supported by HALO Trust for training and 
deployment.  (Graeme Draemu Abernethy; Programme Coordinator, 
UNSOMA, 15th December 2010, UNOPS offices, Nairobi) 
 Prof Ahmed Essa reflects on the lack of capacity after 20 years of Mine Action 
intervention in Somaliland; 
We started with international NGOs saying that the capacity is not there 
and that is how SMAC came about, UNDP capacitating SMAC.  HALO 
Trust & DDG all of them worked with SMAC. 20 years later to say the 
capacity is still not there doesn’t make any sense at all. Then there is a 
failure from the international organisations who were trying to capacitate 
these groups or it is the local people who were not stepping up to the 
role. It’s a failure to say the same thing that was said 20 years ago.  20 
years on we are still talking about capacity building for SMAC and 
building the capacity of the NDA.  We are running around in circles and 
are not being sincere. (Ahmed Essa)   
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The lack of capacity is used by the Sector as a justification for a longer role with 
the continued presence of international actors being justified; the result reduces 
the credibility and legitimacy of the Sector which in the eyes of the communities.  
I mean in terms of genuinely building the capacity of the Somalis to 
manage the problem it didn’t change in 10 years.  SMAC was as inept 
and under-skilled when I left in 2007 as it was 10/12 years before. And 
that I’m afraid was the downfall because that is what UNDP was there 
for.  And I think it’s disingenuous of them if they were ever to claim that 
they had leading or primary role in Somaliland (Nick Bateman) 
This will consequently have meant that the peacebuilding potential for Mine 
Action is weakened and as such the effort will be perceived to have failed; even 
if effective from an institutional point of view, it is likely to simply increase the 
sense of resentment and extent of disassociation as  Talentino (2007) has 
argued.  It is important to note though that DDG had originally focused on 
establishing a mine-clearance capacity that the Somaliland government would 
take over, this was abandoned when they realised that the capacity of mine 
action within the government was unlikely to be developed or effectively 
sustained (Wertz, 2006).  The intention of a phased out hand over to the 
National Demining Agency (NDA) was to be as follows. To position a senior 
DDG local staff as Head of Operations Manager with NDA by the end of 2003; 
to transfer two mine clearance sections to NDA by mid-2004 and to then 
transfer the remaining two mine clearance sections at the end of 2004.   
Political obstacles remained, in terms of full acceptance of this concept by the 
government, in particular due to the then head of NDA, who was widely viewed 
as lacking the requisite skills to fulfil his role as head of a national agency.  His 
post was reportedly “assured” due to his high-level political contacts.  Thus,  
and whilst DDG was keen to hand over assets and contribute to the building of 
a true national capacity, this remained effectively stymied until such time as a 
new or  more appropriately qualified head of NDA,  who had the support of the 
Somaliland mine action community and international donors, was appointed. 
Past experiences of humanitarian organisations in Somalia seem to manifest 
themselves in the Mine Action Sector.  The past was characterised by deep 
grievances which were not helped by the fact that the international actors 
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continually paid lip services to the agency of capacity building for local NGOs; 
and did not appreciate the achievements of local NGOs had gained under 
difficult circumstances and instead highlighted their weakness. There was little 
or no involvement of local actors despite the rhetoric of capacity-building by UN 
agencies and international NGOs. The international agencies perceived the 
local NGOs as clan-based contractors whose claim to represent the local 
communities was put to task (Abdillahi, 1997). Within the Sector, this has not 
changed. 
Failure to understand the local context 
A well-recognised critique is that aid agencies are weak on contextual 
understanding and analysis to support their programming in conflict-affected 
countries.  This critique remains relevant to the Mine Action Sector; evidence 
from donor reports indicate that these were done as requirements and nothing 
contextual and substantive was put into them.  Going through most of these 
reports, there were patterns that emerged that an astute programme manager 
or donor interested in context analysis would have picked up.  This is indicative 
of a weak contextual analysis as some occurrences had been recorded in 
several reports; and basic information on the context was repeated in every 
report year in year out.  Similarly, some informants highlighted that there was 
lack of understanding of the specific contexts in which mine action programmes 
were implemented which required that the situation be carefully analysed in all 
its specificities, taking into account local knowledge.   
Familiarity with local contexts is crucial for various reasons: a nuanced 
understanding of the specific conditions of each place of intervention, the 
motivations of each party, the patterns of alliance and conflict at play, the 
history of antagonisms. Similarly in-depth knowledge of local histories cultures, 
traditions and attitudes would enable the actors to adapt foreign or standardised 
ideas to the context specific conditions during programme design (Mac Ginty 
2008).  
Donor reports that intend to give an illustration of how the organisations analyse 
conflict tend to describe the conflicts very briefly in terms of conflict history but 
with limited analysis of the root causes or political and other dynamic triggers of 
violent conflict (see APPENDIX 7: AN EXCERPT FROM A DONOR REPORT). 
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Some of the paragraphs in the analyses of the conflicts are cut and pasted from 
one programme or project to the next one, representing missed opportunities to 
refine the analysis and the tools of the new project. Comprehensive and 
systematic analysis of a conflict will obviously encourage the development of 
projects that use and design their tools to address the dynamics and root 
causes of conflicts, and should lead to greater effect.   
Failure to understand the local context can be attributed to strategic short-
sightedness stemming from short-term missions and employment policies of 
international organisations. The high turnover means that there is a lack of 
general information, clear commentary, and leadership  particularly by the 
United Nations as highlighted by (Donini, 2012 p. 107).  It also contributes to the 
lack of contextual knowledge by the Sector especially amongst the expatriate 
staff who had the leadership roles, an inherent problem of transient leadership 
and minimal local knowledge. A problem that  Fast et al. (2013)  identified as a 
leading cause of success in complex humanitarian actions being incremental at 
best.  This problem has resulted in loss of institutional learning especially with 
every departure of a Programme Manager.  This was a common problem 
across the Sector and was not limited to any one organisation.  This loss of 
institutional learning was highlighted when I emailed a former Programme 
Manager for DDG seeking clarification of a specific key event in the life of the 
programme. The response received indicated a total lack of awareness of a 
crucial element within the programme.  It appears that programme managers 
did not get an introduction to the history of programmes so as to understand the 
context of the programmes they were taking on.  Similarly, upon their departure, 
any reports written during their time left with them.  The organisations had no 
physical archives for reports etc. and these were only available where the 
respective people had stored them in their personal PCs and were happy to 
share with me.  
Similarly the Sector did not always make use of the experiences of former 
actors.  RIMFIRE had provided the actors that followed with valuable lessons on 
engaging with the local communities amongst other areas.  It however appears 
that lessons were not learnt, and some problems, including labour related 
issues, continually dogged mine clearance organisations.  Similarly as well as 
 
 
282 
 
making the failure of the international community in Somalia as a good starting 
point for all RIMFIRE with all its failures managed to take Mine action in 
Somaliland from a humanitarian emergency to a hindrance to economic 
development and, to a certain extent, social engagement. 
During the period of preparing for my data collection and being in the field, 
HALO Trust had had 3 changes in programme managers, and DDG had 2.  I 
could not trace any person who had worked with UNMAS for longer than a year 
and there was only one individual within the UN who I managed to interview 
during both field visits.  During my second visit he was finishing and leaving for 
another assignment.  Such turnover negatively affects community trust in an 
organisation, relationships within the organisation and with external entities, and 
the ability to implement effective programmes.  
MINE ACTION VIZ A VIZ OTHER PRIORITIES  
In the late 1990’s when the ‘Bad Honeff ‘guidelines were being drafted, mine 
action was considered a key element of development; this has somehow failed 
to be operationalised. Although landmines have long been considered an issue 
of safety and security, the UN emphasises integration of mine clearance in 
broader national programs for reconstruction and development (Harpviken and 
Isaksen, 2004; UNGA, 2004). In most mine affected countries, mine clearance 
is largely conducted apart from peacebuilding and development because it is 
considered a highly technical sector, whose practitioners often have military 
backgrounds (Harpviken and Isaksen, 2004; Kjellman et al., 2003). 
Somaliland is a context where conflict is beyond the immediacy of dealing with 
anti-personnel mines or cluster munitions, as other human security concerns 
have become a more nuanced development issue. Out of the 45 interviewees, 
none of them thought mine action was a priority; in a scale of 1-10, where 1 was 
the top priority, mine action was listed at 7 and below. None of them thought it 
was even as high as 5.   
Although the political context of non-recognition limits the extent to which the 
government engages in mine action; I also view the lack of engagement as an 
illustration of the acknowledgement that the government does not see mine 
action as a priority and hence their failure to incorporate the requirement for 
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demining some of the areas.  Jessica Buchanan, reflecting on the challenges 
they were encountering in having Mine Risk Education incorporated in the 
curriculum, came to the same conclusion:  
Come to think of it, the lack of engagement by the government is a really 
good point.  Maybe that’s something that we should have to step back 
and ask, what are they really saying?  Maybe they are saying it’s not all 
that important.  Even though SMAC believes it’s very important, but at 
the same time they task us (DDG) to pursue the curriculum with the 
government.  They have the motivation, however, it is their job to liaise 
with the government and yet they are asking us? Are they saying there is 
a problem here so we need to prove it by getting this curriculum in? 
(Jessica Buchanan, DDG) 
Mine Action is undertaken amidst a myriad of other complex developmental and 
humanitarian needs facing Somaliland, therefore the question that needs 
addressing is whether Mine Action can continue using ‘isolated intervention’ 
where the primary goal is removing mines from the ground and reducing the 
impact of mines to the communities, in the face of many other challenges (2003 
p. 943).  HALO Trust is the only remaining organisation in Somaliland 
undertaking demining and has traditionally maintained such a policy especially 
in Somaliland. Indeed, HALO Trust’s Executive Director has argued against 
treating mine action like other humanitarian disasters that need a full blown 
“multi-layered” response. He has previously argued that ‘drought, flooding, 
hurricanes, HIV/AIDS are recurring, mines are not’ an argument that he 
presented on the eve of the MBT Review conference (Willoughby, 2004 online).    
HALO Trust’s operationalisation of mine action seems to disregard the caution 
by Horwood that mine action should not just be interested in returning land to 
the communities in a non-contaminated state without necessarily addressing 
other social issues.  This he argues is a potential weakness in pursuing an 
‘isolated intervention’ with mine action being disengaged from development and 
socio-political contexts (Horwood, 2003 p. 943).  Southern Craib, defended 
HALO Trust’s position in relation to concentrating on just mine clearance; he 
uses an analogy of a Taxi company and argues that:   
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HALO Trust is a mine clearance organisation. It is not an education or 
health organisation. I think HALO will question the validity of continued 
risk education and rightfully so frankly. What surprises me to a degree is 
this accusation that is levelled against HALO.  It’s rather like saying, 
Hargeisa Best Taxi Company, they only provide taxis, maybe they should 
get involved in selling pizzas, they are a taxi company, if they wanted to 
sell pizzas they would be a pizza company. HALO Trust is a mine 
Clearance organisation that’s what it does, and does very well, why are 
people surprised that they don’t do other things if they did other things, if 
they wouldn’t be HALO Trust they would be Oxfam.  At most times I miss 
the point. Therefore I think they are justified to stick to what they do best, 
mine clearance. 
As a reflection that mine action is donor driven, this interviewee felt that HALO 
Trust was justified in doing more if the donors requested they do more; then his 
argument is that the organisation should oblige:   
I do understand particular donors e.g. DFID significant in the HALO Trust 
situation want to see more evidence of mine action being linked to follow 
on development. The old argument that it is about casualty reduction is 
less and less accepted. So donors and DFID are examples of those who 
want to see more tangible evidence of benefits, economic or otherwise 
for all mine clearance and HALO have traditionally argued against it. 
They very famously took DFID to court over the award of the contract in 
Cambodia and they lost. I don’t think the case was thrown out, it wasn’t 
even heard. But they will continue to argue that they are better off doing 
what they are good at rather than they are watering down with other 
things that are being done by others. I don’t think that is necessarily a 
bad argument. However I do think it’s relatively sensible if a donor asks 
for something then if you try and provide it for them you are likely to have 
more success. Other clearance agencies will largely give the donor what 
donors want. This avoids conflict with donors. HALO will argue its 
position and on occasions end up in court. 
Indeed the court case that he refers too was filed by HALO Trust on the 
grounds that neither it nor the other bidders had been told whether, and if so 
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how much of the budget could be spent on development rather than de-mining.  
This in HALO’s view was in breach of the general principles of transparency and 
equal treatment in EU law.  Despite what HALO felt about DFID’s inclusion of 
an imprecise demand for development activity alongside de-mining, DFID won 
the case on the grounds that they need under certain circumstances to enter 
into a new contract in a short period of time (BRODIES LLM, 2011 p. 47).  The 
Mines Advisory Group was awarded the contract as they have a broader focus 
on mine clearance. 
A similar view by a HALO Trust programme manager at the time was: 
Our mandate is to get the mines off the ground. We were set up as an 
organisation which specialises in saving the lives and limbs of poor 
people in countries that can be able to benefit from our clearance. The 
policy of the organisation is that mine clearance is a precursor of 
development. What we do has massive impact on development activity 
here. What we make very clear and we do not believe should happen is 
that allocated funding should be put towards development because there 
is just too much mine clearance to do. What I personally and HALO Trust 
position is, is that if the donor want to put money toward mine clearance 
then it should be used for that.  (Rory Logan, HALO Trust Programme 
Manager)  
Such a view or is blind to the reality of maximising impact in context of limited 
resources.  However,  it seems that HALO Trust’s position on the same is 
wavering and is now edging into moving  beyond ‘single issue’ to a more 
‘rounded view of human security’ and has addressed  the problem of explosive 
security in its pilot Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) programme 
which HALO Trust  has established  together with the police and the military.   
Besides conducting clearance for humanitarian benefits, HALO is currently 
addressing the problem of explosives security, and has carried out a pilot 
Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) programme in collaboration with the 
police and the military in order to assist in the safe storage of explosive 
ordnance.  The move by the Sector in Somaliland and globally should be seen 
more in line with OECD/DAC guidelines that call for development actors to 
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move to embrace a broader view of human security in all its aspects, a move 
that will contribute to making the wider socio-political and cultural contexts 
safer.   
SOMALILAND CONTEXT: LIMITING MINE ACTION 
PEACEBUILDING CONCEPTUALISATION 
I argue that the way of conceptualising is largely based on how the Somaliland 
people define peace and therefore the activities that they see as enhancing 
peacebuilding.  Thus, mine action both by the Sector and those outside the 
Sector demonstrates that the way in which peace is conceptualised dictates the 
way in which peacebuilding is defined, highlighting the importance of the history 
of the country as an important aspect in understanding how key aspects of life 
are understood.  Thus the historical turmoil that the country has gone through, 
and the efforts made to achieve stability, have shaped the way in which future 
activities are perceived in Somaliland.  It is therefore not surprising that 
peacebuilding is seen primarily as activities that deal with conflict resolution.  To 
the majority of the people, peacebuilding cannot be anything other than efforts 
towards the resolving of conflicts, as witnessed post 1991, and the continued 
role that is carried out by the elders in addressing everyday conflicts. 
Kurtenbach (2007) asserts that the way in which societies conceptualise peace 
is dependent on various factors; the society itself, its history, cultural and social 
foundations, the legacies of violence and the peacebuilding initiatives. For any 
country that has gone through a phase of war, the transformation or the 
reconstruction that takes place immediately after conflict  happens within a 
context of  the legacies of violence and the post war process that the country 
has gone through.  Therefore conceptualisation of Peace and Peacebuilding in 
Somaliland has been shaped by the context in which the state was founded; 
Somaliland’s history, her culture and the conflict transformative process that has 
taken place.  
So peacebuilding is both the reconciliation and conflict resolution process 
and also later on building on common interests (Haroon Ahmed Yusuf) 
Thus when one talks of peacebuilding in Somaliland, a number of assumptions 
are made; that peacebuilding is about reconciliation; peacebuilding is about 
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state building (that is the reconstitution of the State from scratch), that 
peacebuilding is outside the remit of any external actors and finally that 
peacebuilding is confined to the Elders and government officials. The 
Ownership of peacebuilding is also another critical element as articulated by 
Ahmed Essa: 
The peacebuilding in Somaliland didn’t have anything to do with 
international agencies here and I think that was a good thing. 
Peacebuilding is still local. We still have problems. The problems we 
have are the same ones we had before. Clan conflicts, land disputes. At 
the moment we have one land dispute right now at the coastal region 
between two clans. Three days ago the elders from each clan were here 
giving a press conference about the other clan taking their land. Then the 
other day the other group came here saying the same thing. These are 
the sort of conflicts that may end up into a real armed conflict. However, 
this is still not for the international community to sort out. It is for us, the 
elders, the parliamentarians, and Somaliland people. We have 
parliamentarians and elders from each of the two sides, they talk 
together and then talk to us. UNDP or other International actors have 
nothing to do with that. 
The Program Manager at DDG, expressing his personal views on the role of 
this, argues that the two are mutually exclusive; he is of the same view as the 
majority of the Somaliland people who view peace and peacebuilding as about 
reconciliation: 
In the Somaliland context, we are talking about reconciliation among 
clans and political groups. I don’t necessarily see mine action as peace 
building because the problem of mines in Somaliland is based on a war 
that ended in the mid-70s. The clearance of them now is not remotely 
relevant to peacebuilding in Somaliland. Because they are basically just 
an historical wreck that causes accidents on occasions or prevent the full 
use of land. They are not doing anything necessarily to affect peace. You 
could argue and it has been argued that the continued presence of large 
tank mines or large caliber ammunition provides a supply of explosives 
which could then be used for terrorism or other purposes. There has 
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been some evidence of this.  So you could argue that the full clearance 
and destruction of those minefields will remove that threat. But generally 
without that dynamic, and that dynamic doesn’t exist for instance in 
Angola, and Angola has peace and it still has mines. So I am not entirely 
sure of the full link of mine clearance and peace is. They are mutually 
exclusive. (Southern Craib) 
The only role of external actors in peacebuilding according to Professor Essa is 
the promotion of good governance: 
Some activities that international community can focus on are the rule of 
law. There is room to enlighten people, the stakeholder, local people and 
also the leaders. We have a rule of law, to have respect for good 
governance, we have to have respect for transparency and we have to 
have respect for the really bad effects of corruption. Those all help peace 
in one way or another. I think there is some room for the international 
community to play on that level. In terms of good governance, fighting 
corruption, I think there is room for outsiders to come in and train. 
The historical reconciliation process described in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2 
was largely rooted on the strength and resilience of the local communities, 
which makes Somaliland a success story. Peacebuilding and the formation of a 
political community invariably emerged from below – rather than being imposed 
through a top-down process – and, unusually, took place in the absence of a 
central monopoly of violence (Ibrahim, 2010).  As articulated by this interviewee: 
For me peace has more to do with how the government conducts its 
business. Not HIV programmes, WASH programs etc, however programs 
addressing the control of firearms and issues of advocacy, yes. So 
governance and peace building are inter-related. So if we want to talk 
about peace we have to talk about how the government conducts its 
operations. How does it function? A government that is functioning well is 
a government that is transparent and providing safety for its people in a 
fair way. Sometimes the government is not fair then there would be some 
conflict. I think the Somaliland people value peace as a post conflict 
situation. The reason why we are trying to come up with a very 
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democratic system of governance is one of it. No matter who comes here, 
people want to see the process continue. So anybody who comes 
against that, people will come against him (Suad Abdi, Programme 
Coordinator, Progressio interviewed on the 10th October 2012) 
The historical context offers both a challenge to implementation and a limitation 
to the extent to which mine action is conceptualised within peacebuilding.  The 
history of humanitarian aid in Somalia shapes the extent to which the 
communities of Somaliland interact with interventions – thereby challenging the 
implementation of mine action; similarly the post war reconciliation process 
defines the views of the Somaliland people in the way they conceptualise 
peacebuilding.  This means that though there is acknowledgement that there 
are elements of mine action that can be seen as peacebuilding, the historical 
process that they closely associate with peacebuilding remains within the 
constraints of reconciliation.  
A study by the World Bank entitled, “Consultation with the Poor” conducted in 
Sanaag and Togdheer, found that rural and urban people in Togdheer refer to 
security in terms of the presence or absence of armed conflict and conflict 
related issues, such as killing, robbing, rape etc. Though armed conflict was a 
relatively new phenomenon in urban centres during that research period, the 
rural nomadic pastoral environment had a long history of conflicts between 
clans. 
According to the programme manager for NAGAAD106, an umbrella organisation 
for Women’s NGOs in Somaliland, peace is when there is physical security; 
thus it goes in tandem with the human security concepts of basic freedoms such 
as freedom from needs (such as hunger), and in a more restricted sense, that 
people should be free from fear (of war, for example).  This conceptualisation is 
expressed within the comforts of the cultural explanations as discussed above.  
Physical security is one (indicator of peace) and when I add ‘milk’ it is 
because of the other security which is the basic needs. Both are very 
                                            
106 NAGAAD is a non-governmental umbrella organization founded in 1997 and registered under the 
Ministry of Planning and Office of Attorney General in Somaliland.  The organisation’s main goal is the 
promotion of women’s political, economic and social position within Somaliland. Information from website 
http://nagaad.org/index.php/about-us accessed on 5th of December 2014. 
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important. The other thing is, because of the clan system social support 
system is involved and that is important for building peace. So having 
good relations with other is part of the peace. That is peace at all levels.  
(Haroon Ahmed Yusuf) 
I think mine action is done and has nothing to do with peacebuilding. 
Mine action has to do with reducing the risk of people using mines during 
conflict but it is not in itself part of peacebuilding. But it reduces our ability 
to use mines during conflict.  On the basis of that you need to make 
people see that using landmines is not the way and also you need to 
make sure that there are not landmines in the hands of individuals or 
militias.  So that’s where it would fit (Ahmed Essa) 
Indeed the suggestion that mine action can be considered as peacebuilding 
generated various reactions.  One senior NGO worker actually laughed at the 
thought that anyone would consider Mine Action as peacebuilding: 
Mine clearance helps people move freely. But the question is who laid 
the mines in the first place? Is it Somaliland people or is it someone else?  
People do not see it as peacebuilding and neither do I   see it as 
peacebuilding component. It is just an extra activity. 
This view is held by some within the Sector as well, out of all those interviewed 
working either for the Sector directly, or indirectly, none considered Mine Action 
to be part of peacebuilding. This is a position shared with several others 
including a senior UN official working for the UNHCR who acknowledged that 
mine clearance does create a secure environment however; he argues that 
mine action cannot be related to peace.  “There is peace, therefore mine 
clearance is not part of creating that peace, but is part of reconstruction” 
(UNHCR Head of Sub-Office) 
Similarly, security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in 
which people and communities live in peace, freedom and safety. As such, it 
was not surprising that the people of Somaliland conceptualised peace in terms 
of concepts such as security, stability, safety, freedom and lack of fear.   
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Well, it is. If you define peace as absence of physical harm, then mines 
cause physical harm. So it is peace building. It is giving people security, 
freeing grazing area thus improving the economy. 
This is relevant especially in the broader conceptualisation of peace as applied 
within what can broadly fit within the human security discourse. In this 
conception, peace is akin to security which is associated with personal security 
and not the security of the country.   Thus embracing the basic tenets of human 
security where to be at peace is a matter first reflected in the lives of the people 
and not in the larger notion of the State.  Human Security in this instance is also 
more tightly focused and linked to the ‘freedom from fear’.  The Peacebuilding 
coordinator at the Ministry of Interior articulates this by defining peace and the 
Director of Internal security links peace with the absence of fear and with 
mobility: 
 ‘People living free from fear and able to move freely. Ahmed Hersi 
(Peacebuilding Coordinator, Ministry of Interior) 
There is no conflict.  When they see people working, business is open, 
movement of people. ‘No conflicts with rivals, no fear of movement and 
can carry out all the operations they need to.  Mohamed Ahmed 
Mohamoud; Director Internal Security Ministry of Interior; Interviewed in 
Hargeisa on 9th October 2012) 
FACTORS ENHANCING MINE ACTION PEACE-ABILITY 
POTENTIAL 
Following the end of hostilities, mine action activities help in reducing deaths 
and injuries and most importantly facilitates relative safety for the return of 
refugees and internally displaced. It provides an enabling environment for 
rebuilding economies, opens up transportation routes and other infrastructure 
and most importantly is a source of employment including for former 
combatants.   
SMAC provides the Sectors with the crucial linkage with the government; 
however, it remains weak in implementing and putting to action any policies and 
agreed actions.  In order to address this weakness; HALO Trust employs a full 
time employee for liaison with SMAC to confront the problem of weak 
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organisational structures.  In this way, HALO Trust ensures that the 
bureaucratic process of dealing with the authorities does not necessarily impact 
heavily on their planned activities. It also illustrates an understanding and the 
ability to adapt to the political bottlenecks that occur.  This highlighted flexibility 
and understanding of the circumstances in which mine action takes place.  
Such pragmatism by the Sector to facilitate both the implementation and 
operationalisation of mine action ensures that mine action as activity is 
implemented and continues to exploit its intrinsic potential; similarly the Sector 
is engaging more with activities that are not traditional mine clearance related 
activities; amongst the interviewees, mine action could only be conceptualised 
as mine clearance. 
The Sector’s pragmatic approaches beyond mine action 
According to the Sector’s own guidelines, programmes must be part of an 
integrated response able to support peace-building including reconstruction and 
development of the community with the aim of enhancing the socio-economic 
and cultural infrastructure; thus the Sector’s pragmatic response beyond 
traditional mine related activities has further contributed to the way in which 
mine action is perceived by the communities in Somaliland.  This is illustrated 
by the following quote: 
Mine Action is peacebuilding in two ways. Some of them are building the 
armoury for the police and they are also dealing with registration of the 
small arms of the police. They also deal with a number of projects which 
create job opportunities and thus reduce crime rate.  (Mohamed Ahmed 
Mohamoud) 
a) Addressing Armed Violence Reduction and community Safety  
The role of DDG has encompassed the broader aims of humanitarian mine 
clearance.  Having carried out an assessment in 2007, DDG realised that it 
needed to broaden its interventions from traditional mine clearance to include 
armed violence reduction initiatives in accordance with the needs of the 
Somaliland people.   
With us it is a simplistic approach. If you only address the institutions you 
are not looking at the agents and the weapons. For us, no matter where 
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we are, we would always try and have a comprehensive way of 
addressing things unless someone else is addressing it then we can 
align ourselves with them and they can take care of something. (Karina 
Lynge; DDG). 
A great majority of the people in Somaliland keep a private store of ERWs, and 
this needed to be addressed.   According to DDG, this needed a completely 
different approach requiring extensive advocacy and education.  They therefore 
launched a Community Safety Programme whose goals are largely about 
changing behaviour and attitudes towards Explosive Remnants of War and 
small arms, which are a huge problem.  The programme incorporates 
destruction of ERWs from private stockpiles, provision of education on firearms 
safety including provisions for safe storage for weapons, provision of Mine Risk 
Education and also conflict management courses.   
This  focuses not only on destroying the instruments used for violence, but also 
endeavours to affect positive change in people who commit violence within the 
wider institutional and cultural environments that enable and/or protect against 
violence.  This approach, based on the OECD “armed violence lens”,  is one 
that  captures all the elements and levels that shape armed violence patterns, 
namely the people affected by armed violence, the agents of violence including 
the instruments used for violence, (OECD, 2011).  DDG does this through a 
bottom-up approach through development and safety as a means of effecting 
change within the Somaliland communities.  They do this in partnership with the 
Danish Refugee Council’s (DRC) community driven recovery and development 
programmes.  Such a venture ensures a holistic perspective that addresses the 
conflict as well as the communities – a critical approach that is needed for a 
complex context such as Somaliland (Hamming, 2011). DRC manages activities 
focusing on humanitarian assistance and socio-economic development, while 
DDG helps communities become safer and resist negative pressures. Both 
programmes are community-driven, have a bottom-up approach and are based 
on the communities’ expressed needs. In so doing, these interventions privilege 
‘community-defined’ where  communities engage in activities that are relevant 
and/or important to their specific context in order to comply with the ‘do no harm’ 
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principles.  It also ensures that the programmes are not standardised but are 
delivered in accordance with the needs of the communities. 
DDG acknowledged, quite early on, that the threat from landmines and 
unexploded ordnance was decreasing, and that it needed to refocus its work in 
Somaliland to ensure maximum impact for the communities it works with.   In 
response to the LIS findings that the major causes of accidents were by ERWs, 
and that this was likely to have been caused by tampering with UXO, DDG 
formally adopted the concept of threat reduction across all areas of the 
programme, through an initiative called ‘Village-by-Village Clearance Project’, 
an innovative approach that was highly successful in convincing private owners 
of explosive remnants of war to give up their stockpiles for destruction by 
working with local leaders in implementing advocacy and education initiatives.  
Having identified a problem of private possession of ERWS and UXOs, the 
project was structured so that a country wide UXO threat could be reduced, by 
physically providing a comprehensive and effective coverage of the villages, 
with the aim of reaching a high number of communities in any given area.   The 
aim was also to form liaisons with the communities so that information could be 
gathered through local elders, locally identifying stocks of landmines and UXO 
(whether held within the community or by individuals) and ensuring that the 
same were collected and safely disposed of.   Upon its inception, the UN 
reported that ‘first indications are this is to be a successful approach to reducing 
the dangers of ERW and increasing security in the area’ (MASG, 2006).  
DDG appreciates that communities can be suspicious of interventions on 
sensitive issues and they therefore include sensitisation projects which sensitise 
them regarding the safety concerns that they face including those related to 
Small Arms, Light Weapons and ERWs.  This is done before they fully engage 
with organisations implementing community safety interventions through 
intensive awareness-raising, advocacy and education; people are encouraged 
to stay away from situations that could escalate minor disputes into armed 
violence; through education they are also able to convince the significant 
minority of people who think that small arms are desirable and normal that this 
should not be the case. 
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Due to people’s perception of security within their regions and also due to the 
past history of violence and war, a significant number of people not only 
possess firearms but also keep (private) stockpiles of explosives. These would 
have been harvested and kept with a view to use for protection and also for 
monetary gain.  Thus, DDG undertakes interventions that focus on changing 
people’s attitudes and behaviour regarding ERW.   These stockpiles represent a 
significant risk to the population of Somaliland as they are commonly stored in 
households with few safety precautions. The impact of accidents in these 
circumstances has been shown to be severe (DDG and Small Arms Survey, 
2009).  DDG believes that the scale of the risks surrounding ERW being held in 
private ownership or being harvested for economic and protection reasons are 
significant and require further examination.  
Given the widespread availability of arms and the recognition that little can be 
done to immediately restore the rule of law and establish the new state’s 
capacity to maintain peace and order, there is a natural presumption that an 
early step, some would say prerequisite, should be a programme for 
disarmament.  Cliffe (2005) argued that given the long period of insecurity and 
the reliance on SALW as a means of  livelihood and self-defence, these people 
would rather prioritise the establishment of a  climate of security and the 
provision of alternative livelihoods as prior means to  encourage eventual 
collection of SALW  (Cliffe, 2005). 
b) Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) programmes  
Mine Action’s potential to respond to security is consistent with the broad notion 
of human security as promoted by the UNDP, and widely used by development 
actors.  Thus, for Somaliland having negotiated and having worked on the 
reconciliation process, the people’s view on peace is that it is not simply 
absence of war and violence; with relative peace and stability peace is 
conceptualised more broadly; peacebuilding is thus seen as an activity that 
addresses insecurity as this is seen to obstruct development and hence 
perpetuate conflict. This level of insecurity is perpetuated by the presence of the 
remnants of unregulated small arms, landmines and other ERWs.  This, 
coupled with the presence of ex-combatants, raises the risk of post conflict 
countries returning to violence (Muggah, 2005).  
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Well, it is. If you define peace as absence of physical harm, then mines 
cause physical harm. So it is peace building. It is giving people security, 
freeing grazing area thus improving the economy. 
Therefore the sector is seen as responding to this through the provision of 
appropriate responses to post conflict countries through Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW) destruction projects as well as Physical Security and 
Stockpile Management (PSSM) activities.  Mine Advisory Group (UK) 
undertakes this primarily within their mandate of addressing human security 
issues and humanitarian disarmament.  MAG has not been previously involved 
in traditional mine action programmes in Somaliland however. Within such an 
approach, MAG helps States in developing what they consider as sustainable 
solutions to armed violence, in their efforts of addressing the daily threat posed 
by explosive weapons to civilians in populated areas.  Through the invitation of 
the Police Commissioner in Hargeisa, MAG renovated the main police armoury 
whose poor condition was putting the population at the danger of an accidental 
explosion.  This prompted an invitation by the police to undertake a nationwide 
survey of the more than 40 armouries under the government’s control.   The 
survey was meant to establish if similar poor standards were evident and to 
define how best to secure and manage firearms and ammunition under the 
control of the Government.  Upon completion MAG received funding for a 
Physical Security and Stockpile Management project based in Hargeisa, which 
began in June 2011.  This saw the construction of armouries for Mhaybe Police 
and the Police HQ in Hargeisa and Police and Coast Guard armouries in 
Berbera, Ceel Sheikh and El Sheekh were also surveyed and construction 
completed. Gun racks, door constructions and windows including a welding 
plant at the MAG compound to construct doors and firearms destruction were 
done (MAG Website107). 
A peacebuilding perspective on small arms proliferation is not as such 
concerned with the availability (total numbers) of SALW, but rather with their 
impact on individuals and their communities. 
                                            
107 See http://www.maginternational.org/where-mag-works/mag-in-somalia/#.VR0V4PzF8uc accessed on 
30th of July 2014 
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c) Mine Action as source of Employment 
Unemployment is a huge problem in Somaliland; therefore any activity that is 
seen to employ a huge workforce is seen as contributing positively to 
reconstruction and therefore peacebuilding.  Hence as articulated here, the only 
way that mine action is seen as peacebuilding is in the provision of employment 
as articulated by an ex- Mine Action employee:  
Well I think mine action contributes hugely especially when we go into 
these remote communities where they’ve had no outside assistance or 
very limited outside assistance. Quite often in these types of 
communities there is tension and conflict because there is nothing else 
for people to do. There’s no job, there’s no accompaniment and also in 
the case of Somaliland for example, there is limited resources for land. 
Eventually there is potential and then we have organisation that go 
clearing when there’s a task and for a number of months employ local 
people the local economy is slightly better because there is money. 
Whether it is the deminers who go out to the shops and purchase food, 
and other items or the local people benefit because the agricultural land 
has been cleared and they can go by and start ploughing or they can 
even graze their animals. So you know all of this contributes to 
peacebuilding efforts.  
Similarly, in response to Lardner’s (2008) evaluation of DDG’s activities on 
livelihood; Hammond observed that a large number of staff over DDG’s ten 
years of mine Action in Somaliland  would undoubtedly have contributed to the 
societal benefit in Somaliland (pp: 26).   Both DDG and HALO use the concept 
of operations referred to by Willett (2003) as “proximity demining”  which means 
that the staff are recruited locally to work on local tasks (p. 56). Hammond (in 
Lardner’s 2008 evaluation report) and a number of those interviewed concur 
that this contributed the communities from a financial perspective and appears 
to have had a positive impact to society in the parts of Somaliland where the 
Sector operated. 
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A similar view was held by a senior UNMAS official:   
HALO is extremely economical in terms of value for money. Their costs 
are extremely reasonable and they employ a lot of Somalilanders. So in 
terms of peace building from that perspective it is like the fourth or third 
largest employer in Somaliland. Having 400-800 men employed, getting 
busy every day, getting a salary is a huge benefit. So in that way there is 
a little bit more justification for it. 
As with other communities affected by landmines there are often other problems 
caused by conflict or low levels of post-conflict development. From this 
perspective, it is important that demining achieves as much as it can.  
Various pillars of MA contribute to employment, for example Mine Risk 
Education provides employment and support to youth NGOs working in mine 
education development, integrated programmes of local NGO capacity 
development, inter-ethnic reconciliation, community development, non-formal 
education. Mine risk education is critical also to livelihoods. 
It was the view of some of those interviewed that there was no guarantee that 
the funds available for demining could indeed be utilised in Somaliland; this 
remains a valid point. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several factors that challenge or limit the extent to which mine action 
is conceptualised as peacebuilding.  I use the policy analysis triangle as a 
method of grouping these factors.  I further use Goodhand’s concept of a peace 
audit in assessing the peace-ability of Mine Action. The ‘peace-ability’ 
methodology, is whereby Mine Action achievements are conceptualised in 
terms of their role in increasing or decreasing probabilities for peace, rather 
than as precise cause and effect relationships.  The peace audit concept 
critically looks at the way in which Mine Action is or has been undertaken in 
Somaliland and how this has raised or lowered the probability for peace 
(Goodhand, 2006).   In so doing, I support the argument that mine action is 
inherently part of peacebuilding, however, the context in which it takes place, 
the Sector and the implementation process limit the extent to which the recipient 
community perceives this and therefore the way they conceptualise mine action.   
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The way of conceptualising mine action is largely based on the Somaliland 
context, and the Sector actors.  The chapter highlights that the way 
peacebuilding is understood and conceptualised is largely based on the history 
of the country; an important aspect in understanding how key aspects of life are 
understood.  Thus the historical turmoil that the country has gone through, and 
the efforts made to achieve stability, have shaped the way in which future 
activities are labelled in Somaliland.  It is therefore not surprising that 
peacebuilding is seen primarily as activities that deal with conflict resolution.  To 
the majority of the people, peacebuilding cannot be anything other than the 
efforts towards the resolving of conflicts, as witnessed post 1991, and the 
continued carried out by the elders in addressing everyday conflicts. 
Peacebuilding is therefore narrowly associated with the historical reconciliation 
process limiting the extent to which mine action can be conceptualised as such.   
Despite the huge impact over the years that Somaliland has had to deal with 
mines and UXO contamination, today mine action is not considered a priority by 
the majority of those interviewed, and neither do the mine action practitioners 
themselves consider mine action as peacebuilding.   
Over time even though peacebuilding is seen mainly as conflict resolution, the 
communities have an understanding that, beyond conflict resolution, 
peacebuilding takes on broader notions that encapsulate the ideals of human 
security and development.   As a result therefore, mine action is only seen as 
peacebuilding when it addresses those components that address issues of 
human security such as community safety.  Similarly the extent to which as an 
activity mine action is seen to address other priority needs in the society such 
as provision of employment, then the society does see it as peacebuilding. 
Some actors within the Sector are aware that as part of the humanitarian aid 
sector good intentions are no longer sufficient; and that as agencies working 
within post-conflict environments they need to demonstrate that they are 
achieving positive outcomes.  However, these principles do not necessarily 
appear to guide their work as they carry out their activities within the neutrality 
and impartiality cloak.   
For mine action, this context further dictates the way the way the Sector actors 
interact with the communities in Somaliland.   Mine action has taken place 
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within a ‘securitised’ dominant aid response context that saw agencies harden 
themselves through strengthening protection and more readily adopting 
deterrence measures (Van Brabant, 2010 p. 8). The most visible of these 
deterrence measures for the host community has been the widespread retreat 
of international aid workers into their own expatriate world of the UN and 
international NGO compounds and residential units that are fortified and 
inaccessible; (on which I reflect on in chapter one). With mine action 
traditionally being seen as a secretive operation, coupled with the disconnection 
from the local community especially on the part of HALO Trust, this practise has 
created local grievances with local employees with the behaviour of the actors 
often feeding rumour and supposition.  Hence rather than the politicisation of 
mine action as was seen during the RIMFIRE period, the weakness of the 
Sector is  more about the culture of aid that reduces interaction, the behaviour 
of Sector workers and the endemic distrust between the Sector  agencies.  
Among host populations, the negative cultural and organisational factors are 
illuminated by the fact that mine action is no longer seen as a priority and the 
impact of the Sector’s intervention is perceived as limited and at times not 
visible.   
This is made worse by the fact that the time frame and goalposts for 
achievement of an impact free environment have constantly shifted, this can be 
attributed to the nature of mine action, however as noted, there is a certain 
demonstration of insincerity by the Sector.  This has therefore contributed 
greatly to the cynicism regarding the role of mine action thereby limiting the 
peace-ability potential of the activity to peripheral activities that the Sector 
undertakes.  The continued ‘self- justification’ of the need for continued 
presence by mine action organisations feeds into the local cynicism with the 
common view that the stated need to be present and operating in such 
environments is solely in order to maintain cash flow,  especially in the hope 
that Somalia becomes safe enough, to present budgetary growth opportunities 
(Van Brabant, 2010). 
There has been a great reduction in rates of new accidents and victims 
diminishing the humanitarian role for the mine action related activities especially 
demining.  The Sector’s role has therefore become less central and current 
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programmes are expected to be more in support of development as is already 
the main role of demining in other places. Thus the Sector is slowly realigning 
itself in order to continue to be relevant; this interaction remains minimal. 
However, the Sector has engaged with activities beyond the traditional mine 
clearance role increasing its peace-ability potential. 
The Sector’s failure to build local ownership reflects the critique of liberal 
peacebuilding that external actors see local ownership as a conditional right; 
this is demonstrated by DDG’s reluctance to transfer to the NDA. The critique 
further suggests that in claiming that ownership is a conditional right the 
external actors typically refer to lack of local responsibility, capacity or political 
will and, by implication, they assume that ownership is theirs to grant to local 
authorities or local stakeholders (Sending, 2010 p. 3).  This is DDG alluded to in 
the case of NDA and what others in the Sector are doing, thus conforming to 
the critique.  
This chapter therefore illustrates how mine action reflects the same problems of 
international interventions such as lack of local ownership, dearth of local 
knowledge, use of universal models and conflictual relationships between 
interveners and local stakeholders; however, as Autesserre (2014) has 
established, these problems are not primarily due to the liberal content of 
peacebuilding, in this case mine action as an intervention programme,  however  
the source of the problem, he argues, lies in the very act of imposition  of the 
everyday practise of the interveners on the ground  (p. 53).    I argue that the 
everyday modes of operation and behaviour are some of the factors that 
contribute to negative perceptions about mine action hence diminishing the 
extent to which the society can conceptualise mine action as peacebuilding.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In this concluding chapter I revisit the research question and provide an outline 
on how this has been answered.  The central goal for this thesis has been to 
answer the research question: to what extent are the dominant critiques of the 
liberal peace agenda relevant to Somaliland with particular reference to the 
implementation of mine action intervention?   In an attempt to understand how 
mine action was conceptualised within this literature, I carried out secondary 
data research as the first part of the research; this mainly focused on 
peacebuilding.  The analysis of the literature re-affirmed what (Kjellman et al. 
2003; Harpviken and Isaksen 2004) had noted; that mine action was only 
marginally acknowledged as part of peacebuilding.  They however attributed 
this conceptualisation to the extent to which the Sector, including donors, limited 
mine action within security rather than across the entire peacebuilding spectrum.  
Other factors include the characteristics that define the Sector; its position of 
isolation within the wider Humanitarian Sector; the nature of the activity itself; 
and the actors that engage in mine action.  
I argue for the need to reconceptualise mine action and I do this by tracing the 
debates on landmines, in order to illustrate these normative underpinnings that 
guide mine action.  I argue that mine action as an activity is intrinsically 
peacebuilding – I demonstrate this through the interrogation of mine action 
within the peacebuilding palette to demonstrate the interrelatedness of mine 
action in supporting the broader peacebuilding goals thus arguing for the need 
to re-conceptualise mine action as an activity within broader peacebuilding. 
The process of reviewing the literature on peacebuilding in general was also 
instructive in the extent to which the academic literature was quite critical of 
peacebuilding as reflected in chapter two. I concur with those critics (e.g. 
Chandler, 2010; Sabaratnam, 2011a) who note the extent to which the liberal 
peacebuilding discourse has become increasingly distanced from the concerns 
of the policy discourse and implementation and had become ‘meta-critiques’ of 
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contemporary projects of conflict management.  The critics had become ‘hyper-
critical’ to the extent that even those within (see  for example Paris, Begby and 
Burgess; Newman) have argued  that such criticism had gone past the point of 
justified questioning, and verged on unfounded scepticism and even cynicism 
(Paris, 2010 p. 338) also see (Begby and Burgess, 2009; Newman, 2009).   I 
therefore narrowed my analysis and identified that these critical debates were 
based on several broad standpoints and these were what I called the ‘dominant’ 
critiques.  I noted how this literature and the critiques were generalised and the 
most dominant critiques focused on ‘states’ and the failure of interventions to 
succeed in rebuilding states.  I therefore argue that the critics of liberal peace 
building have a tendency to be state-centric in approach, and therefore this 
largely limits their critiques.  More generally they fail to widen their interrogation 
to include other peacebuilding interventions.  I support this argument by 
presenting the case of Somaliland; a state without recognition; and therefore 
interventions within Somaliland are not subjected to such critiques.  To further 
illustrate the state-centric focus of the liberal critiques,  and the claim that I have 
made that the most critiqued liberal peace agenda is the state building element 
of peacebuilding; I present the case of Somaliland vis a viz the Somalia to and  
demonstrate the way critics offer Somalia as a classic example of the failure of 
liberal peace project and disregard Somaliland’s state formation process which 
would support the suggestion that a ‘hybrid’ approach offers a more sensitive 
operational process and outcome that can be achieved in certain places.  
Somaliland as a context has engaged in an indigenous process of state-building 
that incorporates indigenous local authority within the central government. 
However, this is rarely cited by critics and when it is, it is only done marginally. 
Similarly, the post conflict reconstruction arena in Somaliland is littered with 
interventions which have made limited progress therefore supporting the same 
characteristics that the critics highlight. 
I therefore assert that the critics critique the standardised ‘one size fits all 
approach’ employed by interveners, yet they take the same approach, and in so 
doing apply broad brush across a diverse range of programmes, issues and 
activities that are indeed peacebuilding, as illustrated by the mine action case 
study and contexts such as Somaliland.  
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The critiques are based on systems, structures, and organisational values of 
international peacebuilding based on a single interpretation - liberal peace - 
thereby making a generalised conclusion on the failure of peacebuilding. This 
means there is a limited pool of academic research or interest in issues such as 
mine action thereby contributing to the narrow conceptualisation of mine action 
within this literature. 
Thus, the literature review partly responded to the research question on how 
mine action was conceptualised and the factors that dictated the way in which it 
was.  The second part of the research process was to respond directly to the 
specific questions in relation to Somaliland; and to answer the two broader 
questions on mine action implementation. Further literature review on how mine 
action was implemented and operationalised globally revealed an uncritical and 
self –referential Sector.  This literature on peacebuilding and on mine action 
allowed for preliminary conclusions to be made and provided guidance to the 
data collection phase of the research.   
Drawing from the mine action grey literature, it was evident that the mine action 
sector globally generates guides, instructions etc. to facilitate the 
implementation of mine action on the ground.  This approach is formulaic, 
based on templates that dictate and define the way the Sector engages on the 
ground.  In general terms from the conception of the Sector to its 
implementation, mine action seems like a microcosm of peacebuilding, the way 
it is implemented reflects the same dominant characteristics i.e.; it is 
standardised; technical and externally led  especially in that as an intervention, 
the sector preferred standardised ‘one size fits all’ approaches;  This same 
process of implementation was reflected in Somaliland  where the Sector is 
inherently guided by the need to apply a standardised set of protocols (such as 
establishment of NMAA, undertake LIS, use of the IMSMA) to most mine 
contaminated countries irrespective of context, within a rhetoric that these 
standards are only a guide and that national context should guide their 
application. However in reality this context does not guide implementation as 
highlighted by the process of setting up the Somaliland Mine Action Centre, and 
undertaking the Landmine Impact Survey.  Both processes reflected the critique 
that the failure to secure the respect of the elements of local ownership was 
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based on the peacebuilding actors as external actors formulated peacebuilding 
strategies and implemented them in practice.   
The echoes of the liberal peace paradigm can be discerned in the 
implementation of mine action implementation in Somaliland. These do not 
manifest themselves implicitly but can be discerned in the implementations and 
format of programmes and projects carried out by the UN and other 
international actors in the field.  
Coordination is another element that has elicited critiques; according to critics 
due to the many actors engaged in conﬂict environments coordination is 
required and is either undertaken by dominant states or by the UN; similarly, 
within mine action and precisely due to the disparate actors involved, the UN 
emerged to take the strategic role of coordination whilst funding for mine action 
is provided by key states that emerged during the formation of the sector; these 
states are largely western based; and according to Mac Ginty (2011), therefore 
the direction policies, funding and ideological stances of international NGOs 
including the UN, reflect western interest that fall under the liberal peace rubric. 
According to the critiques the failure emanates from the interventions’ limited 
effort to command legitimacy from the grassroots leading to insufficient ‘local 
ownership’ of the strategic direction and daily activities of such operations 
leading to  potential for building a lasting peace being limited by failure  by 
external interveners to correctly identify peace in complex war-torn environs 
(Cubitt, 2013 p. 92) see also (Donais, 2009). The Sector in this case has not 
only failed  in  building local ownership  more than two decades since they first 
arrived, but has also failed to establish sustainability to enable local actors to 
take over the ownership of mine action related programmes upon the departure 
of the international organisations.  According to critics, failure to create 
ownership contributes to the lack of sustainability important for an effective 
Liberal Peacebuilding agenda (Chandler, 2013; Paris and Sisk, 2009; 
Richmond, 2007; Suhrke, 2002).    
I agree with most of the critiques, however, I argue that in the case of mine 
action, the intervention cannot be seen as having failed completely as the 
evidence indicates that mine action has to a certain extent enhanced the 
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peacebuilding potential in Somaliland by facilitating the reconstruction process.  
However it is narrowly conceptualised as peacebuilding; according to the 
majority of the people who were interviewed, many did not see mine action as 
peacebuilding and those who did only saw it within the narrow view of either 
mine action’s role in enhancing security; or the Sector in general as a means for 
the provision of employment.  Such a limited conceptualisation is a result of 
several factors beyond the way in which the Sector implements programmes 
which have influenced this conceptualisation and these include; actors within 
the Sector, including their relationship with the communities; the Sector’s 
identity and values and most importantly the Sector programmes.  These shape 
the perceptions of the communities and therefore a narrative is formed based 
on their unique history.    
Similarly, the context (including the political status and perception of recipients) 
has not only limited the peacebuilding potential but also the extent to which 
mine action is conceptualised within a ‘peacebuilding sphere’. The Mine Action 
Sector in its governance and operationalisation structure is guided by a 
conventional view that conflict and post-conflict recovery in every context 
follows a universal pattern of social progression. Somaliland’s unrecognised 
status therefore presents a unique challenge to the way in which the Sector 
frames the context; implements programmes and challenges efforts to respond 
to mines and UXO contamination.  The Sector struggles to implement their 
standardised responses because Somaliland is not a typical post conflict 
environment which conforms to the UN and International communities’ neat 
sequencing of aid.  
The historical context further challenges implementation and the efforts of the 
sector in implementing programmes.  This is due to the history of humanitarian 
aid in Somalia which has continually shaped the extent to which the 
communities of Somaliland interact with interventions – thereby challenging the 
implementation of mine action as demonstrated by the efforts of implementing 
the LIS and other programmes in general.  The history of the post-war 
reconciliation process further defines the views of the Somaliland people in the 
way they conceptualise peacebuilding.  This means that though there is 
acknowledgement that there are elements of mine action that can be seen as 
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peacebuilding, the people of Somaliland closely associate peacebuilding within 
the constraints of reconciliation. This supports the assertions made by 
Kurtenbach (2007) that the way in which societies conceptualise peace is 
dependent on various factors; the society itself, its history, cultural and social 
foundations, the legacies of violence and the peacebuilding initiatives.  
Somaliland’s conceptualisation of peacebuilding is thus shaped by the context 
in which the state was founded; Somaliland’s history, her culture and the conflict 
transformative process that has taken place. 
I therefore challenge the argument that liberal peacebuilding has failed by 
arguing that this is a standardised critique that fails to engage with the 
complexities of the inter-relatedness of factors and interventions; how they are 
formulated and implemented on the ground and how they impact on the same. 
Just as there are many actors (intervening) in the name of peacebuilding, so 
there is a number of contexts in which the intervention is taking place and 
therefore different ways in which the recipients (read local) conceptualise their 
own understanding of what peacebuilding is.    
Thus, interrogating the role of mine action and the Sector through the  
adaptation of the simplified model “Policy Analysis Triangle” by  (Walt and 
Gilson, 1994) helped in teasing out interrelationships that are pertinent to 
carrying out a critical analysis.  Adapting this approach prevented a limited 
focus on the Sector allowing an analysis of the role of the actors (Sector 
Actors), the context (Somaliland political and historical context) and process 
(implementation process) in order to demonstrate how inter-related the factors 
are in the outcome of mine action globally and further how the same factors 
shape and coalesce to challenge implementation in Somaliland.   
Similarly, the combination of secondary data, interviews, personal discussions 
and observations generated rich and coherent data that would not have been 
generated by a single method. Hence, methodologically, ‘triangulation’ has 
mitigated the weaknesses and intrinsic biases that come from single-theory or 
single-method studies and provided empirically grounded, convergent and 
comprehensive answers to the research question posed below. 
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1. To what extent is the critique of Liberal Peacebuilding reflected within 
mine action especially the implementation and operationalisation?   
 Which of these critiques are supported by the implementation and 
operationalisation of mine action in Somaliland? 
 To what extent does the Somaliland context define the way in which 
mine action is implemented?  
2. How is mine action in Somaliland conceptualised and what factors 
dictate the way in which it is conceptualised?  
Reflecting on the process of data gathering, it was surprising to come across 
the Sector’s own policy in regards to research and especially the role of the 
National Mine Action Centres.  They are seen  as part of the effort to create 
broader awareness of the landmine problem whereby they can stimulate 
research and debate in academic and public policy circles regarding landmines 
and their impact on the country; through the provision of the mine action 
database as a research dataset; circulating the results and reports with an aim 
of  stimulating wider discussion that informs policy (Downs, 2010).  Like much 
rhetoric from the Sector, this remained just that throughout this research.  
Responses to request for data went unanswered and indeed a majority of those 
within SMAC who were asked to be interviewed turned down the request, or 
promised an interview and didn’t turn up.  As the SMAC is funded by the UN, I 
requested the data from them, but was constantly referred back to SMAC. 
WHY IT MATTERS 
This research was mainly driven by my interaction with the Sector through my 
involvement as an activist and a Landmine Monitor Researcher from 1999 to 
2004.  This, combined with a sharpened interest in academia and the need to 
challenge my previously uncritical outlook on mine action, prompted the interest 
in this project.  A short engagement in 2 research projects for the Sector and an 
encounter with a divided Sector in terms on the approach on operations 
increasingly challenged my pre-conceived ideas.   My engagement in the 
Landmine Monitor had brought an acute awareness of the contrast between 
what the MA Sector was saying and the reality on the ground.  With a growing 
academic literature that was highly critical of the peacebuilding interventions 
that were taking place, the need to interrogate the Sector that I had been 
immersed in drove the research project.    Thus, in order to answer the research 
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question above, I carried out research in three main phases. First an analysis of 
the secondary data on mine action, liberal peace and peacebuilding and 
Somaliland; this was as a means of establishing the foundational background to 
the study. Second was the process of data collection that led to the 
investigation of the Mine Action Sector, institutions that largely work within 
peacebuilding, relevant government ministries, as well as academic institutions. 
The representative samples were mainly from Hargeisa due to security 
restrictions and also due to the fact that most of these organisations are based 
here.  The third phase was the process of data analysis. I relied on an iterative 
process that contributed to understanding of the practice and discourse of the 
mine action sector in Somaliland. 
The importance of Somaliland in the thesis is illustrated in two ways; it 
demonstrates the tendency of liberal peace critics to be state-centric with the 
most critiqued liberal peace interventions drawing heavily on the failure of state 
building processes; Somaliland’s statebuilding project as has been 
demonstrated, has been largely successful and is demonstrative of a hybrid 
model, a process that the critics propose in response to the failure of the liberal 
peace approach.  However, Somaliland’s case study is important in 
demonstrating the extent to which as a context it is populated largely by 
externally driven interventions in areas that are not necessarily defined as 
priorities by local populations or that respond towards the larger goals of peace 
beyond the absence of violence. However, the failure of the international 
community to reconstitute the Somalian state remains the key example of the 
limitation of the liberal peacebuilding agenda through the failure of liberal critics 
to offer scrutiny of the numerous peacebuilding interventions within Somaliland 
which have not had as much success as the state building process.  This case 
study fills this gap and offers a much broader and more nuanced view that 
transcends beyond the 'state'. 
In conclusion therefore, the implementation and operationalisation of mine 
action reflects a the dominant peacebuilding critiques; the thesis has 
demonstrated that mine action intervention is largely externally driven; operates 
within the standardised one size fits all approaches and that just like liberal 
peacebuilding interventions the Sector ignores local context with far reaching 
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consequences.  However, as an activity, mine action cannot be deemed as 
having failed to enhance peacebuilding as its intrinsic values contribute to 
enabling key post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives to take place.  However, 
there are factors, some beyond the role of the Sector in implementing their 
programmes that form constraints on enhancing this peacebuilding potential. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
One area for future research would be to engage in a critical analysis of a 
different sector in Somaliland; this would provide more evidence of the extent to 
which reconstruction in and now development are being driven by external 
actors.  Such a study will further give credence to the claim I have made that 
beyond the state building arena, the rest of Somaliland’s reconstruction and 
development agenda is primarily an externally driven process. Such a study 
would further test the assertions of liberal peace critiques. 
On mine action in general, there is certainly need for research beyond the 
anecdotal evidence on how mine action enhances peacebuilding in post-conflict 
contexts.  Having established that the liberal peace building critiques are 
supported by mine action implementation globally, a study that looks into how 
other different contexts supports or challenges such implementation modalities 
would also contribute further into supporting or discounting the assertions made 
by liberal peace critics. 
Beyond Somaliland, the UN Security Council resolutions 1863 (2009) and 2036 
(2012) provided the mandate for UNMAS to coordinate mine action and support 
AMISOM, the Somali Security Sector, and humanitarian aid in what UNMAS 
describes as “explosive management support” (UNMAS, 2012a p. 12)   In south 
central Somalia, UNSOMA provides capacity-building support to AMISOM 
regarding explosives management in Mogadishu where there are large 
quantities of ERW, weapons, and ammunition stockpiles (Landmine Monitor 
2012).  Thus just as in Somaliland, mine action agencies have provided external 
actors and the international community one of the significant earliest entry 
points and is currently engaged in mine clearance in Somalia.  Therefore further 
research could usefully look into the extent to which the Sector’s engagement in 
Somaliland informs their operationalisation and implementation.   
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Similarly, the context of Somalia is one of that is riddled with security 
challenges, thus research into the suitability of implementation of mine action in 
its current standardised approach will provide more evidence in engaging in 
critical discourses of liberal peace interventions. 
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LIST OF APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1:  DATA COLLECTION 
INSTRUMENTS 
PART A: INFORMATION ON THE RESEARCHER 
Researcher: Sarah Njeri 
  
Contact:  39 Pendragon Lane, Bradford, BD2 4JL 
 
Affiliation: PhD Research Student, Department of Peace Studies, University of 
Bradford, UK. 
 
PART B:  DECLARATION TO PARTICIPANTS 
The participants will have a right to the following information before they can 
sign the consent form: 
 Participation: Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary.   Your 
role in this research will have no bearing in your work or any related 
evaluations or reports.  You are free to withdraw from the interview without 
giving any reasons, to amend or correct their responses, as well as add or 
subtract any comments from the transcript. You are thus free to terminate 
your participation at any time during the research and interview process. 
 Confidentiality:  The recorded responses from the interview will be treated 
confidentially by the researcher.  The collected information from the 
interviews and the meetings will only accessed by the researcher and her 
supervisor, if requested, but will treated with strict confidentiality.  
 Anonymity: If requested in questions where anonymity is requested, this will 
be given and attempts be made in instances where answers given can be 
easily attributed to the interviewee. The identity of the participants will be 
treated confidentially in the publications and will only be disclosed with the 
full consent of the respective participant. 
 Risks and benefits: there are no foreseen risks or benefits (financial or 
otherwise) to you individually from your participation in the research.  
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 Archiving: The collected data from the interview will be kept in a safe for the 
duration of the PhD project and beyond.  It will however be destroyed after a 
period of satisfactory use. 
 Questions about the Research: If you have questions about the research in 
general or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact Professor 
Donna Pankhurst by e-mail (d.t.pankhurst@bradford.ac.uk). This research 
has been reviewed by the Humanities, Social and Health Sciences 
Research Ethics Panel, University of Bradford’s Ethics Review Board. 
 
Researcher signature:..................................... 
 
Date:.....................................................  
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PART C: CONSENT FORM 
 
Researcher:  Sarah Njeri 
  
Contact: 39 Pendragon Lane, Bradford, BD2 4JL, United Kingdom 
Tel:  +44 7735420988 (mobile) 
Email:  snjeri@bradford.ac.uk 
 
Affiliation:  PhD Research Student,  
Department of Peace Studies,  
University of Bradford, UK. 
 
I ……………………………………….. (Name) have read the above information 
and I have had the opportunity to get clarifications.  The same have been 
answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that my participation to this research 
is on a voluntary basis and that I have a right to withdraw at anytime without any 
repercussion.  By signing this form I am attesting that I have read and 
understood the informat ion above and I  f reely give my consent/ 
Assent to participate. I also hereby understand that due to the nature of this 
research my anonymity may not be guaranteed fully. 
 
 
 
  
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date   
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APPENDIX 2: FACTORS THAT CAN BE 
ATTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE 
SOMALILAND RECONCILIATION PROCESS 
Local ownership: This process was based  on a policy of non-involvement  of 
the SNM leaders  (political leadership) thus making it a genuinely  grassroots, 
locally owned, process unlike the externally funded peace conferences in the 
rest of Somalia which have thus far ended in failure (Walls, 2009).  The process 
remained locally instigated throughout, and was funded primarily by domestic 
and diaspora Somalilanders (Bradbury, 2008; Farah and Lewis, 1997). The 
extent to which the process was exclusively without external intervention is said 
to be ‘contentious’ and ‘topical one’ and Walls argues that it is important to note 
the constructive role that ‘interested outsiders’ played (2009 pp 18). 
The reliance on a clan system; the traditional Somali clan system had always 
served as a mechanism of solidarity and fragmentation as well as competition 
and coalition building.  Unlike Italian Somali, the traditional institutions of 
Somaliland had survived British colonial rule (Reno, 2002; Walls and Kibble, 
2010b). Where the clan structure became a source of fragmentation in Somalia; 
it became a source of cohesion in Somaliland.   Somaliland thus adapted those 
positive features and functions of clan organisation in its strategies of organising 
resistance to the regime; resolving conflicts within the SNM movement during 
the struggle, as well as in post war reconciliation and in building political 
consensus (Jama, 2003).  The clan became the key regulator of the intricate 
social interactions of the sub-clans.  Through the process of employing dialogue 
and consultations as a strategy of reconciliation during the inter-clan 
conferences inter-clan factional conflicts were curbed and this enabled 
Somaliland to implement a peacebuilding agenda and also maintain the peace.   
Gradually the country developed a modest capacity to govern, and a national 
assembly of traditional clan elders.   Inadvertently, the  Barre regime had helped 
to reinforce the bonds of the Somaliland traditional elders (Guurti) (Omaar, 1994 
May).  They came to present continuity and normality.  Similarly during the 
democratisation process the elders were given recognition in the constitution of 
the SNM as a form of continuation of the vital role and collaboration regime 
 
 
346 
 
(Farah and Lewis, 1997 p. 359)108 .  Reconciliation and state-building thus 
began in earnest with the transformation from SNM ‘politico-military vanguard’ 
of the struggle against Barre to a more popular based leadership of the clan 
elders (Jhazbhay, 2009 p. 59) 
Inclusiveness; During the peace conferences  all decisions were based on 
consensus with the numbers of official delegates agreed upon in advance 
based on proportional  representation by clan.  Delegates were accountable to 
their communities and spoke and negotiated their behalf.  Initially when the 
process started, the SNM leadership policy was not to establish an independent 
state in the North, as they believed the status of the northern regions was too 
war ravaged to survive on their own, however the majority of the grassroots was 
enthusiastic and therefore independence became SNMs policy (Walls, 2009 p. 
9).   Inclusiveness in this context extends to the extent to which the minority 
clans became included in the process.  However there is not much evidence on 
how the views of those not directly involved, (including refugees and IDPs and 
women to a certain extent) but who could have become an obstacle to a 
settlement, were being accommodated.   
Role of Women; The role of women in the peace process in Somaliland was 
minimal due to the Somali society being a patriarchal society in which internal 
conflict resolution mechanisms do not promote gender equality.  Only two 
women sit in the lower house of Parliament, from a total of 82. In the upper 
house or Guurti there is only one woman from 82 members.  Women are not 
seen as capable of exercising leadership either at village or national levels.  
However, they did play a role in Somaliland even though their role has not been 
acknowledged in the various narratives.  They capitalised on their capacity to 
embrace multiple relationships within the clans, either through birth, marriage or 
even friendships.  This enabled them to easily interact and share information 
that helped mobilise the various clans to participate in the peace rallies.   They 
were able to use their rich culture of poetry and speeches, song and dance to 
challenge clans and appeal to them to end violence and participate in the 
conflict resolution process. In Dini’s view, “such actions ultimately undermined 
                                            
108 Walls and Kibble (2001) however note that this arrangement is today increasingly under pressure, and 
calls up for a rethink on how these traditional institutions will interact with the norms of nation state 
democracy.  
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militia groups’ attack plans thus preventing further conflict. They were also able 
to deter revenge motivated violence through providing resources to conflict-
affected families and groups (Dini, 2010 online).  
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APPENDIX 3: IMSMA THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
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APPENDIX 4: SAMPLE OF RIMFIRE DATA 
COLLECTION TOOL 
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APPENDIX 5: A TIMELINE OF MINE/UXO 
RELATED EVENTS AND ISSUES IN SOMALILAND 
 
YEAR EVENT  
1977- 1978  War between the  Somali 
Democratic Republic and Ethiopia 
Mines heavily laid in the 
border regions of mainly 
the Northern Somalia 
(now Somaliland) 
1981 -1991 War between Somali National 
Movement (SNM) and Siyad 
Barre’s regime  
Mines heavily used by 
both parties 
1992/3 Physicians for Human Rights 
release a report 
Estimates 1,500-2,000 
landmine amputees in 
Somaliland 
1992 Handicap International (HI) moves 
from Hartisheikh refugee camp in 
Ethiopia  to Hargeisa, Somaliland 
A short-term, small 
scale, emergency 
program for the 
production of crutches 
begins 
1991-1993 US State Department and UN fund 
a commercial demining programme 
 
1994-1995 Militia opposed to the government 
of newly formed Somaliland 
(President Ibrahim Egal) and the 
loyalists forces fight mainly in 
Hargeisa 
Mines used widely 
especially in Hargeisa 
and areas east and 
south.  
1997 Somaliland government constitute 
the National Demining Agency 
(NDA) 
UNDP/Somalia Civil Protection 
Program (SCPP)  also constitute 
 UNDP starts compiling 
data for Level 1 survey.  
This is done by SMAC, 
the Somaliland War 
Veterans Association 
(SOYAAL) and the 
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the Somaliland Mine Action Centre 
 
Somali Relief and 
Rehabilitation 
Association (SORRA) 
1998 Somaliland Campaign Against 
Landmines  is established 
A coalition of 
organisations formed to 
work against the use of 
landmines.  Consists of 3 
local NGOs and 2 
International NGOs 
1998 Increased funding for clearance ; 
UNDP hires Mine Tech of 
Zimbabwe  ($202,0000 Spent on 
training and assessment by Mine 
Tech) 
Care International receives 
$343,817 from US department of 
State’s Bureau of Population, 
Refugees and Migration.  
Establishes CARE Somalia Mine 
Action Program (SOMAP) 
Commercial Demining 
starts for 3 months. 
Level  2 Survey and 
capacity  building to NDA 
and SMAC initiated 
1999 NDA starts attempts a systemised 
data collection on casualties 
Data on landmine 
casualties for the period 
of 1988-1999 by region 
and district is made 
available.  
1999 UNDP/SCPP  expands  the mine 
clearance program 
Another commercial 
demining contract is 
awarded to Greenfield 
Associates. 
1st of March 
1999  
House of Representatives pass a 
resolution in favour of total ban of 
landmines 
 
1999 Danish Foreign Ministry awards 4M The start of 
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Kroner (approximately $600,000) to 
the Danish Demining Group;  
Humanitarian Mine 
Action 
1999 Danish Demining Group starts 
based in Adadley 
Start of Level 1 & 2 
Survey and Clearance 
1999 Santa Barbara Foundation (SBF) 
Germany starts  
Mine clearance and Mine 
Risk Education in the 
region of Gabiley (in the 
East) especially the 
minefields around the 
military bases.  Later 
move to Burao 
1999 HALO Trust Starts in September HALO Starts Level 1 
Survey of Awdal region.  
Starts deminer training 
1999 SMAC negotiates for funding for 
comprehensive Level 1 & 2 for 
Togdheer and Awadal regions 
 
1999 UN Secretary General’s October 
report calls for Improved 
coordination and support; including 
the implementation of a  centralised 
control over data collection and 
management 
 
Care International 
complete  Level 1 & 2 
surveys in Awadal and 
Galbeed regions; 
Care International trains 
medical personnel and 
starts a mine awareness 
program 
1999-2000 Donors increase funding to $6.65M Clearance starts in 
Burao allowing 70,000 
residents to return. 
 UNDP/SCPP and SMAC  train 35 
civilian trainers as educators in 
Burao 
 
2000 HALO Trust finishes  the Level 1  
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survey  
HALO Trust receives $1.3M funding 
by the US State Department 
 27 -28 Oct 
2000 
16-18 Nov 
2000 
UNDP/SCCP Mine ban advocacy 
workshop 
Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden States  
conference 
 
Advocacy  conferences 
2001 Survey Action Centre arrives for an 
Advance Survey Mission 
Plans for a Landmine 
Impact Survey  
2001 UNDP Rule of Law (RoLs), formally 
UNDP/SCCP establishes Police 
EOD  
Initially started with 2 
teams, and later 
increased to 5 teams 
2002 Handicap International and 
UNICEF undertake a Knowledge-
Attitudes-Practice (KAP) survey 
Somaliland 
KAP Survey covers 634 
households 29% of 
population surveyed is 
unable to identify 
potential risk. 
March 2002 DDG is contracted by the Survey 
Action Centre to carry out a 
comprehensive Landmine Impact 
Survey 
357 Impact surveys are 
conducted in Awdal 
Galbeed, Todgheer, 
Sahil and parts of 
Sanaag.  Eastern Sanag 
and Sool not surveyed 
for secrutiy reasons. 
  
14th 
November 
2002 
Ministry of defence hands over 
2,382 APL mines and  16 AVMs to 
DDG for destruction 
In  compliance to the 
obligations of the treaty 
on stockpile destruction 
2002 Ministry of RR&R and UNDP 
disagree on the coordination of 
SMAC’s contract not 
renewed by UNDP 
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Mine Action resulting in it becoming a 
unit within the ministry.  
NDA reforms as a mine 
clearance unit; regional 
officers lose contracts 
March 2004 Handicap International undertake  
MRE programs based on the 2002 
KAP Survey and the Landmine 
Impact Survey  
Coordination and training 
on Mine Risk Education 
for other Mine Action 
organisations start. 
August 2004 Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
provides  an introductory MRE 
course in Hargeisa at the request of 
UNICEF 
 
January 2005 Handicap International starts a 
Mine Risk Education program 
Program targets children 
and adult herders (aged 
5 to 29 years in Awdal, 
Togdheer, Saaxil and 
Galbeed regions. 
2008 Three Swiss EOD experts  provide 
operational guidance to the 5 Police 
EOD  
Reinforcement of the  
implementation of IMAS 
   
September 
2008 
HALO Trust starts a Baseline 
Survey 
Designed to re-assess 
the SHAs identified by 
the Landmine Impact 
Survey (LIS) of 2003 and 
2007 conducted within 
Somaliland’s six regions. 
The BLS is largely a 
reassessment of the LIS, 
rather than a village-by-
village survey 
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October 2009 HALO Trust’s Baseline Survey 
(BLS) is completed. 
Identifies 346 SHAs, of 
which 329 were mined 
areas and 17 were battle 
area clearance (BAC) 
tasks. The total 
estimated contaminated 
area was 18.9km2 
November 
2009  
HALO Trust re-trains 22 deminers 
from the NDA.  
 
2010 2 NDA demining teams were 
deployed alongside HALO 
demining teams under HALO 
supervision 
 
2010 HALO Trust begins the 
implementation of its road resurvey 
project. 
The project involves 
resurveying each of the 
222 mined roads that 
HALO had previously 
surveyed. 
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APPENDIX 6: NUMBER OF MINE/UXO CASUALTIES PER YEAR (2000-2011) 
 
Figure 12: Total number of Mine/UXO Casualties per year (2000-2011)  
 
Source: Own compilation from data take from Landmine Monitor 2000-
2011 
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APPENDIX 7: AN EXCERPT FROM A DONOR REPORT 
 
